JUDGMENT J.K. Ranka, J. The instant appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1961) is directed against the order dated 17.12.2013 passed by Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur (in short ITAT) and is relevant for the assessment year 2008-09. 2. The revenue has questioned the order of the Tribunal by using following substantial question of law on which the appeal was admitted in this Court on 21.3.2014 :- "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the ITAT was right in law in appreciating the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2009(317) ITR 218 (SC) regarding the receipts under the (DEPB) and Duty Drawback scheme entitled for deduction u/s 80-IB of the Act of 1961." 3. The brief facts noticed are that respondent assessee is engaged in the business of manufacturing of wooden handicraft items and has shown income by way of export sales. On scrutiny of the assessment and on perusal of the books of accounts and other material it was revealed to the Assessing Officer that the assessee has credited following amounts in the P&L A/c : A. DEPB Rs. 70,197/- B. Drawback duty Rs. 76,27,636/- 4. The assessee in addition to normal profits of the business claimed deduction u/s 80-IB on these amounts duly supported with an audit report. However, the Assessing Officer was not satisfied and held that these are merely incentives to the assessee and a show cause notice was served as to why in the light of judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Liberty India v. CIT, 2009(317) ITR 218 (SC) the said amount be not excluded and the deduction under Section 80-IB of the Act of 1961 & recomputed excluding the above DEPB as well as Drawback Duty and accordingly sought to reduce by recomputing the deduction under Section 80-IB of the Act of 1961. The defence of the assessee was that the Apex Court has not taken into consideration the amendments made in Section 28(iiid) and 28(iiie) of the Act of 1961 and objected to reduction of the above incentives. The Assessing Officer taking into consideration the arguments and objections was of the view that the issue being settled by decision of the Apex Court in the case of Liberty India (supra) not open for discussion and reduced the deduction excluding the export incentives. 5. The Assessing Officer taking into consideration the arguments and objections was of the view that the issue being settled by decision of the Apex Court in the case of Liberty India (supra) not open for discussion and reduced the deduction excluding the export incentives. 5. An appeal was filed before the CIT (A) by the respondent assessee. However concurring with the view of the Assessing Officer it was held that the judgment of Apex Court in CIT v. M/s. Sterling Foods Ltd. (237 ITR 579) as well as the judgment of Liberty India (supra) covers the controversy and accordingly rejected the appeal. 6. The assessee preferred further appeal to the ITAT who vide impugned order although referred the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Liberty India (supra) but held that the said judgment is treated as "per incuriam" and chose to follow the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Chokshi Contracts (P) Ltd. - 251 ITR 587 (Raj.), Saraf Seasoning Udyog 2009(317) ITR 202 (Raj.) the order of Jodhpur Bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Bothra International, Jodhpur in ITA No. 37/JU/2011 dated 21.9.2012 and while setting aside the order allowed appeals of the assessee. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant strongly and vehemently contended that when there is a judgment of the Apex Court dealing with the identical issue in regard to export incentives in the case of Liberty India (supra) and in M/s. Sterling Foods Ltd. (supra) the order, if any, of this Court in the case of Saraf Seasoning Udyog (supra) and Chokshi Contacts (supra) looses significance and the judgment of the Apex Court is binding on all the authorities u/Art. 141 of the Constitution. He further contended that the order of the Tribunal is wholly per verse, illegal and such an order ought not to have been passed by the Tribunal distinguishing the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Liberty India (supra) is superficial. 8. He further contended that the judgment of Chokshi Contacts was entirely on a different issue and rendered where the issue was decided on an application under Section 154 of the Act of 1961. 8. He further contended that the judgment of Chokshi Contacts was entirely on a different issue and rendered where the issue was decided on an application under Section 154 of the Act of 1961. He also contended that the judgment of Saraf Seasoning Udyog (supra) was rendered prior to the judgment of Liberty Indiia (supra) and holding the judgment of Liberty India [supra) to be per incuriam is unheard of. He thus contended that the order cased by the Assessing Officer as well as CIT (A) is just and proper and order of the Tribunal deserves to be quashed and set aside. 9. Per contra, Mr. Suresh Ojha, learned counsel for the assessee respondent contended that incentives are part of the business income and deduction under Section 80-IB of the Act of 1961 is required to be allowed on the business income and once the export incentives are also part of business income/receipts then deduction under Section 80-IB is required to be allowed on the total profit of the assessee. He also contended that in the case of assessee itself for the assessment year 2005-06 and 2006-07, the ITAT had allowed the claim under Section 80-IB of the Act of 1961 and such assessments have become final as the same has not been challenged by the revenue before this Court, and when the claim has been allowed in the past on the same set of facts and material, deductions having been claimed on the same facts, the order of the Tribunal is required to be followed in the light of judgment rendered in the case of Radjasoami Satsang v. CIT AIR 1992 377 (SC) and other judgments. He also contended that when two reasonable constructions are possible then the one which is more favourable to the assessee has to be adopted and relied on the judgment in the case of CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd., 1973(88) ITR 192 (SC). 10. He further contended that the initial order of claim u/Sec. 80-IB was for assessment year 2005-06 and determination is required to be seen in initial year and if claim in initial year is found in order, it deserves to be allowed subsequently in subsequent years. In this regard, he has also relied upon Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. v. CIT, Gujarat 123 ITR 669. In this regard, he has also relied upon Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. v. CIT, Gujarat 123 ITR 669. He also contended that the judgment in Liberty India (supra) has not considered the amended Section 28(iiid) and 28(iiie) of the Act of 1961 and the order of the Tribunal is just and proper and is not required to be interfered with. 11. We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order so also other material and judgments cited at the Bar. 12. In our view the order of the Tribunal is not sustainable in law as when the AO and CIT (A) relied upon the judgment of Liberty India (supra), which, in our view, covers the controversy but surprisingly, the Tribunal has not at all cared to discuss the judgment of the Apex Court which is binding on all the authorities u/Art. 141 of the Constitution of India including the Tribunal. The Tribunal relied upon its own order for the assessment year 2005-06 and 2006-07 respectively which in our view, is unsustainable in law in the light of the judgment of Liberty India (supra) which was available before the ITAT even when the earlier appeals were decided. 13. It would be appropriate to quote relevant para of the impugned order of the Tribunal : 2.7. It is an undeniable and undisputed fact that Assessing Officer has passed the impugned order based on the verdict given in the Liberty India (supra). The perusal of the judgment reveals that their Lordships have not considered the amended provision. As against which is rightly pointed out by the Id. AR, The Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the decision of Saraf Seasoning Udhyog (supra) have discussed and relied on even the amended provision. Further it is trite that when any amended provision is not considered or for that matter, any relevant provision of the Act is not considered while giving a judgment, it is treated as in per curium. 2.8. The Hon'ble High Court has taken its view while deciding the case of Chokshi Contracts (P) Ltd. in 251 ITR 587 (Raj.) that in case amended provisions of the Act are not considered the judgment looses the character of a binding nature. Court has also held as under "Coming to the judgment relied on by" the id. 2.8. The Hon'ble High Court has taken its view while deciding the case of Chokshi Contracts (P) Ltd. in 251 ITR 587 (Raj.) that in case amended provisions of the Act are not considered the judgment looses the character of a binding nature. Court has also held as under "Coming to the judgment relied on by" the id. Counsel for the Revenue in Shree Engineer's case (supra), we are of the opinion that the answer question no. 3 which was referred by the Tribunal has been rendered solely with the reference to the earlier decision of the Court in 'Vishnu Oil and Dal Mills' case 1996(218) ITR 71 (Raj.) only without noticing the relevant provisions of Section 80A and 80AB and Section 80 B(5) and also Section 80 HH(9). It may be noticed that the decision in Vishnu Oil and Dal Mills case 1996(218) ITR 71 (Raj.) dealt with the question whether in computing the gross total income for the purpose of Chapter VI-A requires adjustments of unabsorbed carry forward loss or unabsorbed carry forward depreciation in terms of part D of Chapter IV or in terms of Chapter VI of the Act, which as seen above has to be computed without taking into account the provisions of Chapter VI-A, but after taking into account the provisions of the Act - whether under Chapter IV or Chapter VI. However, the Court was not dealing with the interaction of the various sections contained in Chapter VI-A on the issue of deduction of any amount which is to be allowed under Chapter VI-A. Thus the decision rendered in Shree Engineers' case without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act merely by reference to Vishnu Oil Mills case (1996), 218 ITR 71 (Raj.) was per incuriam and cannot be taken as a binding precedent and does not assist the Revenue in any manner." 2.9. Similar view has been taken by the Jodhpur Bench in the case of M/s. Bothra International, Jodhpur in ITA No. 37/JU/2011 : A.Y. (2002-03) dated 21.9.2012. Therefore, the decision of Liberty India will not rule the field after amendment. Moreover, in any other case, the issue becomes a debatable one in the light of the above decision. It is settled position of law that where any issue is debatable, it cannot be corrected u/s 154 of the Act. Therefore, the decision of Liberty India will not rule the field after amendment. Moreover, in any other case, the issue becomes a debatable one in the light of the above decision. It is settled position of law that where any issue is debatable, it cannot be corrected u/s 154 of the Act. In this regard, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of T.S. Balaram (ITO) v. Volkart Brothers and others reported in 82 ITR 50 (SC) is relevant wherein an action taken by Assessing Officer u/s 154 of the Act was found to be illegal. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held thus :- "In Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Malikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, this court while spelling out the scope of the power of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution rule that an error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. A decision on a debatable point of law is not a mistake apparent from the record - see Sidhramappa Andannappa Manvi v. Commissioner of Income-tax (2). The power of the officers mentioned in Section 154 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, to correct "any mistake apparent from the record." In this case, it is not necessary for us to spell out the distinction between the expressions "error apparent on the face of the record" and "mistake apparent from the record." but suffice it to say that the Income-tax Officer was wholly wrong in holding that there was a mistake apparent from the record of the assessments of the first respondent." We have found that the allowance of deduction is not a glaring, obvious, patent and apparent from record. Hence, it cannot be rectified, in view of our above discussion. Accordingly, we accept the appeal of the assessee and set aside the finding of the Ld. CIT (A) by reversing the same and allow this appeal.".... sd/- sd/- (Hari Om Maratha) (N.K. Saini) Judicial Member Accountant Member Jaipur, dated : 17/12/2013 [underlining by us] 14. Hence, it cannot be rectified, in view of our above discussion. Accordingly, we accept the appeal of the assessee and set aside the finding of the Ld. CIT (A) by reversing the same and allow this appeal.".... sd/- sd/- (Hari Om Maratha) (N.K. Saini) Judicial Member Accountant Member Jaipur, dated : 17/12/2013 [underlining by us] 14. On perusal of Para 2.7 and 2.9 of the Tribunal's order it is clear that the Tribunal finds judgment of Liberty India is per incuriam and further found that the issue of facts is debatable and holds that where the issue is debatable it cannot be corrected under Section 154 of the Act of 1961. It is to be noticed that the year under appeal is not an order u/Sec. 154 and the Assessing Officer has passed an order under Section 143(3) from the stage of passing of the assessment order and has not passed a rectificatory order under Section 154 of the Act of 1961 which has been considered in the case of Bothra International (supra). 15. We have reproduced Para 2.9 of the order of the Tribunal and we find that the instant case is not a case of a rectificatory order or a mistake apparent from record rather it is a case of regular scrutiny assessment and not an order under Section 154 of the Act of 1961. Therefore, the very foundation and premise on which the ITAT has proceeded is wholly perverse. 16. Counsel for the assessee contended that since in the initial year, the claim has been allowed by the Tribunal and attained finality, therefore, the view in the subsequent years was required to be followed and though the principles of law of precedence may not apply but expected to maintain consistency. Be that as it may, in the appeal memo it is observed by the appellant that the tax effect was low in Assessment Year 2005-06 and 2006-07 and in the light of the circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes, no appeal was preferred. Law of consistency does not mean that an order not sustainable in law is also required to be followed. One wrong cannot make subsequent act correct and, therefore, in our view such a claim of the counsel for the assessee deserves to be out rightly rejected. 17. Law of consistency does not mean that an order not sustainable in law is also required to be followed. One wrong cannot make subsequent act correct and, therefore, in our view such a claim of the counsel for the assessee deserves to be out rightly rejected. 17. We may reiterate and also hasten to add that if the initial assessment order is legally unsustainable & perverse, it need not be followed though for diverse reasons may have attained finality. It may be true that consistency in order is required to be maintained but in our view the claim allowed by the Tribunal in the assessment year 2005-06 and 2006-07 is not sustainable and Tribunal has decided contrary to the law laid down by Apex Court in Liberty India (supra) and as the said judgment was available before the ITAT who decided the appeals for the Assessment Year 2005-06 and 2006-07. This also highlights that it requires extra cautious approach by the authorities (Revenue) and standing counsels which should not sweep the matters under the carpet taking advantage of monetary limits fixed by CBDT. This Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/s. Garment Crafts in DB ITA No. 42/2008 decided on 12.1.2016 held that if a substantial question is covered by the judgment of the Apex Court and this Court and is no more res Integra then the circular of Central Board of Direct Taxes about tax effect may not be binding to non-suit the Revenue. 18. Having said so, we will deal with question of deduction under Section 80-IB as to whether the same is allowable or not as held in M/s. Garment Craft (supra) "Sec. 80-IB of the Income Tax Act provides for deduction at a specified percentage in respect of profits and gains derived from the eligible industrial undertakings, and other infrastructure development undertaking on fulfillment of specified conditions for a period of 10 or 12 consecutive assessment years from initial assessment year, as the case may be. On perusal of Section 80-IB, in our view, it postulates that the deduction u/Sec. 80-IB is available to the eligible industrial undertaking where the gross total income of the eligible assessee includes any "profits and gains derived from any eligible business" referred to in the section (emphasis supplied). What has to be seen is "derived from" and not "attributable to". On perusal of Section 80-IB, in our view, it postulates that the deduction u/Sec. 80-IB is available to the eligible industrial undertaking where the gross total income of the eligible assessee includes any "profits and gains derived from any eligible business" referred to in the section (emphasis supplied). What has to be seen is "derived from" and not "attributable to". The expression "derived from" is restrictive as against "attributable to", which is wider. There should be immediate nexus and not distant nexus. In our view DEPB/duty draw back benefits do not form part of net profit of undertaking as they are not derived from the eligible business but are incentives under a particular scheme. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Sterling Foods (supra), where the controversy was relating to deduction u/Sec. 80-HH of the Act, had an occasion to consider about the profits from sale of import entitlements, its nature and observed ad-infra :- "We do not think that the source of the import entitlements can be said to be the industrial undertaking of the assessee. The source of the import entitlements can, in the circumstances, only be said to be the Export Promotion Scheme of the Central Government where under the export entitlements become available. There must be, for the application of the words "derived from", a direct nexus between the profits and gains and only industrial undertaking. In the instant case, the nexus is not direct and only incidental. The industrial undertaking exports processed sea food. By reason of such export, the Export Promotion Scheme applies. There under, the assessee is entitled to import entitlements, which it can sell. The sale consideration there from cannot, in our view, be held to constitute a profit and gain derived from the assessee's industrial undertaking." Thus, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the identical circumstances relating to import entitlements clearly held that it does not constitute profit and gains derived from the assessee's industrial undertaking. 15. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Liberty India v. CIT (supra), in our view, is also directly on the issue as in the instant case u/Sec. 80-IB of the Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in para 14 has observed : "Analyzing Chapter VI-A, we find that section 80IB/80-IA are a code by themselves as they contain both substantive as well as procedural provisions. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in para 14 has observed : "Analyzing Chapter VI-A, we find that section 80IB/80-IA are a code by themselves as they contain both substantive as well as procedural provisions. Therefore, we need to examine what these provisions prescribe for "computation of profits of the eligible business." It is evident that section 80-IB provides for allowing of deduction in respect of profits and gains derived from the eligible business. The words "derived from" are narrower in connotation as compared to the words "attributable to". In other words, by using the expression "derived from", Parliament intended to cover sources not beyond the first degree. In the present batch of cases, the controversy which arises for determination is : whether the DEPB credit/duty drawback receipt comes within the first degree sources ? According to the assessee(s), DEPB credit/duty drawback receipt reduces the value of purchases (cost neutralization), hence, it comes within first degree source as it increases the net profit proportionately. On the other hand, according to the Department, DEPB credit/duty drawback receipts do not come within first degree source as the said incentives flow from the incentive schemes enacted by the Government of India or from section 75 of the Customs Act, 1962. Hence, according to the Department, in the present cases, the first degree source is the incentive scheme/provisions of the Customs Act. In this connection, the Department places heavy reliance on the judgment of this court in Sterling Foods [1999] 237 ITR 579. Therefore, in the present cases, in which we are required to examine the eligible business of an industrial undertaking, we need to trace the source of the profits to manufacture, (see CIT v. Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. reported in [1986] 157 ITR 762." The Hon'ble Court analyzed Duty Exemption Remission Scheme and held DEPB as an incentive. It held in para 18 as under: "Analyzing the concept of remission of duty drawback and DEPB, we are satisfied that the remission of duty is o account of the statutory/policy provisions in the Customs Act/Scheme(s) framed by the Government of India. In the circumstances, framed by the Government of India. It held in para 18 as under: "Analyzing the concept of remission of duty drawback and DEPB, we are satisfied that the remission of duty is o account of the statutory/policy provisions in the Customs Act/Scheme(s) framed by the Government of India. In the circumstances, framed by the Government of India. In the circumstances, we hold that profits derived by way of such incentives do not fall within the expression "profits derived from industrial undertaking" in section 80-IB." It held in para 24 as under: "In the circumstances, we hold that duty drawback receipt/DEPB benefits do not form part of the net profits of eligible industrial undertaking for the purposes of section 80-I/80-IA/80-IB of the 1961 Act." Thus, in our view, the judgment is directly and squarely on the issue and the issue is no more res integra. It may also be relevant to observe that the judgments rendered by this Court in the case of Saraf Seasoning Udyog (supra) and CIT v. Chokshi Contacts (P) Ltd. (supra) are judgments prior to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Liberty India v. CIT (supra) and thus are per incurium. The judgments in the case of Topman Exports v. CIT (supra) and Vikas Kalra v. CIT : (2012) 247 CTR 0382, in our view, are in the context of section 80HHC read with explanation (baa) of the Income Tax Act, and accordingly are distinguishable. The other judgments, relied upon by counsel for the assessees, are also distinguishable in view of what we have noticed here in above and the arguments of the counsel for the assessees find no force and are hereby rejected." 19. The order passed by Tribunal is beyond comprehension. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal exercise judicial function whose duties and functions are very vital in the enforcement of the direct tax laws. It is a final fact finding body and the second appellate authority. The order passed by Tribunal is beyond comprehension. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal exercise judicial function whose duties and functions are very vital in the enforcement of the direct tax laws. It is a final fact finding body and the second appellate authority. The Tribunal is vested with all the powers of the income-tax authorities referred to in Section 131 by virtue of section 255(6), it also clarifies that any proceedings before the Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the purpose of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code and the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Section 195 and chapter XXXV of the Cr.P.C., 1898. 20. This Court in the case of CIT v. Ram Singh and others 2014 (363) ITR 417 (Raj.) had an occasion to take into consideration quite large number of orders of the Tribunal similar to the impugned order while taking into consideration the appeals filed by the Revenue, almost 100 in number, where the orders of the Tribunal were without findings, based on guesswork or disposing of the matters in less than 5 lines without taking into consideration the arguments of both the sides and it would be appropriate to quote relevant para : "It is no doubt true that in an order of affirmation, repetition of the reasons elaborately may not be necessary but even then the arguments advanced/points urged deserves to be dealt with. Reasons for affirmation have to be indicated, though in appropriate cases they may be briefly stated. Recording of reasons is part of fair procedure and reasons are harbinger between the mind of the maker of the decision in the controversy and the decision or conclusion arrived at and they always substitute subjectively with objectivity and as observed in Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974) ICR 120, failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice and this is what was also observed by the apex court in Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. CIT [2005] 273 ITR 56 (SC) : [2005] 2 SCC 329. We find the judgments of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal being the stereotyped, non-speaking, unreasoned, arbitrary and whimsical, and we have no option except to remand the matter back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to revisit the issue afresh de novo in accordance with the guidelines, referred to here in above and as summarized here in above." 21. The Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Gautamchand Bhandari (2012) 347 ITR 491 (Karn.) observed as under: "We cannot avoid observing that of late the quality of orders that are come out from the Tribunal in exercise of its appellate power under section 256 of the Act are found to be wanting and in many respect and many a times the orders are very prefecture, even non-speaking orders and has no correlation to the fact situation that prevails in a given case. We also notice that the members of the Tribunal have developed an unhealthy habit of quoting totally unrelated judgments which are not applicable at all to the facts of the case, to pass orders not otherwise sustainable on facts or in law. We strongly deprecate such a tendency on the part of the members of the Tribunal, which is quite naturally a professional Tribunal comprised of expert members, one member from the Revenue side and another member from the accounting side, with considerable experience in their respective fields and to whom we can attribute expertise. We feel sorry that the confidence posed by the Legislature is not being justified by passing orders that are outcome from the Tribunal now-a-days. It is high time the method of recruitment to the Tribunal is also reviewed by the authority concerned and at least henceforth it is ensured that the members of some standing, integrity and competence are put in place as members of the Tribunal and not all and sundry. The Legislature, particularly the Union Parliament may also take note of such tendency on the part of the Tribunal and ensure for suitable legislative measure so that the purpose and the object with which such Tribunals are constituted really subserve not only the interest of aggrieved assessee but also to ensure that the Revenue's interest is not simply sacrified or jeopardised by errant members. Registrar General of this court is directed to send copies of this judgment to the Law Commission of India, Secretary to Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Secretary to Government, Ministry of law and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of India and the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi." 22. The Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates P. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496, while dealing with the requirement of passing reasoned order by an authority whether administrative quasi-judicial or judicial has laid down as under: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicial. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice, that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process the it is possible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process the it is possible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (I) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretense of reasons or 'rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford 2001 EWCA CIV 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions." (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process". 23. In our view, the order of the Tribunal is beyond comprehension, is totally perverse and is not sustainable in law, and is accordingly quashed and set aside. 24. In the light of what we have observed here in above, the appeal of the Revenue stands allowed. Question of law is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. 25. Let a copy of this order be sent to the President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai; Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi; and to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, for perusal.