JUDGMENT : The petitioners--a District Co-operative Society and its Board of Directors--have a common grievance: It is impermissible for the second respondent to order a series of enquiries into the same set of allegations. 2. Briefly stated, on 28.11.2014, through Ext.P2 the second respondent appointed an Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry into the alleged irregularities as regards the tender for constructing a building under the direction of the second respondent managing committee. As seen from Ext.P2, the second respondent appointed an Enquiry Officer under Section 66(2) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 ('the Act'). In the course of time, the Enquiry Officer submitted Ext.P8 report concluding that there were no irregularities committed by the second respondent. 3. Later, the second respondent issued Ext.P11 proceedings dated 06.06.2015 appointing another Enquiry Officer on the same allegations. That apart, he has also required a Vigilance Officer, ostensibly invoking powers under Section 68A of the Act, to look in to the issue. In turn, the Vigilance Officer issued Ext.P13 notice to the petitioners requiring them to participate in the enquiry being undertaken by him. Thus, aggrieved by Exts.P10 and P11, the petitioners have approached this Court. 4. Sri. P.C. Sasidharan, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that under Section 66 of the Act the Joint Registrar (discharging the functions of the Registrar) can himself enquire into the affairs of the society exercising his supervisory powers or delegate the same to any other person. According to him, the said delegate need not be an employee of the Department. He has further contended that Ext.P10 is ex facie illegal and unsustainable on the simple premise that if Ext.P9 order, i.e., the first enquiry report, stands, there is no occasion for the second respondent to appoint another Enquiry Officer. 5. In other words, if the second respondent for whatever reasons is not satisfied with Ext.P9 enquiry report, he ought to have put the petitioners on notice in terms of Section 66(5) of the Act. And only after hearing them, could he have passed an order setting aside, if it is legally sustainable, Ext.P9 order; only then can the second respondent appoint another Enquiry Officer. The learned counsel has strenuously contended that Ext.P10 order appointing another Enquiry Officer is quite laconic and does not spell out any reasons either. 6. And only after hearing them, could he have passed an order setting aside, if it is legally sustainable, Ext.P9 order; only then can the second respondent appoint another Enquiry Officer. The learned counsel has strenuously contended that Ext.P10 order appointing another Enquiry Officer is quite laconic and does not spell out any reasons either. 6. As regards Ext.P12, a notice from the Vigilance Officer, the learned counsel would contend that if the proceedings initiated under Section 66 of the Act are pending, the second respondent cannot take recourse to Section 68A of the Act. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Ext.P14 circular, in which clauses 10 and 11 are relevant. 7. Sri Arun Chandran, the learned counsel for the additional 7th respondent, has submitted that the Enquiry Officer, who submitted Ext.P9 report, retired from service two months prior to his submitting Ext.P9 report. In fact, in that regard, one Mr. P.N. Sandeep filed a complaint before the Registrar, who in turn directed the Joint Registrar to appoint another Enquiry Officer. 8. The learned counsel, to his credit, has strenuously tried to impress upon the Court that under Section 66 of the Act, an Officer of the Department, apart from the Joint Registrar acting in the capacity of a Registrar, could be appointed to enquire into the affairs of any society. Even before the enquiry Officer could submit Ext.P9 report, asserts the learned counsel, he had seized to be an employee of the Department. For he retired from service on his attaining the age of superannuation. The report submitted subsequently by the superannuated employee lost its binding value, contends the learned counsel. 9. As regards the vigilance enquiry, the learned counsel, in tune with the averments made by the additional 7th respondent in the counter affidavit, has submitted that the second respondent has only ordered a preliminary enquiry. And it cannot be termed as a parallel enquiry said to have been prohibited under Ext.P14 circular. 10. Summing up his submissions, the learned counsel has submitted that neither Ext.P10 nor Ext.P12 is exceptionable to be called into question. Reply: 11. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that at no point in time have the petitioners been put on notice pursuant to Ext.P9 Enquiry Report, even if one were to assume that it could pass statutory muster. Reply: 11. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that at no point in time have the petitioners been put on notice pursuant to Ext.P9 Enquiry Report, even if one were to assume that it could pass statutory muster. He is, however, quick to point out that the Enquiry Officer in his Ext.P9 report has given cogent reasons why he could not submit the report while he was in service. 12. Drawing my attention to Rule 66 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules ('the Rules), the learned counsel would further contend that the procedure mandated thereunder is imperative. According to him, the second respondent cannot be permitted to violate the same. 13. Pertinently, the petitioners' challenged the notice issued by the Vigilance Officer. In that context, when the Court queried why the petitioners have not impugned the very order of the Vigilance Officer's appointment, the learned counsel has submitted that the petitioners have no knowledge of, much less access to, the order said to have been passed by the second respondent in that regard. He has submitted that only through the counter affidavit filed by the 7th respondent have they come to know that actually an order appointing the Vigilance Officer was passed by the second respondent. In this regard, the learned counsel has also submitted that the Government or the Department, despite numerous adjournments, has not chosen to file any counter affidavit. 14. Heard the learned counsel on both sides, apart from perusing the record. Issues: I. Whether the second respondent is entitled to issue Ext.P10 order appointing another Enquiry Officer without setting aside Ext.P9 enquiry report submitted by the previous Enquiry Officer. II. Whether the second respondent, in the face of Ext.P14 circular issued by the Registrar, can order a parallel enquiry by a Vigilance Officer, invoking Section 68A of the Act. Issue No.I: 15. As regards the first issue, the singular contention by the 7th respondent is that the Enquiry Officer, who submitted Ext.P9 report, retired from service before he could submit the report. As has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Section 66 does not spell out even remotely that the enquiry is to be conducted by an officer of the Department. In other words, it is not an enquiry by a designated Officer ex officio. As has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Section 66 does not spell out even remotely that the enquiry is to be conducted by an officer of the Department. In other words, it is not an enquiry by a designated Officer ex officio. Indeed, it is profitable to examine Section 66 of the Act, which to the extent relevant, reads as follows: 66. Supervision and Inspection:-(1) The Registrar shall supervise or cause to be supervised by a person authorised by him by general or special order in writing in this behalf, the working of every society as frequently as he may consider necessary. The Supervision under this sub-section may include an inspection of the books of the society. (2) The Registrar may, on his own motion, or on the application of a creditor of a society, inspect or direct any person authorised by him by order in writing in this behalf to inspect the books of the society: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (4) The Registrar or any person authorised by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall at all reasonable time have free access to and have power to inspect the books, records, accounts, documents, securities, cash balance and other properties, belonging to the society and may summon any person in possession of or responsible for the custody of such books, records, accounts, documents, securities, cash balance and other properties, to produce the same for inspection at any place at the Head Quarters of the society or any branch thereof or where there is no working office for the society, at the office of the Registrar or at the office of any of his subordinate officers. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxxx 16. As seen from the above extract, the statutory mandate is unambiguous. Indisputably, the Joint Registrar has been delegated the powers of a Registrar under Section 66 of the Act. Accordingly, the second respondent can either inspect or authorise any other person to inspect the books of the society. Even under sub-section 1, the second respondent shall supervise or cause to be supervised by a person authorised by him the working of every society as frequently as he may consider necessary. 17. Thus, under both sub-sections 1 and 2, the legislature has advisedly employed the expressions of very vide amplitude. Even under sub-section 1, the second respondent shall supervise or cause to be supervised by a person authorised by him the working of every society as frequently as he may consider necessary. 17. Thus, under both sub-sections 1 and 2, the legislature has advisedly employed the expressions of very vide amplitude. Perhaps, with a view to giving sufficient leverage to the second respondent as regards the affairs of the society, it has employed the expression 'a person' instead of a specific designation. It is neither unusual nor uncommon in departmental parlance: Sometimes the task of enquiry will be assigned to a particular designated Officer; but most times, a person of competence and integrity--without reference to the designation, and this includes an outsider as well--could be assigned the task. In the former, there lies no discretion with the authorities but to appoint the designated official; in the latter, the discretion is wide. 18. The reason for the legislature employing the expression 'a person or any person' is not far to seek: banking, be it of even Co- operative societies, is a complex financial business: either supervision or inspection, at times, needs expertise. If the books of accounts are to be examined, or any other intricate banking operations are to be probed into, the Department officials may not have the expertise in that regard. At times, the second respondent may need the assistance of an auditor or a financial expert. 19. At this juncture, Sri. Arun Chandran has submitted that the Act does not specify that the second respondent should take the assistance of any expert. Appealing as the submission is, every official while discharging the functions essentially enjoys a certain amount of discretion. Unless there is an express prohibition, it always lies within the jurisdiction of the said official to act in the best interest of the Organisation and to sub-serve the cause of the statutory scheme to the extent possible. 20. Accordingly, I see no limitation imposed by Section 66 of the Act upon the second respondent that he cannot take the help of, say, an outsider. On the contrary, the very phraseology of the provision is eloquent that no limitation has been imposed on the power of the second respondent. 21. This Court, in the facts and circumstances, has to conclude that mere retirement of the Enquiry Officer, who submitted Ext.P9 enquiry report, has not vitiated the enquiry report. On the contrary, the very phraseology of the provision is eloquent that no limitation has been imposed on the power of the second respondent. 21. This Court, in the facts and circumstances, has to conclude that mere retirement of the Enquiry Officer, who submitted Ext.P9 enquiry report, has not vitiated the enquiry report. To his credit, the Enquiry Officer has, in the last paragraph of his report, supplied very cogent reasons why he could not submit the report while he was in service. 22. First, I hold that an Enquiry Officer need not be an employee of the Department. Confining to the facts, since the Enquiry Officer was an employee of the Department at the time of his appointment, I further hold that his subsequent retirement has not vitiated Ext.P9 report. 23. We may as well examine Rule 66 of the Rules to determine the procedural parameters to be followed in the case of enquiry or inspection under Section 66 of the Act. As can be seen from sub-rule 5 of Rule 66 of the Rules, once the second respondent is in receipt of an enquiry report, he shall pass such orders thereon as may be considered just after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the society, person, or persons concerned. 24. Continuing in the same vein, I may observe that Ext.P9 report cannot be termed as final and irrevocable. Nor is it the case of the petitioners. All that they have submitted is that, if the second respondent for whatever reason is not satisfied with Ext.P9 enquiry report, he ought to have in terms of Rule 66(5) of the Rules put the petitioners on notice, invited their objections, ruled on them, and then proceed with the matter further. In the present instance, the second respondent has taken recourse to none of those eventualities. 25. A perusal of Ext.P10 reveals that the second respondent seems to have taken instructions from the Registrar based on the complaint submitted by one Sri Sandeep. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the additional 7th respondent has submitted that under the scheme of the Act, there is no requirement for the second respondent to give notice to the petitioners before there could be proceedings under Section 68 of the Act; for, according to the learned counsel, Section 66 is only preliminary. 26. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the additional 7th respondent has submitted that under the scheme of the Act, there is no requirement for the second respondent to give notice to the petitioners before there could be proceedings under Section 68 of the Act; for, according to the learned counsel, Section 66 is only preliminary. 26. First, Ext.P9 enquiry report was at the behest of the second respondent. It could have even been adverse to the petitioners as well. In the present instance, however, it is in their favour. In such an event, the second respondent cannot simply abandon the said report just because it was not on expected lines, and then initiate a further round of enquiry. 27. Even in terms of principles of natural justice and of the common law doctrine, once punitive proceedings have been initiated against a particular person, he or she may take advantage of its positive outcome. If the authority who has caused an enquiry decides to wipe off the findings of the enquiry initiated at his own behest, the person affected ought to be put on notice why that report shall not be recalled or set aside--if justifiable reasons are available. 28. Thus, the second respondent ought to have followed the procedural safeguards engraved into our system of adjudication as a matter of the rule of law, call them principles of natural justice or cannons of common law jurisprudence. 29. At any rate, this Court in Thiruvalla East Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Joint Registrar, 2009(4) KLT 378, while interpreting Rule 66(5) of the Rules, has clearly held that the rule is mandatory, and therefore the second respondent is bound to comply with the said Rule. Once an enquiry report is received, the second respondent is bound to hear the society and the Directors of the Board before any action affecting them is taken. In the present instance, issuing Ext.P10 appointing another Enquiry Officer in total disregard of an earlier enquiry report certainly amounts to an action affecting or prejudicing the petitioners' cause. 30. Thus, in a conspectus, I am constrained to hold that Ext.P10 cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside. Issue No.II: 31. Now we may address the issue concerning Ext.P12 notice issued by the Vigilance Officer. 30. Thus, in a conspectus, I am constrained to hold that Ext.P10 cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside. Issue No.II: 31. Now we may address the issue concerning Ext.P12 notice issued by the Vigilance Officer. Evident it is from Ext.P14 circular issued by the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies that once an enquiry has already been initiated under Section 66 of the Act, a parallel enquiry cannot be taken recourse to under Section 68A of the Act. Of course, the circular also mandates that once an enquiry under Section 68A of the Act has been initiated, on the converse there can be no recourse to Section 66, too. 32. In the present instance, because the second respondent has already initiated an enquiry under Section 66 of the Act, I am of the considered opinion that Ext.P12 cannot be sustained. Ext.P12, being a consequential order from the Vigilance Officer based on a direction earlier given by the second respondent, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that he could not initially challenge the original order for want of knowledge and also lack of access to the proceedings. He has in this regard submitted that the petitioners have come to know about such an order having been passed by the second respondent only from the counter affidavit filed by the additional 7th respondent. 33. Ironically, the second respondent, whose orders are in question, has never chosen to file any counter affidavit defending his own action. Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to comment on the diligence, or its lack, exhibited by the second respondent in prosecuting the litigation involving his own orders. 34. For the reasons mentioned above, the order said to have been passed by the first respondent on 06.04.2015 authorising the Vigilance Officer to undertake a parallel enquiry cannot be sustained in the face of Circular No.14. 35. Before parting, I clarify that setting aside Exts.P10 or Ext.P12 as well as the primary order that has given rise to Ext.P12 does not amount to a judicial imprimatur that Ext.P9 is final and there shall be no further proceedings. Indeed, if the second respondent wants to proceed further based on Ext.P9 or in its disregard, it is essential that he should put the petitioners on notice following the due process and proceed further in accordance with law. This writ petition is allowed as above. Indeed, if the second respondent wants to proceed further based on Ext.P9 or in its disregard, it is essential that he should put the petitioners on notice following the due process and proceed further in accordance with law. This writ petition is allowed as above. No order on costs.