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Gujarat High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 207 (GUJ)

Diamond Cables v. Chandrasinh Amarsinh Rathod

2016-01-28

K.M.THAKER

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. The petitioner is aggrieved by common award dated 31.3.2005 passed by learned labour Court, Vadodara in Reference (LCB) No. 854 of 1992 to 867 of 1992 whereby the learned labour Court directed present petitioner to reinstate the workmen (concerned in the said reference) with continuity of service and backwages at the rates specified in the award in respect of each workmen concerned in the reference cases. 2. Before proceeding further it is necessary to clarify that in this group of 14 petitions the petitioner company has challenged same common award dated 31.3.2005 and identical relief i.e. to quash and set aside the award, are prayed for in all petitions. 2.1 From the award impugned in present petitions it has emerged that, the reference cases were heard together and common award came to be passed in light of the fact that common and almost similar issues were raised and involved in the reference cases and in light of the fact that common submissions were made by the parties. With reference to these petitions also learned Counsel for the petitioner and respondents have made similar and common submissions. In light of such facts these captioned 14 petitions are decided by this common decision. 3. So as to consider the petitioner's challenge against the award it is relevant and also necessary to take into account factual aspects involved in this group of petitions. 3.1 So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the impugned award and the submissions by learned Counsel for the petitioner and respondents that a partnership firm who conducted its business in the name and style of "Diamond Cable" employed present respondents as its workmen in semi skill/unskill categories. The fact that present respondents were, employed by the said partnership firm is not in dispute. 3.2 It appears that present respondents and other workmen were not satisfied with the rates and wages and other service conditions and that therefore dispute was raised. The petitioner employer has alleged that workmen became impatient and they resorted to strike w.e.f. 29.8.1992. 3.3 The workmen denied that they ever restored to strike. They alleged that since they were demanding revision in wages and in their service conditions the employer stopped them from reporting for duty. The petitioner employer has alleged that workmen became impatient and they resorted to strike w.e.f. 29.8.1992. 3.3 The workmen denied that they ever restored to strike. They alleged that since they were demanding revision in wages and in their service conditions the employer stopped them from reporting for duty. The workman also claimed that on 10.9.1992, the workmen served notice to the petitioner to withdraw the termination and to reinstate them. However, the petitioner did not respond to the said notice and continued its manufacturing activities through contract workers. 3.4 The alleged termination resulted in industrial dispute which was referred vide order of Reference dated 01.12.1992. The worker filed their statement of claim and the petitioner filed its reply. Both the sides laid evidence on record. The learned Labour Court considered the material on record and submissions by the parties and passed the award which is impugned in present petition. 4. During the hearing of present petition, Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the petitioner-company further submitted that the workmen had raised unjustified demand and for realizing the demand, they started committing indiscipline. The petitioner also claimed in the written statement that the workmen resorted to strike w.e.f. 29.8.1992 and it had repeatedly intimated (e.g. intimations dated 29.08.1992, 03.09.1992, 14.09.1992, 16.09.1992 and 20.09.1992) the workmen to discontinue the strike and to report for duty, however, the workmen did not report for duty. The learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that it was the respondent-workman who had voluntarily stopped reporting for work and had resorted to strike. It is also claimed by the petitioner employer that on 22.10.1992 it had even issued a notice in newspaper asking the concerned workmen to report for work. However, they did not report for work. In written statement the petitioner employer prayed for declaration that the workmen had resorted to unjust and illegal strike and that the petitioner had not terminated their service, and that therefore, the petitioner was not obliged to comply the condition prescribed under Section 25F of the Act and that since the service of the respondents were not terminated by way of disciplinary action, there was no need or occasion to conduct domestic inquiry by granting opportunity of hearing to the respondents. He submitted that despite written intimations and despite publication of notice in the newspaper, the respondents did not report for work and that therefore, the impugned directions are not justified and the workmen are not entitled for back wages. He further submitted that when they reported for work in response to the purshis, after some time they stopped reporting for duty, and therefore, also impugned directions are not justified. 5. Mr. Rathod, learned advocate denied the allegations about strike and claimed that when they demanded revision in wages and in their service conditions, the petitioner stopped them from reporting for duty and terminated the respondents by oral order, and thereafter, so as to deny or frustrate the demand of the workmen, the petitioner substituted them by engaging contract workers. He also submitted that whenever the workmen reported for duty in response to the letters and notices, either they were not allowed to resume their duties or they were asked to join and report to the contractor and work as contract labourer. The workmen claimed that the petitioner started such modus operandi w.e.f. 29.8.1992. He submitted that at the time when the service were terminated principles of natural justice were not followed and/or retrenchment compensation was not paid and procedure prescribed by law was not followed and Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act was violated and the petitioner terminated the workmen arbitrarily and by oral order and that their services were not terminated after conducting inquiry for any misconduct. 3. According to the claim of the workmen, the action of the petitioner of engaging contract labour for undertaking its manufacturing activity amounts to unfair labour practice. Learned advocate for the respondent-workmen also submitted that the workmen had not resorted to strike and that therefore, there is no error in the award. 6. I have heard Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Mankad, learned advocate for the respondent and I have also considered the award and other material on record. 7. Before proceeding further it is pertinent to mention that according to the claim of the petitioner employer the workmen had (allegedly) resorted to strike, however, it had not taken any action against the workmen and/or it had not even taken steps to seek order of prohibition against alleged strike under Section 10 of the Act and/or to get the strike declared illegal or unjustified. 7.1 On the other hand, the workmen also, in like manner, did not initiate any action before any authority under the Act or before the Court with allegation that the employer had resorted to lock out and they were locked out and were not being allowed to report for duty. Any proceeding was not, and has not been, initiated by the workmen. However, it is not in dispute that the workmen had not been paid wages from and after 28.09.1992. 8. Thus, even if it is assumed that the concerned workmen had resorted to strike, there is no declaration by the Court that the strike was illegal or unjustified. Likewise, there is also no declaration that the petitioner's action amounted to lock out and the lock out was illegal or unjustified. 9. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that any order(s) terminating service of the respondent workmen either on the ground of misconduct or for the reason that they had resorted to strike or by way of retrenchment are not issued and have not been placed on record. It is also pertinent that there is nothing on record to establish that the service of the respondent were terminated in accordance with law. On the contrary the employer has claimed in the written statement that it never terminated service (s) of the respondents. 10. The petitioner employer has not mentioned and has not clarified, at any stage or in any document or in any manner either before the labour Court or even on record of present petition and even during hearing of this petition and even in reply to the specific quarry by the Court that from which date it treated the workmen as non-workmen either by striking off their names from the rolls of the company or by issuing any termination orders or in any other manner and from which date the relationship of employer and employee was severed by the petitioner or treated as severed by it. 11. 11. The learned advocate for the petitioner invoked a purshis dated 08.09.1995, which was filed by the petitioner before the learned Labour Court, wherein the petitioner mentioned that having regard to the pending dispute, it had requested the management of Diamond Cables Limited (i.e. the resultant company offer the partnership firm was converted in a company) to accommodate the concerned workmen and the Company will try to accommodate as many person as it can. On the said ground, the petitioner urged before the learned Labour Court that the concerned workman may approach the management of the Company with application(s). 11.1 The workmen had put a counter remark on the said pursis and declared that without prejudice to their right to claim wages for the intervening period they are ready to report for duty, however, the condition of submitting fresh application for employment was not acceptable. It is given out that with such objection the workman reported for work, but when they were asked to work as contractors workers and their wages were allegedly paid wages through contractor they stopped working with the contractor. 12. At this state, it is relevant to mention most important and relevant fact of this case viz. the employer has not passed and not served termination order(s) to any workman concerned in the reference case and even in reply to Court's query the petitioner has not clarified as to whether the names of the workmen were deleted from attendance and pay registers and if yes, then from which date. 13. According to the petitioner's claim it never, either by covert or by overt act, terminated the services of the workmen. 14. On this count, it is relevant to note that the petitioner's undertaking is a manufacturing unit and carries on industrial (manufacturing) activities. Thus, it would be governed by Model (or settled and certified) Standing Order which provide that service of workman can be terminated by passing an order (by competent authority) in accordance with provision of standing orders. Thus, in absence of any order terminating service of the employees, in eyes of law cessation of service and/or severance of employer and employee relationship did not occur in accordance with law. 15. Thus, in absence of any order terminating service of the employees, in eyes of law cessation of service and/or severance of employer and employee relationship did not occur in accordance with law. 15. It is also pertinent to mention, at this stage, that during the hearing of present petition, the learned Advocate for the petitioner admitted that the manufacturing and other activities of the petitioner were carried on through contract workers. On the other hand, in the written statement, the petitioner denied the allegation that it had terminated the service of the concerned workmen by oral order. 16. Such stand by the petitioner gives rise to below mentioned situation:-- "[a] Since the petitioner claimed that it did not terminate the service(s) of the concerned workmen and did not pass any order, it means that the employer-employee relationship were not severed by following the procedure prescribed by law. [b] This fact would translate into the situation that in eye of law the employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the concerned workmen subsisted in absence of termination order(s). [c] In view of the petitioner's own defence that it had not terminated service of the respondent workmen, there cannot be any objection on the part of the petitioner to give effect to the direction of reinstatement and to allow the respondent workmen to report for duty, more so when of employer-employee relationship was not brought to an end in accordance with law. [d] The second situation which would arise in light of the petitioner's defence before the learned Labour Court is that since the concerned workmen had, allegedly, resorted to strike (according to petitioner's allegation) and despite its intimation notice to report for work, they did not report for work, the petitioner had terminated the service of the concerned workmen. [e] Such termination would amount to action against misconduct. In that event, such action would be per-se illegal because in present case the petitioner had, undisputedly, not conducted any inquiry (on the ground that they had resorted to strike) and had not granted opportunity of hearing and defence. [f] Other situation which would arise is that the petitioner-employer assumed that the respondents had abandoned the service. Meaning thereby, the petitioner had treated the alleged action of the respondent as abandonment of service. [f] Other situation which would arise is that the petitioner-employer assumed that the respondents had abandoned the service. Meaning thereby, the petitioner had treated the alleged action of the respondent as abandonment of service. [g] However, such assumption on the part of the petitioner would not be justified and sustainable because (i) according to the petitioner, the respondent workmen had resorted to strike and there was no material before the employer to assume that the concerned workmen had voluntarily abandoned their services in respect of the workmen who, allegedly, were on strike. Such presumption of abandonment of service could not have been made and it is not legally sustainable since the workmen had been actually protesting - while continuing in the employment - for proper implementation and enforcement of contract of employment; and beside this, (ii) such assumption on the part of the petitioner would oblige the petitioner to comply the condition under Section 25F of the Act, which condition, was, Undisputedly, not complied by the petitioner. [h] This would render the action of the petitioner unsustainable. [i] The above discussion brings out that from any angle or perspective the petitioner's stand-defence is not legal and is not sustainable." 17. On top of this the petitioner claimed - and even asserted in the written statement that it had not terminated the services of the respondents and as a matter of fact, termination order(s) are not passed. Therefore, it cannot said that there was legal severance of employment contract or of the employer-employee relationship. 17.1 On the other hand, the workman consistently maintained that they had not abandoned the service and that they had not resorted to strike. They also claimed that the employer did not allow them to resume their duties and had continued manufacturing activities through contract workers w.e.f. 28.09.1992. The petitioner has not disputed or denied that it had engaged contract workers. 17.2 In light of these facts, the employer's action of engaging contract workers and continuing the manufacturing and other activities through contract workers amounts to impliedly or indirectly terminating services of the respondents. 18. The award of the learned Labour Court which is impugned in present petition has to be considered. 18.1 However, before proceeding further, it is relevant to take into account the provision under Section 23 and Section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 18. The award of the learned Labour Court which is impugned in present petition has to be considered. 18.1 However, before proceeding further, it is relevant to take into account the provision under Section 23 and Section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 18.2 Thus, even if it is assumed that the workmen had resorted to strike w.e.f. 29.8.1992, then also, in light of the provision under Sections 23 and Section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and more particularly in absence of declaration by the Court or in absence of prohibition by appropriate government (under Section 10 (4A) of the Act) the strike cannot be assumed to be illegal. On this]count, what is more important is the fact that, until now, there is no declaration by the Court that the alleged strike was illegal. Thus, the service(s) of the respondent could not have been taken without complying principles of natural justice and without establishing that the workmen had resorted to and participated in illegal and unjustified strike. "In present case, it is an undisputed position that any proceedings on the ground of misconduct were not initiated and conducted against the workmen. 18.3 Further there is no evidence on record, which would establish the allegation that the workmen had resorted to strike. The petitioner has not proved, before the learned Labour Court that the workmen had resorted to strike w.e.f. 28.9.1992 and/or that since they resorted to strike its manufacturing activities or the activities/processes in the factory were affected. The petitioner did not place on record before learned Labour Court any material about stoppage of production or even loss of production. Further, it is informed by learned advocate for the petitioner that manufacturing activity continued even after 28.9.1992 through the contract workers. It is also claimed that during the period prior to the strike the petitioner had been engaging contract workers and the said fact is not disputed by the petitioner. Actually, it is the employer's action viz. engaging contractor's workers which would - if established in appropriate proceedings - amount to unfair Labour Practice. 19. In the award, learned Labour Court has referred to the document dated 20.1.1993 (Exh. 41, which is a letter addressed by the workmen to the petitioner). Actually, it is the employer's action viz. engaging contractor's workers which would - if established in appropriate proceedings - amount to unfair Labour Practice. 19. In the award, learned Labour Court has referred to the document dated 20.1.1993 (Exh. 41, which is a letter addressed by the workmen to the petitioner). By the said letter, the respondent workmen had given response to the petitioner's letter dated 30.12.1992 (which the workmen received on 7.1.1993) and asserted that the petitioner terminated their service w.e.f. 29.8.1992 by oral order. 20. It is also mentioned in the said letter that when they raised industrial dispute and the proceedings were conducted in the office of Assistant Labour Commissioner, the petitioner did not express readiness to reinstate them and/or to allow them to report for duty. The workmen also claimed that the said letter dated 30.12.1992 was issued with malafide intention. 21. The fact situation emerging from the record can be summarized thus:-- "[a] Any order terminating the service of the workmen have not been passed and issued and served to the respondent workmen. Thus, there is no cessation of service in accordance with law and in absence of termination order(s) there was no severance of employer - employee relation in accordance with law and in the eyes of law the employer-employee relationship existed and subsisted between the petitioner and the respondents [b] The petitioner claimed that the respondent workmen had resorted to strike. However, the said allegation is not proved. Any witness is not examined or any material is not placed on record of the learned Labour Court to demonstrate that the strike was resorted to by the workmen (except few letters written by the petitioner to the respondent workmen and/or couple of letters written to the office of Assistant Labour Commissioner and/or because of strike, the manufacturing activity and/or production was stopped or adversely affected. [C] On the other hand, the workmen claimed that their services came to be terminated by petitioner by oral order and they have been replaced by contract workers. It is not disputed by the petitioner that it has engaged contract workers and continued all activities - including manufacturing activities - through contract workers. This aspect would mean that services of the respondents were impliedly served by the petitioner. [d] Any action against the workmen by way of disciplinary measure for any misconduct viz. It is not disputed by the petitioner that it has engaged contract workers and continued all activities - including manufacturing activities - through contract workers. This aspect would mean that services of the respondents were impliedly served by the petitioner. [d] Any action against the workmen by way of disciplinary measure for any misconduct viz. resorting to strike or remaining absent for long duration without permission, were not initiated and any disciplinary action in accordance with law was not taken by the petitioner against the respondent workmen. [e] The petitioner did not take any action to get the alleged strike declared illegal or to get the alleged strike prohibited. [f] When the petitioner filed the purshis in the Court the respondent had responded and reported for duty. This aspect also establishes the fact that workmen had not voluntarily abandoned their service. [g] When the respondent workmen reported for duty the petitioner insisted that the respondents should report for work with the contractor and should work as workmen of the contractor instead of allowing the workmen to resume the duty in their original capacity i.e. as the employee of the petitioner. [h] The petitioner did not bring on record any cogent evidence to establish the allegation that the workmen had played mischief and/or harassed staff members and lady employees. Beside this, if that was the reason for discontinuing the respondents, then it could not have been done without complying principles of natural justice i.e. without conducting the domestic inquiry. In present case, the said procedure was undisputedly not followed." 22. In face of its own case that the termination order(s) were not passed and it had not terminated the workmen, how can the petitioner - employer justify its objection against direction to reinstate the workmen and to allow them to report for/resume duty. In this situation, petitioner's objection against the said direction is not justified. 23. In face of its own case that the termination order(s) were not passed and it had not terminated the workmen, how can the petitioner - employer justify its objection against direction to reinstate the workmen and to allow them to report for/resume duty. In this situation, petitioner's objection against the said direction is not justified. 23. So as to claim that the direction for reinstatement is unjustified, the petitioner will have to admit and accept that there was cessation of employment and it will have to proceed on the premise that the service of the workmen had been terminated and it would also be necessary to establish that in the facts and circumstance of the case the termination of services was not only legal and in accordance with law, but also that termination was justified and proper and that therefore, the direction is not justified. However, the petitioner does not admit or accept said premise. On the contrary the petitioner prayed for declaration that it did not terminate the relations. In this view of the matter, there is no justification in petitioner's objection against the said direction. 24. Actually foregoing discussion and the facts noticed from the record and mentioned above have established that the petitioner's actions amount to termination of workmen's services. Even if the case and defence of the petitioner and his explanation are treated as assumption that the workmen had abandoned their service, then also the employer's action would amount to termination - by way of retrenchment - of workmen's service. In light of the facts of present case, the impugned action is, in both situation, not in accordance with law and thus not sustainable and the learned Court has not committed any error in holding that the petitioner terminated the workmen. In order to claim that the petitioner had terminated their service, the workmen relied on the letters dated 8.9.1992, 10.9.1992, 15.9.1992. The workman relied on said letters and had claimed that their service terminated and their place contract labourer were engaged. The respondent workmen claimed that every time they reported for duty they were not allowed to report for duty and the petitioner carried on the was manufacturing activity through the contract labourer. 25. The workman relied on said letters and had claimed that their service terminated and their place contract labourer were engaged. The respondent workmen claimed that every time they reported for duty they were not allowed to report for duty and the petitioner carried on the was manufacturing activity through the contract labourer. 25. It is pertinent that in addition to above mentioned aspects, the learned Court, so as to reach to the conclusion that the petitioner had terminated services of the respondents w.e.f. 28.9.1992, Court has also taken into account the documents available on record, mainly the letters written by the workmen to the company and the labour Commissioner office. It is true that the petitioner has relied on the notice published in the newspaper (on 22.10.1992) asking them to report for work. 25.1 However, the learned Court relied on the material on record and on petitioner's conduct and actions and rejected the petitioner's allegations. 25.2 One of the letters on which the learned labour Court placed reliance is letter dated 10.9.1992 addressed by the workmen to the petitioner wherein the workmen claimed that after terminating service by oral order the petitioner had engaged contract labourer and though they were reporting for duty they were not allowed to resume work. Learned labour Court also took into consideration the complaint filed by the workmen in the office of labour commissioner vide their letter dated 8.9.1992 and 15.9.1992. From the material on record the labour Court has also recorded the conclusion that by addressing letters the petitioner had merely tried to create an impression that it was inviting workmen to report for duty but the workmen continued strike and did not report for work, however actually the petitioner had never allowed the respondents to resume duty after 28.8.1992. 25.3 On this count the labour Court referred to the letter dated 20.1.1993 addressed by the workmen to the petitioner (exh.41) which was addressed by the workmen to the petitioner, wherein the respondent workmen narrated past events starting from 29.8.1992 and claimed that their service was terminated by oral order and that an impression that the petitioner was inviting them to report for duty was sought to be created, however, actually when they reported for work they were not being allowed to resume duty and instead they were being asked to tender resignation and to start work with, and under, the contractor. 26. 26. The labour Court has not believed the case of the petitioner that it had invited the respondents to report for work but they continued strike and did not report for work. The said finding by the Court derives support from the fact that the petitioner had engaged contract workers and continued its activities. 27. The question which arise in this backdrop is whether the said conclusion and findings of fact by the learned labour Court is perverse and whether it warrants any interference by the Court. 28. Ordinarily this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by labour Court unless it is established that the findings of fact are perverse and apparently contrary to the evidence on record or without any evidence to support such findings. 29. In present case it is not possible to hold that the said finding of fact are perverse. 29.1 Moreover, the petitioner's insistence that the respondent workmen should work under contractor, justifies the conclusions by learned labour Court that the petitioner addressed the letters and issued advertisement only with a view to creating an impression and evidence that it had invited workmen to report for work but the workmen were not reporting for work whereas in fact the petitioner always wanted to convert the status of the respondent workmen into contract labour. 29.2 Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case and material on record, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the said findings of fact recorded by the labour Court. 30. This brings in picture the challenge against the direction to reinstate the respondents. So far as the issue related to the labour Court's direction to reinstate the respondent workmen is concerned, it is necessary to recall that the petitioner has consistently maintained the stand that it never terminated service of the respondents and that it had addressed various letters asking the respondent workmen to report for duty. 30.1 In this background and in light of such fact there was none and there would not be any justification on part of the petitioner to resist and oppose the direction of reinstatement. Moreover in view of the undisputed fact that the petitioner had continued its manufacturing activity through contract workers so far as the direction to the petitioner to reinstate the respondents is concerned, it cannot be faulted and does not warrant interference. Moreover in view of the undisputed fact that the petitioner had continued its manufacturing activity through contract workers so far as the direction to the petitioner to reinstate the respondents is concerned, it cannot be faulted and does not warrant interference. 30.2 In this view of the matter this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order directing the petitioner to reinstate the respondent-workmen. 31. At this stage it is relevant to recall the purshis, whereby the petitioner affected alternative mode of service to the respondent workmen. It is claimed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that such offer was made with a view to avoiding any burden of backwages in the event the decision by the Court goes against the petitioner and also in view of the fact that the said period was transition period for the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner was converted into limited company from partnership firm. It is not disputed that only the form and the status of the undertaking had changed, but not the ownership. The petitioner has claimed that after such offer the respondent workmen had reported for work on and from 14.9.1995 however subsequently by raising dispute about mode of payment of wages they again stopped reporting for work. 31.1 From the evidence on record, it has emerged that after having resumed the service w.e.f. 14.9.1995 in pursuance of the purshis dated 8.9.1995 submitted by the petitioner, the workmen raised grievance in view of the fact that they were being paid wages through contractor, and in protest against such mode of payment they stopped reporting for duty. The said action or method of protest was not justified inasmuch as the said arrangement was made without prejudice to the right and contention of either side and only as stop-gap arrangement so that the question of backwages for subsequent period may not arise and the workmen may also start earning their salary. However the workman failed to appreciate the said larger aspect and stopped reporting for duty w.e.f. 1.11.1995. 31.2. In view of the said fact, this Court is of the view that the respondents cannot be considered entitled for any part of wages for the period after 8.9.1995. The direction by the labour Court to pay backwages at specified rate for the period after 8.9.1995 is not sustainable and deserves to be set aside and accordingly set aside. 31.2. In view of the said fact, this Court is of the view that the respondents cannot be considered entitled for any part of wages for the period after 8.9.1995. The direction by the labour Court to pay backwages at specified rate for the period after 8.9.1995 is not sustainable and deserves to be set aside and accordingly set aside. 31.3 In paragraph 26(1) to 26(13) Labour Court has discussed the facts in respect of each Respondent and their gainful employment during the interregnum. From the said discussion it emerges that the workmen were engaged at one place or another and they were earning income during the interregnum. 31.4 When over all view of the facts of present case are taken into account, it appears that the direction to pay 50% back wages for the period from 28.9.1992 to 7.9.1995 would serve interest of justice. 32. Therefore, following order is passed: "A) The direction by the Labour Court to reinstate the Respondent Workmen is not disturbed and it is hereby confirmed. B) The direction to pay back wages for the period after 8.9.1995 is set aside. C) For the period from 29.8.1992 to 7.9.1995 the Respondents will be entitled for wages @ 10% to be calculated at the rate they were paid wages prior to 28.8.1992. D) It is jointly declared by the learned Advocates for the Petitioner and the Respondents that Respondent No. 2 has died, therefore the said workman will be entitled only back wages @ 50% for the period from 29.8.1992 to the death of his sad demise i.e. 22.8.2004. E) So far as Respondent Workman at srl. No. 14 is concerned, he has crossed age of superannuation and that therefore in his case also the question of reinstatement would not arise. Under the circumstances, he would be entitled for back wages for the period from 29.8.1992 until 7.4.1995 or the date when he attained age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. F) So far as Respondent at Srl. No. 5 is concerned, in view of the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court in paragraph No. 26(5), the said workman will not be entitled for wages even for the aforesaid period i.e. 29.8.1992 to 7.9.1995. F) So far as Respondent at Srl. No. 5 is concerned, in view of the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court in paragraph No. 26(5), the said workman will not be entitled for wages even for the aforesaid period i.e. 29.8.1992 to 7.9.1995. G) It is further clarified that if during the period from 29.8.1992 to the date of award and/or at any time after the date of award, if any workmen attended the age prescribed for superannuation, then service of such workmen will be deemed to have come to an end from the date fixed for superannuation. If such workman attained age for superannuation after 08.09.1995 then such workman would be entitled to back wages at aforesaid rate of 50% till 07.09.1995. H) It is further clarified that since in the interregnum the partnership firm is converted into limited company, upon reinstatement in pursuance of the direction, it will be permissible for the petitioner to reinstate the Respondent workman on any equivalent post and for equivalent nature of work and the Respondent workman will not raise any dispute with regard to assignment of work/department/post etc. so long he is reinstated on post equivalent to the post he held prior to 28.8,.1992 and his service condition with regard to the salary which were applicable at that time is not altered." 32.1 The petitioner will endeavour to carry out reinstatement of Respondent workman as expeditiously as possible and preferably within four weeks from service of certified copy of the order. Accordingly the petitions are partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.