JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. By filing this writ petition the petitioner challenged Memo. vide No.F.14(115)-HFW/97/2512(V-III) dated 12.07.2004 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) whereunder a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against her for gross misconduct on the following article of charges: “Statement of Article of charges framed against Smt. Gouri Malakar, Ex-matron under Health & Family Welfare Department, Government of Tripura. Article-1 That the said Smt. Gouri Rani Malakar while functioning as Staff Nurse in the Sub-divisional Hospital, North Tripura submitted false certificate and affidavit indicating her date of birth is on 30-4-1946 though her actual date of birth is on 30-4-1941 as informed and confirmed by the Controller of Examination Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Dhaka, Bangladesh vide their No.4378/Con/2002 dated 12-6- 2002. By submitting false certificate and affidavit and concealing the actual date of birth, Smt. Gouri Rani Malakar, Ex-Matron continued to work beyond her actual date of retirement on superannuation for a period of nearly 2(two) years (from 1-5-1999 to 19-3-2001). Such activities of Smt. Gouri Rani Malakar are nothing but for illegal gain and are most unbecoming on part of Govt. employees. and this tantamount to gross misconduct. Thus Smt. Malakar has violated Rule-3 of the Tripura State Civil Services(conduct) Rules. 1988.” The petitioner prayed for quashing and/or setting aside the Memo. dated 12.07.2004. 2. Heard learned counsel, Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik for the petitioner and learned State counsel, Mr. J. Majumder for the respondents. 3. The petitioner contended that while she was serving as a Matron in the Department of Health & Family Welfare of the Government of Tripura, on 03.09.2002, Under Secretary to the Government of Tripura lodged an FIR alleging that she has altered her date of birth wrongly with a view to render more services beyond the date of her actual superannuation and that FIR was registered as East Agartala P.S. Case No.174/2002 under Section 468 of IPC. Thereafter, by impugned Memo. Thereafter, by impugned Memo. dated 12.07.2004 a disciplinary proceeding on the same fact was initiated for gross misconduct and the petitioner by making an application dated 25.07.2004 addressed to the Deputy Secretary of the Government of Tripura prayed for dropping the departmental proceeding but since she received no response she filed WP(C) No.33 of 2005 in the Agartala Bench of the Gauhati High Court and that writ petition was disposed of by judgment dated 17.02.2005 directing not to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry till disposal of the criminal proceeding. The criminal case initiated against her was tried by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala and by judgment dated 20.02.2008 she was acquitted from the charge framed against her under Section 468 of IPC. Thereafter, the respondents issued notice dated 22.10.2008 asking the petitioner to appear before the inquiring authority on 11.11.2008 in connection with the disciplinary proceeding drawn under Memo. dated 12.07.2004 but she could not appear on that day and thereafter again another notice dated 28.01.2009 was issued asking her to appear on 06.02.2009. It is further contended by the petitioner that by Memo. dated 08.03.2001(Annexure-10 to the writ petition) the petitioner was put on retirement with effect from the afternoon of 30.04.1999 on her attaining the age of superannuation on 12.04.1999 taking into account her date of birth as 13.04.1941. The disciplinary proceeding since was initiated on 12.07.2004, it was after five years of her date of superannuation and so it was barred by the law of limitation. It is also contended by the petitioner that the article of charges, list of witnesses and the and the documents in the disciplinary proceeding are same and identical as were placed before the criminal court and since the criminal court acquitted her, the disciplinary proceeding on the same and identical charge cannot proceed against her and it will cause injustice to her in enjoying the pensionary and other benefits which have been accrued in her favour due to her long period of service. The disciplinary proceeding cannot proceed further and is liable to be quashed. 4. The disciplinary proceeding cannot proceed further and is liable to be quashed. 4. By filing counter affidavit the respondents inter alia contended that the present writ petition is barred by the principles of constructive res judicata since the issues raised in the present writ petition were available at that point of time when the earlier writ petition was filed and the writ petition is further barred by the principles of delay and laches by influx of time. It is also contended by the respondents that the disciplinary proceeding has been initiated well within the period of limitation from the date of issuance of Memo. dated 08.03.2001 when the petitioner was asked to go on retirement w.e.f. the afternoon of 30.04.1999. It is contended by the respondents that the original date of birth of the petitioner at the time of her entering into service was recorded as 13.04.1941 pursuant to the original certificate produced by the petitioner and thereafter in the year 1977 while she was working under the SDMO, Dharmanagar, on her prayer, SDMO having no authority recorded her date of birth as 13.04.1946. Subsequently, an inquiry was conducted and she was asked to produce the copy of the certificate issued by Dhaka Board but she could not produce the original certificate even after repeated letters written to her and she produced some photocopies on the basis of which the respondents made an inquiry by writing a letter to the Controller of Examination, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Dhaka, Bangladesh and it was reported by the Dhaka Board in writing a letter dated 12.06.2002 that the records of the matriculation examination of the petitioner was verified and according to the record her date of birth was 30.04.1941. Thereafter, FIR was lodged against the petitioner and the disciplinary proceeding was initiated vide Memo. dated 12.07.2004. It is also contended by the respondents that in the service book of the petitioner her original date of birth was recorded as 13.04.1941 and subsequently on her application with false and fraudulent records her date of birth was changed to 13.04.1946 and when the petitioner could not produce the original records even after repeated writing of letters, by Memo. dated 08.03.2001 she was put on retirement w.e.f. the afternoon of 30.04.1999 taking into account her age of superannuation as on 12.04.1999 and that she continued service in the department till March, 2001. dated 08.03.2001 she was put on retirement w.e.f. the afternoon of 30.04.1999 taking into account her age of superannuation as on 12.04.1999 and that she continued service in the department till March, 2001. The disciplinary proceeding therefore cannot be said to be barred by law of limitation. It is also contended by the respondents that the petitioner was not honourably acquitted by the criminal court rather on technical ground the petitioner was acquitted which does not debar the disciplinary proceeding already initiated against her and it is also contended by the respondents that the petitioner by filing a petition dated 25.02.2004(Annexure-R11 to the counter affidavit) admitted that she was due to retire on 30.04.1999 on her attaining the age of superannuation and that she may be excused for the ignorance for her two years more services she already served and that she was ready to return the amount she received for such period of service after retirement on reasonable installments. The respondents therefore prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Learned counsel, Mr. Kar Bhowmik has submitted that in the earlier writ petition the issue of limitation was not raised and so there is no bar in raising the issue in a subsequent writ petition. The procedural law as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be applied in writ proceedings as it is, since the writ court has got wider jurisdiction to render justice for violation of any legal or constitutional rights. He relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of State of Haryana & Ors. v. M.P. Mohla reported in (2007) 1 SCC 457 and Jeypore Suger Company Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer & Ors. reported in (1998) 9 SCC 358 . 6. Learned counsel, Mr. Majumder, on the other hand has submitted that in the earlier writ petition the petitioner made simple prayer not to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry till disposal of the criminal proceeding and that prayer of the petitioner was allowed. While the disciplinary proceeding was already initiated against the petitioner by Memo. dated 12.07.2004, the petitioner was well aware of the factual position and would raise the issue of limitation in that writ petition itself and therefore the present writ petition is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. 7. While the disciplinary proceeding was already initiated against the petitioner by Memo. dated 12.07.2004, the petitioner was well aware of the factual position and would raise the issue of limitation in that writ petition itself and therefore the present writ petition is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. 7. The general doctrine of res judicata is founded on considerations of high public policy to attain the objectives that there must be a finality to litigation and that individual should not be harassed twice over the same kind of litigation. It is in the interest of the public at large that the finality should be attached to the binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individual should not be vexed twice over the same kind of litigation. According to Halsbury, the doctrine applies equally to all courts and it is immaterial in what court the former proceeding was taken, provided only that it was a court of competent jurisdiction, or what form the proceeding took place, provided it was really for the same cause. Constructive res judicata is a special and artificial form of res judicata. Final decision on a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit is res judicata. But a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence in the former suit but which was not done so by any of the parties, will also be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit and the rules of res judicata will equally apply to it. Such a matter is regarded as having been constructively in issue and since the parties had an opportunity of putting it forward, it is considered as having been actually controverted and decided. The principle of constructive res judicata applies in subsequent stages of same proceeding. The bar of constructive res judicata will apply only if a party omits to include one of the several causes of action arising out of the same set of facts and not when different and independent causes of action arise out of altogether different set of facts. 8. It is an admitted position that the impugned disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner by impugned Memo. dated 12.07.2004 on specific article of charges, as already reproduced hereinbefore. 8. It is an admitted position that the impugned disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner by impugned Memo. dated 12.07.2004 on specific article of charges, as already reproduced hereinbefore. It is also an admitted position that Under Secretary to the Government of Tripura lodged an FIR on 03.09.2002 against the petitioner for commission of offence punishable under Section 468 of IPC and that criminal case was pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala. The petitioner contended that she made representation dated 25.07.2004(Annexure-3 to the writ petition) before the authority (Deputy Secretary, Govt. of Tripura) to drop the proceeding since the criminal case was pending. The respondents did not respond to her representation and therefore she filed WP(C) No.33 of 2005 before Agartala Bench of the then Gauhati High Court challenging the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding pending the criminal case. By judgment dated 17.02.2005 the writ petition was disposed of with the following direction: “5. This writ petition, is, therefore, disposed of with the direction to the respondent authority not to proceed with the disciplinary departmental enquiry till disposal of the criminal proceedings. It is made clear that such authority shall be at liberty to take steps against the petitioner in accordance with law after disposal of the criminal proceeding.” 9. The criminal proceeding ended in acquittal of the accused-petitioner by judgment dated 20.02.2008 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala, in case No.GR 671 of 2002(Annexure-7 to the writ petition). The observation of the criminal court as contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 reads as follows: “12. In view of the observation made above and also in consideration of the submission of learned lawyers of both sides as well as circumstances of the present case, I arrive at the decision that the prosecution has not been able to prove the charge Under section 468 of IPC against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and as such she deserves for acquittal. 13. In the result, I hereby acquit the accused Smti. Gouri Malakar from the charge as lebelled against her as punishable Under section 468 of IPC and she is set at liberty.” The criminal court acquitted the accused-petitioner purely on technical ground that the verification certificate which was sent by Dhaka Board was not attested by the High Commissioner and so the benefit of doubt was given to the accused-petitioner. Gouri Malakar from the charge as lebelled against her as punishable Under section 468 of IPC and she is set at liberty.” The criminal court acquitted the accused-petitioner purely on technical ground that the verification certificate which was sent by Dhaka Board was not attested by the High Commissioner and so the benefit of doubt was given to the accused-petitioner. After acquittal from the criminal case the respondents issued notices dated 22.10.2008 and 28.01.2009(Annexure-8 and 9 respectively to the writ petition) asking the petitioner to appear before the inquiring authority in the disciplinary proceeding and thereafter the petitioner filed the present writ petition contending that the disciplinary proceeding is barred by limitation. 10. The question is whether the petitioner would raise the issue of limitation in the earlier writ petition i.e. WP(C) No.33 of 2005 and if not raised whether the petitioner can raise the issue in the present writ petition, and if so, whether it is barred by constructive res judicata? The cause of action for filing the earlier writ petition invariably was the disciplinary proceeding initiated by Memo. dated 12.07.2004 as clearly contained in the judgment passed by the writ court dated 17.02.2005. The cause of action for filing the present writ petition is also the same impugned Memo. dated 12.07.2004. In the earlier writ petition the petitioner simply prayed that the disciplinary proceeding initiated by that Memo. dated 12.07.2004 should not proceed pending final disposal of the criminal proceeding and now after the criminal proceeding ended and the disciplinary proceeding has been taken up the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition on the ground that it is barred by limitation. So, it is abundantly clear that the petitioner would raise that issue of limitation in the earlier writ petition while the issue was already available at that point of time itself and the petitioner, it is to be presumed that, has not raised that issue and thereby abandoned that issue at that point of time. It is clearly stated in the order dated 17.02.2005 in WP(C) No.33 of 2005 that the authority shall be at liberty to take step against the petitioner in accordance with law, after disposal of the criminal proceeding. 11. It is an admitted position that the petitioner has not been acquitted honourably. On technical ground she has been acquitted by the criminal court from the charges framed against her. 11. It is an admitted position that the petitioner has not been acquitted honourably. On technical ground she has been acquitted by the criminal court from the charges framed against her. There is no legal bar in initiating the criminal proceeding if the acquittal was not an honourable acquittal one. In a case of acquittal from a criminal charge on benefits of doubt/on technical ground, the disciplinary authority has the jurisdiction to proceed against an employee in a departmental inquiry on the same issue. 12. In the case of M.P. Mohla(supra) the Supreme Court in paragraphs 22 and 23 has observed: “22. We, as at present advised, do not intend to go into the question as to whether the Revised Pay Rules or the ACP Rules will apply in the case of the respondent. The dispute between the parties has to be decided in accordance with law. What, however, cannot be denied or disputed that a dispute between the parties once adjudicated must reach its logical conclusion. If a specific question which was not raised and which had not been decided by the High Court the same would not debar a party to agitate the same at an appropriate stage, subject, of course, to the applicability of principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata. 23. It is also trite that if a subsequent cause of action has arisen in the matter of implementation of a judgment a fresh writ petition may be filed, as a fresh cause of action has arisen.” The fact of that case is clearly distinguishable to that of the fact of the present case. On almost same bundle of fact the subsequent writ petition was filed but it was on a fresh cause of action. So the Apex Court has held that for a fresh cause of action a subsequent writ petition can be filed in the matter of implementation of an earlier judgment. The ratio of that judgment, in my considered opinion cannot be applied in the facts of the present case since here the issue is identical that the petitioner would raise the issue of limitation in the earlier suit but has abandoned that issue and filed the subsequent writ petition but on the same cause of action. 13. In the case of Jeypore Suger Company Ltd.(supra) the Supreme Court in para 5 of the judgment observed— “5. 13. In the case of Jeypore Suger Company Ltd.(supra) the Supreme Court in para 5 of the judgment observed— “5. We have heard Shri Salve, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, and Shri Mohanty for the respondents. Shri Mohanty has sought to support the impugned order of the High Court on the ground that as the point now raised by the appellant was available earlier and was not taken and as the aforesaid application for clarification was withdrawn, the appellant may not be permitted to raise the same ground. According to us, it would not be just and proper to deny relief to the appellant, which is otherwise due, on the ground that earlier it had only assailed the question of exigibility to tax. It is correct that the plea now taken could have been advanced earlier as well, but the fact this was not done, should not be a ground to deny the relief which is otherwise due to the appellant. The technical plea of constructive res judicata should not stand in the way of the appellant in a case of the present nature. In the peculiar nature of that case, the Apex Court held that the principle of constructive res judicata shall not stand in the way. Fact of that reported case was that the earlier writ petition was filed challenging exigibility of sales tax and the subsequent writ petition was filed seeking benefit of C-forms. Here in this case, the earlier writ petition was filed challenging impugned Memo. dated 12.07.2004 and the present writ petition also was filed challenging the same Memo., whereas in the earlier writ petition only prayed for keeping the D.P. pend., till disposal of the criminal proceeding and now in the present writ petition it is contended that the disciplinary proceeding is time barred, whereas in the earlier writ petition the writ court clearly held that the authority shall be at liberty to take steps against the petitioner in accordance with law after disposal of the criminal proceeding. 14. Learned counsel, Mr. Majumder appearing for the respondents has submitted that the present writ petition is also barred by the provision of Order II Rule 2 of CPC. Mr. 14. Learned counsel, Mr. Majumder appearing for the respondents has submitted that the present writ petition is also barred by the provision of Order II Rule 2 of CPC. Mr. Kar Bhowmik, learned counsel of the petitioner has submitted that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be readily applied in a writ proceeding and where the appropriate relief is to be given, on technical ground it should not be refused. He relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Puran Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. reported in (1999) 2 SCC 205 . 15. Let us reproduce here order II Rule 2 of CPC which reads as follows: “2. Suit to include the whole claim.- (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any court. Relinquishment of part of claim—(2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. Omission to sue for one of several reliefs—(3) A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.” The above provision clearly stipulates that if the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. It is also contemplated in the above provision that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the court, to sue for all such relief he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. 16. Admittedly, by the earlier writ petition the petitioner prayed for only keeping the disciplinary proceeding pending till disposal of the criminal proceeding. 16. Admittedly, by the earlier writ petition the petitioner prayed for only keeping the disciplinary proceeding pending till disposal of the criminal proceeding. She would pray for quashing the disciplinary proceeding on the ground of limitation but she has intentionally omitted to make such a prayer and no relief was sought to quash the proceeding. The relief sought was only to stay the disciplinary proceeding pending criminal proceeding and so the present writ petition is clearly barred by the provisions as contained in Sub Rules (1) and (2) of Order II Rule 2 of CPC. 17. In Puran Singh(supra) the Supreme Court while deciding an issue in respect of application of Order XXII Rule 4 of CPC has made certain observations clarifying the provision of Section 141 of CPC and has held— “……………..After the introduction of the explanation to Section 141 of the Code, it can be said that when Section 141 provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable "in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction" it shall not include a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this background, according to us, it cannot be held that the provisions contained in Order 22 of the Code are applicable per se to writ proceedings. If even before the introduction of the explanation to Section 141, this Court in the case of Babubhai v. Nandlal : (1974) 2 SCC 706 had said that(SCC Heanote p.707) the words "as far as it can be made applicable” occurring in Section 141 of the Code made it clear that, in applying the various provisions of the Code to the proceedings other than those of a suit, the court has to take into consideration the nature of those proceedings and the reliefs sought for after introduction of the explanation the writ proceedings have to be excluded from the expression "proceedings" occurring in Section 141 of the Code. If because of the explanation, proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution has been excluded, there is no question of making applicable the procedure of Code “as far as it can be made applicable” to such proceeding. If because of the explanation, proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution has been excluded, there is no question of making applicable the procedure of Code “as far as it can be made applicable” to such proceeding. The procedures prescribed in respect of suit in the Code if are made applicable to the writ proceedings then in many cases it may frustrate the exercise of extraordinary powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.” In para 11 of the judgment the court has observed— “11. We have not been able to appreciate the anxiety on the part of the different courts in judgments referred to above to apply the provisions of the Code to writ proceedings on the basis of Section 141 of the Code. When the Constitution has vested extraordinary power in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 to issue any order, writ or direction and the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which such High Court is exercising jurisdiction, the procedure for exercising such power and jurisdiction have to be traced and found in Articles 226 and 227 itself. No useful purpose will be served by limiting the power of the High Court by procedural provisions prescribed in the Code. Of course, on many questions, the provisions and procedures prescribed under the Code can be taken up as guide while exercising the power, for granting relief to persons, who have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. It need not be impressed that different provisions and procedures under the Code are based on well-recognised principles for exercise of discretionary power, and they are reasonable and rational. But at the same time, it cannot be disputed that many procedures prescribed in the said Code are responsible for delaying the delivery of justice and causing delay in securing the remedy available to a person who pursues such remedies. The High Court should be left to adopt its own procedure for granting relief to the persons concerned. The High Court is expected to adopt a procedure which can be held to be not only reasonable but also expeditious.” The law explained by the Apex Court as quoted above does not mean that the Code of Civil Procedure has totally been excluded from application in writ proceeding. The High Court is expected to adopt a procedure which can be held to be not only reasonable but also expeditious.” The law explained by the Apex Court as quoted above does not mean that the Code of Civil Procedure has totally been excluded from application in writ proceeding. It is a settled law that the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure is not required to be readily applied to a writ proceeding but the principles of law as contained therein in a particular facts and circumstances of the case may be applied. It is also a settled law that the writ court shall apply the procedure which is fair and transparent and to ensure justice according to law without unnecessary delay. Here in this case, the petitioner to minimize the litigation in her earlier writ petition would easily raise the issue of limitation seeking the relief of quashing the disciplinary proceeding. But she did not do so, rather, was waiting for a subsequent writ petition after the criminal proceeding and in the earlier writ petition simply prayed for staying the disciplinary proceeding pending disposal of the criminal proceeding. Though the procedural law as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure shall not as it is applied in a writ petition but the principle of law cannot be ignored and that may be fairly applied, and so I have no hesitation to arrive at a conclusion that the principle of constructive res judicata and the principle contained in Order II Rule 2 may fairly be applied in the present case of the petitioner. 18. Learned counsel, Mr. Kar Bhowmik referring to Rule 9 of CCS(Pension) Rules has submitted that the disciplinary proceeding was not initiated within the time prescribed by Rule 9(2)(b) and so it is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel, Mr. Majumder submits that the disciplinary proceeding was initiated well within the period of limitation as prescribed in the rule. Rule 9(2)(b) of the CCS(Pension) Rules prescribes thus:- “9(2)(b). Learned counsel, Mr. Majumder submits that the disciplinary proceeding was initiated well within the period of limitation as prescribed in the rule. Rule 9(2)(b) of the CCS(Pension) Rules prescribes thus:- “9(2)(b). The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement, or during his reemployment,— (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the President, (ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution, and (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the President may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to departmental proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relation to the Government servant during his service.” 19. It is not disputed that the disciplinary proceeding has been initiated with the sanction of the Governor. The issue is whether it was for an event taken place, more than four years before the initiation of the proceeding. In the writ petition the petitioner did not make any averment as to when she made application for change of her date of birth. She simply started the writ petition saying that an FIR was lodged alleging that she altered her date of birth for her personal gain of rendering five years more services. She did not elaborately state all necessary facts in the writ petition. However, what is before us is that the original date of birth which was recorded in her service book was 13.04.1941. Subsequently, on her prayer in the year 1977 her date of birth was recorded as 13.04.1046. Thereafter, an inquiry was conducted and during this long period of time she was asked to produce her original admit card and matriculation certificate issued by Dhaka Board but she did not produce the original and certain copies were placed. She was due to retire on 12.04.1999 on her attaining the age of superannuation w.e.f. 30.04.1999 but in view of the entry made in her service book changing her date of birth she continued her service till March, 2001 and only on 08.03.2001 by Memo. No.F.14(115)- HFW/97/7415(V-III) dated 08.03.2001(Annexure-10 to the writ petition) she was put on retirement w.e.f. the afternoon of 30.04.1999. No.F.14(115)- HFW/97/7415(V-III) dated 08.03.2001(Annexure-10 to the writ petition) she was put on retirement w.e.f. the afternoon of 30.04.1999. Inquiry was conducted and the copy of the certificate given by her with a letter dated 10.04.2002 was sent to the Controller of Examination, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Dhaka, Bangladesh(Annexure-9 to the writ petition) for verification and the Controller of Examination of Dhaka Board by letter dated 12.06.2002 informed the respondents that the original date of birth recorded was 30.04.1941 and not 13.04.1046. After receipt of that communication, the FIR of the criminal case was lodged and thereafter disciplinary proceeding was initiated. Even if we take the Memo. dated 08.03.2001, as the date when the petitioner was put on retirement w.e.f. 30.04.1999, the disciplinary proceeding being initiated on 12.07.2004 was within four years and cannot be said to be barred as contemplated in Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of CCS(Pension) Rules. 20. Mr. Kar Bhowmik, learned counsel has referred the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. & Anr. v. Shri Krishna Pandey reported in (1996) 9 SCC 395 and submitted that the disciplinary proceeding being initiated on 12.07.2004 for an event which occurred in 1977 shall be deemed to be barred as contemplated in Rule 9(2) of the CCS(Pension) Rules. After going through the case of Krishna Pandey(supra) I find nothing to apply the ratio of that case in the facts of the present case. On her petition, her date of birth which was originally recorded in her service book was changed. There was inquiry made and in the course of inquiry when she was asked to submit the original admit card and Madhyamik certificate issued by Dhaka Board she could not place the original and a copy submitted by her was sent to Dhaka Board and the verification report was received by the respondents in the month of June, 2002. Thereafter, the FIR was lodged and the disciplinary proceeding was initiated. The petitioner was in service till March, 2001 though she was supposed to be retired on her attaining the age of superannuation w.e.f. 30.04.1999. The cause of action for initiation of the departmental proceeding arose at best on 08.03.2001 when she was put on retirement and ultimately in the month of June, 2002 when communication of Dhaka Board was received. The petitioner was in service till March, 2001 though she was supposed to be retired on her attaining the age of superannuation w.e.f. 30.04.1999. The cause of action for initiation of the departmental proceeding arose at best on 08.03.2001 when she was put on retirement and ultimately in the month of June, 2002 when communication of Dhaka Board was received. By filing Annexure-R11 to the respondent No.2 the petitioner admitted that she was due to retire on 30.04.1999 and that she continued in service till 08.03.2001 and that her ignorance may be excused and she may be paid the retiral benefits. Annexure-R11 has not been controverted by filing rejoinder. Under such circumstances, the writ petition seeking quashing of the disciplinary proceeding is totally unfounded and cannot be said that it was filed for an event more than four years before the date of initiation. 21. Learned counsel, Mr. Majumder has submitted a copy of the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in WP(C) No.163 of 2013 wherein this Court has held that the limitation will start only from the date of discovery of the fraud. We may refer here paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment which read thus:- “5. On the other hand, Sri J. Majumder, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, urges that the action of the petitioner is fraudulent in nature inasmuch as he produced a forged transfer certificate and if thus, such as transfer certificate is found to be forged, then fraud vitiates all action which have been taken on the basis of such transfer certificate. He, therefore, submits that the limitation for all intents and purposes shall start not from the date of submission of the forged transfer certificate, but from the date when it was discovered that the transfer certificate is forged. Sri Majumder has produced the records and even from the records, we find that the verification of the date of birth was only made in the year 2010 and the date of birth was never verified earlier. 6. By now, the law is well settled that fraud vitiates every action and in case of fraud, limitation will start only from the date of discovery of the fraud. According to the petitioner, he was born in the year 1954 and not 1948. 6. By now, the law is well settled that fraud vitiates every action and in case of fraud, limitation will start only from the date of discovery of the fraud. According to the petitioner, he was born in the year 1954 and not 1948. There may be a difference of a few months or even a year while making entry in the service record when a rustic villager enters service, but a difference of six years in age that too on the basis of a document, if wrong, can be presumed to be fraudulent and be presumed to be on the basis of a forged document. However, as pointed out by us, no disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the writ petitioner till date. His pension cannot be stopped nor any recoveries made from his pensionary benefits unless disciplinary proceedings are held and after giving due opportunity to the writ petitioner. If he is found guilty of having committed misconduct, then recovery can be made. Normally, we would have sent the case back to the Government to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner before taking any further action.” 22. The disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner with the allegation that her actual date of birth which was recorded was 13.04.1941 and that she altered her date of birth placing forged document and that was detected after it was verified from the Dhaka Board in the year 2002 and so the disciplinary proceeding which was drawn up on 12.07.2004 cannot be said to be barred by the law of limitation as contemplated in Rule 9(2)(b) of the CCS(Pension) Rules. 23. Before parting with the case record I would like to make certain observation that a writ petition should be filed placing all relevant and material fact so that the court can fairly appreciate the entire fact and take a decision to afford justice. In this writ petition the petitioner deliberately did not place on record in her pleadings the material facts as to what was her date of birth recorded at the time when she joined the service and at what time the date of birth was changed and under what circumstances? What was the reason for having an inquiry in respect of her date of birth and what had happened during the inquiry? What was the reason for having an inquiry in respect of her date of birth and what had happened during the inquiry? She has deliberately suppressed all those material facts and simply approached for quashing the disciplinary proceeding on the ground of limitation. Such conduct of the petitioner is bound to be condemned. The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. 24. In my considered opinion, the petitioner did not approach the writ court in clean hands and suppressed the material facts and therefore the writ petition stands dismissed with cost of `2,000/-(rupees two thousand). 25. The interim order passed on 08.05.2009 in CM Appl. No.68 of 2009 shall stand vacated.