JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge This Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the appellants/plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 31.3.2001 passed by learned District Judge, Kinnaur Civil Division at Rampur Bushahr, in Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1999 whereby he affirmed the judgment and decree dated 20.9.1999 passed by learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla in Case No. 25-1 of 99/87. For convenience, the parties are referred to as plaintiff and defendants. 2. The facts as are necessary for determination of this appeal are that the plaintiff filed a suit for decree of declaration, permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction on the allegations that his great grand father Meeri Mal had migrated from Raipur Rani, District Ambala to the then princely State of Rampur Bushahr in 1936. Meeri Mal had started business at Rampur Bushahr under the name and style of M/s Meeri Mal Lachhman Dass. Lachhman Dass was son of Meeri Mal. After the death of Meeri Mal, Lachhman Dass had carried on the family business. Out of the income of the business, Marri Mal had acquired moveable and immoveable property in the township of Rampur Bushahr. Lachhman Dass had inherited the moveable and immoveable property of his father Meeri Mal. Lachhman Dass had died sometimes in 1950 leaving behind three sons namely Krishan Chand, Keshav Ram and Sadhu Ram. After the death of Lachhman Dass, his three sons had carried on with the family business. The joint Hindu family comprised three sons of Lachhman Dass. Marri Mal had purchased a vacant piece of land described in Khata Khatauni No. 52/162 Khasra No. 240, measuring 64 square yards, (hereinafter referred to as the suit land), in Kasba Bazar within the limits of the township of Rampur Bushahr. There had been partition between three sons of Lachhman Dass on 19.9.1960. As per partition, the suit land had fallen to the share of Sadhu Ram, who was the father of the plaintiff. As per partition, Sadhu Ram had acquired ownership and possession of the suit land. Sadhu Ram was stated to have disappeared sometimes in 1979 and was presumed to be dead under the Presumptive Evidence Law. After the death of Sadhu Ram, the plaintiff had become owner in possession of the suit land. The plaintiff and his father had stacked stones in the suit land. Sadhu Ram was stated to have disappeared sometimes in 1979 and was presumed to be dead under the Presumptive Evidence Law. After the death of Sadhu Ram, the plaintiff had become owner in possession of the suit land. The plaintiff and his father had stacked stones in the suit land. The suit land was ancestral property in the hands of Sadhu Ram, as such, Sadhu Ram could not have alienated the suit land except for legal necessity. The plaintiff had acquired ½ share in the suit land by birth. The plaintiff and Sadhu Ram constituted a joint Hindu family and were governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. After the presumptive death of Sadhu Ram, the proforma defendant No.8 Jai Bhagwan (brother of the plaintiff) and the plaintiff had been joint owners in possession in equal share of the suit land. The proforma defendant No.8 Jai Bhagwan and his father had been putting up at Kalka. Sadhu Ram was literate businessman and had been aware of implications of giving Special Power of Attorney. It had been alleged that sometimes in 1987, Brij Bhushan (father of defendants No.1 and 2) had started interfering with the ownership and possession of the plaintiff and proforma defendant No.8 of the suit land. At such time, the plaintiff had looked into the books of the Collector. It was found that Sadhu Ram through his special power of attorney Keshav Ram (father of Brij Bhushan had alienated the suit land in favour of Brij Bhushan through registered sale deed No. 10/62 of 20.6.1962 for alleged sale consideration of Rs.500/-. On the basis of the sale deed No.10/62 dated 20.6.1962, registered on 22.6.1962, mutation of the suit land had been initially entered in favour of Brij Bhushan but had been rejected. Afterwards, Brij Bhushan and defendants No.1 to 3 had manipulated the attestation of mutation No.1349 of the suit land in favour of Brij Bhushan on 6.6.1970. The defendants No.2 and 3 had been members of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service and had been exercising undue influence over local revenue officials. The defendants No. 1 to 3 had also manipulated attestation of mutation No. 1758 on 20.2.1987 of the suit land in favour of Brij Bhushan. The plaintiff was not bound by false and fictitious sale deed No. 10/62, dated 20.6.1962, purported to have been executed by his father Sadhu Ram in favour of Brij Bhushan. The defendants No. 1 to 3 had also manipulated attestation of mutation No. 1758 on 20.2.1987 of the suit land in favour of Brij Bhushan. The plaintiff was not bound by false and fictitious sale deed No. 10/62, dated 20.6.1962, purported to have been executed by his father Sadhu Ram in favour of Brij Bhushan. The sale deed No.10/62, dated 20.6.1962 of the suit land was stated to be the result of fraud and misrepresentation and was liable to be set-aside. The plaintiff was also not bound by wrong and illegal entries of the books of the Collector and various mutations manipulated by defendants No. 1 to 4. Brij Bhushan and defendants No. 1 to 4 had started raising construction in the suit land in February, 1987. The defendants No. 1 to 4 were sought to be restrained from interfering with the ownership and possession of the plaintiff of the suit land by issuance of a decree of perpetual injunction against them. The construction done by defendants No. 1 to 4 in the suit land was sought to be pulled down by issuance of a decree of mandatory injunction. The defendants No. 1 to 4 were also sought to be restrained from using the sale deed No. 10/62 by issuance of a decree of perpetual injunction against them. With these allegations the suit had been instituted in the trial court on 17.3.1987. 3. The defendants No. 1 to 4 and their predecessors-in-interest Brij Bhushan and Keshav Ram had resisted the suit by raising preliminary objections of limitation, non-joinder and maintainability of the suit. The defendants No.1 to 4 had admitted their relationship with Meeri Mal and Lachhman Dass. Meeri Mal had migrated from Raipur Rani Ambala to the then princely State of Rampur Bushahr in 1936. Meeri Mal and his son Lachhman Dass had started business under the name and style of M/s Meeri Mal Lachhman Dass at Rampur Bushahr. The joint Hindu Family had acquired moveable and immoveable property at Rampur Bushahr. The suit land after the death of Lachhman Dass had been owned and possessed by Krishan Chand, Keshav Ram and Sadhu Ram. The defendants No. 1 to 4 had admitted private partition of the suit land on 19.9.1960. In such private partition, the suit land had fallen to the share of Sadhu Ram. The suit land after the death of Lachhman Dass had been owned and possessed by Krishan Chand, Keshav Ram and Sadhu Ram. The defendants No. 1 to 4 had admitted private partition of the suit land on 19.9.1960. In such private partition, the suit land had fallen to the share of Sadhu Ram. The defendants No. 1 to 4 had stated that Sadhu Ram through his special power of attorney Keshav Ram, had sold the suit land in favour of Brij Bhushan on 20.6.1962 through registered sale deed No. 10/62. The sale deed No. 10/62 had been duly registered by the Sub Registrar on 22.6.1962. After 20.6.1962 Brij Bhushan had been owner in possession of the suit land and had been rightly entered so vide mutation no. 1349 dated 6.6.1970. The plaintiff in collusion with defendants No.5 and 6, had manipulated attestation of mutation No.1730 on 15.7.1986. As such, mutation No. 1758 of the suit land had been rightly sanctioned in favour of Brij Bhushan on 20.2.1987. The defendants No. 2 and 3 were members of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service/Higher Judicial Service, but had not exercised any influence much less undue influence over the local revenue officials of Rampur Bushahr for attestation of mutation of the suit land in favour of Brij Bhushan. It had also been pleaded that in case Brij Bhushan, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No. 1 to 4 was not treated owner of the suit land on the strength of sale deed No. 10/62, dated 20.6.1962, he had acquired right of ownership of the suit land by adverse possession. Brij Bhushan had been in continuous, open, uninterrupted and hostile possession of the suit land w.e.f. 20.6.1962. The possession of Brij Bhushan had ripened into ownership. The plaintiff had not properly valued the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. The plaintiff could not be treated either owner or in possession of the suit land. The plaintiff was bound by the registered sale deed No. 10/62, dated 20.6.1962 and the same deed could not be treated wrong, illegal and void on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation. The plaintiff was also bound by mutation No. 1349 dated 6.6.1970 and mutation No. 1758 dated 20.2.1987. The defendants No. 1 to 4 and their predecessors-in-interest had constructed three storeyed RCC building in the suit land after their building plans stood approved by the local body. The plaintiff was also bound by mutation No. 1349 dated 6.6.1970 and mutation No. 1758 dated 20.2.1987. The defendants No. 1 to 4 and their predecessors-in-interest had constructed three storeyed RCC building in the suit land after their building plans stood approved by the local body. The plaintiff was not entitled to any relief much less to the discretionary relief of permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The proforma defendant No.8 Jai Bhagwan had filed written statement supporting the defence of defendants No. 1 to 4 and their predecessors-in-interest. Defendants No. 5 and 6 had admitted the suit of the plaintiff. Defendant No.7 despite notice, did not contest the suit. 4. On 29.7.1995, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the suit land was coparcenary property, if so, its effect? OPP 2. Whether plaintiff is entitled for the declaratory decree to the effect that vide family arrangement/partition dated 19.9.1960, plaintiff and defendant No.8 are absolutely owner in possession of the land comprised in Khata/Khatauni No. 52/162, Khasra No. 240 to the extent of half share each after their father, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the sale deed dated 20.6.1962 No.10/62 registered on 22.6.1962 in respect of the land comprised in Khasra No. 240 to the extent of 1/3rd share in favour of defendant No.1 (since deceased) is illegal one and in-operative and the result of fraud and misrepresentation and liable to be cancelled alongwith mutation No.1349, dated 6.6.1970 and mutation No. 1758 attested on 20.2.1987 are also liable to be cancelled? OPP 4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the consequential relief of permanent injunction against defendants No.1 to 4 from using the said alleged sale deed No.10/62, as alleged? OPP 5. Whether plaintiff and proforma defendant No.8 are entitled for decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against defendants No.1 to 4 as alleged? OPP 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of mandatory injunction directing defendants No. 1 to 4 to pull down the entire RCC structure over land comprised in Khasra No. 240 to the extent of 64 square yards, as alleged? OPP 7. Whether the suit is within time? OPP 8. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 9. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not valued properly for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD 10. OPP 7. Whether the suit is within time? OPP 8. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 9. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not valued properly for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD 10. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 11. Whether the suit land was in exclusive possession of defendant No.1 Brij Bhushan (since deceased), if so, its effect? OPD 12. Whether defendant No.1, Brij Bhushan (since deceased) was in lawful possession of the suit land by virtue of registered sale deed No.10/62, dated 22.6.1962? OPD 13. Whether the defendant No.1, Brij Bhushan (since deceased) in the alternative had acquired title to the suit land by way of adverse possession? OPD 14. Relief. 5. After recording the evidence led by the parties and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on 20.9.1999, constraining him to file the appeal before the learned lower Appellate Court, who vide judgment and decree dated 31.3.2001 dismissed the same. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by both the learned Courts below, appellants/plaintiffs have filed this Regular Second Appeal, which was admitted by this Court vide order dated 06.10.2003 on the following substantial questions of law No.1, 2, 4 and 5: 1. When the plaintiff-appellant assailed the deed of sale Ext. PG, to be illegal, null and void, on account of having been procured by exercise of fraud and misrepresentation by the alleged attorney executed by late Sh. Sadhu Ram, in favour of Shri Keshav Ram, was not the defendant-respondents obliged to produce and prove on record such documents? Have not both the Courts below acted in excess of their jurisdiction in not drawing adverse inference on account of withholding the original documents despite issuance of notice under Order 12 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the plaintiff-appellant? 2. Whether both the Courts below have put under reliance on inadmissible evidence particularly Exhibit PG which was a certified copy without seeking permission to lead secondary evidence? 3. Whether both the Courts below have failed to consider the true import of the provisions of Section 107 and 108 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the civil presumptive death of late Shri Sadhu Ram? What was the date when such factum was to be presumed? 3. Whether both the Courts below have failed to consider the true import of the provisions of Section 107 and 108 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the civil presumptive death of late Shri Sadhu Ram? What was the date when such factum was to be presumed? Whether both the Courts below have gravely erred in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant being barred by limitation? Are not such findings absolutely wrong and illegal and perverse when the suit from the date of knowledge of the fraud played was within the period of limitation, seeking declaration for setting aside the same? 4. Whether both the Courts below have exceeded their jurisdiction in denying the relief of mandatory injunction to the plaintiff-appellant particularly when it was established that the offending structure was constructed by the defendant-respondents during the pendency of the litigation despite the order of injunction operative against them. 5. Whether vendor Sh. Sadhu Ram through special attorney had executed the sale deed on dated 20.6.1962 registered on dated 22.6.1962 in the office of Sub Registrar, Rampur District Shimla, H.P. in favour of vendee namely Sh. Brij Bhushan in the capacity of exclusive owner of Khasra No. 240 on the basis of family partition or in the capacity of cosharer? I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case carefully and meticulously. Substantial Question of Law No.1. 7. The answer to this question lies in the fact as to whether there are sufficient pleadings so as to constitute fraud or misrepresentation as alleged by the appellants/plaintiffs. For deciding this question, one will have to fall back on the contents of the plaint wherein the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation have been set out more particularly para-9 thereof where the allegations have been pleaded in the following manner: “That the alleged sale deed alleged to have been executed by defendant No.2 in the capacity of his being Special Power of Attorney of late Sadhu Ram pertaining to Khasra No. 240 measuring 64 sqr. Yards in Kasba Bazar Rampur, is altogether void, illegal, inoperative and same deserves to be set-aside and cancelled, as Sadhu Ram never gave any Special Power of Attorney to execute the same in favour of defendant No.2. Yards in Kasba Bazar Rampur, is altogether void, illegal, inoperative and same deserves to be set-aside and cancelled, as Sadhu Ram never gave any Special Power of Attorney to execute the same in favour of defendant No.2. The alleged sale deed which is alleged to have been executed on 20.6.1962 and registered on 22.6.1962 with Sub Registrar, Rampur under registration No. 10/62 by defendant No.2. Late Sadhu Ram never appeared either before Sub Registrar nor before Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Rampur. The alleged sale deed is the result of fraud and mis-representation and the same is forged one. The Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Rampur in mutation No. 1223 dated 30.3.1963 rejected the alleged sale deed and the mutation entered on the basis of this alleged sale deed of No. 10/62 was rejected by him.” 8. Evidently, the aforesaid allegations do not meet and fall short of the requirement of Rule 4 of Order 6, which reads thus: “4. Particulars to be given where necessary.- In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.” 9. It is clearly evident from the aforesaid provision that as per Rule 4 particulars with dates and items are clearly required to be stated in the pleading inter alia in cases of misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence. The object of insisting on these particulars is two fold: (i) It enables the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with; and (ii) It prevents the issue being enlarged and enables the court to determine the controversy at the earliest. ‘Fraud’ is obtaining of an advantage by unfair or wrongful means. 10. Under this rule, where fraud is alleged, necessary particulars have to be set out and stated in the pleadings which must be clear, definite, express and specific. It is not enough to allege fraud without stating particulars with dates and items as to such fraud. General allegations, however strong, if unaccompanied by sufficient particulars, are not enough and the Court will not take notice. 11. It is not enough to allege fraud without stating particulars with dates and items as to such fraud. General allegations, however strong, if unaccompanied by sufficient particulars, are not enough and the Court will not take notice. 11. In Sukhdei (Smt.) (dead) by LRs vs. Bairo (dead) and others (1999) 4 SCC 262 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while pleading fraud, particulars necessary for establishing the same should be specifically stated in the plaint and it was further held that findings on a question of fraud concurrently arrived at by the Courts below should not be interfered with by the High Court while exercising power under Section 100 of CPC. The aforesaid Rule is mandatory and no departure from the Rule is permissible while leading evidence. As regards the plea of misrepresentation, the same means wrong, false or misleading representation. 12. Here again, when misrepresentation is alleged, the party alleging it must state necessary facts of such misrepresentation. Though, it is often observed that fraud and misrepresentation may overlap sometimes, however, particulars of each must be given. It must also be stated whether such representation was verbal or written. When it was alleged that diverse persons were induced by the defendant, names and necessary particulars also should be mentioned in the plaint by the plaintiff. Obviously, the onus is on the party setting up a plea of misrepresentation to prove it. 13. Adverting to the plea as extracted above, it may be noted that the pleadings of the plaintiff are wholly deficient and barring use of the word fraud or misrepresentation, nothing is stated which may even remotely establish the facts which constitute fraud or misrepresentation. 14. As regards, the drawing of adverse possession because of non-production of the document inspite of notice under Order 12 Rule 8 CPC, suffice it to say that before such presumption can be drawn against a party called upon to produce a document, it has to be proved that the document is in fact in the possession and custody of the party concerned. That apart, even otherwise such inference is no more than presumptive evidence which by its very nature is weak evidence and would at best entitle the party issuing the notice to lead secondary evidence of document under the Evidence Act. Substantial question of law No.2: 15. It is not in dispute that Ext. That apart, even otherwise such inference is no more than presumptive evidence which by its very nature is weak evidence and would at best entitle the party issuing the notice to lead secondary evidence of document under the Evidence Act. Substantial question of law No.2: 15. It is not in dispute that Ext. PG was not only produced by the plaintiff but relied upon by the plaintiff in his examination-in-chief while appearing as PW-1. Having produced the document, the plaintiff is estopped from assailing either its mode and manner of production or even the contents thereof. Substantial question of law No.3: 16. It is not in dispute that as per the allegations of the plaintiff, the partition amongst the party took place in 1960 and the sale deed in question was executed and registered in the year 1962, whereas the suit came to be filed only on 17.3.1987 i.e. after 25 years of the registration of the sale deed. Though, the learned counsel for the appellants would harp upon on the various mutations attested from time to time, but these mutations are hardly of any value as it is the sale deed which is the document of title that was required to be assailed and the mutations attested either ways could not furnish a cause of action. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sankalchan Jaychandbhai Patel and others vs. Vithal Bhai Jaychandbhai Patel (1996) 6 SCC 433 has held that the mutation entries are only to enable the State to collect revenues from the persons in possession and enjoyment of the property and the right, title and interest as to the property should be established dehors the entries. Entries are only one of the modes of proof of the enjoyment of the property. However, mutation entries in themselves do not create any title or interest therein. 18. Similar reiteration of law can be found in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sawarni (Smt.) vs. Inder Kaur (Smt.) and others, (1996) 6 SCC 223 , wherein in paragraph -7 it was observed as under: “7. ……..Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question……” 19. ……..Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question……” 19. Furthermore, it is not always safe to rely upon the revenue records in cases like the instant one where one of the parties is possessed of a registered document of title. Entries in revenue records have often been held to be paradise of the Patwari and here it shall be apt to refer to the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baleshwar Tewari (dead) by LRs. and others vs. Sheo Jatan Tiwary and others (1997) 5 SCC 112 which read thus:- “16. Under these circumstances, even if any enquiry was conducted unless the appellant is given notice and an opportunity to adduce the evidence to establish his right in the enquiry made, the finding generally does not bind him. Entries in revenue records are the paradise of the patwari and the tiller of the soil is rarely concerned with the same. So long as his possession and enjoyment is not interdicted by due process and course of law, he is least concerned with entries. It is common knowledge in rural India that a raiyat always regards the lands he ploughs, as his dominion and generally obeys, with moral fiber the command of the intermediary so long as his possession is not disturbed. Therefore, creation of records is a camouflage to defeat just and legal right or claim and interest of the raiyat, the tiller of the soil on whom the Act confers title to the land he tills.” 20. Even otherwise, admittedly the respondents are in possession of a registered document of title which is correct and complete proof of ownership and revenue entries including mutation entries have nothing to do with the ownership and cannot be treated as evidence of ownership of the property. There is a presumption in regard to the correctness of registered document. 21. In Ningawwa vs. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar AIR 1968, SC 956, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima-facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. 21. In Ningawwa vs. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar AIR 1968, SC 956, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima-facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.” 22. In Prem Singh vs. Birbal (2006) 5 SCC 353 , it was held as under: “27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima-facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, respondent No.1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.” 23. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, the time spent in the mutation proceedings cannot be set off while computing the period of limitation. The suit filed by the plaintiff is clearly time barred and moreover the timing of the suit is such when the plaintiff knew fully well that most of the evidence with the passage of time may have got destroyed. 24. As already observed, there is no valid plea of fraud and misrepresentation and as regards, the knowledge thereof, it is too late in the day for the plaintiff to canvass that he only acquired knowledge in the year 1987 and filed the suit immediately. Rather it is established that the plaintiff had been contesting the mutation proceedings which in turn were admittedly based upon the sale deed in question, and still he would have this Court believe that he had no knowledge qua the sale deed. What then was the plaintiff really contesting is anybody’s guess? 25. Therefore, in absence of the case of the plaintiff falling within any of the exemptions as contemplated under Rule 6 of Order 7 of the case, no fault can be found with the concurrent findings rendered by the learned Courts below regarding the suit of the plaintiff being highly time barred. 26. 25. Therefore, in absence of the case of the plaintiff falling within any of the exemptions as contemplated under Rule 6 of Order 7 of the case, no fault can be found with the concurrent findings rendered by the learned Courts below regarding the suit of the plaintiff being highly time barred. 26. The appellants have failed to point out as to how both the Courts below exceeded the jurisdiction in deciding the relief of mandatory injunction particularly when the plaintiff has failed to establish the fact that offending structures were constructed by the defendants/respondents during the pendency of the litigation. This question is based on a pure findings of fact, and, therefore, is not open to challenge in these proceedings. That apart, in absence of proof of fraud or misrepresentation and more particularly when this question has not been agitated before the learned lower Appellate Court, the same is not open to challenge in this appeal. Substantial question of law No.5: 27. It is vehemently argued by the appellants that there is a recital in the sale deed that vendor by way of family partition became owner of Khasra No. 240 measuring 64 Sqr. Yards and there is also further a recital that the sale deed was executed by vendor in the capacity of co-sharer. It is further argued that Sadhu Ram could not have been exclusive owner and at the same time the co-sharer of the property and this casts a serious doubt on the deed itself. 28. I find this contention to be not only devoid of any merit but to say the least preposterous. It is pleaded case of the plaintiff that immoveable properties possessed by their ancestors were divided amongst S/Sh. Krishan Chand, Keshav Ram and Lala Sadhu Ram on 19.9.1960 and the suit land fell to the share of Sadhu Ram as is evident from para-5 of the plaint which reads thus: “5. That the aforesaid immoveable properties were divided amongst themselves by S/Sh. Krishan Chand, Keshav Ram and Lala Sadhu Ram on 19 Sept. 1960 by way of family arrangement and the following properties came in the share of each: Krishan Chand : (i) One residential house single storey first floor Is raised. (ii) One small shop in Main Bazar, Raipur Rani. Keshav Ram : (i) One two stories shop in Main Bazar, Raipur Rani. (ii) One Kholla (Khandar). 1960 by way of family arrangement and the following properties came in the share of each: Krishan Chand : (i) One residential house single storey first floor Is raised. (ii) One small shop in Main Bazar, Raipur Rani. Keshav Ram : (i) One two stories shop in Main Bazar, Raipur Rani. (ii) One Kholla (Khandar). Sadhu Ram : Total land situated in Khasra No.240 measuring 64 Sqr. Yards in Kasba Bazar Rampur. The aforesaid family arrangement by way of partition was fully being acted upon by all the three persons and the possession of the aforesaid properties so allotted to them in that family arrangement remained that of the person to whom it was allotted according to aforesaid arrangement. Since this family arrangement by way of partition was affected each one of allotted to them in that partition. In this way late Sh. Sadhu Ram the father of the plaintiff became the full and exclusive owner in possession of the land comprising in Khasra No. 240 measuring 64 sqr. Yards in Kasba Bazar Rampur by aforesaid partition. The said land on the spot was Khandar since the time of Great-Grand Father of the plaintiff.” 29. Notably, even the defendants/respondents have not denied these facts and, therefore, both the parties were alive to the factual situation that not only was there a partition inter se the co-owners but this property in fact fell to the share of Sadhu Ram in such partition. Thus, there was no question of Sadhu Ram being co-owner of the property in the year 1962 when partition had already been affected in 1960 and therefore, even if any such word is found to have been mentioned in any document, the same would only be superfluous and compulsory termed to be an accidental slip having virtually no bearing on the issue on hand. The appellants cannot convert a mountain out of a mole and thereby perpetuate the litigation which is already pending for the last more than thirty years. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. In view of aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed with costs throughout. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of.