JUDGMENT : V.L. Achliya, J. 1. Being aggrieved by the Judgment & Order dated 25.01.2002 passed in Sessions Case No. 67/1997 by 1st Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Jalna whereby the appellants were held guilty of offence punishable u/s 306 & 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the appellants have preferred this Appeal. 2. In brief, the facts leading to filing of the present Appeal are summarized as under: - On 22.05.1996, PW1 - Warshakit Sudamrao Salunke, the complainant visited the Ambad Police Station and lodged complaint to the effect that the marriage between appellant No. 1 and his daughter Rekhabai was solemnized on 15.03.1995. Initially for the period of six months, his daughter Rekhabai was treated properly by accused. Subsequently, the Appellant No. 2 - the father-in-law of his daughter sold the ornaments, which were given to her in her marriage, to meet the family requirements. At the time of selling those ornaments, the appellant No. 2 had promised her to purchase new ornaments for her. However, the appellant has not fulfilled his promise. When his daughter insisted to honour the promise and prepare new ornaments for her, the accused ill-treated her and told her that if she insists for ornaments then she should bring the same from her parents. At the time of Diwali festival, the deceased was brought to his house. At that time, the deceased disclosed the said facts to him and other family members. She further disclosed that, the accused told her that they could have got better girl than her, who could have brought Jeep in dowry. The complainant found her daughter to be frustrated. He, therefore, obtained loan of Rs. 5,000/- from brother of his wife and gave it to appellant No. 2 to prepare new ornaments for his daughter. However, the appellant No. 2 has not prepared new ornaments. At the time of Sankrant, when he went to fetch his daughter, he found her daughter nervous. When he made enquiry from her, she disclosed that accused have told her that if she insists for ornaments then she should not stay in their house and they would not allow her to be alive. Complainant alleged that his daughter committed suicide on account of continuous ill-treatment which she was facing from the accused. When he made enquiry from her, she disclosed that accused have told her that if she insists for ornaments then she should not stay in their house and they would not allow her to be alive. Complainant alleged that his daughter committed suicide on account of continuous ill-treatment which she was facing from the accused. On the basis of complaint dated 22.5.1996 lodged by father of the deceased, the offence u/s 498-A, 304B & 306 r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code came to be registered against the appellants No. 1 to 3 and co-accused Mandodari Rangnath Jadhav (Orig. Accused No. 3), who died during the pendency of trial. After registration of offence, the Investigating Officer visited the spot of incident and prepared spot panchanama Exh. 13, seized one can, burn pieces of clothes, burn hairs of deceased, burn stick, match box & necklace of black bids. He recorded the statements of Sulochanabai (PW2), the mother of the deceased, Sudamrao Deorao Salunke (PW3), the grand-father of the deceased and Padmanabh Sudamrao Salunke (PW4) the uncle of the deceased. On conclusion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was prepared and filed in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambad, Dist. Jalna. In due course, the case was committed to the Sessions Court at Jalna. 3. On 08.08.2001, the charge was framed against the accused. All of them have pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to prove guilt against the accused, the prosecution has examined five witnesses. The accused have not entered into defence. They have taken the defence of total denial and false implication at the instances of the complainant and his family. On conclusion of trial, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has held the appellants guilty for offence punishable u/s 306, 498-A r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. For committing offence u/s 306 of the IPC, appellants No. 1 and 2 were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. For committing offence u/s 498-A of the IPC, the appellants are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 1 year and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. Being aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal. 4. Mr. 500/- in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. For committing offence u/s 498-A of the IPC, the appellants are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 1 year and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. Being aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal. 4. Mr. Kale, learned counsel for the appellants, has strongly assailed the reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court with contention that, it is a case of gross improper appreciation of evidence. He has submitted that, even if case of the prosecution is accepted in its entirety, still no conviction can be awarded against accused for any of the offence for which they were tried before Sessions Court. He has pointed out that, the deceased was admitted in burn condition in Hospital at Jalna where her dying-declaration was recorded immediately after admission. Dying declaration recorded on 19/5/1996 is at Exh. 34, wherein she has even not slightly whispered about the ill-treatment she was facing at the hands of the appellants. On the contrary, She has categorically stated that, she was alone in the house when the incident was occurred & the accused had gone to attend marriage. She has categorically stated that, she poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire and at that time she could not understand as to what she was doing. She has specifically stated that, she was admitted in hospital by her husband and father-in-law. Learned counsel submitted that, learned Judge has totally ignored the dying-declaration at Exh. 34 which clearly exonerates the appellants from charge u/s 498-A as well as 306 of the IPC. He has further pointed out that, the prosecution has examined four witnesses who are the close relatives of the deceased. No independent witness has been examined by the prosecution. The complaint itself filed after four days of the incident. Prosecution has not explained the delay of four days in lodging the complaint. He has further pointed out that, if we go by the testimony of PW1 to PW4, it is nowhere the case of the prosecution that the deceased was subjected to ill-treatment and harassment to coerce her to meet any unlawful demand from her or her parents. Similarly, there is no evidence to infer that the accused has aided and abetted the commission of suicide by the deceased. Similarly, there is no evidence to infer that the accused has aided and abetted the commission of suicide by the deceased. The trivial dispute on account of ornaments given in the marriage were sold to meet the urgent requirement of the family cannot be treated as a cause sufficient to drive the deceased to commit suicide nor it can be inferred that by selling the ornaments the accused have instigated and abetted the commission of suicide by the deceased. In support of the submission advanced, the learned counsel has referred and relied upon the decisions in the cases of Ramaiah alias Rama v. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 2014 SC 3388 , Amalendu Palalias Jhantu v. State of W.B. reported in AIR 2010 SC 512 , Mangal Ram v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2014 SC 1782 , Assoo v. State of M.P. reported in 2012 Cri.L.J. 658 & the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ravindra Pyarelal Bidlan and others v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1993 Cri.L.J. 3019. 5. On the other hand, the learned APP has supported the judgment and order passed by the trial Court. He has submitted that the prosecution has duly proved that the deceased died an unnatural death within a period of seven years of her marriage. Prosecution witnesses PW1 to PW4 have deposed at length the type of ill-treatment and harassment the deceased was suffering at the hands of the accused. In this background, the learned APP submits that, it raises presumption u/s 113(A) of the Evidence Act that the suicide has been abetted by accused persons. So far as delay in lodging the complaint, the learned APP submitted that the prosecution has satisfactorily explained the delay. The complainant i.e. PW1 has categorically deposed that on 20.05.1996, the funeral was performed. Thereafter, wife of the complainant got ill. He therefore lodged complaint on 22.05.1996. He further submitted that, the reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court are fully in consonance with the evidence on record, there is absolutely no perversity in the reasons & findings recorded by trial Court. He further submitted that, the judgment and order passed by the trial Court calls for no interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 6. In order to appreciate the submissions advanced, I have carefully scrutinized the oral and documentary evidence on record. He further submitted that, the judgment and order passed by the trial Court calls for no interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 6. In order to appreciate the submissions advanced, I have carefully scrutinized the oral and documentary evidence on record. In my view, the reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court are totally perverse and not sustainable in law. There is no cogent, convincing and reliable evidence to sustain the conviction u/s 498-A and 306 of the IPC. 7. If we consider the case of the prosecution then prosecution has approached with a case that, marriage between the accused No. 1 and deceased was solemnized on 15.03.1995. She died due to burn injuries on 19.05.1996. Undisputedly, the deceased died within a period of 14 months from her marriage. As per the case of the prosecution, there was no ill-treatment to the deceased for a period of six months after her marriage. No complaint was lodged against accused prior to 22.05.1996 about any ill-treatment and harassment meted out to the deceased. In sum and substance it is the case of prosecution that, in the marriage the deceased was given ornaments weighing 2 tolas i.e. approximately 20 gms. Those ornaments were sold by appellant No. 2 to meet urgent need of family. While selling those ornaments, the accused No. 2 had promised to deceased that he will purchase new ornaments for her. After lapse of considerable period, the accused No. 2 had not abided the words given to deceased to prepare new ornaments for her. When the deceased insisted accused No. 2 to prepare the ornaments, the accused alleged to have told her that if she continues to make such grievance then she should bring it from her father and warned not to make such repeated grievance. The evidence adduced by the prosecution further reveals that, the another grievance raised by the deceased was that she was forced to work in the field. For said reasons, the complainant and other witnesses have deposed that the deceased has committed suicide due to ill-treatment and harassment at the hands of the accused. In my view, if we take the allegations made against the accused in its entirety to be true and correct, still no offence u/s 498-A and 306 of the IPC is proved against the accused. In my view, if we take the allegations made against the accused in its entirety to be true and correct, still no offence u/s 498-A and 306 of the IPC is proved against the accused. While appreciating the evidence, the Court has to keep in mind the financial and social status of the accused and the deceased. All types of harassment not falls within the meaning of cruelty as explained in Section 498-A of the IPC. 8. In order to appreciate the submissions advanced, it is necessary to consider Section 498A of the IPC, which reads as under :- 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. - Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.-For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means - (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. In the case of Girdhar Shankar Tawade v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2002 SC 2078 , the Apex Court has considered the purport of Section 498-A and in para 3 observed as under: "The basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid 'cruelty' which stands defined by attributing a specific statutory meaning attached thereto as noticed herein before. Two specific instances have been taken note of in order to ascribe a meaning to the word 'cruelty' as is expressed by the legislatures : Whereas explanation (a) involves three specific situations viz., (i) to drive the woman to commit suicide or (ii) to cause grave injury or (iii) danger to life, limb or health, both mental and physical, and thus involving a physical torture or atrocity, in explanation (b) there is absence of physical injury but the legislature thought it fit to include only coercive harassment which obviously as the legislative intent expressed is equally heinous to match the physical injury : whereas one is patent, the other one is latent but equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute since the same would also embrance the attributes of 'cruelty' in terms of Section 498-A. " 9. Thus, if we consider the purport of Section 498-A, then it is not all type of ill-treatment and harassment to be treated as cruelty as referred in Section 498A of IPC. The term 'cruelty' has been explained as restricts to acts explained in clause (a) or (b) of Section 498A. If we consider the cruelty as defined in explanation (a) as well as explanation (b) of Section 498-A, then it is not that every cruelty is made punishable. In order to establish the offence u/s 498A, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the cruelty as explained either under clause (a) or clause (b) of Section 498-A of IPC. In the instant case, if we consider over all testimony of PW1 to PW4, the witnesses examined by the prosecution, then they have consistently deposed that the deceased was feeling aggrieved due to selling of her ornaments by accused No. 2 on the pretext to meet the family requirement and his failure to abide by the promise made to the deceased that he will prepare new ornaments for her. It is nowhere the case of the prosecution that at any point of time the deceased was subjected by accused to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. In absence of such allegations, the conviction u/s 498A of IPC is not sustainable. It is nowhere the case of the prosecution that at any point of time the deceased was subjected by accused to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. In absence of such allegations, the conviction u/s 498A of IPC is not sustainable. If we consider the cruelty as explained under clause (a) of Section 498-A, then it contemplates wilful conduct on the part of the accused of a nature likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health. No doubt, the deceased has committed suicide but mere act of commission of suicide by the deceased is not sufficient to bring home the charge u/s 498-A or 306 of the IPC. In order to attract offence u/s 498-A within the meaning of cruelty as explained in clause (a) of Section 498-A, there must be evidence of nature to infer that there was wilful conduct on the part of the accused to drive the deceased to commit suicide. It is an admitted fact that, at the time of incident, the deceased was alone at home & the accused were not present in the house. There is no evidence that immediately prior to the incident the accused committed any act which has prompted the deceased to commit the suicide. 10. If we consider the testimony of PW1-Warshakit/complainant and father of the deceased, then he has deposed that for initial period of six months there was no ill-treatment to the deceased. He has categorically deposed that accused No. 2 sold the ornaments of the deceased to meet the household expenses. The accused No. 2 told her that he will again prepare ornaments for her but he did not prepare the same and, therefore, the deceased was unhappy. There used to be a friction between deceased & accused on that count. Thus, the root cause of unhappiness of the deceased was the act of accused No. 2 to sell her ornaments and non-fullfillment of his promise made to deceased. The other witnesses examined by the prosecution such as Sulochana (PW2), Sudam (PW3) & Padmanabh (PW4), mother, uncle and grand-father of the deceased have deposed on same lines. Thus, the root cause of unhappiness of the deceased was the act of accused No. 2 to sell her ornaments and non-fullfillment of his promise made to deceased. The other witnesses examined by the prosecution such as Sulochana (PW2), Sudam (PW3) & Padmanabh (PW4), mother, uncle and grand-father of the deceased have deposed on same lines. Therefore, even if testimony of PW1 to PW4 is accepted in its entirety, still it makes out no case of wilful conduct on the part of the accused sufficient to drive a woman to commit suicide. Similarly, the acts of the accused cannot be termed as an act abetting the commission of suicide by the deceased. In this context, the ld. counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Assoo v. State of M.P. reported in 2012 CRI.L.J. 658, wherein the Apex Court has observed that every quarrel between a husband and wife which results in a suicide cannot be taken as an abetment by the husband and the standard of a reasonable and practical woman as compared to a headstrong and over sensitive one has to be applied. If the deceased has committed suicide for such a reason that the ornaments weighing two tolas which were given in her marriage were sold by her father-in-law to meet the family need and failed to abide by the promise to prepare new ornaments and for this reason the deceased was unhappy and committed suicide, then it can be inferred that deceased was over sensitive and impractical. For such impractical and oversensitive act, the accused cannot be held guilty of offence u/s 498-A as well as 306 of the IPC. 11. Similarly, the other allegation that deceased was unhappy for the reason that she was forced to work in the field cannot be the cause to commit suicide. It has come on record that the accused were not from well-to-do family. They were doing agricultural work. The accused and the deceased were residing in the village. It is quite natural that the woman from such family works in the agriculture field. The deceased was also not coming from well to do family. As per the fact deposed by PW1, the father of deceased borrowed Rs. 5,000/- as a loan from his brother-in-law and gave it to the accused to purchase ornaments. It is quite natural that the woman from such family works in the agriculture field. The deceased was also not coming from well to do family. As per the fact deposed by PW1, the father of deceased borrowed Rs. 5,000/- as a loan from his brother-in-law and gave it to the accused to purchase ornaments. The fact, that the father of the deceased was not having even Rs. 5,000/-, discloses the deceased was also not coming from very well to do family and it was not unusual on the part of the accused to ask her to work in the agricultural field. It has come on record that the deceased has studied upto 10th std. Due to her educational background, the deceased may be unhappy to work in the agriculture field. However, the act of accused to ask her to work in the agriculture field cannot be treated as an act amounting to cruelty as explained in Section 498A of the IPC. Similarly, such an act of the accused cannot be termed as an act of aiding or abetting the commission of suicide by the deceased. Asking the woman member in the family to work in the agriculture field is the normal act which takes place in the Indian society and particularly in the villages. If the woman, who is over sensitive and headstrong, take such acts otherwise and picks up quarrel with her husband and in-laws and commits suicide then such acts cannot be termed as wilful conduct on the part of the husband and her in-laws to drive a woman to commit suicide. It was never in contemplation of the legislature to punish the person for such acts of over sensitive, headstrong and impractical person committing suicide on account of matrimonial discord in the family. 12. The Apex Court in the case of Amalendu Palalias Jhantu v. State of W. B. reported in AIR 2010 SC 512 , has categorically observed that before holding accused guilty of offence u/s 306, the Court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative except to put an end to her life. Thus, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Thus, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without their being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. To attract offence u/s 306 of IPC, there must be positive act on the part of the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide. The person must have played an active role either to instigate or to facilitate the commission of suicide by the person committing suicide. In the instant case, there is no iota of evidence even to remotely connect the accused to infer that they committed such act with a view to abet the deceased to commit suicide. Neither any act of instigation nor any act of facilitation to commit suicide by the deceased can be inferred on the part of the accused in the light of the evidence on record. The allegations against the accused if taken to its face value, then at the most, it can be inferred that there was petty quarrel amongst the accused and the deceased on account of her ornaments sold by accused no. 2 and non-fulfilment of promise to prepare new ornaments. Asking the deceased by accused that if she continues to make grievance about the ornaments then she should bring it from her parents, also cannot be treated as an act amounting to instigation on the part of accused even to remotely suggest the deceased to commit suicide. In absence of any intentional act of abetting the deceased to commit suicide on the part of the accused, the conviction u/s 306 of the IPC is not sustainable in law. 13. On perusal of the reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court, it appears that the trial Court swayed away by the fact that the deceased has committed suicide within a period of 14 months from her marriage. The reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court on this count are not sustainable in law. It is quite settled position in law that to attract presumption u/s 113(A) of the Evidence Act, it is necessary that the prosecution must bring on record that there was a demand of dowry and harassment on account of such dowry. The reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court on this count are not sustainable in law. It is quite settled position in law that to attract presumption u/s 113(A) of the Evidence Act, it is necessary that the prosecution must bring on record that there was a demand of dowry and harassment on account of such dowry. As discussed, in the instant case, there is no iota of evidence that there was a demand of dowry or unlawful demand on the part of the accused to coerce the deceased or her parents to meet such demand. In absence of any evidence to attract the presumption u/s 113(A), there is no question of rebuttal of presumption on the part of the accused. As discussed, even accepting the case of the prosecution in its entirety, still no case is made out to sustain charge u/s 498-A as well as 306 of the IPC. In this context, the learned counsel for the appellants has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mangal Ram v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2014 SC 1782 wherein the Apex Court has held that, mere fact that wife died within few months after the marriage is not sufficient to raise the presumption u/s 113A of the Evidence Act. In para 26, the Apex Court has observed as under: 26. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage, the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband has subjected her to cruelty, the presumption as defined under Section 498-A IPC, may attract, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. The term "the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband" would indicate that the presumption is discretionary. The term "the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband" would indicate that the presumption is discretionary. So far as the present case is concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution has not succeeded in showing that there was a dowry demand, nor the reasoning adopted by the Courts below would be sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to fall under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. In this connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257 , wherein this Court has examined the scope of Section 113A of the Evidence Act and Sections 306, 107, 498-A etc. and held that, unlike Section 113B of the Evidence Act, a statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on the proof of circumstances enumerated in Section 113A of the Evidence Act. This Court held that, under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution has to first establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband has subject her to cruelty. Even though those facts are established, the Court is not bound to presume that suicide has been abetted by her husband. Section 113A, therefore, gives discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption having regard to all other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty, it can consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word 'cruelty' in Section 498-A IPC. 14. The decision in the case of Mangal Ram v. State of Haryana is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence to the effect that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the accused persons to meet to dowry demand. Petty quarrel on account of alleged selling of ornaments of the deceased by accused cannot be treated as an act of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC. In this view, the conviction of the appellant u/s 306 and 498-A of the IPC is not sustainable in law. 15. Petty quarrel on account of alleged selling of ornaments of the deceased by accused cannot be treated as an act of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC. In this view, the conviction of the appellant u/s 306 and 498-A of the IPC is not sustainable in law. 15. The reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court are not sustainable in law because there is no cogent, convincing and reliable evidence to sustain the charge u/s 498-A and 306 of the IPC. There is no dispute that the deceased has committed suicide and died on account of burn injuries. In the dying-declaration at Exh. 34/C, which was recorded immediately after admission of deceased in hospital, the deceased has not attributed a single act to accused to be held them responsible for committing suicide. In her statement, the deceased has not stated anything about the harassment and ill-treatment she was suffering from accused. Dying declaration was recorded immediately after the incident & appears to be untainted and truthful. The complaint in question was lodged by PW1 after four days of the incident. It has come on record that incident was occurred on 19.05.1996. Accused sent two persons to village of PW1 to inform the admission of the deceased in burn condition. On the day of the incident itself, the parents of the deceased were informed about the incident. They performed the funeral of the deceased on 20.05.1996. The complaint was lodged on 22.05.1996. Thus, there was delay of four days in lodging the complaint. The complainant (PW1) has deposed that, his wife was suffering from cold and cough and therefore he could not lodge the complaint immediately after the incident. The explanation as put forth as to delay in lodging the complaint appears to be wholly unsatisfactory. The wife was suffering from cold & cough cannot be accepted as reason to prevent the person to lodge complaint when such grave incident of commission of suicide by his daughter had taken place. It has been brought through the cross-examination of PW1 that, 30-40 relatives of PW-1 were present at the time of funeral which had taken place on 20.05.1996. It has been brought through the cross-examination of PW1 that, 30-40 relatives of PW-1 were present at the time of funeral which had taken place on 20.05.1996. If really there was an ill-treatment and harassment and the deceased has committed suicide on account of such grave ill-treatment and harassment, it was expected that any members from the family of PW1 which includes PW2 to PW4, should have lodged the complaint. PW2 is the wife of PW1. In the cross-examination, she has deposed that after funeral she went to her village Nagapur. She was unable to tell the ailment from which she was suffering. Thus, PW2 has contradicted the version of PW1 that the deceased was seriously suffering from ailment which prevented him to immediately lodge the complaint. Thus, the explanation put forth by the prosecution as to delay in lodging the complaint cannot be accepted as satisfactory explanation. In this view, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the complaint Exh. 36 was lodged after due deliberation by PW1 and other family members, cannot be ruled out. In this context, the ld. counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramaiah alias Rama v. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 2014 SC 3388 wherein the Apex Court while dealing with the case involving more or less facts held that the delay in lodging FIR must be treated as a conduct on the part of the of the complainant as unnatural and delay in lodging the FIR is fatal to the case of the prosecution. 16. Thus, considering the evidence in its totality, I have no hesitation to reach to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt to sustain the charge u/s 498A as well as Section and 306 of the IPC. The reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable both on facts and law. There is no evidence much less sufficient to convict the appellants u/s 498-A as well as 306 of the IPC. The reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court are based upon improper appreciation of the evidence and same are perverse and not sustainable in law. In the result, the accused are entitled to be acquitted. Hence, the following order. There is no evidence much less sufficient to convict the appellants u/s 498-A as well as 306 of the IPC. The reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court are based upon improper appreciation of the evidence and same are perverse and not sustainable in law. In the result, the accused are entitled to be acquitted. Hence, the following order. ORDER (I) Criminal Appeal No. 74 of 2002 is allowed and the impugned Judgment & Order dated 25.01.2002 passed in Sessions Case No. 67/1997 by Ist Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Jalna convicting the appellants for offence u/s 306 and 498-A r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, is set aside. (II) The appellants/accused are acquitted of offence u/s 306 & 498-A r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. (III) Fine, if paid, same shall be refunded to them. (IV) Their bail bonds stand discharged. Appeal allowed.