JUDGMENT V.K. Shukla, ACJ. Narvadeshwar Prasad is before this Court assailing the validity of the order dated 26.04.2016 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.18430/2016 (Narvadeshwar Prasad vs. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others), wherein learned Single Judge has proceeded to dismiss the writ petition in question on the ground that petitioner-appellant should avail the remedy of approaching industrial adjudicator. 2. Brief background of the case is that petitioner-appellant has been performing and discharging duties as a conductor with U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and allegations have come forward that petitioner-appellant's Bus No.UP53T/00046 was checked by Traffic Superintendent alongwith Traffic Inspector Ashok Singh and Nagendra Pratap Singh, Assistant Traffic Inspector on 25.03.2014, leaving Koyaldar Dhani at 6.00 P.M. at the said point of time 67 passengers were sitting in the bus and seven passengers were found without ticket and they were issued 01 consolidated ticket for Rs.490+Rs.3500 as penalty and for the same petitioner-appellant was suspended by Assistant Regional Manager vide order dated 26.03.2014 followed by charge-sheet dated 08.05.2014. Petitioner-appellant submitted reply to the said charge-sheet in question and thereafter the inquiry in question proceeded and in the said inquiry Hari Shankar Pandey appeared and proved the report in question that has been so prepared by him in respect of inspection that has been so carried out on 25.03.2014 and on the said date, the said report has been produced alongwith way bill. The petitioner-appellant proceeded to cross-examine Hari Shankar Pandey and only proceeded to put two questions (i) as to whether he has checked his cash and the reply that was given was 'No'; (ii) as to whether statement of passengers were taken. The reply was 'Yes they have given oral statement and not in writing and the said fact has been mentioned in the report'. In the said inquiry, the petitioner-appellant proceeded to mention that his reply be considered as his last statement and he does not intent to produce any witness and he does not intent to cross-examine any witness and he is fully satisfied with the inquiry. Thereafter from the record in question this much is reflected that a show cause notice was issued to him as to why he should not be removed from service. Thereafter from the record in question this much is reflected that a show cause notice was issued to him as to why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner-appellant submitted his reply and in the said reply in question, that has been so submitted, he has proceeded to make a mention that the Inquiry Officer had not produced Ashok Singh, Traffic Inspector and Nagendra Pratap Singh Assistant Traffic Inspector and at no point of time, on the explanation that has been so furnished, any serious consideration has been made and further petitioner-appellant requested that those two incumbents should be inquired and the petitioner-appellant should be given opportunity of hearing. The Disciplinary Authority, thereafter, has considered the same and has found the petitioner-appellant guilty and order of dismissal has been passed. Aggrieved against the same, petitioner-appellant has preferred appeal and the said appeal in question has been rejected. Thereafter, after dismissal of the said appeal in question, Writ Petition no.69032 of 2015 has been preferred and same has been disposed of by relegating the petitioner-appellant to file revision under the regulation and then revision in question has been preferred and same has also been dismissed. Against the said orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellant Authority and the Revising Authority, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.18430 of 2016 has been filed and same has been dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. 3. Shri Bhupendra Nath Singh, Counsel for petitioner-appellant submitted that in the present case reasonable opportunity of hearing has not been provided to the appellant and as such, the petitioner-appellant ought not to have been relegated to avail alternative remedy of approaching the Industrial Tribunal and the said remedy is not at all equal and efficacious remedy and on merits the order of punishment is per-se bad being in contravention of principle of natural justice. 4. 4. Shri Mangala Prasad Rai, Advocate representing U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, on the other hand, contended that U.P. State Road Transport Corporation runs an industry and petitioner-appellant is a workman and in view of this, once the provisions of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act are clearly attracted and the only plea that was raised of defective inquiry, then the order in question does not suffer from any infirmity and coupled with this, it has been contended that even otherwise reasonable opportunity has been afforded to the petitioner-appellant, his guilt in question has been substantiated, as such no interference is required to be made. 5. After respective arguments have been advanced, the factual situation on which there is no dispute is that petitioner-appellant has been dismissed from service on a charge that he was carrying seven ticket-less travellers in bus owned by U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and the said order in question has been affirmed in appeal and revision. 6. Petitioner has been before this Court with a grievance that the order of punishment that has been so passed, has been in breach of principle of natural justice and based on the same, it is being contended that petitioner-appellant ought not to have been relegated to avail the alternative remedy of approaching the Industrial Tribunal and as such, Special Appeal deserves to be allowed. 7. Alternative remedy, as per the Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks 1998(8) SCC 1 , is not a constitutional bar to High courts jurisdiction but is self imposed restriction. Alternative remedy would not operate as bar in following contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of fundamental right (ii) where there is violation of principal of natural justice (iii) where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction (iv) where the vires of Act is challenged. 8. View to the similar effect has been once again reiterated in the case of M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corporation vs. Jahan Khan 2007 (10) SCC 88 , by mentioning that exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. 9. 8. View to the similar effect has been once again reiterated in the case of M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corporation vs. Jahan Khan 2007 (10) SCC 88 , by mentioning that exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. 9. This Court, while exercising the authority under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, exercises the Authority of judicial review wherein a limited interference is warranted in cases arising out of disciplinary proceedings culminating eventually in punishment. Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, 1995 (6) SCC 749 has reiterated the principle of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings as follows: "Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re- appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has co- extensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 781, this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued." 10. On the parameters of the aforementioned provision, the facts of the present case are being adverted to as to whether the principle of natural justice has been breeched in the present case or not as is being alleged warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its authority of judicial review. 11. The service conditions of petitioner-appellant are governed by U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (other than that Officers) Regulation 1981 wherein Rule 64 deals with procedure that has to be adhered for providing major penalty. 12. In the present case, what we find from the record in question is that petitioner-appellant has been charge-sheeted vide charge-sheet dated 08.05.2014. 11. The service conditions of petitioner-appellant are governed by U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (other than that Officers) Regulation 1981 wherein Rule 64 deals with procedure that has to be adhered for providing major penalty. 12. In the present case, what we find from the record in question is that petitioner-appellant has been charge-sheeted vide charge-sheet dated 08.05.2014. The charge-sheet in question provides for as follows: ^^dk;kZy;] lgk;d {ks=h; izcU/kd] m0iz0 jkT; lM+d ifjogu fuxe] xksj[kiqjA i=kad&th0vkj0@fMiks@fMLi@bZ&1 3116@14 fnukad 8&5Qjojh 2014 Jh uoZns'oj izlkn] ifjpkyd ¼fuyfEcr½ xksj[kiqj fMiks }kjk&okgu fu/kkZj.k izHkkjh] xksj[kiqjA fo"k;& vkjksi i= ,rn~ }kjk vki ij fuEufyf[kr vkjksi yxk;s tkrs gSA ;g fd vki }kjk fnukad 25-03-2014 dks ifjpkfyr bl fMiks dh okgu la[;k ;w0ih0 53Vh 0046 dk fujh{k.k Jh gfj'kadj ik.Ms; ;krk;kr v/kh{kd }kjk vius lg;ksfx;ksa ds lkFk fl)kFkZuxj &xksj[kiqj ekxZ ij le; 18-00 cts vkj&/kkuh uked LFkku ij fd;k x;k fujh{k.k ds le; okgu esa dqy 67 ;k=h ;k=kjr ik;s x;s ftlesa 07 ;k=h HkkSfrd fujh{k.k esa ukSxs dksbZ xokg izLrqr ugha djuk gSA eq>s fdlh vU; lk{kh ls iwNrkN ugha djuk gSA eSa tkap dk;Zokgh ls iw.kZ : i ls larq"V gwWA g0vLi"V** 13. On the basis of the evidence that has come forward on record, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding the petitioner-appellant guilty of misconduct. Petitioner-appellant thereafter had been issued a show cause notice and he submitted his reply and then, at the said point of time, he has proceeded to make a request that Ashok Singh T.I. and Nagendra Singh A.T.I. have not been summoned and further opportunity be provided to him. 14. The charge-sheet in question was clear and categorical and it clearly reflected Hari Shankar Pandey was to be the witness and at no point of time any other witness was ever proposed to be produced in support of charges mentioned in the charge-sheet and as far as petitioner-appellant is concerned, he also at no point of time has ever asked for any witness to be summoned rather on 19.12.2014, he clearly proceeded to make a mention that his statement in reply should be treated a final and he does not intent to inquire from anyone. 15. 15. Once such is the factual situation of the inquiry and the charges have been brought home, then to say that inquiry in question is vitiated on account of violation of principle of natural justice cannot be accepted by us and as far as request that has been made by means of letter dated 27.05.2015, clearly it is an attempt on the part of the petitioner-appellant to reopen the inquiry without any lawful justification and basis. A totally new story is being sought to be developed that at no point of time he ever entered inside the Bus rather contrarily he was sitting in Sumo vehicle. Petitioner, at the point of time when he was provided opportunity to cross-examine him, never dared to counter him with said situation. It has also been mentioned by petitioner that Enquiry Officer did not enquire from Hari Shankar Pandey as to the activity of his associates at the point of checking. All these facts clearly reflect that in enquiry petitioner did not raise all these issues before Enquiry Officer and thereafter as an afterthought such stand has been sought to be set up. In view of this, in our considered opinion, from the evidence on record this much was clearly substantiated that petitioner has indulged in misconduct of letting travel seven ticket less travellers in the UPSRTC bus and the said opinion formed by disciplinary authority and as affirmed by appellate and revisional authority does not suffer from any infirmity as principle of natural justice has not at all been breached. 16. In the case of V. Ramanna vs. A.P.S.R.T.C. 2005 (7) SCC 338 , the Apex Court has held that the post of conductor is a post of trust. A person guilty of breach of trust should be imposed punishment from removal of service. In Regional Manager U.P.S.R.T.C vs. Hoti Lal AIR 2003 SC 1462 , where the employee was conductor on duty in Bus No. UCG 108, while checking was done by Assistant Regional Manager then it was found that 16 persons were without ticket. Termination order was interfered by High Court, the said order has been set aside by Apex Court by mentioning that High Court ought not have interfered with the quantum of punishment. 17. Termination order was interfered by High Court, the said order has been set aside by Apex Court by mentioning that High Court ought not have interfered with the quantum of punishment. 17. The Apex Court in the cases of N.W. Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. H.H. Pujar AIR 2008 SC 3060 and Divisional Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Kamruddin AIR 2009 SC 2528 has dealt with matters relating to conductors who have indulged in activity of carrying passengers without tickets and Apex Court has clearly expressed its opinion that it is one of the gravest misconduct and no other punishment except that of dismissal or removal from service shall be given to such incumbents. 18. Once such is the factual scenario, then in exercise of our authority of judicial review on the parameters that are provided for, we cannot come to a conclusion or reach to a conclusion that in the present case principle of natural justice has been violated/breached in any manner whatsoever, in view of this, present Special Appeal in question has to be dismissed on merits. Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Bridge Corporation vs. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karmchari Sangh, Civil Appeal No.433 of 2004 has taken the view that it is always in the interest of workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in forums created under the Act and it would need a very strong case for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in the Statute and in no other manner. This Court had relegated the petitioner-appellant to avail the alternative remedy of approaching Industrial Adjudicator but petitioner-appellant has shown his complete unwillingness to approach the said forum and contrarily has addressed this Court on merits and specially on the ground that principle of natural justice has been breached. We have extensively dealt with the matter on the issue of principle of natural justice as well as on merit and we find no substance in the arguments advanced. With these, present Special appeal is dismissed.