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Gujarat High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 21 (GUJ)

Kishen Patel v. Gujarat Insecticides Ltd.

2016-01-05

JAYANT M.PATEL, V.M.PANCHOLI

body2016
JUDGMENT : Jayant M. Patel, J. 1. The present application being Civil Application No. 11448 of 2015 is for condonation of delay of 1200 days roughly more than 3 1/2 years in preferring the appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge. As the delay was for a long period of 1200 days, we had also heard learned Counsel for the applicant-appellant on merits of the appeal. 2. On the aspect of condonation of delay, if the matter is considered as it is, there is no sufficient explanation whatsoever except the economical condition. The ground of paralytic effect on the body is alleged but no supporting document is produced. Further, on which date, the applicant was paralyzed and when he became capable to move are also not given except the vague statement. Even if the factum of withdrawal of the earlier Letters Patent Appeal and the filing of the review application and dismissal thereof are considered, we do not find that such can be said to be sufficient explanation for condonation of delay since even after the review application, the appellant cannot be said to have taken action well in time. Merely because review application is preferred, the limitation would not get automatically extended. Under these circumstances, the explanation cannot be said to be sufficient to exercise the discretion for condonation of delay of such long period of 1200 days. At this stage, we may usefully refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another (2010) 5 SCC 459 , 2010 (88) AIC 220 (SC), and more particularly the observations made at paragraphs 14, 15, and 16, which read as under:-- "14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the Courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. 15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 , N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 ,and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106 . (Emphasis supplied) 16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay - G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142 , State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 , State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309 , State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu, (1996) 10 SCC 635 , State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 , 2005 (29) AIC 65 (SC), and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, (2008) 14 SCC 582 ." 3. The aforesaid shows that if the delay is for a shorter period, the Court may take lenient view in the matter and if the delay is for a longer period, strict view is required. The aforesaid shows that if the delay is for a shorter period, the Court may take lenient view in the matter and if the delay is for a longer period, strict view is required. If the facts of the present case and more particularly, the statement made in the application for condonation of delay is considered with the above referred decision, we do not find that the delay deserves to be condoned. Hence the application for condonation of delay deserves to be dismissed. 4. On the merits of the Letters Patent Appeal, it has been submitted by learned Counsel Mr. Pandya for the applicant-appellant that the inquiry officer who conducted the inquiry was the officer of the company and, therefore, he could not hold the inquiry. He submitted that the confession of the charge was in order to have the lesser penalty because the other similarly situated employee was imposed lesser penalty. In his submission, the Labour Court has not considered all the relevant aspects and more particularly as that of the length of service of 18 years prior to the dismissal of the applicant-workman. It has been submitted that no compensation is ordered and the award has been passed for dismissal of the reference. The learned Single Judge has not recorded any reasons nor has dealt with the contention and, therefore, there is merit in the appeal to be considered. 5. If the impugned award passed by the Labour Court is considered, it transpires that on the aspects of legality and validity of the inquiry, the preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the workman and after hearing both the sides, the Labour Court has rejected the preliminary contention by holding that the inquiry was legal and valid. Thereafter, both the sides submitted application to proceed with the reference. The Labour Court, thereafter, examined the aspects as to whether findings recorded by the inquiry officer were perverse to the record or not and after considering all the material on record including the deposition of the respective witnesses, the Labour Court found that the finding by the inquiry officer cannot be said to be perverse to the record. Even the aspects of confession of the charge by the workman was also taken into consideration. 6. Even the aspects of confession of the charge by the workman was also taken into consideration. 6. After having found that the charge was proved, the Labour Court has examined the aspects of proportionality of punishment under section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act'). The Labour Court found that the applicant-workman was working as watchman. While on duty during night time, he was found sleeping. The charge was proved and, therefore, the punishment cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate and the Labour Court did not interfere with the punishment imposed upon the applicant-workman. The award was passed for dismissal of the reference. 7. The contention raised that the officer of the company held the inquiry would no more survive when after hearing both the sides, the inquiry was found to be legal and valid and the said order has not been set aside by any higher forum and, therefore, the appellant now cannot raise the grievance to that extent. So far as the other grounds are concerned, if serious misconduct is found as proved and considering the duty which was required to be discharged by the applicant as that of security guard, the Labour Court, if has not interfered with the quantum of punishment, such view cannot be said to be perverse or illegal. 8. In view of the above, if the learned Single Judge has not interfered with the award and dismissed the petition, we do not find that any useful purpose would be served by examining the matter on the ground that no detailed reasons are recorded by the learned Single Judge. 9. Under these circumstances, we find that there is no merit in the appeal to be considered. When there is no merit in the appeal to be considered, no useful purpose would be served by taking too lenient view on the aspect of the delay and thereafter to consider the merits of the appeal at a later stage. Under the circumstances, the application for condonation of delay in Civil Application No. 11448 of 2015 is dismissed. As the delay has not been condoned, Letters Patent (Stamp) No. 1195 of 2015 and Civil Application (Stamp) No. 10459 of 2015 would not survive and shall stand disposed off.