JUDGMENT : INDIRA BANERJEE, J. This appeal is against a judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 28th February, 1997 passed by the Learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Civil Court, Contai in Sessions Trial No. XI/Sept/95 whereby three appellants namely — (i) Ajit Kumar Manna, (ii) Anath Bandhu Manna (brother of the appellant no.1) and (iii) Gouri Manna were convicted of offences under Sections 498A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The appellant No. 1, Ajit Kumar Manna, has been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment of 10 years and fine of Rs.2,000/- for offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. In default of payment of fine, this appellant was to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year more. 3. The appellant No.2, Anath Bandhu Manna, has been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 8 years and to fine of Rs.2,000/- for offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. In default of payment of fine the appellant No.2 was to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year more. 4. The appellant No.3, Gouri Manna, has been sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for 2 years and to fine of Rs.1,000/- for offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code and in default of payment of fine, has to suffer simple imprisonment for 6 more months for offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. All three appellants have been sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for 2 years and to fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment whereof, further simple imprisonment of 6 months for conviction under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 6. It is the case of the prosecution that the de facto complainant's youngest daughter Smt. Sabita Rani was married to Ajit Kumar Manna, a railway employee, posted at Kharagpur, in accordance with Hindu rites and customs. 7. The appellant No.1, Ajit Kumar Manna, who used to work at Kharagpur, used to come home on Saturdays. The deceased being his wife used to reside with her in-laws. 8. The prosecution has alleged that about 1 year after the marriage of the deceased with the appellant No.1, Ajit Kumar Manna, the deceased was subjected to torture. The appellant No.1 also used to torture her whenever he came home from Kharagpur and did not permit the deceased to visit her paternal home. After she became pregnant she was made to undergo abortion. 9. The appellant No.1 also used to torture her whenever he came home from Kharagpur and did not permit the deceased to visit her paternal home. After she became pregnant she was made to undergo abortion. 9. On 8.2.1993 Bhutnath Kar came to know that his daughter Sabita Rani had committed suicide by hanging herself. Thereafter the de facto complainant, Bhutnath Kar, went to the matrimonial home of his daughter, along with his son, and found that she had committed suicide by hanging herself in the bedroom. The de facto complainant allegedly came to know upon enquiry from the neighbours that from 8:00 p.m. of the previous night, the deceased was tortured continuously for which, she committed suicide. 10. On 15.2.1993, Bhutnath Kar (P.W.12) lodged a complaint, which was scribed by one Sudhangshu Sekhar Kar (P.W.23), and on the basis thereof, Patashur Police Station Case No.12 dated 15.2.1993 was registered for investigation. 11. Subsequent to completion of investigation in connection with Patashur Police Station Case No. 12 dated 15.2.1993, charge sheet was submitted against the appellants and two others under Sections 498A/306/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The case was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions and finally transferred to the Learned Assistant Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Contai. 12. On consideration of the materials on record, charges were framed. under Sections 498A/306/34 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellants and two others to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 13. In course of trial, the prosecution examined 25 witnesses and the defence adduced one witness. The accused were examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. The Prosecution Witness Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 were all either neighbours or co-villagers of the accused appellants. 15. The Prosecution Witness No.1 claimed to have seen torture towards the deceased with his own eyes. The tenor of the evidence suggests that she was tortured by her husband, Ajit Manna, being the appellant No. 1. This may be inferred from the fact that this witness stated that he saw torture towards Sabita with his own eyes and when she was tortured, none of the members of the family of Ajit Manna would come to save her from that assault. It is patently clear that the deceased was subjected to assault by her husband, Ajit Manna. 16. It is patently clear that the deceased was subjected to assault by her husband, Ajit Manna. 16. The evidence of Prosecution Witness No. 2 is apparently based on hear say. The Prosecution Witness No. 3, a neighbour claimed that the appellants tortured the deceased. The appellant No.1, Ajit himself tortured the deceased when he came home every Saturday. Ajit had married the second time and the deceased was his second wife. In cross-examination, he stated that Ajit had tortured the deceased by assaulting her. 17. The Prosecution Witness No. 4 also deposed that all the appellants used to torture the deceased on flimsy grounds. The day before the incident of suicide the appellant No. 1, Ajit Manna returned home at night and there was a quarrel after which torture of the deceased ensued. The appellant No. 1 abused the deceased in filthy language, which this deponent heard. He had also seen the appellant No. 1, Ajit assaulting and torturing his wife, who had been crying loudly the day before the deceased was found hanging. This deponent stated in her cross-examination that the deceased was made to go through an abortion. The Prosecution Witness No.4, a neighbour also deposed that the accused appellant tortured the deceased. 18. The Prosecution Witness No. 5 stated that he lived at a distance of 10 cubits from the house of the accused appellants. The accused appellants tortured the deceased and abused her. 19. The Prosecution Witness No.6 stated that all the appellants abused and harassed the deceased almost every day and at the weekend when the appellant No.1, Ajit Kumar Manna, came home from Kharagpur, he also tortured and assaulted the deceased. In answer to a query from Court he stated that he had seen the accused appellant No. 1, Ajit Kumar Manna assault the deceased by fists and blows with his own eyes. 20. The Prosecution Witness No. 7 stated that the deceased was not treated well in her husband's house. He could not, however, say the reason why the deceased was tortured. He deposed that the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself with a rope. 21. The evidence of the Prosecution Witness No.8, Namita Rani Das, reveals that the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 on and off abused and harassed the accused appellant. He could not, however, say the reason why the deceased was tortured. He deposed that the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself with a rope. 21. The evidence of the Prosecution Witness No.8, Namita Rani Das, reveals that the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 on and off abused and harassed the accused appellant. This witness saw the occurrence with her own eyes as her house is very near to the house of the accused appellants. She stated that her house was about 10 cubits away from the house of the accused. In answer to a query from Court this witness stated that she had seen the appellant No.1 torture and assault the deceased at the instigation of the appellant Nos. 2 and 3. The appellant No.1 assaulted her by catching hold of hair and also by fists and blows and the deceased cried loudly. 22. The Prosecution Witness No. 9 stated that she knew the deceased. She had personally seen the deceased being assaulted by her husband. She, however, stated that the other accused appellants did not assault her. The Prosecution Witness No. 10 gave evidence to the same effect and claimed that he had himself been a witness to the torture. 23. The Prosecution Witness No.11 also stated that the accused appellants all assaulted and tortured the deceased by fists and blows and sometimes she even bled because of the assault. 24. The Prosecution Witness No.15 stated that the accused appellants tortured the deceased mentally and physically. In cross-examination, however, he admitted that his evidence was based on hear say. 25. The Prosecution Witness No.17, a neighbour, claimed that he had seen the accused appellants torture the deceased with his own eyes. No particulars of the kind of torture have been given by him. 26. The Prosecution Witness No.18, another neighbour, deposed that all the accused persons tortured her mentally and physically. This witness saw the accused appellants torture the deceased on the day before the incident. Three of them assaulted the deceased by catching her hair. They even assaulted her with an iron rod, and blood came out from her head. 27. The Prosecution Witness Nos. 12, 13 and 14 are de facto complainant i.e. the father of the deceased, the brother of the deceased and the mother of the deceased respectively. 28. Three of them assaulted the deceased by catching her hair. They even assaulted her with an iron rod, and blood came out from her head. 27. The Prosecution Witness Nos. 12, 13 and 14 are de facto complainant i.e. the father of the deceased, the brother of the deceased and the mother of the deceased respectively. 28. The Prosecution Witness No. 12, father of the deceased and de facto complainant deposed that his daughter used to tell him about the torture meted out to her whenever she came to her paternal home. He also stated that the accused appellants were responsible for the suicide of his daughter. However, he did not give any details of the torture nor could he give the reasons for the torture. 29. The Prosecution Witness No.13 stated that the accused appellants used to torture his sister off and on. Whenever his sister came home, she used to talk about the torture meted out to her. The accused appellant No.3 used to torture her sister by putting chilly in her mouth. He also stated that the accused appellants misbehaved with his family members when they visited the matrimonial home of the deceased to see her. He further deposed that the accused appellants did not provide his sister with clothes. He stated that the accused appellant No.1 was the root cause of all torture and the others tortured his sister at his instance. 30. The Prosecution Witness No.14, mother of the deceased deposed that her daughter had told her that the appellants all used to torture her. The accused appellants had twice forced her into an abortion against her will. 31. The Prosecution Witness No.16, Secretary of the Mahila Samity of the locality for 19 years deposed that the deceased had before her marriage been a member of the Mahila Samity. The deceased had told the Prosecution Witness No. 16 that the accused appellants had tortured her. This deponent further deposed that the accused appellants had confessed to her that they had not provided any food to the appellant before her death inspite of request. This witness claimed that the accused appellants confessed that the deceased had died as a result of torture and that these accused persons had collected a rope from the house of Subal, an accused who had been acquitted and made her hang from the rope. 32. This witness claimed that the accused appellants confessed that the deceased had died as a result of torture and that these accused persons had collected a rope from the house of Subal, an accused who had been acquitted and made her hang from the rope. 32. The Post Mortem doctor, being the Prosecution Witness No. 21 opined that the death was due to hanging and not otherwise. From his evidence, it appears that he did not find any injury mark on the dead body to substantiate the allegation that she might have been struck with an iron rod on the head. He also did not find any blood on the body of the deceased. 33. The Prosecution Witness No. 22, a Homeopath deposed that the deceased had gone to his chamber along with the accused appellants and an abortion was done. In cross-examination, he stated that she had consented to the abortion. The Prosecution Witness Nos. 24 and 25 are police witnesses, who did not have any personal knowledge of what had transpired. 34. By the judgment and order under appeal, the learned Sessions Court was pleased to convict the appellants of the charges under Section 498A/306 of the Indian Penal Code. Two other accused, namely Bankim Das and Subal Chandra Bera were acquitted. 35. Mr. Sandipan Ganguly appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the incident resulting in the death of Sabita Rani Manna occurred on 7th February, 1993. Inquest was also held on the dead body of Sabita Rani Manna at the house of the appellant No. 1 on 8th February, 1993. The inquest was conducted in the presence of Prasanta Kumar Bera, brother of the deceased who was also examined as a witness. The de facto complainant, being the father of the deceased (PW 12) corroborated the fact that he had gone to the place of occurrence with his son. 36. Mr. Ganguly strenuously contended that both PW 12, i.e. de facto complainant and his son Prasanta Kumar Bera came in contact with the police officers at the place of occurrence. They also as per their own statement made enquiries from local people. Yet no complaint was lodged till 15th February, 1993. The delay of eight days in filing the complaint remained unexplained. 37. Mr. They also as per their own statement made enquiries from local people. Yet no complaint was lodged till 15th February, 1993. The delay of eight days in filing the complaint remained unexplained. 37. Mr. Ganguly submitted that delay, without any explanation, per se raises suspicion about the veracity of the First Information Report and points at the possibility of concoction and/or embellishment. In such circumstances, the allegations in the First Information Report cannot be given credence at all and this long delay in lodging of the First Information Report creates grave suspicion about the prosecution case. The delay in this case suggests that the appellants have falsely been implicated as an after thought. 38. However, as argued by Mr. Ranabir Roychowdhury, appearing on behalf of the State, delay has duly been explained. It is categorically stated that the de facto complainant, being the father of the deceased was so mentally upset and depressed as a result of the death of his daughter, that he took time to lodge the First Information Report. 39. Moreover, as rightly argued by Mr. Roychowdhury, delay in lodging the First Information Report, does not in itself vitiate the criminal proceedings, if there are materials to show that there was substance in the allegations. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sahebrao v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 408. 40. In Sahebrao (supra) the Supreme Court held that delay in filing the First Information Report could not by itself be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and discard it, if any possible explanation has been offered. 41. In our view, the unnatural death of a daughter in tragic circumstances and consequential shock and trauma suffered by the hapless parents is good ground for delay in filing a First Information Report. Delay only of seven days, in a case of an unnatural suicidal death, is in our view, not so long a delay as to render the entire prosecution case susceptible to doubt. 42. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is set out herein below for convenience:- “498A. Delay only of seven days, in a case of an unnatural suicidal death, is in our view, not so long a delay as to render the entire prosecution case susceptible to doubt. 42. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is set out herein below for convenience:- “498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 43. To attract the penal provision of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, cruelty must be wilful conduct, which is of such a nature, as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman, whether mental or physical. Harassment of a woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her, or any person related to her, to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand, would also amount to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 44. As pointed out by Mr. Ganguly, in this case, there is no evidence of any demand by the appellants, for any property or valuable security, and as such Clause (b) of the definition of torture has no relevance. None of the witnesses who deposed in Court on behalf of the prosecution have alleged of harassment to coerce the deceased or her relatives to concede to any dowry demand or any other property related demand. 45. None of the witnesses who deposed in Court on behalf of the prosecution have alleged of harassment to coerce the deceased or her relatives to concede to any dowry demand or any other property related demand. 45. This Court is, however, required to adjudicate whether Clause (a) of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is attracted. In other words, whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution, reflects wilful conduct on the part of the appellants, which is of such a nature, as was likely to drive the deceased to commit or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical. 46. Mr. Ganguly argued that a perusal of the evidence of the witnesses would reveal that none of the witnesses had described the nature of the torture/cruelty which had allegedly been perpetrated upon the deceased. The allegations were of a general nature. In the absence of clear evidence relating to the nature of the wilful conduct, the Trial Court could not have reached the conclusion that wilful conduct was of such a nature, as was likely to drive the deceased to commit suicide, or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical. 47. On analysis of the evidence, it cannot be said that the allegations of torture are totally vague and devoid of particulars. There is ample evidence of regular assault of the deceased by the appellant No.1. reference may be made to the evidence of PW 1, PW 3, PW 4, PW 6, PW 8 who said the appellant No.1 assault the deceased. 48. Mr. Ganguly argued that the witnesses have only alleged one or two solitary incidents. Such incidents had not been disclosed to the investigating officer immediately after the incident, when investigation was initiated. Such disclosures were made for the first time before the learned Trial Court after lapse of more than three years, and ought not to be relied upon, since the possibility of concoction and/or embellishment cannot be ruled out. 49. So far as the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned the allegations are of a general nature. One of the Prosecution Witness namely Prosecution Witness No.1 stated that they did not save the deceased when she was tortured by the appellant No. 1. Other witnesses have stated that these appellants abused the deceased. Others have referred to solitary incidents. So far as the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned the allegations are of a general nature. One of the Prosecution Witness namely Prosecution Witness No.1 stated that they did not save the deceased when she was tortured by the appellant No. 1. Other witnesses have stated that these appellants abused the deceased. Others have referred to solitary incidents. However, there is ample evidence that the appellant No. 1 tortured the deceased whenever he came home. He regularly assaulted her. Atleast 6 to 7 witnesses have said so. They claimed to have seen the torture themselves. 50. Mr. Ganguly submitted that PW 11 deposed that the appellant assaulted and tortured the deceased with fists and blows and sometimes blood came out from her mouth due to such assault. However, when the PW 25 was confronted with the statements he stated that PW 11 had not told him about such assault by fists and blows at the time of investigation. 51. Mr. Ganguly submitted that PW 13 had, in his evidence stated that Gouri Manna used to torture his sister by throwing chilly into her mouth. However, the investigating officer being the PW 25 stated that the PW 13 had not made any such statement to him in course of investigation. 52. There may have been some exaggeration and some embellishment by some of the witnesses. However, there is ample evidence to substantiate the charges against the appellant No. 1 of offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and also Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. A large number of neighbours stated that they had seen that the appellant No.1 regularly assaulted and tortured his wife. There is evidence of merciless torture of the deceased by the appellant, the evening before the incident. 53. Mr. Ganguly further argued that Prosecution witness Nos. 12, 13 and 14 had stated that the deceased had told them about the torture inflicted upon her when the deceased visited them. However, all the three witnesses stated that they neither visited the matrimonial home of the deceased nor was the deceased permitted by the accused to visit her parental home. In the circumstances, their evidence in Court is not free from suspicion since the said witnesses, by their own admission, could not possibly have learnt of the torture directly from the deceased. 54. Mr. In the circumstances, their evidence in Court is not free from suspicion since the said witnesses, by their own admission, could not possibly have learnt of the torture directly from the deceased. 54. Mr. Ganguly cited the judgment of this Court in Narayan Chandra Nandy v. The State of West Bengal, reported in (2013) 2 C. Cr. LR (Cal) 882 where this Court stated that disclosures made by the lady to neighbours and/or relations being hear say evidence, the same was not admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. In this case, in the absence of any evidence of any interaction between the deceased and the Prosecution Witness Nos. 12, 13 and 14, their evidence that they were informed by the deceased of the torture meted out by the accused appellants, could not be relied upon. In this case, however, the conviction is not based only on the hearsay evidence of witnesses. As observed above, many neighbours actually witnessed regular torture and assault of the deceased. 55. Mr. Ganguly rightly submitted that the fact that the deceased committed suicide was not ground enough to presume that her suicide was induced by torture. The Court would have to weigh and test the evidence and be satisfied of its veracity. 56. We are however unable to agree with Mr. Ganguly that the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses does not satisfy the test for arriving at the finding that the accused appellant No. 1 meted out such torture on the victim, as to induce her to commit suicide. 57. Mr. Ganguly cited Amar Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 64 where the Supreme Court held: “A prosecution witness who merely uses the word ‘harass’ or ‘torture’ and does not describe the exact conduct of the accused which, according to him, amounted to harassment or torture may not be delivered by the Court in cases under Section 498A or 304B of the Indian Penal Code”. 58. Mr. Ganguly argued that in this case too the witnesses only deposed that the appellants had harassed and tortured the deceased without describing the nature of such torture or harassment. It could not, therefore, be ascertained whether the nature of the conduct of the accused persons falls within the meaning of cruelty as defined under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. It could not, therefore, be ascertained whether the nature of the conduct of the accused persons falls within the meaning of cruelty as defined under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The charge under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code had manifestly not been proved. 59. It is perhaps not correct to say that the witnesses had not described the nature of the torture or harassment meted out to the deceased. There is evidence of eyewitnesses stating that the appellant No.1 regularly assaulted the deceased. The assault was by fist and blows. The deceased used to shriek and cry obviously in pain. The nature of the conduct of the appellant No.1 certainly falls within the meaning of cruelty as defined under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Unable to bear the torture the unfortunate bride put an end o her own life. 60. Mr. Ganguly next argued that Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishment for the offence of abetment of commission of suicide. It is, therefore, necessary for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant had abetted the commission of suicide through their conduct and/or behaviour. A proximate and live link was required to be established by the prosecution between the purported acts of abetment and the death of the deceased. The prosecution had to prove direct or indirect acts of incitement which prompted the suicide of the deceased. 61. Mr. Ganguly argued that mere disputes and discords in the matrimonial home or mere harassment of the wife by the husband due to differences would not per se attract Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, if the wife committed suicide. In support of his submission, Mr. Ganguly cited Sohan Raj Sharma v. State of Haryana, reported in [2008] 2 C.Cr.L.R. (SC) 174, Bhagwan Das v. Kartar Singh, reported in (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 664. According to Mr. Ganguly, so far as the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned, there does not exist any materials at all, which reflect any conduct on their part which can be termed to be abetment and incitement or goading of the deceased to commit suicide. The PW4 only deposed that on the night prior to the incident of suicide, the appellant No. 1 had returned home and there had been a quarrel between the deceased and the appellant No.1. The PW4 only deposed that on the night prior to the incident of suicide, the appellant No. 1 had returned home and there had been a quarrel between the deceased and the appellant No.1. The appellant No.1 had abused the deceased by using filthy language and had assaulted and tortured the deceased, who was found crying loudly. 62. Mr. Ganguly submitted that except the aforesaid piece of evidence, there was nothing on record to show the conduct by any of the appellants that tantamounts to incitement to the deceased to commit suicide. Even if the aforesaid evidence is accepted against the appellant No. 1, the same only reflects a solitary incident of harassment or torture by the husband, but does not in any manner reflect that the deceased was instigated or aided by the appellant No.1 to commit suicide. 63. Mr. Ganguly argued that abetment involves intentional instigation or aiding of a person to do a thing, and conspiracy would involve intention to enter into conspiracy to incite that thing. A more active role which can be described as instigating or aiding of doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to abet commission of offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Ganguly submitted that the charge under Section 306 was also not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. Ganguly reiterated that the prosecution was required to prove the charges against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. The Court while convicting the accused persons are required to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. In the event there exists some doubt regarding the culpability of the accused persons, the accused persons are entitled to the benefit of doubt. Suspicion however grave, cannot take the place of proof. 64. Mr. Ganguly concluded that the allegations in this case are omnibus in nature and belated and do not satisfy the standards of “proof beyond reasonable doubt”. 65. There can be no doubt that in criminal jurisprudence there is a presumption of innocence and guilt must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Suspicion however grave, cannot take the place of proof as held by the Supreme Court in Narendra Singh v. The State of M.P., reported in 2004 SCC (Cri) 1893. There is a long distance between “may be” and “must be”. Suspicion however grave, cannot take the place of proof as held by the Supreme Court in Narendra Singh v. The State of M.P., reported in 2004 SCC (Cri) 1893. There is a long distance between “may be” and “must be”. The case of Narendra Singh v. The State of M.P. (supra) was based on circumstantial evidence. The dead body of the deceased was lying in the kitchen. The Trial Court observed that the door of the kitchen had to be broken open keeping in view the place of occurrence vis-a-vis the points of possible entries thereto. The Trial Court had not relied on the post-mortem report. However, in appeal, the High Court held the husband guilty. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had considered the escape of the assassin through one of the two gaps as possible, but did not assign any reason as to how the same can be said to have been established. Furthermore, it did not appear that a case had been made out by the prosecution. Had it been the prosecution case that the appellant No.1 after throttling the deceased and setting her on fire escaped through one of the two open places mentioned by the High Court, it was obligatory on the part of the Court to give an opportunity to the appellants to explain it. Such opportunity had not been given. The Supreme Court found that however strong circumstances may be, all links in the chain had to be proved. In the case before the Supreme Court a vital link in the chain, i.e. possibility of the husband committing the offence, closing the door and then sneaking out of the room from one of the two places had not been proved by the prosecution. 66. The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is proved by the evidence of PW 1, Kshudiram Das, neighbour of accused, PW 3 Lakshmikanta Samanta, a neighbour of accused, PW 4 Sunil Rani Samanta, also a neighbour of accused, PW 6 Sunil Bera, a witness who specifically deposed that the appellant No.1 tortured the deceased victim the day before her death. 67. The prosecution has also proved that the deceased under went abortion may be one year prior to her death. However, the doctor being PW 22, Uttam Kumar Das, deposed that abortion was carried out with the consent of the deceased. 67. The prosecution has also proved that the deceased under went abortion may be one year prior to her death. However, the doctor being PW 22, Uttam Kumar Das, deposed that abortion was carried out with the consent of the deceased. Even assuming that the abortion was not forced upon the deceased, there is still ample material to show that the petitioner had been ill-treated by her husband being the appellant No. 1, to such an extent that she was constrained to take her life. 68. In this context it would be pertinent to refer to Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. “113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.—When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. “Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 69. Having regard to the evidence of torture to which the deceased had been subjected by her husband this Court may, in view of Section 113A of the Evidence Act, presume that this suicide has been abetted by her husband. The appellant No.1 has rightly been convicted under Section 306 and under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 70. However, so far as the appellant No. 2 and 3 are concerned, there are only vague allegations of cruelty and torture. The evidence so far as these appellants are concerned is not sufficient for conviction of these appellants under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, or under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 71. The appeal is allowed in part. 72. The conviction of the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 is set aside. The conviction of the appellant No. 1 is, however, upheld. 73. Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties expeditiously, subject to compliance with the requisite formalities. 71. The appeal is allowed in part. 72. The conviction of the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 is set aside. The conviction of the appellant No. 1 is, however, upheld. 73. Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties expeditiously, subject to compliance with the requisite formalities. SAHIDULLAH MUNSHI, J.:— I Agree