JUDGMENT Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J. – Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. It is admitted between the parties that Harinandan was owner of disputed landed property, who had taken loan from Union Bank of India for purchase of tractor and mortgaged the disputed plot No. 885 and other properties in favour of Bank as a security for the loan. He could not repay the loan and died in the year 1986. He was substituted by his legal representatives, 1st set, (Defendants no. 1 to 3). It is also admitted that plaintiffs had offered to purchase the disputed land, then it was agreed between the parties that plaintiffs will pay the Bank loan of Rs. 96,000/- upto 31.7.1988 and thereafter when defendants will receive 'No Objection Certificate' then they will sell the plot no. 855 to plaintiffs. In this way the parties entered into registered agreement for sale dated 31.10.1986, and at the time of this contract they have received Rs. 2000/- as advance consideration from plaintiffs. Thereafter, plaintiffs had also given more amount to defendants as against proposed sale consideration. It is also admitted that plaintiffs has deposited the amount of Rs. 96,000/- in loan account of defendants, but said deposition was not within time. 3. Apart from above mentioned admitted facts, the plaint case in brief was that plaintiffs had contracted to purchase whole of the plot no. 885 from defendant but it was found by them that defendants 1st set maybe owner of only ¾th share of disputed property, because they were under litigation by one Baij Nath (defendant no-4/ defendant 2nd Set of plaint), who had claimed remaining ¼th share in this property. Then on non-execution of sale-deed in accordance with the terms of contract, the plaintiff had filed suit for specific performance of contract for ¾th share in disputed property. During pendency of original suit dispute between defendant 1st set and Baij Nath was resolved in revenue court, and Baij Nath has relinquished his claim on disputed property, so finding defendants 1st set to be the owner of whole of the plot no. 885, the plaintiff had amended plaint and sought relief of specific performance of contract for whole of the disputed property. 885, the plaintiff had amended plaint and sought relief of specific performance of contract for whole of the disputed property. It was further pleaded in plaint that parties had came to mutual arrangement that the execution of registered sale-deed of disputed property will be made on 10.1.1989, but on that date plaintiffs had been waiting defendants, who had not arrived for execution of sale-deed. After that, on request of plaintiffs the defendants were not ready to execute the sale-deed. Therefore, after serving the legal notice, plaintiff had filed suit for specific performance. 4. Apart from above mentioned admitted facts, defendants had denied the remaining plaint averments and pleaded that plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract and, therefore he had not deposited whole of the loan amount of Rs. 96.000/- in loan account of Hari Nandan in time. Due to nonpayment of loan amount within time, its interest enhanced. Defendant had never consented to extend time of execution of contract of sale in question. Plaintiffs are person of ordinary status and do not have financial capacity to get the sale-deed executed by paying agreed consideration. Defendants 1st set had given notice dated 18.1.1989 to plaintiff for non-performance of agreement for sale. After service of said notice, defendants are not responsible for any act done by plaintiff and his suit is liable to be dismissed. In their counter claim, defendants had pleaded that because of delay caused by plaintiff in deposition of loan amount, defendant first set were forced to pay additional interest of Rs. 8971.70 to Bank. So they are entitled to receive this amount with interest from plaintiff. 5. Defendant no.-4 Baij Nath had also filed written statement in which he had admitted that defendant 1st set are the sole legal representatives of deceased Hari Handanand that he was erroneously included parties in this suit. 6. After affording opportunity of hearing to the parties and accepting their evidence the Civil Judge (S.D.), Ghazipur had decided the original suit by its judgment dated 29.11.2004 by which the suit of plaintiff was dismissed, and counter claim of defendant 1st set was partly allowed for recovery of Rs. 8971.70 at the rate of 9% per annum from plaintiffs. 7. After affording opportunity of hearing to the parties and accepting their evidence the Civil Judge (S.D.), Ghazipur had decided the original suit by its judgment dated 29.11.2004 by which the suit of plaintiff was dismissed, and counter claim of defendant 1st set was partly allowed for recovery of Rs. 8971.70 at the rate of 9% per annum from plaintiffs. 7. Against the judgment of the trial court, Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2004 was preferred by plaintiff of the original suit, which was heard and allowed by judgment dated 5.4.2016 of Additional District Judge/ Special Judge (E.C. Act), Ghazipur. By this impugned judgment the first appellate court had set aside the judgment dated 29.11.2004 of trial court and directed that plaintiff will deduct Rs. 23450-/- deposited by him in loan account of Hari Nandan from total amount of agreed consideration of Rs. 96,000/-, pay the remaining consideration to defendant and then defendant was directed to execute sale-deed of disputed property in favour of plaintiffs. 8. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment dated 5.4.2016 of first appellate court, the defendants of original suit had preferred the present Second Appeal. 9. Counsel for the appellant contended that in this particular matter time was the essence of contract of sale. He submitted that according to terms of contract, the plaintiff respondents had to deposit Rs. 96,000/- in loan account of Harinandan by 31.7.1988, but the same was not deposited by him. He submitted that even after that amount of Rs. 96,000/- was not deposited by him, which has resulted loss to defendant 1st set in form of payment of additional interest of amount of loan. The said loss was caused to the defendant 1st set on account of fault of plaintiffs, so defendants are entitled to recover said amount. He further submitted that there was no mutual arrangement between the parties for extension of period of execution of sale-deed. He further submitted that trial court had given some specific findings in favour of defendants 1st set which was not reversed by first appellate court at the time of allowing the appeal. So the impugned judgment of first appellate court is erroneous. Therefore, the appeal should be admitted for being allowed. 10. Counsel for the respondent contended that in this matter time of execution of sale-deed was not essence of contract. So the impugned judgment of first appellate court is erroneous. Therefore, the appeal should be admitted for being allowed. 10. Counsel for the respondent contended that in this matter time of execution of sale-deed was not essence of contract. The sale-deed in question was to be executed after 'no objection certificate' being produced by defendant-appellant. He further submitted that original agreement for sale was for whole of the property but when plaintiffs had came to know that there is cloud on exclusive ownership of plaintiffs, and defendant no.-4 Baij Nath was claiming his ¼th share in this property; then plaintiff has to file suit for specific performance of contract for sale regarding ¾th share only. But when the litigation came to an end between defendants 1st set and defendant no.-4 and the exclusive ownership of whole of the disputed property was found flawless in favour of defendants 1st set, then plaint was amended immediately for relief of execution of sale-deed of whole of the property. He submitted that in this matter the delay, if any, was caused because of fault of defendants, who had entered into litigation and plaintiffs came under apprehension that defendant first set may be owner of only ¾th share of disputed property. He further submitted that plaintiff-respondent have been ready and always willing to perform his part of contract and no prejudice would be caused to defendants-appellants when suit for specific performance is decreed. Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. 11. The main point to be the disputed in this matter as to whether time was essence of agreement to contract for sale dated 30.10.1986 or not. Lower appellate court had appreciated the evidences independently including those evidences which were not considered by the trial court and gave finding that time was not essence of the contract. This finding is based on appreciation of evidence. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that when there was specific plea understating between the parties that plaintiff had to deposit the loan amount till 31.7.1988, then for the payment of consideration in question, there was the time limit which was essence of the contract. This finding is based on appreciation of evidence. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that when there was specific plea understating between the parties that plaintiff had to deposit the loan amount till 31.7.1988, then for the payment of consideration in question, there was the time limit which was essence of the contract. In this regard, after consideration of evidences, it is found that when the agreement of sale dated 31.7.1988 was executed then only advance consideration of 2,000/- was received by defendants/appellants and terms of contract were mentioned in its deed in which it was specifically mentioned that before execution of sale deed, defendants/appellants will obtain no objection certificate. There is neither pleading nor any evidence to the fact that defendants/appellants have obtained any such no objection certificate. Apart from it, although delay was caused by plaintiffs/respondents in depositing the amount in loan account of Harinandan, but it were appellants who were responsible for it because they had never informed the plaintiffs/respondents about their dispute or litigation with defendant no. 4 Baij Nath. Due to that litigation not only payment of amount of loan was delayed but after the payment of loan, plaintiff had filed original suit only for ¾th portion of disputed property and for remaining ¼th portion, he amended the plaint when litigation of defendants/appellants with Baij Nath had ended. After appreciation of evidences, first appellate court had given specific finding that time was not essence of the contact. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants cited case of Venkatesh Construction Co. v. Karnataka Vidyuth Karkhane Ltd., (2016) 4 SCC 119 , in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: 20. The appellate court may not interfere with the finding of the trial court unless the finding recorded by the trial court is erroneous or the trial court ignored the evidence on record. The High Court reversed the decree passed by the trial court without discussing oral and documentary evidence and several grounds raised before the trial court. The High Court veered away from the main issue and went on to elaborate on the law of arbitration and the mode of setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which in our view, was not warranted. The High Court veered away from the main issue and went on to elaborate on the law of arbitration and the mode of setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which in our view, was not warranted. Without considering the oral and documentary evidence, the High Court erred in interfering with the factual findings recorded by the trial court and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.” 13. In the light of above-mentioned verdict and perusal of the record reveals that first appellate court in this matter had reversed the finding and decree of trial court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidences and other circumstances of the case as discussed in judgment of lower appellate court. Those points were also considered which had lost sight of the trial court. Therefore, apparently correct and acceptable finding of lower appellate court based on proper appreciation of evidence and with reasons for reversing the finding of lower court is apparently such that should not be interfered in second appeal by re-appreciation of evidence. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is found unacceptable. 14. Another contention of learned counsel for the appellants had been about the alleged unfair advantage to respondents/plaintiffs in case of specific performance of contract. In this regard, lower appellate court had framed points of determination no. 5 and decided it in favour of plaintiffs/respondents and against appellants. It is also pertinent to mention here that this ground was not taken in written statement nor specific evidences were given in that regard by appellants side. Apart from it, lower appellate court had considered the family status of appellants for determining that whether there is any chance of unfair advantage to respondents by specific performance of contract and decided this point in favour of plaintiffs/respondents and against defendants/appellants with finding, specially considering the absence of such specific plea in written statement, is found unacceptable without any infirmity or perversity. 15. The another point regarding alleged absence of readiness and willingness on the part of plaintiffs/respondents was raised, therefore argument of learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is that lower appellate court had specifically discussed the facts, evidences, circumstances and given finding in favour of plaintiff/respondent. 15. The another point regarding alleged absence of readiness and willingness on the part of plaintiffs/respondents was raised, therefore argument of learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is that lower appellate court had specifically discussed the facts, evidences, circumstances and given finding in favour of plaintiff/respondent. As discussed above, there was some delay in filing of suit for specific performance but firstly, it is filed within period of limitation; secondly its reason is satisfactory explained when plaintiffs found that there is a litigation between defendants' first set (appellants) and defendant's second set (defendant no. 4) in which litigation is going on in which defendant no. 4 Baijnath is calming ¼th share of disputed property. So firstly plaintiffs served notice for specific performance of contract, then filed suit for ¾th share of dispute property because remaining ¼th share was under litigation and thereafter when said litigation between defendants' first set and second set had ended then they amended the plaint for specific performance of contract for whole of the disputed property. It is found that plaintiffs have always been ready and willing to perform their part of contract for which they have been doing one thing or the other and at appropriate time they filed suit. The finding in this regard as given by lower court is found correct and acceptable. 16. The only main point of determination in this matter was as to whether time of essence of the registered agreement to sell dated 31.10.1986 or not. This fact could be determined only on the basis of evidences and nothing question of law involved in it. Accordingly lower courts had decided this point on the basis of evidences available before it and findings in that regard are correct and acceptable. 17. On examination of the reasoning recorded by the learned first appellate court in first appeal, I am of the view that judgment in civil appeal as above is well reasoned, and based on proper appreciation of entire evidences on record. In this matter dispute related to such fact that could have been decided on basis of evidence, as it had been decided by first appellate court. No perversity or infirmity is found in finding re corded by the first appellate court to warrant interference through this appeal. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law, was involved before this Court. No perversity or infirmity is found in finding re corded by the first appellate court to warrant interference through this appeal. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law, was involved before this Court. None of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants can be sustained. 18. In view of the above, this Court finds that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. The second appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.