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2016 DIGILAW 2066 (GUJ)

RAMESHCHANDRA BUDERMAL RAJAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2016-09-24

G.R.UDHWANI

body2016
JUDGMENT : The petitioners-original accused are aggrieved by judgment and order dated 30/07/2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Junagadh @ Veraval in Criminal Appeal No.4 of 2000, whereby the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned 3rd Joint Judicial Magistrate First Class, Veraval in Criminal Case No.1943 of 1993 dated 18/02/2002 under Sections 7 (1) and (5) read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short the Act) came to be confirmed. 2. As per prosecution case, on 26/03/1993 at about 12:30 p.m., the complainant-Food Inspector visited the petitioner’s shop and took the sample of biscuit for analysis which were, after following necessary procedure, sent to the Public Analyst, Vadodara and was rejected by the said laboratory as adulterated by its report dated 16/06/1993. The complaint was therefore made alleging the adulteration of the food within the meaning of Sections 2(ia)(a), 2(ia)(b), 2(ia)(j) and 2(ia)(m) and thus it was alleged that the petitioners violated Rule 8 of the Food Adulteration Act as also Section 7(1) and 7(5) of the PFA Act. 3. On the basis of the material placed before the learned trial Court, Criminal Case No.1943 of 1993 was registered and charge was framed and the accused having denied the charge, they were tried and found guilty and were unsuccessful in appeal as aforesaid. 4. Number of contentions have been raised by learned Counsel for the petitioners amongst which, one of the contentions is that the complainant had initially obtained the report from Bhuj Laboratory which indicated that the article was not adulterated. The Food Inspector in his cross-examination was successfully confronted with the said fact. 5. On the basis of the report of the Bhuj Laboratory, as well as, Vadodara Laboratory, sanction was obtained. Learned Counsel would contend that the complainant had no authority in law to call for the report in absence of making out the case under Section 13(2E) which provides that the Food Inspector can exercise the option of sending the second part of the sample collected to another laboratory, if the report submitted by the 1st laboratory is found to be erroneous. Learned Counsel would contend that the report obtained from Bhuj Laboratory was neither produced on record; nor it was the case of the complainant that it was erroneous. Learned Counsel would contend that the report obtained from Bhuj Laboratory was neither produced on record; nor it was the case of the complainant that it was erroneous. Learned Counsel would submit that in absence of such a foundation, the dispatch of 2nd part of food sample to the Vadodara Laboratory was illegal exercise of powers by the complainant and therefore, only on this ground, the petitioners should succeed in this petition. 6. Learned APP appearing for the respondents vehemently supported the impugned judgment and order passed by the Courts below with the submission that the report Exhibit-66 was obtained under Section 13(2) of the Act on the application made by the accused No.2 and that report established that the food article was adulterated. In her submission therefore, earlier two reports will stand superseded and therefore, even if the report from Bhuj Laboratory was not produced and even in absence of the case having been made out under Section 13 (2E), the petitioners’ prosecution under the Act, was legal and valid and this Court should not interfere by exercising its revisional jurisdiction once the concurrent findings of facts were rendered by the two Courts below. 7. Having considered the rival contentions, it is more than clear that as per procedure prescribed in Section 11, the Food Inspector is obliged to give a notice expressing his intention to collect the sample for analysis and he is further required to divide the sample into three parts. Each part of the sample collected has different purpose to achieve, as explained by this Court in a decision rendered in Criminal Appeal No.599 of 2005 on 08/01/2015. 8. A bare perusal of Section 13(2E) clearly indicates that to avail the right under Section 13(2E) a foundation that the report obtained on the basis of the first part of the sample from the laboratory is erroneous must be laid. Said foundation was relevant and necessary since the exercise of powers under Section 13(2E) were dependent upon the fact of 1st report being erroneous and the factum of 1st report being erroneous must be proved during the trial. In absence of the said foundation, there would be two contradictory reports and in such an eventuality benefit of doubt must go to the accused. Therefore, the accused is entitled to challenge the foundation of the report being erroneous during the trial. In absence of the said foundation, there would be two contradictory reports and in such an eventuality benefit of doubt must go to the accused. Therefore, the accused is entitled to challenge the foundation of the report being erroneous during the trial. The Food Inspector cannot decide on its own that the report is erroneous. He is only required to place the evidence before the Court supporting his case that the report is erroneous. Further, before placing such evidence on record of the Court, the Food Inspector is required to collect the material to show that the report is erroneous. He may then proceed to exercise the powers under subsection (2E) of Section 13. The Food Inspector cannot ignore the 1st report and withhold it from the Court, although he may rely upon other reports after satisfying the Court that the 1st report was erroneous. 9. In the instant case, the Food Inspector admitted having obtained report from Bhuj Laboratory which reported that food article was not adulterated, but, did not produce it with his complaint or during trial. Further, the scheme of Section 13(2E) does not permit the Food Inspector to obtain any number of reports as per his sweet will or as suits his purpose. He himself appears to have decided that the report was erroneous without producing any material before the Court to justify the said conclusion. He only produced the report which stated that the food article was adulterated. This course adopted by the Food Inspected was contrary to the law and cannot be sustained. 10. The argument of the learned APP that since the accused opted for the report under Section 13(2) of the Act, all other previous reports were superseded and therefore, prosecution could rely upon the report obtained from Vadodara as well as the Central Food Laboratory is fallacious and is in ignorance of Section 13(2E). The argument would hold good in a case where the accused uses his right under sub-section( 2) of Section 13 and in such a case the report by CFL would supersede the previous reports. But, the question of superseding the report, which was not made a part of evidence can never arise. In fact, the question of obtaining the 2nd and 3rd report will arise only after making out a case under subsection (2E) of Section 13. But, the question of superseding the report, which was not made a part of evidence can never arise. In fact, the question of obtaining the 2nd and 3rd report will arise only after making out a case under subsection (2E) of Section 13. Thus, there can be no question of supersession of the report obtained by the Food Inspector from Bhuj Laboratory. 11. Both the Courts below were in serious error in not appreciating the aforesaid legal position and erroneously read a blanket right of Food Inspector to obtain 2nd report in subsection (2E) of Section 13 of the Act. 12. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the revisionist are entitled to succeed. The judgment and order rendered by the appellate Court below confirming the judgment and order passed by the learned 3rd Joint Judicial Magistrate First Class, Veraval in Criminal Case No.1943 of 1993 on 18/02/2002 is quashed and set aside. The petitioners are acquitted of all the charges leveled against them. Bail bonds and sureties shall stand discharged. 13. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid