Udhna Academic Education Trust v. Ashish Chitranjan Mehta
2016-09-28
BIREN VAISHNAV
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Baiju Joshi, learned advocate for the Petitioners, Mr. Jayraj Chauhan, learned advocate for Respondent No. 1 and Ms. Nisha Thakore, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Respondent No. 3. Respondent No.2 though duly served, has chosen to remain absent. 2. This petition is preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the Order dated 25.6.2004 passed by the Gujarat Affiliated Colleges Services Tribunal at Ahmedabad below Application No.27 of 2004. 3. The Applicant before the Tribunal was constrained to approach the Tribunal by filing an Application under Section 8 of Gujarat Affiliated Colleges Services Tribunal Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) on being aggrieved by the order dated 12.5.2004 passed by the Petitioner - Institution, whereby, the services of the Applicant - Respondent No.1 were terminated. Several contentions were raised before the Tribunal, inter-alia, contending that the order of termination was illegal, inasmuch as, though the Applicant was appointed on probation for a period of two years vide order dated 14.7.2002, his services could not have been terminated in the manner they were. A specific contention was raised in the Application that order was punitive. The contention was also raised that the termination order passed by the Petitioner herein was in midst of academic session and, therefore, the cause of terminating the services of Respondent No.1 was not in accordance with law. A reply was filed by the Petitioner-Institution raising various contentions. 4. On perusal of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, it appears that the Tribunal has decided the Application on a sole point that the order of termination was not in accordance with Ordinance 69A. The contention of the Applicant amongst several others was that the order of termination passed on 12.5.2004 was illegal in view of the fact that in accordance with Ordinance 69, wherein, clause 8(iii) provides that the notice of the termination of service of a teacher on probation shall be effective only after the approval of Vice Chancellor. Thereby, it was the case of the Applicant that the termination of a teacher on probation was to be effective only after the approval of Vice Chancellor. In view of the fact that such approval was not taken by the Petitioner-Institution, the order of termination was ineffective. The Tribunal on this short ground allowed the Application vide impugned order dated 25.6.2004. 5. Mr.
In view of the fact that such approval was not taken by the Petitioner-Institution, the order of termination was ineffective. The Tribunal on this short ground allowed the Application vide impugned order dated 25.6.2004. 5. Mr. Baiju Joshi, learned advocate for the Petitioners has drawn my attention to the contention raised in this petition that the Applicant had not produced the correct ordinance before the Tribunal and in fact, ordinance produced at Annexure `G', page No.36 to the petition was the correct ordinance, which does not require any approval of the Vice Chancellor and the ordinance produced by the Applicant-Respondent No.1 herein was not the correct ordinance. It is further submitted by Mr. Baiju Joshi, learned advocate for the Petitioners that the ordinance at Annexure 'G' is the correct one. In that view of the fact, Mr. Jayraj Chauhan, learned advocate for Respondent No.1 has drawn my attention to page No.58 i.e. Annexure `R-1' to the reply filed. It is apparent that the amended ordinance dated 10th October, 2001 which was the ordinance in force was sent to all the concerned Universities and, therefore, it is undisputed now that the ordinance that was in force when the Respondent herein was terminated was the one relied upon by the Tribunal. I, therefore, could not find fault with the Tribunal for having decided the Application only on the short point of the ordinance in force. 6. However, today, during the course of arguments, Mr. Baiju Joshi, learned advocate for the Petitioners has drawn my attention to a letter dated 22.5.2004, at page 109 of the paper-book, written to the Vice Chancellor of the South Gujarat University by the Petitioner-college, few days after the order of termination, whereby, the Vice Chancellor of the University was informed that the services of the Respondent No.1 have been terminated. From the said fact, it is apparent and undisputed that subsequent to the order of termination that the Vice Chancellor approval was necessary, which is evident from this communication. However, Mr. Jayraj Chauhan, learned advocate for Respondent No.1 has invited attention of this Court to the said communication dated 22.5.2004, wherein, though, apparently the termination appears to be simplicitor, the fact remains that the appointment of the Applicant-original Respondent No.1 was on 14.7.2002 and his termination was effective on and from 12.5.2004 only.
However, Mr. Jayraj Chauhan, learned advocate for Respondent No.1 has invited attention of this Court to the said communication dated 22.5.2004, wherein, though, apparently the termination appears to be simplicitor, the fact remains that the appointment of the Applicant-original Respondent No.1 was on 14.7.2002 and his termination was effective on and from 12.5.2004 only. It is also contended by him that in view of the specific assertion in the letter dated 22.5.2004 holding that the service of the Petitioner was unsatisfactory, this Court should lift the veil and hold that the termination was stigmatic and punitive, and not termination simplicitor. He has also drawn my attention to page 33, wherein, a specific contention has been made by the Applicant-original Respondent No.1 that circumstances were pointed out before the Tribunal to substantiate the fact that termination of service of the Respondent-original Applicant before the Tribunal was punitive and not termination simplicitor. 7. Having perused the order of the Tribunal, the issues raised by the Applicant-Respondent No.1 have not been considered by the Tribunal, though raised before it and the Tribunal has decided the Application only on the question of noncompliance of Ordinance 69(A). 8. Mr. Baiju Joshi, learned advocate for Respondent No.1 contended that in accordance with the practice before the Tribunal, the Tribunal being vested with original jurisdiction, it ought to have examined the witnesses and led evidence and the Tribunal, within a short period of 19 days, disposed the Application on the short ground of Ordinance 69, which, even otherwise, appears to be undisputed as that was the Ordinance in force. However, in view of the fact that Tribunal has not considered the issues raised before it i.e. whether the order of termination, which was impugned before it, was termination simplicitor or punitive, in view of the letter dated 22.5.2004 and in view of the specific contention raised by the original Applicant-Respondent herein, further to the fact that termination could not have been made in the midst of the academic session, in my view that is the issue which ought to have been decided by the Tribunal. 9. In view of above facts and circumstances, this petition is partly allowed. The Tribunal is directed to decide the Application No.27 of 2004 afresh on all issues raised before it without being influenced by the order passed by this Court.
9. In view of above facts and circumstances, this petition is partly allowed. The Tribunal is directed to decide the Application No.27 of 2004 afresh on all issues raised before it without being influenced by the order passed by this Court. Such Application shall be heard and decided by the concerned Tribunal preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. However, it is made clear that it would be open for all the parties to produce all the documents for consideration before the Tribunal including the documents which are the part of the proceedings before this Court. 10. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.