JUDGMENT : Anuja Prabhudessai, J. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with consent of parties. 2. The Petitioners have filed the present writ petitions for quashing and setting aside the notices issued by the Respondent No.2 – Assistant Municipal Commissioner (Market) directing each of the Petitioners to pay the arrears of compensation charges and hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the respective shops within thirty days from the date of receipt of the notice. 3. Brief facts giving rise to these petitions are as under:- In the year 1998 the Municipal Corporation of Gr. Mumbai (for short Corporation), Respondent No. 3 herein, had called for tenders for allotment of shops situated inside the Subway at Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) Railway Station and Churchgate Railway Station, Mumbai. The Petitioners' were successful bidders and each one of them was allotted a shop upon execution of leave and license agreement. The tenure of the said agreement for the first block period was 10 years and each subsequent block period was of 5 years. 4. The petitioners were put in possession of the respective shops within CST and Churchgate subway and they have been conducting their business in the said shops. The Corporation had extended the initial period of licence till the year 2011. Though there was no renewal of the agreement for the subsequent period, the Petitioners continued to be in possession of the subject shops on payment of compensation from time to time . 5. By the impugned notices, the Petitioners have been intimated that the respondent no.3 Corporation proposes to use the space abutting the highway for putting information kiosk, video walls for dissemination of information of civic related issues and for other civic amenities for the benefit of general public/pedestrians. The Petitioners were therefore called upon to pay the arrears of compensation charges and to vacate and hand over possession of the said shops. 6. Mr. Anturkar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners submitted that MCGM has no powers to evict the petitioners from the subject shops without resorting to the procedure envisaged under section 105B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 [for short "the MMC Act"]. Shri Anturkar, the learned Sr. Counsel contends that the notice of eviction is arbitrary, in violation of principles of natural justice and without authority of law. 7. Mr. Shri Anturkar, the learned Sr. Counsel contends that the notice of eviction is arbitrary, in violation of principles of natural justice and without authority of law. 7. Mr. Sakhare, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Corporation has submitted that the subject shops are in a subway, which is a public street within the meaning of Section 3(x) of the MMC Act. He therefore contends that the said shops are not covered under the definition of 'Corporation Premises' within the meaning of Section 105A (b) of MMC Act and hence the provisions under Section 105B are not applicable. He has relied upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in BPCL v. MCGM [1984 Mh.L.J. 865], wherein it was held that underground petrol tank is not a building within the meaning of Section 3(a) of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The learned Sr. Counsel Shri Sakhare has relied upon the decision in Steelmax v. MCGM [1990 (2) Bom C.R. 151] wherein the single judge of this court has held that pole-ads are not premises and that upon termination of the agreement, the Commissioner has power to remove such pole-ads and clear the obstruction on public streets. 8. Mr. Sakhare, the learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the agreements and submitted that the leave and licence agreement expired in the year 2011 and the said agreements have not been renewed and therefore the Petitioners have no legal right to continue their possession in the subject shops. He has further submitted that the rights of the petitioners are contractual rights governed by the terms and conditions of the agreements. He has brought to our notice clause 33 of the agreements and submitted that the licence period having come to end, the petitioners are liable to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the respective shops. 9. Mr. Sakhare has submitted that the subject shops vest in the Corporation and the same are required to be removed/demolished for the purpose of widening the subway. He has submitted that the Commissioner is authorised to widen the said subway/public street under the powers conferred under Section 289(2) of MMC Act. He has submitted that the court should not invoke its writ jurisdiction since the petitioners have no legal right to continue to be in possession of the said shops, and particularly when the action of the Corporation is in public interest. He has submitted that the court should not invoke its writ jurisdiction since the petitioners have no legal right to continue to be in possession of the said shops, and particularly when the action of the Corporation is in public interest. In support of his submissions, Mr. Sakhare relied upon the decision in Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Hariyana [ (1971) 1 SCC 486 ] and State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmikutty [ (1986) 4 SCC 632 ]. In both these decisions wherein the issue was regarding appointment of Addl. District/District Judges, the Apex Court has held that a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally protected right is the foundation of jurisdiction of a court to issue a writ of mandamus. 10. We have perused the documents placed before us and considered submissions advanced by the learned Senior Counsels appearing for the respective parties. The first and foremost question is whether the said shops form part of the 'Public Street' as defined under Section 3(x) of MMC Act or whether these shops are 'Corporation Premises' within the meaning of section 105A(b) of MMC Act. 11. It is to be noted that under Section 3(x) of MMC Act 'Public Street' means any street heretofore levelled, paved metalled, channeled, sewered or repaired by the Corporation and any street which becomes a public street under any of the provisions of this Act [or which vests, in the corporation as a public street. Whereas Section 105A (b) defines "Corporation premises" as any premises belonging to, or vesting in, or taken on lease by, the corporation. The term premises as defined in Section 3(g) includes buildings and the term "Building" as defined in Section 3(s) includes a house, outhouse, table, shed, hut, tank (except tank for storage of drinking water in a building or part of a building) and every other such structure whether of masonary, bricks, wood, mud, metal or any other material whatsoever. 12. In the instant case, the dispute is in respect of the shops which are covered by the definition of 'building'. Hence the said decision in BPCL (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case. The said shops are situated inside the subway at CST and Churchgate Railway Station, belong to and vest in the Respondent Corporation. 12. In the instant case, the dispute is in respect of the shops which are covered by the definition of 'building'. Hence the said decision in BPCL (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case. The said shops are situated inside the subway at CST and Churchgate Railway Station, belong to and vest in the Respondent Corporation. The petitioners have placed on record the layout plan, a perusal of which reveals that the said shops were constructed at the time of construction of the subway. The said shops were not constructed on the land, which forms part of the subway over which the public had right of way but the same are abutting the subway. In the light of above, these shops cannot be considered as part of the subway or the public street but are "Corporation premises" within the meaning of Section 105A(b) of the MMC Act. Consequently, the decisions in v. (supra) are not applicable to the facts of the case. 13. It is not in dispute that the Corporation had invited tenders for allotment of these shops. The petitioners being the highest bidders were put in possession of the said shops by the Competent Authority of the Respondent Corporation by virtue of leave and license agreements. Clause 33 of the licence agreement provides that whenever licence is revoked, withdrawn or terminated by the licenser, the licence shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the said shops and in default the licensor or the competent municipal officer shall be entitled to enter the said shops and occupy the same. In the instant case, the licence was valid till the year 2011. The corporation had not withdrawn or revoked or terminated the licence but even after the expiry of initial authorization, the Respondent corporation allowed the Petitioners to continue to occupy and conduct business in the premises on accepting additional 50% compensation charges. 14. The term 'unauthorized occupation' within the meaning of section 105A(d) of MMC Act, not only covers persons in occupation of corporation property without authority but also includes persons who continue to occupy the premises after the authority under which he occupied the premises has expired or has been determined. In the instant case, the Corporation had inducted the petitioners in the said shops with due process of law. In the instant case, the Corporation had inducted the petitioners in the said shops with due process of law. Thus the occupation of the premises at its very commencement was under authority, but such authority has since expired and the petitioners continued to be in possession of the Corporation premises even after the expiry of the authority. The petitioners are therefore in unauthorized occupation of the Corporation premises, which are abutting the subway/public street. 15. By the impugned notice the Corporation has sought to recover possession of the said Corporation premises which are in unauthorized occupation of the petitioners. By these notices the Corporation had informed the petitioners that the subway was getting over crowded and congested due to continuous and unending flow of pedestrians. The petitioners were further informed that the shops were causing nuisance to the pedestrians and that it proposes to use the space occupied by the shops for providing civic amenities to the pedestrians. The Corporation had therefore called upon the petitioners to hand over vacant possession of the shops within 30 days from the receipt of the notice. 16. It is to be noted that Chapter 11 of MMC Act contains special provisions relating to public street. An analysis of the provisions under this chapter makes it clear that all the public streets within Brihan Mumbai vests in Corporation and are under the control of the Commissioner. The provisions under the MMC Act makes it clear that it is the primary duty of the Corporation to maintain and widen the public streets. In the instant case the shops allotted to the petitioners are abutting the subway over which the pedestrians have right of passage. It cannot be ignored that over the last decade the volume of pedestrians has grown manifold resulting in congestion of the subway and hardship and inconvenience to the pedestrians. There is also no controversy over the fact that it is the statutory obligation of the Corporation to safeguard the rights of the pedestrians for free and unhindered passage with reasonable measure of safety and security. Nevertheless, such statutory obligation has to be discharged in accordance with statutory provisions. 17. In this regard it is pertinent to note that Chapter 5-A of; the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act confers powers on the Municipal Commissioner to evict persons from the Corporation premises. Nevertheless, such statutory obligation has to be discharged in accordance with statutory provisions. 17. In this regard it is pertinent to note that Chapter 5-A of; the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act confers powers on the Municipal Commissioner to evict persons from the Corporation premises. Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 105B enables the Commissioner to evict a person in unauthorised possession of Corporation premises where as clause (c) enables the Commissioner to recover possession of the corporation premises if required by the corporation in the public interest. Sub-section (2) of 105B prescribes the procedure expected to be followed for exercising such power. 18. In the instant case the Corporation has sought to evict the petitioners, who are in possession of the premises for a period of over 10 years, without taking recourse to the remedy available under the statute and without following due process of law. The action of the Corporation, a statutory body, is not in consonance with the procedure prescribed by the statute. The action of the Corporation being arbitrary, in violation of principles of natural justice and contrary to the statutory provisions, the petitioners were justified in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this court. 19. Under the circumstances and in view of discussion supra the petitions are allowed. The impugned notices are quashed and set aside. We, however, make it clear that this order shall not preclude the Corporation from evicting the Petitioners from the subject premises by following due process of law. Petitions allowed.