JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 8.6.2011, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shimla, H.P. hereinafter referred to as ?the Tribunal?, for short, in MAC Petition No.22-S/2 of 2011/05, titled Sh. Parveen versus Sh. Anup Thakur and another, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.4,90,000/- alongwith interest @ 8% per annum with costs assessed at Rs.5,000/- came to be awarded in favour of the claimant and insurer was saddled with the liability, for short ?the impugned award?, on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal. 2. Claimant and owner-cum-driver have not questioned the impugned award on any ground, thus it has attained the finality, so far as it relates to them. 3. The insurer has questioned the impugned award on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal. 4. The claimant, by the medium of claim petition, under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, for short ?the Act? had invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for the grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.19,24,950/-, as per the break-ups given in the claim petition, on account of the injuries suffered by him in a motor vehicle accident occurred on 30.7.2004, which was caused by Anup Thakur-respondent No. 1 in the claim petition, while driving vehicle No. HP-01-8456, rashly and negligently. In the said accident, right arm of the claimant had been crushed. He was taken to District Hospital Solan for immediate medical aid, was referred to IGMC Shimla and remained admitted there up to 3.8.2004. On the same date, i.e., on 3.8.2004, he was referred to PGI Chandigarh, and discharged on 11.8.2004. The petitioner is stated to have spent Rs.1,00,000/- on his medical treatment. 5. The claim petition was resisted by the respondents by the medium of the replies and following issues came to be framed: (i) Whether the petitioner sustained injuries in a vehicular accident involving vehicle No. HP-01-8456 caused due to rash and negligent driving by respondent No.1? OPP. (ii) If issue No. (i) is proved, to what amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to and from whom? OPP (iii) Whether the vehicle in question was being driven in violation of terms and conditions of insurance policy? OPR-2. (iv) Whether the driver of the vehicle was not holding valid and effective driving licence? OPR-2. (v) Relief. 6. OPP. (ii) If issue No. (i) is proved, to what amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to and from whom? OPP (iii) Whether the vehicle in question was being driven in violation of terms and conditions of insurance policy? OPR-2. (iv) Whether the driver of the vehicle was not holding valid and effective driving licence? OPR-2. (v) Relief. 6. The claimant led evidence and has examined Dr Ravinder Mokta as PW1, Sh. Bhim Chand Sharma, PW2, Shri Sandeep Kumar PW4 and claimant himself has stepped into the witness-box as PW3. 7. The Tribunal, after scanning the evidence, made the award dated 4.9.2008 in MAC Petition No. 118/S/2 of 2005, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.4,90,000/- came to be awarded in favour of the claimant and insurer was saddled with the liability. 8. The appellant/insurer invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, by filing petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which was registered as CMPMO No. 227 of 2009. The said petition was allowed vide judgment and order dated 9.3.2011, and following directions were passed. ?13. Consequently, the award is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal shall decide the application filed by the insurance Company under Section 170 of the Act at the first instance. Thereafter, it shall give only one opportunity to the claimant to produce the Doctor since in this case the claimant had already taken a number of opportunities and had also taken dasti summons to produce the doctor. No application for examination of the doctor on commission shall be entertained and it shall be the responsibility of the claimant to serve and produce the doctor who issued the disability certificate. Only one opportunity in this behalf shall be given and in case the claimant fails to produce the doctor, the evidence of the claimant shall be closed. In case the doctor is examined, an opportunity to rebut the evidence shall be given to the respondents and to the insurance Company if it is permitted to contest the claim on al grounds.? 9. After remand, the claimant examined PW5 Rattan Chand, who produced the record relating to the disability certificate and PW6 Dr. B.K. Arya, Medical Specialist has proved the disability certificate Ext. PW1/A. 10. 9. After remand, the claimant examined PW5 Rattan Chand, who produced the record relating to the disability certificate and PW6 Dr. B.K. Arya, Medical Specialist has proved the disability certificate Ext. PW1/A. 10. Thereafter, the learned Tribunal has passed the award dated 8.6.2011, granted the compensation as referred to supra, subject matter of the present appeal. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the Tribunal has fallen in an error in not allowing the appellant to lead evidence and prayed for the remand. The argument though is forceful and attractive, but is devoid of any force, for the following reasons. 12. This Court vide judgment dated 9th March, 2011, referred to supra had directed the Tribunal to examine the application under Section 170 of the Act filed by the insurer which was granted vide order dated 18.4.2011. Thus, the appellant/insurer was permitted to contest the claim petition on all grounds available to it, had neither led any evidence before the Tribunal at the first instance nor after remand. 13. The insurer had to discharge the onus on issues No. (iii) and (iv), has failed to discharge the same at the first instance. In terms of the earlier award, both the issues were decided against the insurer and also came to be decided against the insurer in terms of the impugned award, subject matter of this appeal. Both these issues relate to the terms and conditions of the insurance policy read with the mandate of Sections 147 and 149 of the Act, the defences available to the insurer. The insurer was to lead evidence, as per the mandate of Section 170 of the Act on all other grounds which were available to it. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant/insurer has not disputed the following. (i) Factum of accident, (ii) Rashness and negligence of the driver, (iii) Disability suffered by the claimant. 15. This Court can examine the case at this stage and hear the parties on all grounds which are available, in terms of the mandate given under Section 170 of the Act. 16. Admittedly, there is no dispute viz-a-viz issue No. (i). Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. (i) are upheld. 17. Before I determine issue No. (ii), I deem it proper to determine issue No. (iii) & (iv). I have examined the pleadings, evidence and gone through the record. 16. Admittedly, there is no dispute viz-a-viz issue No. (i). Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. (i) are upheld. 17. Before I determine issue No. (ii), I deem it proper to determine issue No. (iii) & (iv). I have examined the pleadings, evidence and gone through the record. The insured has obtained insurance of the vehicle, in terms of the mandate of the Act, in order to protect the interest of the driver, third party and himself. The record does disclose that the insured/owner had obtained all the required documents as per the mandate of the Act. 18. While going through the entire record as it is, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that the insured has not committed any willful breach, in terms of the mandate of the Sections 147 and 149 of the Act, not to speak of violating the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. 19. The question of remand on the ground that the insurer has not been allowed the opportunity to lead evidence, cross-examine witnesses and medical certificate, does not arise as it will amount to dragging the claimant again to the protracted litigation which is against the aim and object of granting the compensation. The claimant has suffered permanent disability of 50% and is not in a position to work as driver, as discussed by the Tribunal. Having said so, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. (iii) are upheld. Issue No. (iv). 20. It was for the insurer to prove that the driver was not having a valid and effective driving licence, has not led any evidence. The driving licence Mark-R-1 is on record which does disclose that the driver was having a valid and effective driving licence. It will be a futile exercise to ask the Tribunal to provide one opportunity to the appellant to lead evidence because the driving licence is on the record which is valid and effective one. 21. The apex Court in case titled Rakesh Kumar & Etc. v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and others. Etc. Etc., reported in JT 2016 (6) SC 504, has held that once the license was proved and marked in evidence without any objection by the Insurance Company, it has no right to raise any objection about its admissibility at a later stage. v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and others. Etc. Etc., reported in JT 2016 (6) SC 504, has held that once the license was proved and marked in evidence without any objection by the Insurance Company, it has no right to raise any objection about its admissibility at a later stage. It is apt to reproduce paras 21 and 22 of the said judgment herein. ?21. In the light of foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the High court was not right in reversing the finding of the Tribunal. Indeed, the High Court should have taken note of these reasons which, in our view, were germane for deciding the issue of liability of the Insurance Company arising out of the accident. 22. We, therefore, find no good ground to concur with the finding of the High Court. Thus while reversing the finding, we hold that the driver of the offending vehicle was holding a valid driving license (Exhibit-R1) at the time of accident and since the Insurance Company failed to prove otherwise, it was liable to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and enhanced by the High Court.? 22. The Tribunal has rightly recorded the findings on issue No. (iv), are accordingly, upheld. Issue No. (ii). 23. The claimant has proved that he was admitted in the hospital, i.e., in IGMC Shimla from 30.7.2004 upto 3.8.2004 and after 3.8.2004 till 11.8.2004 at PGI Chandigarh and has suffered 50% permanent disability. The Tribunal, after exercising guess work and assessment, has awarded compensation as follows: (i) Rs.11000/- under the head ?medical expenses.? (ii) Rs.3,000/- under the head ?travel expenses.? (iii) Rs.10,000/- under the head ?attendant charges? (iv) Rs.25,000/- on account of lay-off, (v) Rs.25,000/- under the head ?mental and physical pain?, and (vi) Rs.4,16,000/- under the head loss of future income, loss of amenities of life, loss of expectation of life, etc.= Total Rs.4,90,000/- along with costs assessed at Rs.5,000/-. 24. The amount awarded by the Tribunal is meager. Virtually, the claimant has lost his right arm and is not in a position to work as driver in future, as discussed by the Tribunal in para 21 of the impugned award. The medical certificate issued by Dr. B.K. Arya is on record. The Tribunal has recorded the statement of the expert in para 17 of the award. It is apt to reproduce statement of PW6 Dr.B.K. Arya herein. The medical certificate issued by Dr. B.K. Arya is on record. The Tribunal has recorded the statement of the expert in para 17 of the award. It is apt to reproduce statement of PW6 Dr.B.K. Arya herein. ?The petitioner Parveen Kumar had been examined by me as a member of the Medical Board. He was found to have suffered crush injury right forearm with ankylosis elbow at 90 degree with claw hand with non functional limb with disuse atrophy and disability thereof of permanent character was 50% in relation to whole body. Dr. Ramesh Chauhan, Orthopedic surgeon had also been present and he had also examined petitioner Parveen Kumar. Disability certificate, copy Ext. PW-1/A had been signed by Dr. Ramesh Chauhan and myself. The Medical Superintendent had also signed the disability certificate. I have brought the original record of this disability certificate. Cross-examination by Sh. Vipul Prabhakar, Advocate, on behalf of the respondent No.2. I had not medically treated this patient at any stage? 25. It is beaten law of land that the compensation is to be awarded in an injury case under pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads by making guess work. 26. My this view is fortified by the judgments made by the Apex Court in the cases titled as R.D. Hattangadi versus M/s Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. & others, reported in AIR 1995 SC 755 , Arvind Kumar Mishra versus New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & another, reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6085, Ramchandrappa versus The Manager, Royal Sundaram Aliance Insurance Company Limited, reported in 2011 AIR SCW 4787, and Kavita versus Deepak and others, reported in 2012 AIR SCW 4771. 27. This Court has also laid down the same principle in a series of cases. 28. The age of the claimant was 24 years at the time of the accident. The multiplier applicable is ?16? in view of the 2nd Schedule attached to the Act, read with Sarla Verma and others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another reported in AIR 2009 SC 3104 and upheld in Reshma Kumari and others versus Madan Mohan and another, reported in 2013 AIR SCW 3120. 29. The appellant/insurer has, in fact, not cross-examined the doctor. The disability certificate stands proved. The permanent disability has affected the profession of the claimant as driver totally for the reason that he is not in a position to work as driver in future. 29. The appellant/insurer has, in fact, not cross-examined the doctor. The disability certificate stands proved. The permanent disability has affected the profession of the claimant as driver totally for the reason that he is not in a position to work as driver in future. The tribunal has assessed the income of the claimant at Rs.4,000/- per month though it is meager but claimant has not questioned the same, is reluctantly upheld. 30. Thus, the claimant has lost source of income to the tune of Rs.4,000/- per month. Though he has suffered 50% disability but it has permanently affected his earning capacity. Having said so, the claimant has lost source of dependency to the tune of Rs.4000/- x16x12= Rs.7,68,000/-. 31. The Apex Court in its latest decision in Jakir Hussein vs. Sabir and others, (2015) 7 SCC 252 , while discussing its earlier pronouncements, observed that in injury cases, the compensation would include not only the actual expenses incurred, but the compensation has to be assessed keeping in view the struggle which the injured has to face throughout his life due to the permanent disability and the amount likely to be incurred for future medical treatment, loss of amenities of life, pain and suffering to undergo for the entire life etc. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 11 and 18 of the said decision hereunder: ?11. With regard to the pain, suffering and trauma which have been caused to the appellant due to his crushed hand, it is contended that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal was meagre and insufficient. It is not in dispute that the appellant had remained in the hospital for a period of over three months. It is not possible for the courts to make a precise assessment of the pain and trauma suffered by a person whose arm got crushed and has suffered permanent disability due to the accident that occurred. The appellant will have to struggle and face different challenges as being handicapped permanently. Therefore, in all such cases, the Tribunals and the courts should make a broad estimate for the purpose of determining the amount of just and reasonable compensation under pecuniary loss. Admittedly, at the time of accident, the appellant was a young man of 33 years. The appellant will have to struggle and face different challenges as being handicapped permanently. Therefore, in all such cases, the Tribunals and the courts should make a broad estimate for the purpose of determining the amount of just and reasonable compensation under pecuniary loss. Admittedly, at the time of accident, the appellant was a young man of 33 years. For the rest of his life, the appellant will suffer from the trauma of not being able to do his normal work of his job as a driver. Therefore, it is submitted that ton meet the ends of justice it would be just and proper to award him a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- towards pain, suffering and trauma caused to him and a further amount of Rs.1,50,000/- for the loss of amenities and enjoyment of life. …………. …………… …………… 18. Further, we refer to the case of Rekha Jain & Anr. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2013 8 SCC 389 wherein this Court examined catena of cases and principles to be borne in mind while granting compensation under the heads of (i) pain, suffering and (ii) loss of amenities and so on. Therefore, as per the principles laid down in the case of Rekha Jain & Anr. and considering the suffering undergone by the appellant herein, and it will persist in future also and therefore, we are of the view to grant Rs.1,50,000/- towards the pain, suffering and trauma which will be undergone by the appellant throughout his life. Further, as he is not in a position to move freely, we additionally award Rs.1,50,000/- towards loss of amenities & enjoyment of life and happiness.? 32. In view of the ratio laid down by the apex Court in the judgment, supra, I am of the considered view that the claimant-injured is entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.1,50,000/- under the head =pain and sufferings' and Rs.1,50,000/- under the head =loss of amenities of life'. 33. The question is-whether this Court can enhance compensation? The answer is in affirmative for the following reasons. 34. Keeping in view the object of granting of compensation and the legislature's wisdom read with the amendment made in the MV Act in the year 1994, it is for the Tribunal or the Appellate Court to assess the just compensation and is within its power to grant the compensation more than what is claimed and can enhance the same. 34. Keeping in view the object of granting of compensation and the legislature's wisdom read with the amendment made in the MV Act in the year 1994, it is for the Tribunal or the Appellate Court to assess the just compensation and is within its power to grant the compensation more than what is claimed and can enhance the same. 35. This Court in a case titled as United India Insurance Company Ltd. Versus Smt. Kulwant Kaur, reported in Latest HLJ 2014 (HP) 174, held that the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Court is/are within the jurisdiction to enhance the compensation and grant more than what is claimed. 36. The same view was taken by the Apex Court in the case of Nagappa versus Gurudayal Singh and others, reported in AIR 2003 Supreme Court 674. It is apt to reproduce paras 7, 9 and 10 of the judgment herein: ?7. Firstly, under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (hereinafter referred to as ?the MV Act?) there is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case where from the evidence brought on record if Tribunal/Court considers that claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. Only embargo is – it should be 'Just' compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the M.V. Act. Section 166 provides that an application for compensation arising out of an accident involving the death of or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both, could be made (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. Under the proviso to sub-section (1), all the legal representatives of the deceased who have not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as respondents to the application for compensation. Under the proviso to sub-section (1), all the legal representatives of the deceased who have not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as respondents to the application for compensation. Other important part of the said Section is sub-section (4) which provides that ?the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.? Hence, Claims Tribunal in appropriate case can treat the report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed. 8. .......................... 9. It appears that due importance is not given to sub-section (4) of Section 166 which provides that the Tribunal shall treat any report of the accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158, as an application for compensation under this Act. 10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to ?make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just?. Therefore, only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.? 37. In the case titled as State of Haryana and another versus Jasbir Kaur and others, reported in AIR 2003 Supreme Court 3696, the Apex Court has discussed the expression 'just'. It is apt to reproduce para 7 of the judgment herein: "7. It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in S. 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which is to be in the real sense "damages" which in turn appears to it to be 'just and reasonable'. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; nor a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed question. Statutory provisions clearly indicate the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; nor a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be just" a wide discretion is vested on the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression "just" denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just. (See Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation ( AIR 1998 SC 3191 )." 38. The same view has been taken by the Apex Court in a case titled as The Divisional Controller, K.S.R.T.C. versus Mahadeva Shetty and another, reported in AIR 2003 Supreme Court 4172. 39. The Apex Court in a case titled as A.P.S.R.T.C. & another versus M. Ramadevi & others, reported in 2008 AIR SCW 1213, held that the Appellate Court was within its jurisdiction and powers in enhancing the compensation despite the fact that the claimants had not questioned the adequacy of the compensation. 40. The Apex Court in the case titled as Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Mohd. Nasir & Anr., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 3717, laid down the same principle while discussing, in para 27 of the judgment, the ratio laid down in the judgments rendered in the cases titled as Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Ors, (2003) 2 SCC 274 ; Devki Nandan Bangur and Ors. Versus State of Haryana and Ors. 1995 ACJ 1288 ; Syed Basheer Ahmed & Ors. versus Mohd. Jameel & Anr., (2009) 2 SCC 225 ; National Insurance Co. Versus State of Haryana and Ors. 1995 ACJ 1288 ; Syed Basheer Ahmed & Ors. versus Mohd. Jameel & Anr., (2009) 2 SCC 225 ; National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Laxmi Narain Dhut, (2007) 3 SCC 700 ; Punjab State Electricity Board Ltd. versus Zora Singh and Others (2005) 6 SCC 776 ; A.P. SRTC versus STAT and State of Haryana & Ors. versus Shakuntla Devi, 2008 (13) SCALE 621 . 41. The amount awarded under four heads, i.e.,Rs.11000/- under the head ?medical expenses? Rs.10,000/- under the head ?attendant charges?, Rs. 3000/- under the head ?travel expenses? and Rs.25,000/- on account of lay-off, is maintained. 42. Viewed thus, the claimant is awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.7,68,000/- ,+ Rs.1,50,000/-+Rs.1,50,000/-+ Rs.11000/-+ Rs.10,000/- + Rs.25,000/-+Rs.3000/-= Total Rs.11,17,000/-. 43. The Tribunal has awarded interest @ 8% per annum. However, interest was to be awarded at rate of 7.5% per annum, for the following reasons. 44. It is a beaten law of the land that the rate of interest should be awarded as per the prevailing rates, in view of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in cases titled as United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others versus Patricia Jean Mahajan and others, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 281 ; Satosh Devi versus National Insurance Company Ltd. and others, reported in 2012 AIR SCW 2892; Amrit Bhanu Shali and others versus National Insurance Company Limited and others reported in (2012) 11 SCC 738 ; Smt. Savita versus Binder Singh & others, reported in 2014, AIR SCW 2053; Kalpanaraj & others versus Tamil Nadu State Transport Corpn., reported in 2014 AIR SCW 2982; Amresh Kumari versus Niranjan Lal Jagdish Pd. Jain and others, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 433 , and Mohinder Kaur and others versus Hira Nand Sindhi (Ghoriwala) and another, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 434 , and discussed by this Court in a batch of FAOs, FAO No. 256 of 2010, titled as Oriental Insurance Company versus Smt. Indiro and others, being the lead case, decided on 19.06.2015. 45. Accordingly, interest @7.5% per annum is awarded from the date of claim petition till realization of the amount. 46. The insurer is directed to deposit the enhanced amount alongwith interest @ 7.5% per annum, within eight weeks from today in the Registry. 45. Accordingly, interest @7.5% per annum is awarded from the date of claim petition till realization of the amount. 46. The insurer is directed to deposit the enhanced amount alongwith interest @ 7.5% per annum, within eight weeks from today in the Registry. The Registry, on deposit, is directed to release the amount in favour of the claimant, strictly in terms of the conditions contained in the impugned award, through payees' cheque account, or by depositing the same in his bank account, after proper verification. 47. The amount already deposited by the insurer in the Registry, be released in favour of the claimant, forthwith, strictly in terms of the conditions contained in the impugned award, through payees' cheque account, or by depositing the same in his bank account, after proper verification. 48. Viewed thus, the appeal is disposed of along with pending applications, compensation is enhanced and the impugned award is modified as indicated hereinabove. 49. Send down the record forthwith, after placing a copy of this judgment.