JUDGMENT : 1. By this writ-application under Article 226 of the constitution of India, the writ-applicant – a former Additional Assistant Engineer, has prayed for the following reliefs:- 8(A) Be pleased to allow this petition. (B) Be pleased to quash and set aside the orders dated 13.3.2003 and 20.3.2003 passed by the respondent No.1 herein reverting the present petitioner form the post of Deputy Executive Engineer to Additional Assistant Engineer. (C) Be pleased to direct the respondents authorities to consider the present petitioner as having been regularized to the post of Deputy Executive Engineer from 1.3.1996, i.e. the date on which his probation ended and be pleased to further direct the respondents authorities to pay to the petitioner the dues of salary and all other incremental dues and any other allowances as payable to the present petitioner on the basis of such regularization with 12% interest thereon. (D) Be pleased to declare the action of the respondents of not granting approval to the promotion granted to the present petitioner after a period of nine years and reverting him from the post of Deputy Executive Engineer to the post of Additional Assistant Engineer as being illegal, arbitrary and malafide. (E) Pending hearing and final disposal of this petition, be pleased to stay the implementation, execution and operation of the impugned orders dated 13.3.2003 and 20.3.2003 of the respondents authorities. (F) Pending hearing and final disposal of this petition, be pleased to direct the respondents authorities to pay to the present petitioner all dues of salary as well as incremental dues as if the orders dated 13.3.2003 and 20.3.2003 have been stayed by this Honourable Court. (G) Be pleased to award exemplary costs to the petitioner. (H) Be pleased to pass such other or further order or reliefs in the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. The case of the writ-applicant may be summarized as under:- 2.1 The writ-applicant joined the services of the Gujarat Rural Housing Board as a Supervisor on 26/12/1978. On 01/03/1994, he alongwith two other Engineers was promoted as the Deputy Executive Engineer. The promotion was on a probation period of two years. It appears that after the order was passed by the Board promoting the writ-applicant and other Engineers, an approval of the State Government was sought for. On 01/03/1994, he alongwith two other Engineers was promoted as the Deputy Executive Engineer. The promotion was on a probation period of two years. It appears that after the order was passed by the Board promoting the writ-applicant and other Engineers, an approval of the State Government was sought for. 2.2 After a period of nine years, i.e. in the year 2002, the State Government thought fit to decline the approval to such promotions given by the Board on two grounds, (i) the promotion could not have been given without clearing the Departmental Examination; and (ii) the promotion was contrary to the Policy of the State Government declared in the year 1998 as regards curtailing the expenditure. 2.3 Since the State Government declined to grant approval to the promotion given to the writ-applicant, the Board passed an order reverting him to the post of the Assistant Additional Engineer. Thus, having worked on the promotional post of the Deputy Executive Engineer for a period of almost nine years, the writ-applicant was reverted to his original post of the Assistant Additional Engineer and retired during the pendency of this writ-application. 3. Being dissatisfied, he has come up with this writ-application. 4. Mr. Mithil Mehta, the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicant vehemently submitted that the impugned order passed by the respondent no.1 reverting his client from the post of the Deputy Executive Engineer to the Additional Assistant Engineer is erroneous and illegal. The learned counsel submitted that for any reason if the Board thought fit to revert his client from the promotional post to the original post then atleast an opportunity of hearing should have been given. No notice was issued and no opportunity of any hearing was given before passing the impugned order. 5. The learned counsel submits that no where in the Act or Rules, it has been laid down that prior sanction or approval of the State Government is a must for the purpose of promotion. According to the learned counsel, the reliance placed on Section14 of the Gujarat Rural Housing Board Act, 1972 is absolutely misconceived. Section14 of the Act, 1972 talks about the appointment and not promotion. It is the proviso to Rule 14 which provides for approval of the State if the salary exceeds a particular appointment. 6. According to the learned counsel, the reliance placed on Section14 of the Gujarat Rural Housing Board Act, 1972 is absolutely misconceived. Section14 of the Act, 1972 talks about the appointment and not promotion. It is the proviso to Rule 14 which provides for approval of the State if the salary exceeds a particular appointment. 6. The learned counsel further submits that the Policy of the State Government not to pass any orders of promotion with a view to curtail the expenditure came in force sometime in the year 1998, whereas, the order of promotion was passed way-back in the year 1994. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel submits that there being merit in the writ-application, the same may be allowed and the relief as prayed for be granted. 7. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Rathod, the learned counsel appearing for the Board and Mr. Goutam, the learned AGP appearing for the State. 8. Mr. Rathod, the learned counsel appearing for the Board submits that the Board did pass an order promoting the writ-applicant to the post of the Deputy Executive Engineer. According to Mr. Rathod, no sooner the order was passed subject to passing of the departmental examination then, the approval of the State Government was sought for. He submits that initially some queries were raised by the State Government, but a no point of time, the Government questioned the functioning of the writ-applicant on the promotional post. 9. The learned AGP appearing for the State submits that Section14 of the Act contemplates prior approval of the State Government. There is no provision in the Act which provides for expost facto sanction or approval. According to the learned AGP, the Board should have asked the writ-applicant to first clear the departmental examination and only thereafter the order promoting him could have been passed. The passing of the departmental examination within one year from the date of promotion would not save the situation. The learned AGP would also submit that despite the Policy of the State Government not to pass orders of promotion with a view to curtail the expenditure, the Board proceeded to do so. 10. The learned AGP submits that the delay which occurred in taking the decision was on account of the administrative exigencies. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. 10. The learned AGP submits that the delay which occurred in taking the decision was on account of the administrative exigencies. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Rathod as well as the learned AGP pray that there being no merit in this writ-application, the same may be rejected. 11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Board as well as the State Government committed any error in passing the impugned orders. 12. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, let me look into the provision of Section 14 of the Act, 1972. Section 14 reads as under:- Section 14. The Board may appoint a Secretary, one or more Rural Assistant Housing Commissioners and a Rural Housing Commissioner and such other officers and servants as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions: Provided that the appoint of a Rural Housing Commissioner and of any other officer whose salary exceeds rupees one thousand and four hundred per mensem shall be subject to the previous approval of the State Government. 13. The plain reading of Section 14 would suggest that the same is with regard to appointment of officers and servants with the previous approval of the State Government. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the term “appointment” would also include “promotion”. I find it a bit difficult to accept the interpretation put forward on behalf of the respondents that the term “appointment” in the Section 14 referred to above would include “promotion”. It appears that any fresh appointment on the establishment of the Board would be subject to the previous approval of the State Government. Neither in the Rules governing promotion to the post of the Deputy Executive Engineer nor in the Act, 1972, there is anything which makes it mandatory for the Board to seek the previous approval of the State Government before passing any order of promotion. 14. Having regard to the language employed in the rule, it is difficult to take the view that the word “appointment” is wide enough to include both 'direct recruitment' and 'promotion' as a general rule. The reason is that in the substantive part of the rule, there is no reference of any previous approval of the State Government. 14. Having regard to the language employed in the rule, it is difficult to take the view that the word “appointment” is wide enough to include both 'direct recruitment' and 'promotion' as a general rule. The reason is that in the substantive part of the rule, there is no reference of any previous approval of the State Government. It is the proviso which says that if the salary of a Rural Housing Commissioner or any other Officer exceeds a particular amount then the appointment shall be subject to the previous approval of the State Government. 15. It is a settled law that the normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Survey [1880 (5) QBD 170], (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha ( AIR 1961 SC 1596 ) and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta ( AIR 1965 SC 1728 ); when one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subjectmatter of the proviso. The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. It is a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. "If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso." Said Lord Watson in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. (1897 AC 647) (HL). Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. (See A. N. Sehgal and Ors. (1897 AC 647) (HL). Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. (See A. N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje Ram Sheoram and Ors. ( AIR 1991 SC 1406 ), Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors. ( AIR 1991 SC 1538 ) and Kerala State Housing Board and Ors. v. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. and Ors. ( 1994 (5) SCC 672 ). Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing v/s. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 12 . "...The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment...." C.I.T. Maysore v/s. IndoMercantile Bank Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 713 . "...To read a proviso as providing something by way of an addendum or as dealing with a subject not covered by the main enactment or as stating a general rule as distinguished from an exception or qualification is ordinarily foreign to the proper function of a proviso..." 16. In such circumstances referred to above, it was not at all necessary or obligatory on the part of the Board to seek the approval of the order of promotion from the State Government. 17. The term “appointment” in Rule 14 should not be read in a wide and comprehensive sense to include an appointment by way of direct recruitment as well as the appointment by way of promotion. I am of the view that in the proviso to Rule 14, the expression “appointed” cannot be said to have been used in the context of promotions. The proviso makes it very clear that approval of the State Government is necessary only if the salary exceeds a particular amount on being appointed as a Rural Housing Commissioner or an Officer of the Board. 18. I am also not impressed by the submissions of the learned AGP that the promotion was contrary to the Policy of the State Government. As pointed out above, such policy was introduced in the year 1998, whereas, the order of promotion is of the year 1994. It is also not in dispute that within one year from the date of promotion, the writ-applicant cleared the departmental examination. 19. As pointed out above, such policy was introduced in the year 1998, whereas, the order of promotion is of the year 1994. It is also not in dispute that within one year from the date of promotion, the writ-applicant cleared the departmental examination. 19. The above takes me to consider the contention that the impugned order of reversion could not have been passed without issue of notice and opportunity of hearing. It cannot be denied that the provision made by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India is mandatory. It enjoins that a person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State, shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. It is admitted that no opportunity to show cause against the proposed order, before it was actually post, was given to the writ-applicant. The stance of the respondents, however, is that the writ-applicant was holding the post, from which he reverted, only temporarily and that too was on a probation and therefore, no notice of the order, therefore, need have been given. If a person officiating in a higher post is reverted to his original and substantive post by way of penalty, it amounts to reduction in rank, because such reversion is apt to stand in his way in securing promotion in the normal course. The principles of natural justice, if not the provisions of any statute law, require that a man shall not be removed from office or otherwise dealt with no his material disadvantage without fair, adequate and sufficient notice being given to him of what is alleged to his detriment, and without granting him an opportunity to meet the accusations levelled against him. The Courts are always extremely zealous in the enforcement of the maxim 'Audi Alteram Partem' (No man shall be condemned unheard). But there will be no condemnation if the reversion from the officiating to the original and substantive post is effected purely on administrative grounds or when it comes in its normal course. The Courts are always extremely zealous in the enforcement of the maxim 'Audi Alteram Partem' (No man shall be condemned unheard). But there will be no condemnation if the reversion from the officiating to the original and substantive post is effected purely on administrative grounds or when it comes in its normal course. In that case, the reversion may not be due to any supposed fault of the officer and it may not be by way of penalty or manifestation of disfavour. 20. A similar view was taken in – 'Jatindra Nath v. R. Gupta', AIR 1954 Cal 383 (B), where it was held that in the case of a person officiating in a higher post, if he is reverted to his original post in the normal course, there is no question of punishment or penalty being imposed, but it is quite a different thing if he is degraded or reverted to his original rank as a punishment for having committed some offence, or for indiscipline, insubordination or misconduct. If an order of reversion is likely to stand as a bar to the future promotion of the officer in the normal course, since it casts serious reflections on his efficiency, and is made by way of penalty, there appears to be no reason why he should not be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. But in a case where the order is made in the ordinary course of events or for some such other administrative reason, there is no occasion or necessity for an explanation of the officer to be reverted to his substantive post. 21. In the case in hand, the Board tried it best to defend the order of promotion. However, the State decline to approve the same on the ground which are not at all convincing. 22. One more question arises for my consideration is whether the administrative decision in the form of the impugned order could be said to be having civil consequences? 23. To put it in other words, even if the impugned order of reversion is an administrative decision, but leading to far reaching civil consequences as it adversely affected the right to continue in the promotional post then whether an opportunity of hearing should have been given to the writ-applicant. 23. To put it in other words, even if the impugned order of reversion is an administrative decision, but leading to far reaching civil consequences as it adversely affected the right to continue in the promotional post then whether an opportunity of hearing should have been given to the writ-applicant. The State would argue that the promotion was adhoc and the writ-applicant was on a probation and therefore, had no right to continue in the promotional post. 24. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Ratan Sinha Vs. State of Bihar; (2009) 14 SCC 690 . The appellant in the said case was appointed on a daily wages and was made permanent in the work-charge establishment alongwith several other persons in the respondent establishment. The appellant asserted that although he was appointed as a daily wager, yet he was asked to discharge the work of accounts clerk in view of his qualification and experience. The appellant filed an application before the Circle Promotion Committee for his promotion or reappointment to the post of accounts clerk and the request was considered by the committee and recommended his case for change of his nomenclature from daily-wager to accounts clerk and on the recommendations so made, the Electrical Superintending Engineer, Department of Energy, Patna issued an order changing his nomenclature from the labourer to accounts clerk, subject to approval of the Chief Electrical Engineer, Government of Bihar, Patna. The Incharge Chief Electrical Inspector approved the proposal of the Committee and issued the necessary orders in that regard. However, subsequently, the regular Chief Engineer on assumption of charge, having found that the order passed by the Incharge Chief Electrical Engineer was contrary to the rules and the government orders issued from time to time, has cancelled the earlier order. Such order was questioned by the appellant by filing a writ petition. The writ-petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge, mainly on the ground that the impugned order had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant. Such order was questioned by the appellant by filing a writ petition. The writ-petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge, mainly on the ground that the impugned order had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant. The appeal filed by the respondents was allowed by the Division Bench and it set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge, primarily on the ground, that affording an opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order is mere empty formality and even if an opportunity of hearing was granted, the result would have been the same. 25. The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal held as under: 9. The respondent is an instrumentality of the State, and therefore, all its administrative decisions would be subject to the doctrine of equality and fair play, as incorporated in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. If any of its actions or administrative decisions result in civil consequences, the actions or decisions could be judicially reviewed or tested on the anvil of principles of natural justice. This principle of law has been laid down by this Court in catena of cases. 10. In Canara Bank and Others Vs. Debasis Das and Others reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557 , this Court has held in paragraph 19 that “19....even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. This Court has elaborated the expression `civil consequence' by observing that it encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. This Court has further stated, that, in its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in civil life.” 11. The decision complained against in the instant case is an administrative decision. The decision is likely to have far reaching civil consequences for the appellant, as it has adversely affected his right to continue in the promotional post. Therefore, in our view, the decision concerning the promotion makes itself available for scrutiny by the Courts on the touchstone of well-established principles of natural justice. The decision that was questioned before the Court was an administrative decision having civil consequences and is alleged to have been taken without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. 12. Therefore, in our view, the decision concerning the promotion makes itself available for scrutiny by the Courts on the touchstone of well-established principles of natural justice. The decision that was questioned before the Court was an administrative decision having civil consequences and is alleged to have been taken without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. 12. The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant, basically is that, the administrative decision taken by the respondents is unfair, unreasonable and in breach of principles of natural justice. The administrative decision taken by the respondents is within the realm of public law and therefore, the decision ought to have been taken in a fair and reasonable manner. This was more necessary because the action cancelling the promotion of the appellant had civil consequences in the sense that it not only puts an end to the right of the appellant and also his further career prospectus. Therefore, the respondents are under an obligation to take all decisions in a fair and lawful manner by adhering to the rules of natural justice. 13. The law in this regard has been settled by several decisions of this Court. The principle that emerge from the decisions of this Court is that, if there is a power to decide and decide detrimentally to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in exercise of such a power and that the rule of natural justice operates in areas not covered by any law validly made. 14. Corollary principles emanating from these cases are as to what particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to an extent on the facts and circumstances of that case and that it is only where there is nothing in the statute to actually prohibit, the giving of an opportunity of being heard and on the other hand, the nature of the statutory duty imposed on the decision maker itself implies an obligation to hear before deciding. These cases have also observed, whenever an action of public body results in civil consequences for the person against whom the action is directed, the duty to act fairly can be presumed and in such a case, the administrative authority must give a proper opportunity of hearing to the affected person. 15. These cases have also observed, whenever an action of public body results in civil consequences for the person against whom the action is directed, the duty to act fairly can be presumed and in such a case, the administrative authority must give a proper opportunity of hearing to the affected person. 15. This Court in Canara Bank's case (supra) has stated that:- "the adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized states is of supreme importance or when a quasi judicial body embarks on determining dispute between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is an issue. Even an administrative order, which involves civil consequence must be consisted with the rules of natural justice. 26. In the case of D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd.; (1992) 3 SCC 259 , the Supreme Court has explained the meaning of the term “Civil Consequences”. The observations made in paras 8, 9 and 10 are relevant, which are as under:- 8. The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is whether the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly, namely' the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent the authority to act arbitrarily effecting the rights of the concerned person. 9. It is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the right of any person without first being informed of the case and be given him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. In Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner & Ors. [1978] 2 SCR 272 at 308F the Constitution Bench held that 'civil consequence' covers infraction of not merely property or personal right but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotion every thing that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. v. The Chief Election Commissioner & Ors. [1978] 2 SCR 272 at 308F the Constitution Bench held that 'civil consequence' covers infraction of not merely property or personal right but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotion every thing that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, page 1487 defined civil rights are such as belong to every citizen of the state or country they include rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors., this court held that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The person concerned must be informed of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Since no such opportunity was given it was held that superannuation was in violation of principles of natural justice. 10. In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] SCR 289, per majority, a seven Judge bench held that the rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Art. 14 of the Constitution as any rule of substantive law. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621, another bench of seven judges held that the substantive and procedural laws and action taken under them will have to pass the test under Art, 14. The test of reason and justice cannot be abstract. They cannot be divorced from the needs of the nation. The tests have to be pragmatic otherwise they would cease to he reasonable. The procedure prescribed must be just, fair and reasonable even though there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the right of that individual. The duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. The duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. Even executive authorities which take administrative action involving any deprivation of or restriction on inherent fundamental rights of citizens, must take care to see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is patently impartial and meets the requirements of natural justice. 27. What can be deduced from the above noted decision of the Supreme Court is that even an administrative order which involves the civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Whether an opportunity of hearing should have been given or not before passing an order of reversion to the original post from the promotional post would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. 28. I am of the view that if the Board was helpless before the State Government then atleast the State Government should have given an opportunity of hearing to the writ-applicant before directing the Board to revert the writ-applicant to his original post. 29. On 09/09/2016 the following order was passed. 1. Prima facie, the action on the part of the Housing Commissioner of the Gujarat Rural Housing Board in reverting the writ applicant from the promotional post to the original post after a period of nine years appears to be arbitrary. 2. The learned AGP as well as Mr. Rathod, the learned counsel appearing for the Board shall answer the following two questions; (I) Whether any show-cause notice was issued to the writ applicant before passing the impugned order dated 13th March, 2003? (ii) Whether any opportunity of hearing was given to the writ applicant before the order of reversion came to be passed? (iii) Why it took nine years for the Commissioner to pass the impugned order, more particularly, when the Board had already sought the approval way back in the year 1994? Post the matter on 14th September, 2016. 30. It is conceded that no show-cause notice was issued to the writ-applicant or any opportunity of hearing was given before the order of reversion came to be passed. Post the matter on 14th September, 2016. 30. It is conceded that no show-cause notice was issued to the writ-applicant or any opportunity of hearing was given before the order of reversion came to be passed. There is no explanation at the end of the Commissioner why took nine years to pass the impugned order. 31. Not an iota of reason has been assigned by the State Government why it took nine odd years to tell the Board that it could not have passed the order of promotion. The Board being an autonomous body blindly followed the directions of the State Government. 32. Having regard to the overall facts, the action on the part of the Government as well as the Board could be termed as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India. 33. The writ-applicant has retired from the service. I also do not approve the stance of the Board having passed the order of promotion consciously. It is not fair and proper on the part of the Board to disown the writ-applicant. It is not fair on the part of the Board to turn around and say that the order of promotion was not in accordance with the Rules and Regulations. On the contrary, it appears from the affidavit-in-reply that the Board vide its letter dated 26/11/2002 had requested the State Government to reconsider the case of the writ-applicant. 34. I am of the view that the Board as well as the State Government should reconsider the issue in light of the observations made by this Court and take an appropriate decision afresh in accordance with law. 35. The writ-application succeeds and is hereby partly allowed. The impugned orders dated 13/03/2003 and 20/03/2003 are hereby ordered to be quashed. The respondents are directed to reconsider the issue afresh as directed above and take an appropriate decision within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of the order. The decision shall be in writing and with reasons. If the decision once again goes against the writ-applicant then it shall be open for him to challenge the same before this Court. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.