JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—The petitioner is a married daughter. Her father late Mangal Sen Sharma was a Wasil Baqi Nawis (WBN) (Senior Assistant) in Tehsil Office, Hapur. She has preferred this writ proceedings for quashing the order dated 01st March, 2016 passed by the second respondent, the District Magistrate whereby her application for compassionate appointment has been rejected on the ground that she is a married daughter thus she is not entitled for appointment. 2. A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice. 3. Late Mangal Sen Sharma was working as WBN (Senior Assistant) in Tehsil Office, Hapur. He unfortunately died on 10th January, 2014 leaving behind his wife Smt. Asha Sharma, one son Prashant Mohan Sharma and two daughters, namely, Smt. Parul Sharma and the petitioner. The petitioner moved an application for her appointment on compassionate ground with no objection of other members of the family. She is a postgraduate in Economics. Her marriage was solemnized with one Ashwani Sharma and she is living with her mother, who is alone after the death of petitioner’s father. It is stated that financial position of her husband, who is in small job of a private company, is not sufficient to support her and her mother. 4. The mother of the petitioner moved an application to the District Magistrate, Hapur on 20th January, 2016 for petitioner’s appointment on compassionate ground. In her representation, she has stated that she does not have any source of income and she is dependent on the petitioner who is living with her. Her mother has also enclosed the judgement of this Court in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P. and another, 2016(1) ADJ 21 (DB). A similar application has been filed by the petitioner also before the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate by the impugned order has rejected the application of the petitioner on the grounds that under Rule 2(c) of the Uttar Pradeh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974 (the Rules, 1974), the petitioner is not entitled for her appointment as under the said provision only unmarried daughter is entitled for compassionate appointment. The District Magistrate by the impugned order has rejected the application of the petitioner on the grounds that under Rule 2(c) of the Uttar Pradeh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974 (the Rules, 1974), the petitioner is not entitled for her appointment as under the said provision only unmarried daughter is entitled for compassionate appointment. Insofar as the judgement of this Court in Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) is concerned, the District Magistrate was of the opinion that in the said case the petitioner was not party, therefore, no benefit can be granted to the petitioner on the basis of the said judgement. It is also stated that the State Government has not issued any direction pursuant to the judgement in Smt. Vimla Srivastava’s case. 5. Alongwith the impugned order a minutes of meeting has also been served upon the petitioner, wherein the aforesaid grounds are mentioned and it has been signed by Additional District Magistrate (Finance & Revenue), Prabhari Adhikari, Collectorate, Administrative Officer, Collectorate, Hapur and the concerned clerk. 6. Dissatisfied with the order of the District Magistrate the petitioner has preferred this writ petition. As the grounds mentioned in the impugned order are purely legal and do not raise any factual dispute, learned Standing Counsel has not proposed to file any counter-affidavit. Thus, the matter is taken on the board for final disposal, at this stage, with their consent as the pure question of law is to be answered. 7. Concededly, the petitioner is a married daughter. Rule 2(c) of the Rules, 1974 defines the family, which reads as under: “2(c) “family” shall include the following relations of the deceased Government servant: (i) Wife or husband; (ii)Sons/adopted sons; (iii) Unmarried daughters, unmarried adopted daughters widowed daughters and widowed daughter-in-law; (iv)Unmarried brothers, unmarried sisters and widowed mother dependent on the deceased Government servant, if the deceased Government servant was unmarried; (v) aforementioned relations of such missing Government servant who has been declared as “dead” by the competent Court. Provided that if a person belonging to any of the above mentioned relations of the deceased Government servant is not available or is found to be physically and mentally unfit and thus ineligible for employment in Government service, then only in such situation the word “family” shall also include the grandsons and the unmarried granddaughters of the deceased Government servant dependent on him.” 8. As can be seen from the aforesaid Rule, married daughter is not included in the definition. However, vires of the said rule was challenged by a married daughter Vimla Srivastava. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) has considered the provisions of Rule 2(c) of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974. This Court found that the word ‘unmarried’ used under Rule 2(c)(iii) of the Rules, 1974 is arbitrary and has consequently struck down the same and directed the respondents for reconsideration of the claim of the petitioner, Smt. Vimla Srivastava, in the light of its judgement. The relevant part of the judgement in Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) is extracted herein below: “25. During the course of submissions, our attention was also drawn to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Mudita v. State of U.P., 2015(9) ADJ 16 . The learned Single Judge while proceeding to deal with an identical issue of the right of a married daughter to be considered under the Dying-in-Harness Rules observed that a married daughter is a part of the family of her husband and could not therefore be expected to continue to provide for the family of the deceased Government servant. The judgment proceeds on the premise that marriage severs all relationships that the daughter may have had with her parents. In any case it shuts out the consideration of the claim of the married daughter without any enquiry on the issue of dependency. In the view that we have taken we are unable to accept or affirm the reasoning of the learned Single Judge and are constrained to hold that Mudita does not lay down the correct position of the law. 26. In conclusion, we hold that the exclusion of married daughters from the ambit of the expression “family” in Rule 2 (c) of the Dying-in-Harness Rules is illegal and unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. 27. We, accordingly, strike down the word ‘unmarried’ in Rule 2 (c) (iii) of the Dying-in-Harness Rules. 28. In consequence, we direct that the claim of the petitioners for compassionate appointment shall be reconsidered. 27. We, accordingly, strike down the word ‘unmarried’ in Rule 2 (c) (iii) of the Dying-in-Harness Rules. 28. In consequence, we direct that the claim of the petitioners for compassionate appointment shall be reconsidered. We clarify that the competent authority would be at liberty to consider the claim for compassionate appointment on the basis of all the relevant facts and circumstances and the petitioners shall not be excluded from consideration only on the ground of their marital status.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The question which falls for consideration is, what will be the effect of striking down the word ‘unmarried’ from the definition of family under Rule 2(c)(iii) of the Rules, 1974. It is a well-settled law that while considering the vires of subordinate legislation there is presumption that the rule is intra-vires. In case there is possibility of two interpretations then the Court must endeavor to save it. It is also open to the Court to read down such provision in a manner to avoid it being declared ultra vires. However, if the Court declared the provision ultra vires then the consequence of declaration will follow. This principle has been considered in the case of La Roche & Co. A.g. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, (1974) 2 All ER 1128, wherein it has been held that a subordinate legislation is presumed to be valid until declared invalid by a Court in a proceeding initiated by a proper person. The consequence of declaration of invalidity is to render the same incapable of ever having had any legal effect. But till the presumption of validity continues, it has to be obeyed. 10. The Supreme Court has also considered the effect of declaring a provision ultra vires in the case of K.N. Raghwan v. Habeeb Moahmmed and others, (2002) 10 SCC 180 and held as under: “7. This submission suffers from patent illegality as there could be no question of fixing a fair rent under provisions which are held to be ultra vires. The only reason submitted for accepting fixation of rent by the Rent Controller is, since the appellant was not party to the proceedings in which the High Court declared the said provisions as ultra vires, hence not binding. The submission has no merit. The only reason submitted for accepting fixation of rent by the Rent Controller is, since the appellant was not party to the proceedings in which the High Court declared the said provisions as ultra vires, hence not binding. The submission has no merit. When any provision is held to be ultra vires, it covers the field as against all its subjects who are within the jurisdiction of the said legislation and the Court. Thus this submission to us looks strange that as he was not a party to it hence would not bind him, has no merit and is rejected.” 11. If the Court declares a provision ultra vires, it collapses automatically, and it need not to be set aside. If only a rule is declared ultra vires, that part of the rule will be severed from the rule. After a provision it declared ultra vires, it is always open to legislature to alter or omit the provision declared by the Court ultra vires or it may enact/make new provision with a view to make the enactment consistent with the law declared by the Court. Reference may be made to the judgement in the case of Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar and others v. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endownments, Mysore and another, AIR 1963 SC 966 . 12. The Supreme Court in a recent case Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and others, (2014) 8 SCC 470 , has also considered the resultant effect of declaring a provision of law illegal or void. It has been held that no legislative body has disobeyed and disrespected the order passed by the Court declaring a legislation illegal or void, if the order has attained finality. The relevant observation of the Court reads as under: “16.1 The Supreme Court has been vested with the power to decide substantial questions of law, as also, to interpret the provisions of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction to determine, whether or not, laws made by Parliament or by a State Legislature, are consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of India. And in case any legislation is found to be enacted in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of India, this Court is constrained to strike it down. The resultant effect is, that a law enacted by the Parliament or by a State Legislature, is declared illegal or void. And in case any legislation is found to be enacted in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of India, this Court is constrained to strike it down. The resultant effect is, that a law enacted by the Parliament or by a State Legislature, is declared illegal or void. After a Court’s verdict has attained finality, not once, never and never, has any legislative body ever disobeyed or disrespected an order passed by a Court declaring a legislation, illegal or void.” 13. The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has also plenary power to declare a statute ultra vires and illegal. The effect of declaring the provision invalid, illegal or void by the High Court will be same as in the case of Supreme Court. 14. The similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the cases of St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council of Teacher Education and another, (2003) 3 SCC 321 ; Krishnasamy Reddiar Educational Trust v. Member Secretary, National Council for Teacher Education and another, (2005) 4 SCC 89 , and Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board v. Indraprastha Gas Limited and another, (2015) 9 SCC 209 . Hence the effect of striking down the word ‘unmarried’ is that the said word may remain on the statute but it is inoperative. The State Government has not made any further amendment thus the effect will be that the married daughter would be entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. The judgement of the Division Bench in Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) has consistently been followed by this Court. 15. Another Division Bench in the case of Somwati @ Girija and another v. State of U.P. and another, Special Appeal No. 236 of 2016, decided on 28th March, 2016, has followed the judgement of Smt. Vimla Srivastava’s case. The said special appeal arose against the judgement of the learned Single Judge dated 15th February, 2016 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 40877 of 2015 (Somwati @ Girija and another v. State of U.P. and others). The learned Single Judge has taken a view that in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) the Division Bench failed to notice the Full Bench judgement in the case of Km. Shehnaj Begum v. State of U.P. and others, 2013(5) ADJ 577 (FB). The learned Single Judge has taken a view that in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) the Division Bench failed to notice the Full Bench judgement in the case of Km. Shehnaj Begum v. State of U.P. and others, 2013(5) ADJ 577 (FB). However, in special appeal the Division Bench has followed Smt. Vimla Srivastava’s case on the ground that in Km. Shehnaj Begum (supra) the validity of Rule 2(c)(iii) was not in issue. The Court on the basis of plain reading of the definition held that the married daughter is not entitled for compassionate appointment in terms of definition given under Rule 2(c) of the Rules, 1974. Before the Full Bench the question of vires of word ‘unmarried’ was neither raised nor decided. Hence the Division Bench in Somwati (supra) has held that Smt. Vimla Srivastava’s case is binding on a coordinate Bench wherein the issue with regard to the validity of word ‘unmarried’ was raised and the Court found that it was ultra vires and has struck down the said word. 16. Insofar as the view taken by the District Magistrate that the petitioner was not a party in Smt. Vimla Srivastava’s case hence the benefit of the said judgement cannot be extended to her is concerned, it is completely misconceived. The High Court is an Apex Court of the State, the law declared by it is binding on all the Tribunals/Courts/Authorities under its supervision. 17. Article 141 of the Constitution of India provides that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all the Courts, authorities and tribunals. True, there is no such provision in the Constitution in respect of the High Courts. However, by the judicial pronouncements the Supreme Court has laid down the law that the similar power which Article 141 of the Constitution confers to the Supreme Court is also available with the High Courts. In the case of M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta and another v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1893 , the Supreme Court held as under: “29. ....The division Bench of the High Court held that a contravention of a condition imposed by a licence issued under the Act is not an offence under S. 5 of the Act. Ltd. Calcutta and another v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1893 , the Supreme Court held as under: “29. ....The division Bench of the High Court held that a contravention of a condition imposed by a licence issued under the Act is not an offence under S. 5 of the Act. This raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest Court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Art. 215, every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Art. 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Art. 227 it has jurisdiction over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that Court and start proceedings in direct violation of it..... We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest Court in the State is binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction.” 18. M/s. East India Commercial Co. (supra) has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Shri Bhimsen Dixit, AIR 1972 SC 2466 , wherein the Court has held as under: “14. Under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the High Court is vested with the power of superintendence over the Courts and tribunals in the State. Acting as a quasi judicial authority under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the appellant was subject to the superintendence of the High Court. Accordingly the decisions of the High Court were binding on him. Under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the High Court is vested with the power of superintendence over the Courts and tribunals in the State. Acting as a quasi judicial authority under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the appellant was subject to the superintendence of the High Court. Accordingly the decisions of the High Court were binding on him. He could not get away from them by adducing factually wrong and illegitimate reasons. In East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta v. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta, (1963) 3 SCR 338 : ( AIR 1962 SC 1893 ), Subba Rao, J. observed....” 19. Similar view has also been taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Commercial Tax Officer and another, (1988) 169 ITR 564 ; and by this Court in K.N. Agrawal v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1991) 189 ITR 769 . 20. The Division Bench of this Court in K.N. Agrawal (supra), has held that a judgement of the High Court is binding on all authorities and it cannot be ignored. The Court held that even if appeal is pending against the order of the High Court in Supreme Court, and in case there is no interim order then the order of the High Court is binding on the authorities. Permitting an authority to ignore the judgement on the ground that it is under appeal before the higher Court would introduce judicial indiscipline and it would lead to an chaotic situation. The Division Bench speaking through Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Chief Justice (as His Lordship then was) held as under: “...Just because an appeal is pending, the decision of this Court cannot be treated as not final, nor can it be ignored. It is binding upon the authorities within the territories of this State. The Income-tax Officer had no option but to follow this decision of this Court in the case of this assessee. ...Permitting him to take such a view would introduce judicial indiscipline, which is not called for even in such cases. It would lead to a chaotic situation...” 21. In the case in hand, it has not been brought to the notice of the Court that any Special Leave Petition has been preferred by the State Government against the judgement in Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra). 22. It would lead to a chaotic situation...” 21. In the case in hand, it has not been brought to the notice of the Court that any Special Leave Petition has been preferred by the State Government against the judgement in Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra). 22. The aforesaid law clearly leaves no ground of doubt that even an authority who is not a party in the writ petition, is bound by the law laid down by the High Court. He cannot take a plea that the authority concerned was not a party in the writ petition. 23. The next ground taken by the District Magistrate in his order is that pursuant to the judgement of the High Court in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra), the State Government has not issued any direction. In my considered opinion, the view taken by the District Magistrate is not only arbitrary and illegal but is contemptuous also. The District Magistrate or any authority in the State is subordinate to the jurisdiction of the High Court. 24. Under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the Court can issue a direction to any person or authority including in appropriate case any Government and the Subordinate Court. It has also power of superintendence on all the Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It includes the administrative officers as well as officers who performs the quashi judicial functions. If a provision has been declared ultra vires by the Court then it becomes inoperative and if an authority ignores the law laid down by the High Court, he can do it on his own peril. This issue has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in somewhat same facts in the case of Dr. Rohit Gupta v. Principal, S.N. Medical College, Agra and others, (1995) 1 UPLBEC 365 , wherein the Court has expressed its deep anguish on conduct of a Principal of a Medical College, who had passed an order that he will comply with the order of the Court only when he receives some directions from the State Government. Relevant part of the said order is quoted below: “5. Relevant part of the said order is quoted below: “5. We are distressed to note from annexure-7 to the petition that the Principal has taken a stand that he will take action in respect of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court only when he receives some communication from the State Government. This action of the Principal, in our opinion, amounts to contempt of Court. No authority can say that it will not comply with the judgment of this Court unless it has received a communication from the State Government. The judgments of this Court are binding on all authorities automatically and it is not that they become finding only when approved by the State Government. It is surprising that the Principal of a medical college has taken a wholly illegal and untenable stand in annexure-7 to the writ petition. We were inclined to issue contempt notice but we refrained ourseleves from doing so as we feel that he has issued the letter which is annexure-7 in ignorance of the legal position but we will grant no further indulgence to him in future. The Principal of S.N. Medical College, Agra and all other authorities in the State must know that orders of this Court are binding on them automatically and must be faithfully and punctually complied with, and such authorities cannot take a stand that they will comply with the judgment of this Court only when they receive some communication from the State Government. In future this Court will not tolerate this kind of attitude from any authority and all authorities are cautioned against taking up such attitude in respect of the orders or judgments of this Court.” (emphasis supplied) 25. From the aforesaid law laid down by the Division Bench, it appears that the District Magistrate has committed a contempt of this Court despite warning issued to the authorities that the order of this Court is automatically binding. 26. The Supreme Court has also considered this issue in the case of Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah, (2007) 7 SC 689, and held that a direction issued by the competent Court has to be obeyed and implemented. Relevant part of the order reads as under: “32. We are of the considered opinion that once a direction is issued by a competent Court, it has to be obeyed and implemented without any reservation. Relevant part of the order reads as under: “32. We are of the considered opinion that once a direction is issued by a competent Court, it has to be obeyed and implemented without any reservation. If an order passed by a Court of law is not complied with or is ignored, there will be an end of rule of law. If a party against whom such order is made has grievance, the only remedy available to him is to challenge the order by taking appropriate proceedings known to law. But it cannot be made ineffective by not complying with the directions on a specious plea that no such directions could have been issued by the Court. In our judgment, upholding of such argument would result in chaos and confusion and would seriously affect and impair administration of justice. The argument of the Board, therefore, has no force and must be rejected.” 27. Before taking the said view, the District Magistrate ought to have taken a legal opinion. The officials/functionaries of the State are assisted by a battery of lawyers of the State. If they have any doubt regarding application of law or the judgement of the High Court/Courts, they ought to take legal opinion. Their casual approach to the law laid down by the highest Court of the State cannot be countenanced. 28. As a sequel to the above, I find that the impugned communication and order dated 26.2.2016 and 1.3.2016 need to be quashed. Accordingly, they are quashed. The matter is remitted to the District Magistrate to decide afresh in the light of the judgement in Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) expeditiously, but not later than three months from the date of communication of this order. He shall pay regard to the fact that in the matter of compassionate appointment, there should not be any loss of time. 29. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is allowed. 30. No order as to costs. ——————