Judgment : 1. The appellant, who was accused No.1 in Sessions Case No.197 of 2007, filed this appeal, feeling aggrieved by judgment dated 11.06.2010, of the Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Vijayawada, convicting him for the offences under Section 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and, also sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000 in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 201 of IPC, with the direction that both the sentences shall run concurrently. 2. The case of the prosecution is briefly stated hereunder. Accused Nos.1 and 3 were partners in a venture by name MM Fabrications in SR Complex, Autonagar, Vijayawada. Accused No.1 married the deceased about twelve years back and were blessed with a son and a daughter. Earlier, when the couple were residing in the house of P.W.5 in Ayyappanagar, accused No.1 developed illicit contact with accused No.2, an unmarried woman, who was working as a saleswoman in a clothes shop at Besent Road. The deceased questioned accused No.1 about the illicit relationship between him and accused No.2, as informed to her by L.W.10. As a result of the said relationship between accused No.1 and accused No.2, the deceased and accused No.1 had strained feelings against each other. Accused No.2 shifted her residence to RTC Colony, but accused No.1 continued his relationship with accused No.2. The differences between the deceased and accused No.1 became a routine. Accused No.1 and the deceased have shifted their residence to the upstairs portion of the house of one Jnana Prakasha Rao (P.W.2). In view of the persistent disputes between the deceased and accused No.1, the latter has taken an ultimate decision to get rid of the former as he perceived the same to be the only solution to the problem in order to keep his relation with accused No.2, in tact. Accused No.1 took the help of accused Nos.2 and 3 to eliminate the deceased. 3. As per their pre-plan, on 17.08.2006, when accused Nos.1 and 3 were in the house, deceased and accused No.2 went to the house and a quarrel ensued between accused No.1 and the deceased. Accused No.1 took the help of accused Nos.2 and 3 to eliminate the deceased. 3. As per their pre-plan, on 17.08.2006, when accused Nos.1 and 3 were in the house, deceased and accused No.2 went to the house and a quarrel ensued between accused No.1 and the deceased. Accused No.2 shut the front side doors and prevented the deceased from going out of the house. As the deceased was resisting, accused No.1 with one hand shut her mouth and sealed her lips, and with his other hand throttled her. Accused No.3 caught hold of the deceased tightly while accused No.2 thrashed the deceased with forcible fists on her every vital part and accused No.1 hit the head of the deceased to the wall and accordingly accused Nos.1 to 3 have caused her violent death. The three accused dragged the deceased into the bathroom, kept her in the sitting position and set her ablaze by pouring kerosene, giving a colour that the deceased attempted to commit suicide, and created a scene as if accused No.1 forcibly opened the bathroom door dismembering the inner bolt. On noticing the smoke billowing up, P.W.2 and the neighbours rushed to the scene of offence and in the process, accused No.2 slipped away through the staircase. Accused No.3 remained with accused No.1 and the latter declared to the on-lookers and the kith and kin of the deceased that the deceased has committed suicide by setting herself ablaze. On coming to know about the incident, P.W.1, the brother of the deceased, gave Ex.P.1 – report, which was registered as Crime No.487 of 2006, under Section 174 of CrPC. P.W.17 investigated the crime during which he has inspected the scene of offence and prepared a rough sketch in the presence of P.Ws.12 and 13, besides getting the scene of offence photographed by P.W.15. P.W.17 has also got inquest conducted over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of P.Ws.12 to 14 on the dead body and the same was sent to post-mortem examination to know the cause of the death. P.W.16, the Medical Officer, who conducted the post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, issued Ex.P.14 post-mortem certificate and gave opinion pending analysis report of Viscera to rule out poisoning. The material objects were forwarded to the concerned experts under letter of advice. P.W.16, the Medical Officer, who conducted the post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, issued Ex.P.14 post-mortem certificate and gave opinion pending analysis report of Viscera to rule out poisoning. The material objects were forwarded to the concerned experts under letter of advice. P.W.16 gave Ex.P.15, his final opinion for the cause of the death to the effect that the same was due to ‘combined effect of pressure on various part of body – mouth, face, nose neck, chest, abdomen, upper and lower limbs, head, perineal regions, palms and soles, smothering and strangulation (palm on strangulation), mugging, garrotting, burk and gagging with post-mortem findings and tongue protruded, petechial haemorrhages and associated injuries notched potentiate injuries. Based on the medical evidence, the case was re-registered for the offences under Sections 302, 498-A and 201 of IPC on 25.04.2007 at 20.00 hours, by P.W.18, who has after verification of the record of investigation made by P.W.17 and P.W.20, further examined the material witnesses and recorded their statements in detail, besides collecting the evidence against the accused. P.W.18 arrested accused Nos.1 to 3 on 28.04.2007 at 06.00 hours at D.No.56-3-26/5, Ramineninagar, in the presence of L.Ws.22 and 23, and got the confession of the accused recorded in the presence of the said list witnesses. The accused were remanded to judicial custody. P.W.18 sent requisition on 14.05.2007 for test identification of accused Nos.2 and 3 by P.W.7, and during the test identification parade conducted by III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada (P.W.19), P.W.7 identified the accused and stated that he was present at the time of the death of the deceased at the scene of offence and left the place after the incident. P.W.19 recorded Section 164 CrPC statements of P.W.4 and his sister (L.W.9). P.W.18 has filed the charge sheet against all the accused. 4. In support of its case, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 20 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.24. The defence has not let in any oral evidence, but marked Ex.D.1, relevant portion in Section 161 CrPC statement of P.W.11. 5. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the lower Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant for the offences under Section 302 and 201 of IPC, and acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 of all the offences. 6. The defence has not let in any oral evidence, but marked Ex.D.1, relevant portion in Section 161 CrPC statement of P.W.11. 5. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the lower Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant for the offences under Section 302 and 201 of IPC, and acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 of all the offences. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the prosecution has failed to establish the motive for the commission of the offence by the appellant and as the case is based on circumstantial evidence, the absence of motive constitutes a strong ground for acquittal of the appellant. She has further submitted that the evidence let in by the prosecution is not strong enough to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt and that therefore the lower Court has committed a serious error in convicting the appellant on such weak evidence. She has taken the Court through the oral and documentary evidence and pleaded that the appellant deserves to be acquitted, at least on benefit of doubt. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor opposed the above submissions and commended the correctness of the conclusions drawn by the lower Court in convicting the appellant for the offences under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC. 8. Having regard to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the point that needs to be adjudicated is whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. MOTIVE: 9. This is a case which rests purely on circumstantial evidence in which motive undoubtedly plays an important role in order to prove the guilt of the accused. It is well settled that the accused can be convicted on circumstantial evidence, only if every other reasonable hypothesis of guilt is completely excluded and the circumstances are wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused [See State (Delhi Administration) v. Shri Gulzari Lal Tandon, AIR 1979 SC 1382 ]. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the Courts must be circumspect in appreciating and evaluating the evidence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the Courts must be circumspect in appreciating and evaluating the evidence. In Bodhraj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45 the Supreme Court held as under: “It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1977) 2 SCC 99 , Eradu v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 316 , Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 SCC 330 , State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi, (1985) Suppl. SCC 79, Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 1 SCC 1 and Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. 1989 Suppl. (1) SCC 560. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab : AIR 1954 SC 621 it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC 193 , wherein it has been observed thus: (SCC pp. 206-07, para 21) In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 the Supreme Court held as follows: “In the case in hand there is no eyewitness of the occurrence and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 the Supreme Court held as follows: “In the case in hand there is no eyewitness of the occurrence and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with their innocence.” This legal position is reiterated by the Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Nizam v. State of Rajasthan (2016) 1 SCC 550 . In the charge sheet, the prosecution has alleged illicit contact between accused Nos.1 and 2 as the motive for killing the deceased. Significantly, P.W.1, the brother and, P.W.3, the mother of the deceased, spoke in detail about the demand for money by the appellant and they have not stated illicit intimacy between the appellant/accused No.1 and accused No.2 as the motive for the former to kill the deceased. There are, however, certain features emerging from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which reflected the acquaintance of the appellant with accused No.2. P.W.4, the child witness, who is the son of the appellant and the deceased, deposed in his chief examination that both accused Nos.2 and 3 used to come to their house. In the cross-examination made on behalf of accused No.2, the only suggestion that was given to the witness was that he did not state before the Police that accused Nos.2 and 3 used to come to their house. Interestingly, no suggestion was put to the witness to the effect that accused No.2 was not visiting his house. At the earliest point of time after the death of the deceased, in the inquest report, based on the evidence of the witnesses examined during the inquest, it was observed that at the scene of offence the appellant and accused No.3 were present and one lady was found running away. At the earliest point of time after the death of the deceased, in the inquest report, based on the evidence of the witnesses examined during the inquest, it was observed that at the scene of offence the appellant and accused No.3 were present and one lady was found running away. The jurisdictional Magistrate has conducted the test identification parade during which accused Nos.2 and 3 were identified by the witness under Ex.P.22, identification proceedings. During the investigation, the Police recorded P.W.7’s statement wherein he has allegedly stated that when he was going into his portion of the house, which is adjacent to the house where the deceased and appellant were residing, he saw the deceased and another lady, whom he identified during the test identification parade as accused No.2, going upstairs where the deceased and accused No.1 were living, that after ten to fifteen minutes, he saw the smoke coming from the house of the deceased and when he was going to upstairs, he saw that lady (accused No.2) running away in confusion in front of him and that when he has enquired with the appellant and accused No.3, they informed him that her name is Siva Nagamani. Of course, this witness has turned hostile and deposed that about one year after the death of the deceased, he has seen accused Nos.2 and 3 in sub-jail premises in Vijayawada and prior to that he has not seen them. We are conscious of the fact that the lower Court has acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3. However, the above incriminating aspects clearly establish that accused Nos.1 and 2 had acquaintance with each other and therefore the possibility of their illicit relationship and the deceased objecting to the same should not be ruled out. In this context, we may refer to certain case law on the aspect. In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar 1999 SCC (1) Supp. 80 the Supreme Court held that a motive is something which prompts a person to form an opinion or intention to do certain illegal act or even a legal act but with illegal means with a view to achieve that intention. In Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab (2007) 13 SCC 90 the Supreme Court reiterated its view that motive is in the mind of the accused and can seldom be fathomed with any degree of accuracy. In Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab (2007) 13 SCC 90 the Supreme Court reiterated its view that motive is in the mind of the accused and can seldom be fathomed with any degree of accuracy. In Subedar Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1989 Supp (1) SCC 91 the Supreme Court observed that the evidence regarding the existence of motive which operates in the mind of an assassin is more often than not within the reach of others and that the motive may not even be known to the victim of the crime. Thus, in our opinion, even if the prosecution has not established strong motive with unimpeachable evidence, if the chain of circumstances are so complete as to connect the appellant to the offence, the Court cannot acquit him merely on the ground that the prosecution could not establish the motive. EVIDENCE: 10. P.W.2 is the owner of the house in a portion of which the appellant and the deceased were residing as tenants. He has deposed that on receiving the information that smoke was coming out from the portion of the house of the deceased, he rushed there and saw heavy smoke inside the house, that sometime thereafter he along with others went into the house and found the victim in the bathroom in the sitting position and her tongue was found coming out. He has further deposed that he saw accused No.1 present at that time and somebody was also present there and that the Police came and took away accused No.1 and another person in the jeep. No suggestion was put to the witness suggesting that the appellant along with somebody was not present at the scene of offence. P.W.4, son of the appellant and the deceased, who was aged thirteen years at the time of his giving evidence, stated that on the day of his mother’s death, they did not take lunch box to school and that the watchman told him that his mother brought lunch for himself and his sister. He has further deposed that for more than one year prior to the death of his mother, his father and mother used to quarrel with each other. While admitting that his grand-mother used to take his mother to the hospital, he has, however, denied the suggestion that since his mother was suffering from stomach pain, she was taken to hospital. He has further deposed that for more than one year prior to the death of his mother, his father and mother used to quarrel with each other. While admitting that his grand-mother used to take his mother to the hospital, he has, however, denied the suggestion that since his mother was suffering from stomach pain, she was taken to hospital. He has also denied the suggestion made by the counsel for accused No.3 that he was tutored. P.W.7, who was a crucial witness, allegedly gave statement to the Police that he has seen accused No.2 along with the deceased entering the residential portion of the house before the occurrence, and later accused No.2 hurriedly climbing down through steps and running away and that he has also seen accused No.3 with accused No.1. P.W.7 has also identified accused Nos.2 and 3 in the test identification parade conducted by P.W.19 – Judicial Magistrate, under Ex.P.22. However, he was evidently won over by the defence and he did not support the case of the prosecution. P.W.19 categorically deposed that in the test identification parade, P.W.7 has identified accused Nos.2 and 3 among nine non-suspected persons. His evidence remained unshaken. The only ground on which the trial Court has acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 was that P.W.7 who identified them has turned hostile and has not supported the case of the prosecution and P.W.11, who has spoken to the presence of accused Nos.1 to 3 was not subjected to test identification parade as she has not seen the said accused earlier. But, as held by the lower Court the last seen theory is squarely attracted to this case. The defence has not disputed the presence of the appellant in the house. Even if we exclude accused Nos.2 and 3, except the appellant no one else was present at the house. Therefore, the onus lies on him to explain the incriminating circumstances leading to the death of his wife. In this regard, the contradictory stand taken by the defence on the cause of suicide by the deceased deserves to be noticed. At the cross-examination of P.W.1, it was suggested to him that due to stomach pain, the deceased committed suicide. However, it was suggested to P.W.3, the mother of the deceased, that since her sons did not attend the funeral ceremony of accused No.1’s brother-in-law, the deceased felt bad and committed suicide. At the cross-examination of P.W.1, it was suggested to him that due to stomach pain, the deceased committed suicide. However, it was suggested to P.W.3, the mother of the deceased, that since her sons did not attend the funeral ceremony of accused No.1’s brother-in-law, the deceased felt bad and committed suicide. This inconsistency exposes the falsity of their defence. If we carefully weigh the undisputed facts, it is difficult, nay, impossible to accept the theory of the deceased committing suicide. As noted hereinbefore, P.W.4 has categorically stated that the watchman has informed him that the deceased herself has brought lunch box to the school sometime before her death. It is quite hard to believe that a person in the frame of the mind to commit suicide would have carried lunch box to her children. Further, if a person wanted to commit suicide by self-immolation, he/she would not normally choose bathroom for that purpose, as kitchen is the most convenient place where gas/kerosene and matchbox/lighter are readily available. MEDICAL EVIDENCE 11. Ex.P.14 - post-mortem report reveals that 3/4th part of the tongue of the deceased got stretched. In his highly acknowledged work “Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology”, ‘3rd Edition’, Dr. K.S. Narayan Reddy has described the signs of asphyxia due to strangulation as under: “A sudden compression of the windpipe often makes a person powerless to call for help, and causes almost immediate consciousness and death. If there is slight vagal effect and some venous obstruction, there will be slight congestion of head and neck and occasional petechial haemorrhages, with moderate venous construction and some respiratory obstruction asphyxial signs are moderate. When constricting force is great, asphyxial signs are marked. Intense congestion and deep cyanosis of the head and neck is seen, because the vertebral arteries continue to supply blood to the head and venous drainage is very less. The face is puffy, oedematous, congested and cyanotic. The eyes are wide open, bulging and suffused, with confluent scleral haemorrhage; the pupils dilated, the tongue swollen and often bruised, dark-coloured and protruded. Petechial haemorrhages are common in the skin of the eyelids, conjunctivae, face, forehead, behind the ears and scalp. Bloody froth may escape from the mouth and nostrils, and there may be bleeding from the nose and ears. The hands are usually clenched. The genital organs may be congested and there may be discharge of urine, faces and seminal fluid. Petechial haemorrhages are common in the skin of the eyelids, conjunctivae, face, forehead, behind the ears and scalp. Bloody froth may escape from the mouth and nostrils, and there may be bleeding from the nose and ears. The hands are usually clenched. The genital organs may be congested and there may be discharge of urine, faces and seminal fluid. These asphyxial signs may be absent if death occurs quickly and vagal inhibition, due to pressure on carotid sheath.” (emphasis added) In Ex.P.14 - post-mortem report the external injuries on the body of the deceased are described as under: “Eye balls protruded & PH+ 3/4th part of Tongue is protruded and stretched, closed eye lids & clenched in between Teeth (Tightened) extensively. Smell of kerosene + throughout body. Heat stiffening is present all over the body. Hypostasis is not appreciable on dependant parts of body.” (emphasis added) In State of U.P. v. Ravindra Prakash Mittal (1992) 3 SCC 300 , the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with a case involving identical charge against the accused viz., that he has killed the victim by strangulation and later burnt the body. While accepting the prosecution case, the Supreme Court has referred to and relied upon Taylor’s ‘Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence’, to determine whether the burns were sustained before or after the death of the victim. The following passage from Taylor’s Medical Jurisprudence was quoted: “Not uncommonly the victim who inhales smoke also vomits and inhales some vomit, presumably due to bouts of coughing, and plugs of regurgitated stomach contents mixed with soot may be found in the smaller bronchi, in the depths of the lungs.” Ex.P.14 - post-mortem report inter-alia shows that Trachea & Bronchi – congested, and no soot is present; Lungs – Oedematous and congested; Heart and Pericardial sac – congested and PH+; Stomach and contents – about 10 c.c. of undigested food particles, and no specific smell. The Doctor described various injuries as post-mortem burn injuries and not ante-mortem, which clearly suggests that after doing away with the deceased by strangulation, she was taken to bathroom and burnt, by keeping the body in sitting posture. This conclusion derives strong support from the final opinion of the Doctor, vide Ex.P.15, wherein it was stated that the cause of the death was ‘combined effect of pressure on the various parts of the body’. This conclusion derives strong support from the final opinion of the Doctor, vide Ex.P.15, wherein it was stated that the cause of the death was ‘combined effect of pressure on the various parts of the body’. P.W.16 – Doctor, was put to extensive cross-examination. He has supported his conclusion that the burn injuries were post-mortem due to absence of erythema (superficial reddening of the skin caused by the dilation of the blood capillaries). He has denied the suggestion that erythema may be absent when the death is instant. One of the most significant revelations under Ex.P.14 post-mortem certificate is that ‘No soot is present’ in Trachea & Bronchi. In the case of ante-mortem burns due to inhalation of smoke emanating from such burns, soot was bound to be present in Trachea & Bronchi. In Prabhudayal v. State of Maharashtra (1993) 3 SCC 573 , the Supreme Court quoted from the book ‘The Essentials of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, Sixth Edn. at page 255, by Dr. K. S. Narayan Reddy, to distinguish between the death due to asphyxia and the death due to burn injuries, described the signs of asphyxia, which were the same as noted hereinbefore. In case of burn injuries, the learned author was quoted as under: “…the brain is usually shrunken, firm and yellow to light brown due to cooking. The dura matter is leathery.” (Dura matter is meninges of the brain). If the death has occurred from suffocation, aspirated blackish coal particles are seen in the nose, mouth and whole of the respiratory tract. Their presence is proof that the victim was alive when the fire occurred. The pleurae are congested or inflamed. The lungs are usually congested, may be shrunken and rarely anaemic … Visceral congestion is marked in many cases ….The heart is usually filled with clotted blood. The adrenals (glands above kidneys) may be enlarged and congested.” (emphasis is ours) The common symptoms of internal and external injuries in case of strangulation and burns are described in paragraph 32 of the judgment wherein it is mentioned that ‘the face is swollen and distorted, the tongue protruded, the lungs are usually congested, visceral congestion is marked in many cases.’ The Supreme Court has relied upon the absence of clotting of blood in the heart as one of the main features to hold that the death did not occur on account of burns. In the present case also, in Ex.P.14 - post-mortem report, no blood clots in the heart were found. Thus, in our opinion, absence of soot in Trachea & Bornchi, blood clots in heart, and stomach contents not having been mixed with soot in the lungs, is sufficient to safely conclude that the death occurred due to asphyxia due to strangulation and that the burns were post-mortem as opined by P.W.16, Doctor. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the histopathology report on the skin burns was not filed and that therefore it has to be presumed therefrom that the prosecution has deliberately withheld the said report. No doubt, the histopathology report would have conclusively revealed whether the burns were post-mortem or ante-mortem and we find laxity on the part of the investigating agency in this regard. However, the accused cannot take undue advantage of the lapse of the investigating agency, when all the other incriminating circumstances rule out the possibility of the burns as the cause of the death. In this regard, the conduct of the appellant is worth discussing. CONDUCT OF THE ACCUSED 13. Contrary to the suggestion given to P.W.3 that the wife of the deceased has committed suicide angered by her brothers not attending the funeral of the brother-in-law of her husband, the appellant has answered question No.18 in his Section 313 CrPC statement by stating that the deceased has died unable to bear the stomach pain, that he has got all the medical reports with him and that he will file the same. The fact, however, remains that he has not filed any medical record proving his allegation that stomach ailment was the reason for his wife committing suicide. P.W.11, who is a co-tenant of the appellant and the deceased, categorically deposed that when smoke was coming out from the house, and several people gathered near the house of the appellant, the latter informed the people that due to gas leak the deceased was caught in fire and that when the persons present there questioned him why he was standing outside without going inside the house to bring the deceased out, the appellant has asked those persons to go inside and bring the deceased out. In her cross-examination, P.W.11 has admitted that she has not stated to Police as deposed by her before the Court. In her cross-examination, P.W.11 has admitted that she has not stated to Police as deposed by her before the Court. Even if this statement of P.W.11 is not be given credence to, there is nothing on record to show that the appellant has taken active part in trying to rescue his wife while she was in flames inside the house. The conduct of the accused both prior to and after the offence is one of the relevant factors in judging his guilt or innocence. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra (1992) 3 SCC 106 the Supreme Court held as under: “It is settled law that the conduct of an accused in an offence previous and subsequent to the crime are relevant facts. Absence of any attempt to save the life of the deceased while she was burning and was charred to death, the conduct of the accused in not attempting to give any medical aid, the conduct of the appellant immediately after the death and falsely proclaiming that there was short circuit implying to scare away the people from attempting to save the deceased – these are most telling and relevant crucial facts apart from repulsive inhuman conduct. The false plea of suicide is yet another relevant fact. When the death had occurred in the custody of the accused the appellant is under an obligation in Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement at least to give a plausible explanation for the cause for her death. No such attempt was even made except denying the prosecution case. These facts completely are inconsistent with the innocence, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of gruesome murder of his wife.” In Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 2 SCC 684 , while dealing with the aspect of conduct of the accused immediately after the incident, the Supreme Court observed as under: “…The normal human conduct of any person finding someone engulfed in flames would be to make all efforts to put off the flames and save the life of the person. Though, the appellants were the closest relations of the deceased, they did not do anything of the kind. Though, the appellants were the closest relations of the deceased, they did not do anything of the kind. Let alone making any effort to extinguish the fire, according to PW2 when the father-in-law of the deceased, at her request, was giving her the bontha to extinguish the flames, appellant 2, the mother-in-law of the deceased, objected to the same. This conduct speaks volumes about the extent of hatred which the mother-in-law exhibited towards her daughter in-law. They rendered no first-aid to the deceased. Their conduct at the time of the occurrence, therefore, clearly points towards their guilt and is inconsistent with their innocence. … …The theory of suicide has no legs to stand upon. The conduct of the appellants who did not try to extinguish the fire or render any first-aid to her, also totally betrays the theory of suicide and we agree with the High Court that the theory as set up by the appellants is highly unbelievable or unacceptable. The prosecution has, thus, successfully established that the conduct of both the appellants both at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellants and inconsistent with their innocence.” CONCLUSION AND THE RESULT 14. As observed by the lower Court it is an unfortunate case where due to long lapse of time in commencement of trial after the death of the deceased, the crucial witnesses have turned hostile. However, notwithstanding the same, the trail of culpability of the appellant continued to haunt him in the form of strong circumstances, including the place where the body of the deceased was found, the nature of the injuries found on the body of the deceased and the cause of the death as certified by the Doctor, which clearly point to the guilt of the appellant as discussed above. We are therefore in full agreement with the view of the trial Court that this is not a case of suicidal death, but the same is clearly a case of homicide caused by the appellant. Therefore, the lower Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant, and also imposed fine on him as aforementioned. Hence, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.