JUDGMENT V.K. Shukla, J. Raj Kamal Sonkar is before this Court assailing the validity of the order dated 7.4.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 59185 of 2008 (Raj Kamal Sonkar Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad through Registrar General) wherein learned Single Judge has proceeded to dismiss the writ petition in question. 2. Brief factual matrix of the case in hand is that petitioner appellant has been working as an employee of this Court since 19.11.1996 when he joined as Routine Grade Assistant and with the passage of time he has been promoted to the post of Lower Divisional Assistant in December 1999 and was placed on probation. Subsequent to the same, in the year 2005 his claim for confirmation has been considered but candidature of petitioner appellant was not found suitable and net effect of the same was that matter pertaining to petitioner appellant was deferred. Thereafter, once again in the said direction exercise was undertaken for confirmation in October 2007 by a committee constituted by the Registrar General of this Court and at the said point of time as the services of petitioner appellant was not found satisfactory, the matter relating to him was once again deferred. Petitioner appellant feeling aggrieved by the said action preferred representation before the Registrar General and Registrar General in his turn on 15.10.2008 rejected the representation by recording a categorical finding that overall conduct of the petitioner appellant is not satisfactory. The material that has been relied upon by him for forming the said opinion was the warning entry, that has been so issued to the petitioner appellant, on 19.7.2007 based on departmental enquiry. This much is also reflected that thereafter the decision that has been communicated to the petitioner appellant, same has been subject matter of challenge in Writ Petition No. 59185 of 2008. In the writ petition in question petitioner appellant apart from assailing the validity of the said order, has also proceeded to make a prayer that his services in question should be confirmed since December 2000 and he should be accorded promotion w.e.f. 31.8.2007, the date from which his juniors have been promoted, with all consequential benefits. 3. In the writ petition in question petitioner appellant apart from assailing the validity of the said order, has also proceeded to make a prayer that his services in question should be confirmed since December 2000 and he should be accorded promotion w.e.f. 31.8.2007, the date from which his juniors have been promoted, with all consequential benefits. 3. This much is also clearly reflected that during the pendency of the writ petition in question before this Court vide order dated 17.4.2009, the services of petitioner appellant has been confirmed on the post of Assistant Review Officer from the date of the order, subject to the decision of the instant writ petition. Petitioner appellant, thereafter, has been promoted as Review Officer vide order dated 31.5.2010 passed by the Registrar General. All these actions, so taken, during the pendency of the writ petition in question, were to abide by the decision to be taken in the writ petition. In the writ petition in question, counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and, thereafter, with the consent of the parties writ petition in question has been taken up and finally decided and the said decision as it is against the petitioner appellant, petitioner appellant is before this Court in this intra court appeal preferred under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules. 4. Sri Nirvikar Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner appellant, submitted before this Court that services of petitioner appellant are governed by the Allahabad High Court Officers & Staff (Condition of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "1976 Rules") and the outer limit is provided therein for probation and confirmation and once the outer limit has come to an end, then services of petitioner appellant has to be treated as automatically same stood confirmed and even otherwise in the facts of the case there was no adverse material based on the same on the strength of which services of petitioner appellant could have been treated as unsatisfactory and, accordingly, present special appeal deserves to be allowed by allowing the prayers, that have been so made. 5. 5. Sri Samir Sharma, representing this Court, on the other hand, contended that under the scheme of things provided for in 1976 Rules confirmation is not to be accorded as a matter of right and once confirmation is hedged with pre-requisite terms and conditions, then the scheme of things clearly reflect that there has to be a positive exercise for confirmation and here requisite exercise has been undertaken as there has been adverse material as against the petitioner appellant, confirmation has not at all been made and subsequently confirmation has been accorded as at the said juncture the pre-requisite terms and conditions stood fulfilled and, in view of this, there is no occasion or reason for this Court to intervene in the matter and special appeal is liable to be dismissed. 6. After respective arguments have been advanced, we proceeded to consider the submissions advanced on the basis of relevant rules and the relevant material that are available on record. The services of the petitioner appellant is governed by the 1976 Rules. Rules 32 and 33, which are relevant for answering the issues posed before this Court, are as under: - "32. Probation.- (1) A person on initial appointment to a post in the establishment in substantive capacity shall be placed on probation for a period of one year. (2) The Appointing Authority may allow continuous service rendered in an officiating capacity or as a temporary measure on the post or on a higher post, to be taken into account for the purpose of computing the period of probation. (3) The Appointing Authority, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the period of probation in individual cases specifying the date upto which the extension is granted. Provided that in no case the period of probation will be extended by three years. (4) If it appears to the Appointing Authority at any time during or at the end of the period of probation or extended period of probation, as the case may be, that a probationer has not made sufficient use of his opportunities or has otherwise failed to give satisfaction, he may be reverted to his substantive post, if any, or if he does not hold a lien on any post, his services may be dispensed with. (5) A person whose services are dispensed with under sub-rule (4) shall not be entitled to any compensation. 33. (5) A person whose services are dispensed with under sub-rule (4) shall not be entitled to any compensation. 33. Confirmation.- A probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of his period of probation or extended period of probation as the case may be, if- (a) his work and conduct during the probationary period have been found to be satisfactory; (b) he is considered fit for confirmation; and (c) his integrity is certified." A bare perusal of the Rules quoted above would go to show that Rule 32 of 1976 Rules provides for a probation of one year which could be extended by three years and thus the maximum period of probation under the service rules is four years. There is a requirement of confirmation of a probationer against his appointment at the end of period of his probation or extended period of probation as the case may be and the said confirmation has to be preceded by (a) his work and conduct during the probationary period have been found to be satisfactory (b) he is considered fit for confirmation and (c) his integrity is certified. On the parameters of these Rules in question it has to be seen as to whether in the facts of the case after the expiry of period of probation, confirmation is automatic or not, as has been claimed by the petitioner appellant. After noticing the provisions as quoted above, the view point of Hon'ble Apex Court on this aspect of the matter, as to when no order of confirmation has been passed in writing and the outer limit of probation period prescribed has come to an end then as to whether it would be the case of deemed confirmation or not is being looked into. Apex Court in the case of State of of Punjab Vs. Dharam Singh reported in AIR 1968 SC 1210 took the view that where service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation in such case it is permissible to draw the inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. Relevant paragraphs 1, 5 6, 8 and 9 are being quoted below: "(1) Members of the Service, officiating or to be promoted against permanent posts, shall be on probation in the first instance for one year. (2) Officiating service shall be reckoned as period spent on probation, but no member who has officiated in any appointment for one year shall be entitled to be confirmed unless he is appointed against a permanent vacancy. (3) On the completion of the period of probation the authority competent to make appointment may confirm the member in his appointment or if his work or conduct during the period of probation has been in his opinion unsatisfactory he may dispense with his services or may extend his period of probation by such period as he may deem fit or revert him to his former post if he was promoted from some lower post : Provided that the total period of probation including extensions, if any, shall not exceed three years. (4) Service spent on deputation to a corresponding or higher post may be allowed to count towards the period of probation if there is a permanent vacancy against which such member can be confirmed.' The respondents were officiating in permanent posts and under Rule 6 (3) they continued to hold those posts on probation in the first instance for one year. The maximum period of probation fixed by the rules was three years which expired on October 1, 1960. The respondents continued to hold their posts after October 1, 1960, but formal orders confirming them in their posts were not passed. Under Rule 7, the Director of Public Instruction, Punjab was the appointing authority. By two separate orders passed on February 10, 1963 and April 4, 1963, the Director terminated their services. The order in each case stated that the services of the respondent concerned '`are hereby terminated in accordance with the terms of his employment. The order shall take effect after one month from the date it is served on him". Rule 12 provides that ill matters relating to discipline, punishment and appeals, members of the service shall be governed by the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952. The orders dated February 10 and April 4, 1963 were passed without holding any departmental enquiry and without giving the respondents any opportunity of making representations against the action taken against them. The orders dated February 10 and April 4, 1963 were passed without holding any departmental enquiry and without giving the respondents any opportunity of making representations against the action taken against them. The respondents filed separate writ petitions in the Punjab High Court challenging the aforesaid orders on the ground that they had acquired substantive rights to their posts, and that the orders amounted to removal from service, and were passed in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution. The appellants pleaded that the respondents were temporary employees, that their services were terminated in accordance with the terms of their employment, and that the impugned orders did not amount to removal from service and were not in violation of Article 311. Learned single Judge of the High Court rejected the respondents contentions and dismissed the writ petitions. The respondents filed separate Letters Patent appeals against these judgments. The appellate Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned orders. The appellate Court held that the respondents were not temporary employees, that they held the posts on probation, that on the expiry of three years period of probation they must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts, that the impugned orders having deprived them of their right to those posts amounted to removal from service by way of punishment and were passed in violation of Article 311 and the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952. It is against these appellate orders that the present appeals have been filed after obtaining special leave. 5. In the present case, Rule 6 (3) forbids extension of the period of probation beyond three years. Where, as in the present case, the service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. In such a case, it is permissible to draw the inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. 6. The employees referred to in R. 6 (1) held their posts in the first instance on probation for one year commencing from October 1,1957. On completion of the one year period of probation of the employee, four courses of action were open to the appointing authority under Section 6 (3). The authority could either (a) extend the period of probation provided the total period of probation including extensions would not exceed three years, or (b) revert the employee to his former post if he was promoted from some lower post, or (c) dispense with his services if his work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory, or (d) confine him in his appointment. It could pass one of these orders in respect of the respondents on completion of their one year period of probation. But the authority allowed them to continue in their posts thereafter without passing any order in writing under Rule 6 (3). In the absence of any formal order, the question is whether by necessary implication from the proved facts of these cases, the authority should be presumed to have passed some order under Rule 6 (3) in respect of the respondents, and if so, what order should be presumed to have been passed. 8. The initial period of probation of the respondents ended on October 1, 1958. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation, the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation up to October 1, 1960 by implication. But under the proviso to R. 6 (3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. In view of the proviso to R. 6 (3), it is not possible to presume that the competent authority extended the probationary period after October 1, 1960, or that thereafter the respondents continued to hold their posts as probationers. 9. But under the proviso to R. 6 (3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. In view of the proviso to R. 6 (3), it is not possible to presume that the competent authority extended the probationary period after October 1, 1960, or that thereafter the respondents continued to hold their posts as probationers. 9. Immediately upon completion of the extended period of probation on October 1, 1960, the appointing authority could dispense with the services of the respondents if their work or conduct during the period of probation was in the opinion of the authority unsatisfactory. Instead of dispensing with their services on completion of the extended period of probation, the authority continued them in their posts until sometime in 1963, and allowed them to draw annual increments of salary including the increment which fell due on October 1, 1962. The rules did not require them to pass any test or to fulfil any other condition before confirmation. There was no compelling reason for dispensing with their services and re-employing them as temporary employees on October 1, 1960 and the High Court rightly refused to draw the inference that they were so discharged from services and re-employed. In these circumstances, the High Court rightly held that the respondents must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts. Though the appointing authority did not pass formal orders of confirmation in writing, it should be presumed to have passed orders of confirmation by so allowing them to continue in their posts after October 1, 1960. After such confirmation, the authority had no power to dispense with their services under Rule 6 (3) on the ground that their work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory. It follows that on the dates of the impugned orders, the respondents had the right to hold their posts. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. The removal from service could not the made without following the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and without conforming to the constitutional requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. The removal from service could not the made without following the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and without conforming to the constitutional requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution. As the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 was not followed and as the constitutional protection of Article 311 was violated, the impugned orders were rightly set aside by the High Court." 7. Thereafter in the case of Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another reported in 1974 (2) SCC 831 Apex Court has approved the principal set out in the case of Dharm Singh (supra) but in fact of the said case confirmation by implication has been negatived because before completion of 3 years High Court found primafacie that the work as well as the conduct of the appellant was unsatisfactory and notice was given to the appellant on 4 October, 1968 to shows cause as to why his services should not be terminated, as such it was held that as notice was given at the end of the probation the period of probation gets extended till the inquiry proceedings commenced by the notice under Rule 9 comes to an end and further in this back ground the explanation to Rule 7 (1) shows that the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended impliedly if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of this period of probation. "70. Counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, (1968) 3 SCR 1 = ( AIR 1968 SC 1210 ) where this Court drew an inference that an employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation is confirmed in the post by implication. In Dharam Singh's case (supra) the relevant rule stated that the probation in the first instance is for one year with the proviso that the total period of probation including extension shall not exceed three years. In Dharam Singh's case (supra) the relevant rule stated that the probation in the first instance is for one year with the proviso that the total period of probation including extension shall not exceed three years. In Dharam Singh's case (supra) he was allowed to continue without an order of confirmation and therefore the only possible view in the absence of anything to the contrary in the Service Rules was that by necessary implication he must be regarded as having been confirmed. 71. Any confirmation by implication is negatived in the present case because before the completion of three years the High Court found prima facie that the work as well as the conduct of the appellant was unsatisfactory and a notice was given to the appellant on 4 October, 1968 to shows cause as to why his services should not be terminated. Furthermore, Rule 9 shows that the employment of a probationer can be proposed to be terminated whether during or at the end of the period of probation. This indicates that where the notice is given at the end of the probation the period of probation gets extended till the inquiry proceedings commenced by the notice under Rule 9 come to an end. In this back ground the explanation to Rule 7 (1) shows that the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended impliedly if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of this period of probation. This implied extension where a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of the period of probation is not found in Dharam Singh's case (1968) 3 SCR 1 = ( AIR 1968 SC 1210 ) (supra). This explanation in the present case does not mean that the implied extension of the probationary period is only between two and three years. The explanation on the contrary means that the provision regarding the maximum period of probation for three years is directory and not mandatory unlike in Dharam Singh's case (supra) and that a probationer is not in fact confirmed till an order of confirmation is made. 72. In this context reference may be made to the proviso to Rule 7 (3). The explanation on the contrary means that the provision regarding the maximum period of probation for three years is directory and not mandatory unlike in Dharam Singh's case (supra) and that a probationer is not in fact confirmed till an order of confirmation is made. 72. In this context reference may be made to the proviso to Rule 7 (3). The proviso to the Rules states that the completion of the maximum period of three years' probation would not confer on him the right to be confirmed till there is a permanent vacancy in the cadre. Rule 7 (3) states that an express order of confirmation is necessary. The proviso to Rule 7 (3) is in the negative form that the completion of the maximum period of three years would not confer a right of confirmation till there is a permanent vacancy in the cadre. The period of probation is therefore extended by implication until the proceedings commenced against a probationer like the appellant are concluded to enable the Government to decide whether a probationer should be confirmed or his services should be terminated. No confirmation by implication can arise in the present case in the facts and circumstances as also by the meaning and operation of Rules 7(1) and 7 (3) as aforesaid. In the case of Shiv Kumar Sharma Vs. Haryana State Electricity Board, 1988 Law Suit (SC) 436, Apex Court keeping in view the facts of the case in hand mentioned that archaic rule of confirmation gives scope to the executive authority to act arbitrarily and if during the period of probation a government servant is found to be unsuitable, his services may be terminated and on the other hand if he is found to be suitable, he be allowed to continue in service and in such a situation it is not necessary that there may be need of confirmation of an officer appointed on probation after the completion of probationary period. Thereafter in the case of M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank, AIR 1988 SC 286 , Apex Court has taken the view that if order of confirmation or discharge at the end of probation period has not been passed and consequences of absence of express confirmation has not been specified then in that event non-discharge of such a probationer after the expiry of probation period, held would result in implied confirmation. Relevant paragraph 8 is being quoted below: "8. The first point need not detain us. The period of the probation was one year, in the first instance. The employer could extend it only for a further period of six more months. The limitation on the power of the employer to extend the probation beyond 18 months coupled with the further requirement that at the end of it the services of the probationer should either be confirmed or discharged render the inference inescapable that if the probationer was not discharged at or before the expiry of the maximum period of probation, then there would be an implied confirmation as there was no statutory indication as to what should follow in the absence of express confirmation at the end of even the maximum permissible period of probation. In cases where, as here, these conditions coalesce, it has been held, there would be confirmation by implication. (See : State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 , Om Prakash Maurya v. U. P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation Lucknow, AIR 1986 SC 1844 . " Hon'ble Apex Court thereafter in the case of Daya Ram Dayal Vs. State of M.P., 1997 SCC (L&S) 1797, has taken the view that continuance in service beyond maximum period up to which probation could be extended in such situation, the employee is deemed to have been confirmed. Thereafter on the ground of unsatisfactory performance without holding disciplinary enquiry, termination has not been approved. Relevant paragraphs 5,6,7, 12 and 13 are being quoted below: "5. The point that arises for consideration in the appeal is: Whether in view of the fact that Rule 24 of the Rules prescribes not only the original period of 2 years of probation but also provides for extension of probation subject to a maximum of another 2 years, the appellant must be deemed to have been confirmed at the end of 4 years of probation even though no order of confirmation was issued and whether termination of his services without any inquiry must be held to be in violation of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India? 6. We have already set out the facts and the contentions. We shall now set out the rule which both sides tried to interpret in their favour. 6. We have already set out the facts and the contentions. We shall now set out the rule which both sides tried to interpret in their favour. Rule 24 of the Rules reads as follows : "24.(1) Every candidate appointed to the cadre shall undergo training for a period of six months before he is appointed on probation for a period of two years which period may be extended for a further period not exceeding two years. The probationers may, at the end of the period of their probation be confirmed subject to their fitness for confirmation and to having passed by the higher standard, all such departmental examination as may be prescribed. (2) During the period of probation, he shall be required to do magisterial work and acquire experience in office routine and procedure. (3) If during the period of probation (he) has not passed the prescribed departmental examinations, or has been found otherwise unsuitable for the service, the Governor may, at any time, therefore, dispense with his service." It will be noticed that the rule does not merely fix a period of probation but also fixes a maximum period beyond which the probation cannot be continued and if that be so, the question is whether by implication the officer who is continued beyond the said maximum period must be deemed to have been confirmed by implication? 7. An examination of the rulings of this Court on the question of probation and confirmation shows that in some cases this Court has held that mere continuation beyond the period of probation does not amount to confirmation unless the order of appointment or the rule contains a deeming provision while in some other cases, it has been held that in certain exceptional situations, it is permissible to hold that the services must be deemed to be confirmed. We shall show that there is no real conflict between the two sets of decisions and it depends on the conditions contained in the order of appointment and the relevant rules that are applicable. 12. Thus, even though the maximum period for extension could lead to an indication that the officer is deemed to be confirmed, still special provisions in such rules could negative such an intention. 13. 12. Thus, even though the maximum period for extension could lead to an indication that the officer is deemed to be confirmed, still special provisions in such rules could negative such an intention. 13. It is, therefore, clear that the present case is one where the Rule has prescribed an initial period of probation and then for the extension of probation subject to a maximum, and therefore the case squarely falls within the second line of case, namely, Dharam Singh's case ( AIR 1968 SC 1210 ) and the provision for a maximum is an indication of an intention not to treat the officer as being under probation after the expiry of the maximum period of probation. It is also significant that in the case before us the effect of the rule fixing a maximum period of probation is not whittled down by any other provision in the rules such as the one contained in Samsher Singh's case ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 ) or in Ashok Kumar Mishra's case (1991 AIR SCW 1241). Though a plea was raised that termination of service could be effected by serving one month's notice or paying salary in lieu thereof, there is no such provision in the order of appointment nor was any rule relied upon for supporting such a contention. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Wasim Beg Vs. State of U.P, 1998 (3) SCC 321 , has taken the view qua the question as to whether an employee at the end of the probationary period automatically gets confirmation in the post or whether an order of confirmation or any specific act on the part of the employer confirming the employee is necessary, will depend upon the provisions in the relevant Service Rules relating to probation and confirmation. There are broadly two sets of authorities of this Court dealing with this question. In those cases where the Rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, this Court has held that at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be a deemed confirmation of the employee unless Rules provide to the contrary. Relevant paragraphs 12, 15,16, 17 and 18 are being extracted below: "12. The appellant was appointed on probation as Divisional Manager on 10-1-1978. The letter of appointment mentioned that his probation was for a period of one year. Relevant paragraphs 12, 15,16, 17 and 18 are being extracted below: "12. The appellant was appointed on probation as Divisional Manager on 10-1-1978. The letter of appointment mentioned that his probation was for a period of one year. Under the earlier Service Rules then in force, the respondents had the discretion to extend the period of probation without assigning any reason therefor. But there was no such order extending the period of probation of the appellant. As per the Rule relating to probation, the appointing authority was required to issue to the appellant a certificate of having satisfactorily completed probation at the end of the probationary period. No such certificate has been issued. The Rule relating to confirmation states that the employee shall be deemed to have become a confirmed employee after he has successfully completed the period of probation. The deemed confirmation depends on satisfactory completion of probation. The High Court has taken the view that since no certificate has been issued by the respondents at the end of one year about the appellant having satisfactorily completed his period of probation, he remained on probation for a period of seven years till 1985 when his services were terminated by the order of 31st of March, 1985. 15. Whether an employee at the end of the probationary period automatically gets confirmation in the post or whether an order of confirmation or any specific act on the part of the employer confirming the employee is necessary, will depend upon the provisions in the relevant Service Rules relating to probation and confirmation. There are broadly two sets of authorities of this Court dealing with this question. In those cases where the Rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, this Court has held that at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be a deemed confirmation of the employee unless Rules provide to the contrary. In those cases where the Rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, this Court has held that at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be a deemed confirmation of the employee unless Rules provide to the contrary. This is the line of cases starting with State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, (1968) 3 SCR 1 : ( AIR 1968 SC 1210 ); M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank, 1987 Supp SCC 643 : ( AIR 1988 SC 286 ); Om Parkash Maurya v. U.P. Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow, 1986 Supp SCC 95 : ( AIR 1986 SC 1844 ); State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargav, (1987) 4 SCC 482 : ( AIR 1987 SC 2135 ). 16. However, even when the Rules prescribe a maximum period of probation, if there is a further provision in the Rules for continuation of such probation beyond the maximum period, the Courts have made an exception and said that there will be no deemed confirmation in such cases and the probation period will be deemed to be extended. In this category of cases we can place Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831 : ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 ) which was the decision of a Bench of seven Judges where the principle of probation not going beyond the maximum period fixed was reiterated but on the basis of the Rules which were before the Court, this Court said that the probation was deemed to have been extended. A similar view was taken in the case of Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra, (1991) 3 SCC 325 : (1991 AIR SCW 1241). In Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 560 : (1996 AIR SCW 55), although the Rules prescribed that the probationary period should not exceed two years, and an order of confirmation was also necessary, the termination order was issued within the extended period of probation. Hence the termination was upheld. 17. In Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 560 : (1996 AIR SCW 55), although the Rules prescribed that the probationary period should not exceed two years, and an order of confirmation was also necessary, the termination order was issued within the extended period of probation. Hence the termination was upheld. 17. The other line of cases deals with Rules where there is no maximum period prescribed for probation and either there is a Rule providing for extension of probation or there is a Rule which requires a specific act on the part of the employer (either by issuing an order of confirmation or any similar act) which would result in confirmation of the employee. In these cases unless there is such an order of confirmation, the period of probation would continue and there would be no deemed confirmation at the end of the prescribed probationary period. In this line of cases one can put Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, (1963) 1 SCR 416 : ( AIR 1962 SC 1711 ); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Ali Khan, (1966) 3 SCR 821 : ( AIR 1966 SC 1842 ); Shri Kedar Nath Bahl v. The State of Punjab, (1974) 3 SCC 21 : ( AIR 1972 SC 873 ); Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1985) 2 SCC 5 : ( AIR 1985 SC 603 ) and Tarsem Lal Verma v. Union of India, (1997) 9 SCC 243 ; Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra, (1991 AIR SCW 1241) (supra) and State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla, (1996) 9 SCC 190 : (1996 AIR SCW 2518). In the recent case of Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P., AIR 1997 SC 3269 : ( 1997 AIR SCW 3331 ) (to which one of us was a party) all these cases have been analysed and it has been held that where the Rules provide that the period of probation cannot be extended beyond the maximum period there will be a deemed confirmation at the end of the maximum probationary period unless there is anything to the contrary in the Rules. 18. In the present case under the Service Rules in force at the time when the appellant was appointed on probation, there was no time-limit on the period up to which probation can be extended. 18. In the present case under the Service Rules in force at the time when the appellant was appointed on probation, there was no time-limit on the period up to which probation can be extended. The appointing authority was required to issue a certificate of the appellant having satisfactorily completed the period of probation. The provision relating to deemed confirmation would come into effect on his satisfactorily completing probationary period. From the affidavit filed by the respondent-Corporation as also looking to the report which was submitted by the Managing Director to the Board of Directors on 8-2-1985, it is clear that the appellant was considered by the respondents as having satisfactorily completed his period of probation on 9-1-1979, and he was considered as a regular employee from 10-1-1979. In the affidavit of the respondent-Corporation before the High Court also it has been very fairly stated that the services of the appellant were satisfactory for the first few years and his work was very good. It was only thereafter that serious problems arose regarding his work and the Corporation suffered losses on that account. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that the appellant remained a probationer till his discharge. Hon'ble Apex Court, thereafter in the case of High Court of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Satya Narain Jhavar, (2001)7 SCC 161 , took the view, that case of Dayaram Dayal does not lay down correct law, in regard to interpretation of Rule 24 of the Rules. Relevant paragraphs 11,36,37 and 38 are being extracted below for ready reference : "11. The question of deemed confirmation in service Jurisprudence, which is dependent upon language of the relevant service rules, has been subject matter of consideration before this Court times without number in various decisions and there are three lines of cases on this point. One line of cases is where in the service rules or the letter of appointment a period of probation is specified and power to extend the same is also conferred upon the authority without prescribing any maximum period of probation and if the officer is continued beyond the prescribed or extended period, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed. In such cases there is no bar against termination at any point of time after expiry of the period of probation. In such cases there is no bar against termination at any point of time after expiry of the period of probation. Other line of cases is that where while there is a provision in the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. The inference in such cases is that officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed upon expiry of the maximum period of probation in case before its expiry order of termination has not been passed. The last line of cases is where though under the rules maximum period of probation is prescribed, but the same require a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing an order of confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of confirmation. In such cases, even if the maximum period of probation has expired and neither any order of confirmation has been passed nor the person concerned has passed the requisite test, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed merely because the said period has expired. 36. In the case on hand, correctness of the interpretation given by this Court to Rule 24 of the Rules in the case of Dayaram Dayal (supra) is the bone of contention. In the aforesaid case, no doubt, this Court has held @page-SC3251 that a maximum period of probation having been provided under sub-rule (1) of Rule 24, if a probationer's service is not terminated and he is allowed to continue thereafter. It will be a case of deemed confirmation and the sheet anchor of the aforesaid conclusion is the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra). But, in our considered opinion in the case of Dayaram Dayal ( supra) Rule 24 of the Rules has not been interpreted in its proper perspective. A plain reading of different sub-rules of Rule 24 would indicate that every candidate appointed to the cadre will go for initial training for six months whereafter he would be appointed on probation for a period of 2 years and the said period of probation would be extended for a further period not exceeding 2 years. Thus, under sub-rule (1) of Rule 24 a maximum period of 4 years' probation has been provided. Thus, under sub-rule (1) of Rule 24 a maximum period of 4 years' probation has been provided. The aforesaid sub-rule also stipulates that at the end of the probation period the appointee could be confirmed subject to his fitness for confirmation and to have passed the departmental examination, as may be prescribed. In the very sub-rule, therefore, while a maximum period of probation has been indicated, yet the question of confirmation of such a probationer is dependent upon his fitness for such confirmation and his passing of the departmental examination by the higher standard, as prescribed. It necessarily stipulates that question of confirmation can be considered at the end of the period of probation, and on such consideration, if the probationer is found suitable by the Appointing Authority and he is found to have passed the prescribed departmental examination then the Appointing Authority may issue an order of confirmation. It is too well settled that an order of confirmation is a positive act on the part of the employer which the employer is required to pass in accordance with the Rules governing the question of confirmation subject to a finding that the probationer is in fact fit for confirmation. This being the position under sub- rule (1) of Rule 24, it is difficult for us to accept the proposition, broadly laid down in the case of Dayaram Dayal (supra) and to hold that since a maximum period of probation has been provided thereunder, at the end of that period the probationer must be held to be deemed to be confirmed on the basis of the judgment of this Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra). 37. In the case of the Judicial Officers who are respondents before us, it is the positive case of the High Court that their case for confirmation was considered while they were continuing on probation but the Full Court did not consider them suitable for confirmation and they were given a further opportunity of improving themselves. Even notwithstanding such opportunity they having failed to improve themselves and the High Court having considered them unsuitable for confirmation the order of termination emanated. Even notwithstanding such opportunity they having failed to improve themselves and the High Court having considered them unsuitable for confirmation the order of termination emanated. It is difficult for us to comprehend that a probationer while continuing on probation, on being considered is found unsuitable for confirmation by the Appointing Authority and yet it can be held to be a deemed confirmation because of maximum period of probation indicated in the rule, merely because instead of termination of the services he was allowed to continue and was given an opportunity for improving and even after the opportunity he failed to improve and finally the Appropriate Authority finding him unsuitable directs termination of his services. The very fact that sub-rule (I) of Rule 24 while prescribing a maximum period of probation therein entitles a probationer for being considered for confirmation and confers a right on the Appointing Authority to confirm subject to the fitness of the probationer and subject to his passing the higher standard of all departmental examination must be held to be an inbuilt provision in sub-rule (I) which would negative the inference of a confirmation in the post by implication, as interpreted by this Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra) while interpreting Rule 6 of the Punjab Educational Services (Provincialised Cadre) Class III , Rules 1961. AIR 1968 SC 1210 : 1968 Lab IC 1409 . 38. Ordinarily a deemed confirmation of a probationer arises when the letter of appointment so stipulates or the Rules governing service condition so indicate. In the absence of such term in the letter of appointment or in the relevant Rules, it can be inferred on the basis of the relevant Rules by implication, as was the case in Dharam Singh (supra). But it cannot be said that merely because a maximum period of probation has been provided in Service Rules, continuance of the probationer thereafter would ipso facto must be held to be a deemed confirmation which would certainly run contrary to Seven Judge Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Shamsher Singh (supra) and Constitution Bench decisions in the cases of Sukhbans Singh (supra), G.S. Ramaswamy (supra) and Akbar Ali Khan (supra). AIR 1968 SC 1210 : 1968 Lab IC 1409. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mir Mohd Khasim Vs. AIR 1968 SC 1210 : 1968 Lab IC 1409. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mir Mohd Khasim Vs. Union of India reported in 2004 (10) SCC 721 has taken the view that where employee is continued after maximum period of probation then probationer has to be deemed to have been confirmed, but where no maximum period of probation is provided for there would be no automatic confirmation of employee on the expiry of the period unless an order is passed in this regard. Relevant paragraph 9 and 11 are being extracted below: "The moot question which arises for consideration is about the effect of the order of granting relaxation to the appellant from R. 7(e) and the consequences which flow from the said order. According to the appellant on successful completion of period of probation nothing further is required to be done before confirming the officer. All that was required had been accomplished since the appellant had cleared the tests as required under R. 6(b) as well as has undergone the period of probation which has been considered to be successful completion @page-SC3262 of period of probation as per R. 7(e). That being the position the appellant shall be deemed to have been confirmed. Whereas Ms. K. Amareshwari, learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 3 submits that unless an order of confirmation is passed the appellant cannot be deemed to have been confirmed. It is further pointed out that the rules do not prescribe any maximum period of probation nor any provision says that it shall not be extended beyond any given period of time. In such circumstances, it is submitted, the law is settled that there will be no automatic confirmation unless such an order is passed. In our view, there cannot be any dispute about the proposition that where no maximum period of probation is provided there would be no automatic confirmation of the employee on expiry of period of probation unless an order is passed in that regard. In such cases it is taken that the period of probation continues unless and until an order of confirmation is passed. Our attention has been drawn to a decision in the case of Commissioner of Police, Hubli and another v. R. S. More, (2003) 2 SCC 408 . In such cases it is taken that the period of probation continues unless and until an order of confirmation is passed. Our attention has been drawn to a decision in the case of Commissioner of Police, Hubli and another v. R. S. More, (2003) 2 SCC 408 . In this case the appointing authority was empowered to extend the period of probation up to certain prescribed limit but there was a further provision that mere expiry of the prescribed period or extended period of probation would not entitle the probationer to claim satisfactory completion of his probation. Hence he would continue to be under probation and it would not be treated as deemed confirmation. In connection with this case it may be observed that the rule itself provided for extension of period of probation and thereafter that completion of period of probation or extended period of probation will not automatically entitle the employee deemed to have been confirmed unless a specific order in that regard is passed. Hence the above decision would not be of any help to the respondent. It may further be observed that in the matter of period of probation and confirmation it would always depend upon the language of the rule on the point. A reference has also been made to a decision of this Court in the case of High Court of M. P. through Registrar and others v. Satya Narayan Jhavar, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 161 , more particularly to paragraph 11 of the judgment which we beneficially quote as under : AIR 2003 SC 983 : 2003 AIR SCW 478 : 2003 Lab IC 745 : 2003 AIR ? Kant HCR 462. Apex Court in the case of Registrar, High Court of Gujarat Vs. C.G. Sharma, 2005 (1) SCC 132 , once again considered the issue of automatic or deemed confirmation and reiterated that deemed confirmation would flow in the light of the language of the Rules in question. Relevant paragraph 26 of the said judgment is quoted below; "26. A large number of authorities were cited before us by both the parties. C.G. Sharma, 2005 (1) SCC 132 , once again considered the issue of automatic or deemed confirmation and reiterated that deemed confirmation would flow in the light of the language of the Rules in question. Relevant paragraph 26 of the said judgment is quoted below; "26. A large number of authorities were cited before us by both the parties. However, it is not necessary to go into the details of all those cases for the simple reason that sub-rule 4 of Rule 5 of the Rules is in pari materia with the Rule which was under consideration in the case of State of Maharashtra V. Veerappa R. Saboji and we find that even if the period of two years expires and the probationer is allowed to continue after a period of two years, automatic confirmation cannot be claimed as a matter of right because in terms of the Rules, work has to be satisfactory which is a pre-requisite or pre-condition for confirmation and, therefore, even if the probationer is allowed to continue beyond the period of two years as mentioned in the Rule, there is no question of deemed confirmation. The language of the Rule itself excludes any chance of giving deemed or automatic confirmation because the confirmation is to be ordered if there is a vacancy and if the work if found to be satisfactory. There is no question of confirmation and, therefore, deemed confirmation, in the light of the language of this Rule, is ruled out. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respondent on this aspect has no merits and no legs to stand. The learned single Judge and the learned Judges of the Division Bench have rightly come to the conclusion that there is no automatic confirmation on the expiry of the period of two years and on the expiry of the said period of two years, the confirmation order can be passed only if there is vacancy and the work is found to be satisfactory. The rule also does not say that the two years' period of probation, as mentioned in the rule, is the maximum period of probation and the probation cannot be extended beyond the period of two years. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no question of automatic or deemed confirmation, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no question of automatic or deemed confirmation, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. We, therefore, answer this issue in the negative and against the respondent." In a more recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kazia Mohammed Muzzammil Vs. State of Karnakata and another, 2010 (8) SCC 155 , the Apex Court, after considering catena of cases in favour of and against the proposition of deemed confirmation, held as under: - "19. Having discussed in some elaboration the conduct of the appellant as well as his antecedents, now we proceed to examine the merits of the legal controversy raised in the present case on behalf of the appellant in relation to `deemed confirmation'. The `deemed confirmation' is an aspect which is known to the service jurisprudence now for a considerable time. Both the views have been taken by the Court. Firstly, there can be `deemed confirmation' after an employee has completed the maximum probation period provided under the Rules wherafter, his entitlement and conditions of service are placed at parity with the confirmed employee. Secondly, that there would be no `deemed confirmation' and at best after completion of maximum probation period provided under the Rules governing the employee, the employee becomes eligible for being confirmed in his post. His period of probation remains in force till a written document of successful completion of probation is issued by the Competent Authority. 20. Having examined the various judgments cited at the bar, including that of all larger Benches, it is not possible for this Bench to state which of the view is correct enunciation of law or otherwise. We are of the considered opinion, as to what view has to be taken, would depend upon the facts of a given case and the relevant Rules in force. It will be cumulative effect of these two basics that would determine the application of the principle of law to the facts of that case." The question of deemed confirmation in service Jurisprudence, is dependent upon language of the relevant service rules, terms and conditions of appointment and as noted above there are clearly three lines of cases on said point. (i) One line of cases is where in the service rules or the letter of appointment a period of probation is specified and power to extend the same is also conferred upon the authority without prescribing any maximum period of probation and if the officer is continued beyond the prescribed or extended period, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed. In such cases there is no bar against termination at any point of time after expiry of the period of probation. (ii) Other line of cases is that where while there is a provision in the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. The inference in such cases is that officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed upon expiry of the maximum period of probation in case before its expiry order of termination has not been passed. (iii) The last line of cases is where though under the rules maximum period of probation is prescribed, but the same require a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing an order of confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of confirmation. In such cases, even if the maximum period of probation has expired and neither any order of confirmation has been passed nor the person concerned has passed the requisite test, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed merely because the said period has expired. On the touch stone of the provisions quoted above and the judgements of the Apex Court as well as under the scheme of things provided for, Rule 33 clearly mandates a positive act for passing of the order of confirmation by the employer. Confirmation of probationer is not automatic on expiry of the period of probation or the extended period of probation but same is hedged with the conditions i.e. an incumbent, who intends to be confirmed, has to have (a) his work and conduct during the probation period should be found to be satisfactory (b) he should be fit for confirmation and (c) his integrity should be certified. Unless and until all these three pre-requisite terms and conditions are not at all in existence, then by no stretch of imagination an incumbent can even remotely think of the fact that automatically after completion of maximum period of probation, confirmation would be automatic one. The language and intent of the Rules is thus clear and categorical and on these parameters once claim of petitioner appellant was examined, then the records are speaking for itself as to in what way and manner he has conducted himself at the point of time when he has been on probation and when he has been not confirmed i.e. like pre-confirmation stage. The record shows that in the year 2001-02 while the petitioner appellant was on probation, he has been awarded following adverse entry: - "2001-02 Habitual late comer, leaves Office without permission. Work and conduct FAIR. Integrity certified." The said entry in question clearly reflects upon the fact that during the extended period of probation petitioner appellant did not prove himself to be an efficient employee rather contrarily his habits have been noted by the employer of being habitual late comer, leaving office without permission and work and conduct being fair. Thus it was clear that his work and conduct was not satisfactory. In the year 2005, when exercise has been undertaken for confirmation, then once again he has not been found fit for confirmation and matter relating to him, thereafter, has been deferred. The learned Single Judge has clearly proceeded to make a mention that same was clearly indicative of fact that he was given more time to prove his capability and suitability to his post. This much is also reflected that once petitioner appellant was not confirmed employee, then net effect of the same has been that he was not falling within the zone of consideration for according promotion and, accordingly, promotion has been denied to him in the year 2007. This much is also reflected that once petitioner appellant was not confirmed employee, then net effect of the same has been that he was not falling within the zone of consideration for according promotion and, accordingly, promotion has been denied to him in the year 2007. This much is also reflected that in pursuance of the orders passed by the Registrar General dated 25.7.2007 a three member committee comprising of Registrar (Establishment), OSD (Litigation) and OSD (Classification) was constituted to consider the confirmation of 244 Assistant Review Officers and the said committee after having regard to the entire service records made recommendation for confirmation of services of 222 Assistant Review Officers whereas it has recommended for postponing the confirmation of 22 Assistant Review Officers and same was inclusive of petitioner appellant also. Learned Single Judge has noted remark of the committee in relation to the petitioner appellant for not recommending him for confirmation as under; Sl. Emp. No. Name Remarks 15 6061 Raj Kamal Sonkar Adverse entry in the year 2001-02. Warning vide Registrar General's order dated 12.6.2007. As reported by the Registrar General's office that a Preliminary enquiry has been concluded by the Enquiry Officer and is under consideration before the learned Registrar General for final orders. Due to the above punishment he has not been found satisfactory, as such, the Committee is of the opinion that his case may be deferred at present. The adverse entry of the year 2001-02 was subject matter of consideration in the year 2005 when on its basis the petitioner appellant was denied confirmation, but his service was not terminated and he was afforded further opportunity to improve upon his performance and prove his capability and suitability to the post. Thereafter, when the case of the petitioner appellant was considered once again for confirmation in the year 2007, and same was declined in October 2007 in the backdrop that Registrar General on 12.6.2007 issued warning and asked petitioner appellant to be careful in future. From the side of the petitioner appellant it has been submitted that such material could not have been used. Petitioner appellant is labouring under a wrong impression, inasmuch as, before you intend to be confirmed, you have to have a clean record and here the learned Single Judge has extensively noted the way and manner petitioner appellant has conducted himself. From the side of the petitioner appellant it has been submitted that such material could not have been used. Petitioner appellant is labouring under a wrong impression, inasmuch as, before you intend to be confirmed, you have to have a clean record and here the learned Single Judge has extensively noted the way and manner petitioner appellant has conducted himself. The relevant paragraph 25 of the judgement of learned Single Judge is quoted below; "25. In the case of the petitioner, the proceedings which culminated with recording of warning in the character roll of the petitioner commenced on a report of Deputy Registrar (Judicial) dated 24.11.2005 complaining that the petitioner was in habit of coming late and leaving office before time, being absent without prior information, careless towards his official duties, misbehavior towards his superiors and not amenable to their advice. A preliminary inquiry was got conducted through Sri A.K. Mukherjee, OSD (Classification) and the petitioner was found prima facie guilty of repeated acts of misconduct, insubordination, gross indiscipline and carelessness towards his official duties. He described the petitioner an incorrigible stubborn official. In view of such report, a full fledged departmental inquiry was initiated by order dated 16.1.2006. A charge sheet was served on the petitioner and after conducting the disciplinary inquiry, the Inquiry Officer, having regard to the attendance register, various reports of the Section Officer, statement of Sri Santosh Kumar, Deputy Registrar (J), Sri Prem Chandra, Section Officer, Sri V.B. Jauhari, the then Section Officer and Sri Vijay Kumar-II, Section Officer (EW-1 to EW-4) and statement of Sri K.P. Mishra, ARO Writ C-1 (DW-1), concluded that the charges levelled against the petitioner stand proved. The order of the Registrar General dated 12.6.2007 recites that the petitioner had given an undertaking that the mistakes committed by him is regretted and had sought unconditional apology and assured that he would be vigilant in future. Upon the said undertaking, the Registrar General, despite the fact that the delinquency stood proved, let off the petitioner by issuing a warning to him. The relevant extracts in this regard from the order of the Registrar General dated 12.6.2007, are reproduced for convenience of reference: - "I have gone through the enquiry report as well as comments submitted by the delinquent official and examined the material on record. The relevant extracts in this regard from the order of the Registrar General dated 12.6.2007, are reproduced for convenience of reference: - "I have gone through the enquiry report as well as comments submitted by the delinquent official and examined the material on record. There is sufficient material on record to establish that Sri Raj Kamal Sonkar, ARO is guilty for the aforesaid lapses. The representation/ comments being devoid of any merit are hereby rejected..... Further Sri Raj Kamal Sonkar has given undertaking that whatever the mistake has been done in past is regretted and seek unconditional apology and assures in future that he would be vigillent. Upon the said undertaking, Sri Santosh Kumar Srivastava, Deputy Registrar (Judicial) vide report dated 12.06.2007 has observed that after the enquiry, now Sri Sonkar has realized his mistake and tendered his apology and assured that such type of mistake would not be repeated in future. In his opinion, he could be given an opportunity to amend himself as he is at the stage of starting of his service so with a warning to be careful in future, he may be given an opportunity to become an ideal employee of this Court. Having consideration of the entire aspect as well as charges leveled against Sri Sonkar it is finally concluded that Sri Raj Kumal Sonkar, A.R.O. is found guilty of the charges leveled against him. Further, considering his carrier and first enquiry as well as subsequent report of the D.R. (J) dated 12.06.2006, who has initially recommended for enquiry of indiscipline and misbehavior against him. I am of the considered view that warning will meet the ends of justice, hence Sri Raj Kamal Sonkar is warned to be careful in future and be a disciplined employee. Let the warning be recorded in his character roll and he be informed accordingly." 8. As already mentioned above under the scheme of things provided for confirmation is not at all automatic and once on record there existed material to show and substantiate that during his continuance in service his work and conduct was not found satisfactory and a conscious decision has been taken not to confirm the petitioner appellant at the said point of time cannot be faulted. Once you have been warned to be careful in future and to be disciplined employee, same clearly inheres in itself that incumbent has not at all conducted himself in a manner that could by any stretch of imagination be termed to be satisfactory. 9. In the present case, learned Single Judge has extensively dealt as to what is the purport of probation and the purport of probation is testing of the capability and character of a person during the specified period, in such a situation and in this background, the view, that has been formed by the learned Single Judge, does not warrant any interference by us. 10. Coupled with this, in the present case, petitioner appellant thereafter has been confirmed on the post of Assistant Review Officer vide order dated 17.4.2009 and with the passage of time has been considered for promotion for the post of Review Officer vide order dated 31.5.2010. In view of the above, special appeal sans merit and same is dismissed, accordingly.