JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition, filed by the original petitioner Pragjibhai Lallubhai Patel under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against the order dated 7.12.2000 (Annexure-F) passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”). During the pendency of the petition, the original petitioner having expired, his legal heirs have been permitted to be brought on record. Earlier Mr.Harshad J. Shah, learned Counsel was appearing for the respondent No.1 Raysingbhai Ishvarbhai Patanwadia, who claimed to be the tenant in respect of the land in question. According to Mr.Shah, he was not able to get any instructions either from the respondent No.1 or from the advocate who appeared for the respondent No.1 in the trial Court, and hence, this Court had permitted him to withdraw his appearance. Mr.Bhargav Hasukar appears as Amicus Curiae for respondent No.2 Trust, the original owner of the land. 2. The short facts giving rise to the present petition are that the land bearing Survey No.12 admeasuring 1 acre and 5 gunthas situated in the Sim of Village Vaniyad, Taluka Shinor, District Vadodara, belonged to the respondent No.2 Trust, which was being managed by the Vahivat Karta deceased Ranchhodbhai Govindbhai. As per the case of the petitioner, the said land was transferred by the said Trust in favour of the petitioner by executing a writing on 10.8.1965 and since then the petitioner was in possession of and was cultivating the land in question. It is further case of the petitioner that the Mamlatdar and ALT, Dabhoi had initiated an inquiry under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Tenancy Act”), however, had dropped the proceedings of the inquiry as per the order dated 10.8.1978 (Annexure-A). In the said inquiry proceedings, the respondent No.1 was also a party. However, the said order remained unchallenged at the instance of the respondent No.1. The Mamlatdar and ALT again initiated another inquiry under Section 84C of the Tenancy Act and again dropped the said proceedings vide the order dated 6.9.1988 (Annexure-B). The said order also remained unchallenged at the instance of the respondent No.1. However, the said order remained unchallenged at the instance of the respondent No.1. The Mamlatdar and ALT again initiated another inquiry under Section 84C of the Tenancy Act and again dropped the said proceedings vide the order dated 6.9.1988 (Annexure-B). The said order also remained unchallenged at the instance of the respondent No.1. However, the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), Vadodara in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act, suo motu took the matter for review and vide the order dated 11.6.1990 (Annexure-C) remanded the case to the Mamlatdar and ALT, holding that the petitioner Pragjibhai L. Patel was in unauthorized possession of the land in question and, therefore, he was required to be evicted and the possession of the land was required to be handed over to the respondent tenant. 3. Pursuant to the said order passed by the Deputy Collector, the Mamlatdar and ALT again initiated the proceedings under Section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act, which was registered as the Ganot Case No.414 of 1989. The said Mamlatdar and ALT vide the order dated 27.1.1992 (Annexure-D) held that the sale made by the respondent No.2 Trust in favour of the petitioner was illegal, and therefore, directed them to hand over the possession of the land in question to the respondent No.1 tenant under Section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act. The petitioner and the respondent No.2 being aggrieved by the said order had preferred an appeal being Appeal No.10/1992 before the Assistant Collector, who vide the order dated 6.3.1993 (Annexure-E) allowed the same and set aside the order dated 27.1.1992 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT. The respondent No.1, therefore, filed the revision application being TEN.B.A. 398/1993 before the Tribunal, who vide the impugned order dated 7.12.2000 (Annexure-F) allowed the same and directed that the possession of the land in question be obtained from the petitioner or his successor-intitle and to hand it over to the legal heirs of the respondent No.1. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed the present petition. 4. The learned Counsel Mr.D. N. Pandya for the legal heirs of the original petitioner, placing heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Dhondiram Tatoba Kadam Vs. Ramchandra Balwantrao Dubal (since Decd.) By His LRS. And Anr., reported in 1995(1) GLR 344 and of this Court in the case of Jashbhai M. Patel Vs. 4. The learned Counsel Mr.D. N. Pandya for the legal heirs of the original petitioner, placing heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Dhondiram Tatoba Kadam Vs. Ramchandra Balwantrao Dubal (since Decd.) By His LRS. And Anr., reported in 1995(1) GLR 344 and of this Court in the case of Jashbhai M. Patel Vs. Dhulabhai Lakhabhai, reported in 1997(2) 1196 submitted that the ingredients of Section 32(1B) having not been fulfilled, the proceedings initiated by the Mamlatdar and confirmed by the Tribunal were required to be quashed and set aside. He also submitted that the Deputy Collector had no authority to exercise the power under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act after one year of the order passed by the Mamlatdar. Taking the Court to the various orders passed by the authorities, he submitted that the respondent No.1 who claimed to be in the possession of the land in question, had not remained present before any of the authorities and he had also not bothered to remain present in the present petition, though duly served, and therefore, it is duly established that he was never interested in any of the proceedings initiated by the Mamlatdar and the Deputy Collector. 5. However, the learned Counsel Mr.Hasurkar appointed as Amicus Curiae for the respondent No.2 has submitted that the respondent No.1 was dispossessed by the petitioner and the respondent No.2 Trust without following due process of law as contemplated under Section 15 of the Tenancy Act and that the Tribunal having rightly considered the provisions of Section 32(1B), this Court exercising limited jurisdiction may not interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. 6. The learned AGP Ms.Bhatt has also supported the order passed by the Tribunal and submitted that the sale made by the respondent No.2 in favour of the present petitioner was not legal and, therefore, the possession of land in question with the petitioner, was also illegal. 7. In the instant case, it is required to be noted that the Mamlatdar and ALT had initiated the proceedings under Section 84C of the Tenancy Act and dropped the same by the order dated 10.8.1978. Again the said Mamlatdar had initiated the said proceedings and again dropped the same by the order dated 6.9.1988. 7. In the instant case, it is required to be noted that the Mamlatdar and ALT had initiated the proceedings under Section 84C of the Tenancy Act and dropped the same by the order dated 10.8.1978. Again the said Mamlatdar had initiated the said proceedings and again dropped the same by the order dated 6.9.1988. In both the proceedings, the respondent No.1 Raysingbhai Ishvarbhai Patanwadia was the party to the proceedings, however, he had not bothered to challenge the said orders. It was the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) who, in exercise of the revisional power under Section 76A, had suo motu taken the case in revision and, that too, after a period of one year from the date of the order passed by the Mamlatdar. It is settled legal position that the Collector or the Deputy Collector could not call for any record after the expiry of one year from the date of the order passed by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal, in view of the proviso to Section 76A of the said Act, and therefore, the very initiation of the proceedings under Section 76A at the instance of the Deputy Collector was bad in law. 8. At this juncture, beneficial reference of the decision of this Court in the case of Thakorbhai Tribhovandas Rao And Ors. vs State Of Gujarat And Ors., reported in (1995) 1 GLR 636 be made in this regard. This Court while dealing with Section 76A of the Tenancy Act in the said decision has held as under:- “It will be seen that no record can be called for by the Collector after the expiry of one year from the date of the order made by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of the proceedings of the Mamlatdar or Tribunal. The proviso to Section 76A would be applicable even in a case where a Reference is made by the State Government requiring the Collector to call for the record and proceedings for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order. The proviso to Section 76A would be applicable even in a case where a Reference is made by the State Government requiring the Collector to call for the record and proceedings for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order. The limitation prescribed by the proviso for the exercise of the revisional powers beyond the expiry of one year from the date of the order is clear and explicit and the Collector will have no revisional power to be exercised beyond the period of one year prescribed by the proviso to Section 76A. ...” 9. In view of the afore-stated legal position, no record could be called for by the Collector or Deputy Collector after the expiry of one year from the date of the order of the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 76A of the said Act. 10. It further appears that pursuant to the said order passed by the Deputy Collector under Section 76A, which was otherwise illegal, the Mamlatdar and ALT initiated the proceedings under Section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act against the original owner – respondent No.2, without making the petitioner Pragjibhai as substantive party to the proceedings. Apart from the fact that the said order dated 27.1.1992 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT suffered from the violation of the principles of natural justice, from the order itself it appears that the land was subject to the provisions of Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, 1969 and the said Act having been repealed, the name of the respondent No.1 was deleted from the record of the rights. The respondent No.1 also had never bothered to file any proceedings either under Section 32(1B) or otherwise for getting the possession of the land in question either from the petitioner or from the respondent No.2. The Assistant Collector, therefore, in the appeal filed by the petitioner and the respondent No.2, had rightly observed that the provisions contained in Section 32(1B) did not apply to the facts of the case and, therefore, set aside the order dated 27.1.1992 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT. However, the Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 7.12.2000 allowed the revision filed by the respondent No.1. 11. However, the Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 7.12.2000 allowed the revision filed by the respondent No.1. 11. At this juncture it is required to be noted that for the purpose of attracting the provisions contained in Section 32(1B), the tenant is required to prove that he was in possession of the land on the appointed day i.e. 15.6.1955 and was dispossessed before 1.4.1957 and that his landlord was in possession on 31.7.1969. In this regard a very pertinent observations made by the Supreme Court in case of Dhondiram Tatoba Kadam (supra) are required to be reproduced, which read as under:- “Section 32(1B) entitles a tenant to restoration of possession provided he was in possession on the appointed date, i.e. 15th June, 1955 and was dispossessed before 1st April, 1957 and his landlord was in possession on 31 July, 1969. The Section is, thus, in two parts one creating right and the other entitling restoration of possession. Proceedings for restoration could take place either at the instance of the tenant or suo motu by the Tahsildar. But the order could be passed only if the primary requirements of tenant being in possession on the appointed date and his dispossession before Ist April, 1957 were satisfied. The language of the latter part of the Section directing the Tahsildar to take possession of the land from the landlord and restore it to the tenant who on restoration by operation of law becomes purchaser from the date of restoration are clear legislative indications to construe the section liberally in favour of the tenant.” It is further held therein that - “The effect of surrender was that the appellant ceased to be tenant. Assuming that surrender was invalid and the appellant left the possession over land of his own accord, was the dispossessed as contemplated in Section 32(1B) of the Act? Voluntary giving up of possession does not amount to dispossession unless the law provides for it. 'Dispossess' according to Black's Law Dictionary means: 'to oust from land by legal process; to eject, to exclude from reality'. The dispossession should have been, therefore, either by legal process or by physical act of exclusion. It would not include leaving possession voluntarily or by surrender. The appellant, therefore, did not satisfy the second requirement. Consequently, he did not become purchaser of the land under Section 32(1B) of the Act.” 12. The dispossession should have been, therefore, either by legal process or by physical act of exclusion. It would not include leaving possession voluntarily or by surrender. The appellant, therefore, did not satisfy the second requirement. Consequently, he did not become purchaser of the land under Section 32(1B) of the Act.” 12. If the afore-stated ratio is made applicable to the facts of this case, it appears that in the instant case, the respondent No.1 who claimed to be the tenant in respect of the land in question had not only failed to remain present before the Tribunal, but had also failed to prove the necessary ingredients of Section 32(1B) that he was in possession of the land on the appointed date and was dispossessed on or before the specified date otherwise than in the manner provided under the Act and that the respondent No.2 landlord was in possession of the land in question on the said date. As held by the Supreme Court, dispossession should have been either by the legal process or by physical act of exclusion and it would not include leaving possession voluntarily or by surrender. The very fact that the respondent No.1 had never bothered to challenge the orders passed by the Mamlatdar in the proceedings initiated under Section 84C of the Tenancy Act and thereafter also had not made any application under Section 32(1B) of the said Act, implied that he had voluntarily surrendered his rights in respect of the land in question and had also voluntarily handed over possession of the land in question to the respondent No.2 landlord. Under the circumstances, the ingredients of Section 32(1B) having not been fulfilled at the instance of the respondent No.1, the Tribunal had committed gross error of law in passing the impugned order. 13. The impugned order dated 7.12.2000 passed by the Tribunal being perverse and in utter disregard to the provisions contained in Section 32(1B), the said order deserves to be quashed and set aside and is hereby set aside. 14. The petition stands allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute.