JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Sunita Agarwal, J.—Heard Shri W.H. Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Nitin Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri M.A. Qadeer, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Shamim Ahmad, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 9 to 11. Shri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Advocate has appeared for respondent Nos. 1 to 8. 2. This petition is directed against the findings recorded by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 17, Allahabad in Civil Appeal No. 88 of 2004 (Manish Prakash v. Dr. Prabhu Sharan Rajvedi and others) vide judgment and order dated 22.8.2005 with regard to the suit property which is stated to be a Waqf property. 3. The brief facts relevant to note before dealing with the controversy in hand are: One Sharifan Bibi daughter of Musammat Imaman Bibi was exclusive owner of House No. 1, Shiv Charan Lal Road, Allahabad and House No. 14, Dhondipur, Allahabad. She also owned a House No. 205, Uncha Mandi, Allahabad. 4. By means of a registered Waqf deed dated 26.2.1932, she created a Waqf known as Waqf Sharifan Bibi with respect to her two properties namely 1, Shiv Charan Lal Road, Allahabad and House No. 14 Dondipur, Allahabad in and vested in Allahtala (God). The aforesaid Waqf deed was registered on 26.2.1932 in Bahi No. 1, Zild No. 613 on pages 298-301 at serial No. 362 in the office of the Sub-Registrar. Mussammat Sharifan Bibi had no issues, she died sometimes in the year 1951-52, her only brother Rahimuddin predeceased her. 5. The present petition arises out of Appeal No. 88 of 2004, the dispute herein is with regard to Premises No. 1, Shiv Charan Lal Road, Allahabad. In the municipal record, this property was initially recorded in the exclusive name of Mushammat Sharifan Bibi, however, at a later stage her name was entered/mutated as Mutwalli. After her death, the name of Sri Quammaruddin @ Kalekhan son of Rahimuddin was recorded as Mutwalli Waqf Sharifan Bibi in the municipal record. After death of Quammaruddin, Nizamuddin grand son of Rahimuddin was appointed Mutwalli and his name was also recorded as such in the municipal register. 6. It is noteworthy that Waqf Sharifan Bibi is also registered with U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board, Lucknow and is entered as such in the register of Waqfs maintained under Section 37 of the Waqf Act. 7. 6. It is noteworthy that Waqf Sharifan Bibi is also registered with U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board, Lucknow and is entered as such in the register of Waqfs maintained under Section 37 of the Waqf Act. 7. The present proceeding arises out of a dispute raised by the tenants of the disputed property namely 1, Shiv Charan Lal Road, Allahabad as a result of execution of a registered sale-deed dated 4.7.2002 by Nizamuddin, the Mutwalli. The tenants/respondents of the suit property filed an Original Suit No. 430 of 2002 (Dr. P.S. Rajvedi and others v. Manish Prakash and others) seeking injunction against defendant Nos. 1 to 3 including defendant No. 4 on the plea that the defendant No. 4 had illegally sold the Waqf property to defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 may be restrained from interfering in their possession. A relief of declaration of the sale-deeds dated 4.7.2002 and 5.7.2002, executed in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 by defendant No. 4, as null and void document was also sought. The suit was contested by all the defendants. Defendant Nos. 1 to 2, defendant No. 3, defendant No. 4 and defendant No. 5 have filed their separate written statements. The defendant Nos. 1 to 2 filed a counter claim for relief of permanent injunction against the plaintiff’s from raising construction, forcefully entering into any portion of the suit property and from alienating it in any matter. A further relief of restraining them from interfering in defendant’s possession and ownership was also sought. The defendant No. 3 filed a counter claim for damages for the act of defamation of the plaintiffs. 8. The trial Court by judgment and order dated 24.8.2004 partly decreed the suit restraining the defendants from interfering in possession and occupation of the plaintiffs/tenants of the suit property except by adopting due process of law, however, the relief of sale-deed as null and void document declaration was refused. The counter claims of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and defendant No. 3 for injunction and damages were also rejected. 9. The relief of declaration of sale-deed as null and void document was denied on the ground that the plaintiffs being tenants cannot ask for the said relief. As the suit property is a Waqf property, such relief can only be claimed by the Waqf Board, New Mutwalli or persons interested therein. 9. The relief of declaration of sale-deed as null and void document was denied on the ground that the plaintiffs being tenants cannot ask for the said relief. As the suit property is a Waqf property, such relief can only be claimed by the Waqf Board, New Mutwalli or persons interested therein. The relief of permanent injunction sought by the defendants was refused on the ground that there is no prove of survey and preparation of list under Sections 4, 5, 6 and 27 of the Waqf Act. There is no decision/adjudication of the Waqf Tribunal in this regard and the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 though obtained the sale-deed on a bona fide belief that the defendant No. 4 was owner of the suit property, however till a declaration is made by the tribunal under the Waqf Act regarding status of Waqf, no relief can be granted to the defendants/purchasers. 10. Thus while noting that the plaintiffs are in legal occupation of the suit property as tenants, it was directed that they shall not be dispossessed by the defendants except in accordance with law. 11. Challenging the decree passed by the trial Court in rejecting the counter claim of permanent injunction sought by defendant Nos. 1 and 2, they preferred an appeal which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 88 of 2004. 12. The appellate Court though dismissed the appeal on merits but recorded a finding that the suit property was not a Waqf property rather it was the property owned by Nizamuddin who had succeeded this property in his personal capacity being eldest amongst the heirs and representatives of Musammat Sharifan Bibi. It was also concluded that the plaintiffs have been occupying the suit property as tenants and they cannot be evicted by the defendants/purchasers except by adopting due process of law. The decree passed by the trial Court was not interfered and the appeal was dismissed, accordingly. 13. The defendant No. 5 namely Waqf Musammat Sharifan Bibi impleaded through its New Mutwalli Naseeruddin @ Nahaluddin @ Nehal Khan son of Quammaruddin, aggrieved by the finding of the first appellate Court on the question of Waqf filed a Second Appeal No. 827 of 2005. 14. 13. The defendant No. 5 namely Waqf Musammat Sharifan Bibi impleaded through its New Mutwalli Naseeruddin @ Nahaluddin @ Nehal Khan son of Quammaruddin, aggrieved by the finding of the first appellate Court on the question of Waqf filed a Second Appeal No. 827 of 2005. 14. The second appeal was dismissed as withdrawn for the reason that the appeal was found not maintainable against the findings recorded by the first appellate Court as the appeal can be maintained only against a decree by a person who is aggrieved by the same. Consequently, they had withdrawn the second appeal with liberty to taken recourse of the alternative remedy. This petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India was filed thereafter. It was permitted to be amended under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by amendment order dated 5.5.2016. 15. Sri W.H. Khan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Waqf submits that the appellate Court has acted beyond its jurisdiction in holding that Nizamuddin the defendant No. 4 had inherited the suit property in his personal capacity. The Waqf Sharifan Bibi was created by a registered Waqf deed dated 26.2.1932, thereafter, Waqif was in possession of the property as Mutawalli till her life time. After her death, Quammaruddin and Nizamuddin were managing the property as Mutawalli. The Waqf was created for the fact that Smt. Sharifan Bibi had gone for “Hajj” in the year 1932. Before leaving in order to manage her property, she created a Waqf Alalaulad. She herself went to the office of Registrar for the purpose of getting the Waqf deed, registered. 16. As soon as the Waqf is created, the Waqif is divested of the Waqf property in his personal capacity, the property vests in Allahtala (God) and no one can claim his/her personal right to the said property. 17. Reliance has been placed by the appellate Court upon a document dated 7.4.1948 to hold that the Waqf was cancelled by the Waqif. This is an act of the appellate Court which was completely beyond its jurisdiction. The Waqf deed could not have been cancelled by a registered document allegedly executed by the Waqif in the year 1948. No suit was filed by Waqif for cancellation of Waqf deed or the document dated 7.4.1948 was never relied upon by her before any Court of law to state that she did not create the Waqf. 18. The Waqf deed could not have been cancelled by a registered document allegedly executed by the Waqif in the year 1948. No suit was filed by Waqif for cancellation of Waqf deed or the document dated 7.4.1948 was never relied upon by her before any Court of law to state that she did not create the Waqf. 18. On the other hand, Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned Senior Advocate for respondent Nos. 9 to 11 would submit that the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable against the findings of the Civil Court. The relief of cancellation of sale-deed sought by the plaintiffs were refused by the trial Court. The finding of trial Court while passing the decree, therefore, has become final against the petitioner/defendant No. 5. No appeal was filed by the plaintiffs and noticably no cross appeal was filed by petitioner/defendant No. 5 before the first Appellate Court. The findings arrived in the appeal filed by the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 cannot be examined at the instance of defendant No. 5 against whom the decree has become final. It has no right to maintain the present petition. 19. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Balkrishna Das v. Radha Devi, 1989 AIR (ALL)-0-133, The Jammu & Kashmir Bank v. Lal Mohamed Bangroo, AIR 1989 J&K 25 and Hardevinder Singh v. Paramjit Singh and others, 2013(1) JCLR 748 (SC), to submit that if a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person, he can prefer an appeal. Even a decree holder can approbate the decree as to the part which affects him and negates his claim. An appeal lie from every decree, a respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based shall file a cross objection in so far as it is based on that finding notwithstanding that the decree may be wholly or in part in favour of that respondent. 20. The second submission is that the Waqf deed dated 26.2.1932 was an out come of fraud committed by brother of Mushmmat Sharifan Bibi, she in fact had never intended to create a Waqf. 21. Elaborating this submission, he submits that the Waqf deed was prepared on mistaken facts, it was never acted upon. 20. The second submission is that the Waqf deed dated 26.2.1932 was an out come of fraud committed by brother of Mushmmat Sharifan Bibi, she in fact had never intended to create a Waqf. 21. Elaborating this submission, he submits that the Waqf deed was prepared on mistaken facts, it was never acted upon. Sharifan Bibi was holding the suit property in her personal capacity and treated it as her personal property through out her life time. Her name was not recorded as Mutwalli of the Waqf property till her death. She was a Pardanasheen, illiterate lady and was misguided by her brother with an aim to deprive her of property. She had gone for “Hajj” and her signatures/thumb impression were obtained on the Waqf deed without her intention to create the Waqf deed. To find out as to whether the Waqf was validly created, the intention of Waqif is one of the attending circumstance. An unintended document prepared on mistaken facts cannot create a valid Waqf that too when it was never acted upon. 22. None of the beneficiaries have been provided benefits under the Waqf deed. These facts are further established from the registered document dated 7.4.1948 executed by Sharifan Bibi. As soon as she came to know about the illegal act of creation of the Waqf, she executed a registered deed to cancel it. She had categorically stated therein that she was residing with her brother and the Waqf deed was got registered against her will and intention to create the Waqf. She was holding the suit property in her capacity as an owner and got the deed dated 7.4.1948 registered to declare that the Waqf deed dated 26.2.1932 was an out come of fraud. 23. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court and the other High Courts in T.N. Wakf Board v. Hathija Ammal (Dead) by LRs. and others, 2001 (8) SCC 528 , Shivshankar Gurgar v. Dilip, 2014 (2) SCC 465 and Yanala Malleshwari w/o Y. Yadagiri Reddy etc. etc. v. Smt. Ananthula Sayamma w/o Lte Gopaiah and another etc. etc., AIR 2007 AP 57 (FB), to submit that Waqf deed can be cancelled by a registered document as it was obtained by fraud played upon the executor which makes the deed a void document. etc. v. Smt. Ananthula Sayamma w/o Lte Gopaiah and another etc. etc., AIR 2007 AP 57 (FB), to submit that Waqf deed can be cancelled by a registered document as it was obtained by fraud played upon the executor which makes the deed a void document. There is no necesity of getting a declaration from a Court of law with respect to a document which itself is void ab initio. 24. Submission is that the cancellation deed dated 7.4.1948 being a registered document is admissible in evidence and clinches the issue. It is admissible for all collateral purposes at least to establish that the Waqf was not intended. Musammat Sharifan Bibi was in occupation of the Waqf property as her personal property, her name was never recorded in the municipal record as Mutwalli till her life time. She did not take any step to register the Waqf with the Waqf Board. None of the beneficiaries have been accorded benefits under the Waqf deed. 25. All these factors are sufficient to conclude that there was no Waqf at all. Sharifan Bibi was issueless, her brother predeceased her. She was survived by her nephew Quammaruddin who had inherited the suit property in his personal capacity. After his death, the property devolved upon Nizamuddin son of Fakruddin @ Munney in his personal capacity. Naseeruddin son of Quammaruddin has not been conferred any right or interest in the suit property. He got registration of the Waqf with the Waqf Board in the year 1995 with an intention to grab the suit property. Proceeding for cancellation of registration is pending before the Waqf Board. 26. Lastly in a feeble attempt learned Senior Advocate for the respondent Nos. 9 to 11 submits that the Waqf was created in the year 1932, it was not registered with the Waqf Board within the time frame provided under the Old Waqf Act, this fact itself makes the Waqf ineffective, void and inactive. 27. Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Advocate appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 8 (in the petition) and the plaintiffs in Original Suit No. 430 of 2002 raises an objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the appellate Court to entertain the appeal. 27. Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Advocate appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 8 (in the petition) and the plaintiffs in Original Suit No. 430 of 2002 raises an objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the appellate Court to entertain the appeal. He contended that only the Waqf Tribunal has the jurisdiction to examine as to whether the suit property is a Waqf property or not, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide and declare the Waqf and look to the validity of the Waqf deed. Once a Waqf is registered, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted by express provision under Section 85 of the Waqf Act, 1995. 28. In view of the express bar created by the Act, it was not open for the appellate Court to examine the issue in hand. It is for this reason, the trial Court had refused to grant the relief of injunction to the defendants and has recorded that a declaration is required by the Waqf Board under Sections 6 and 27 of the Waqf Act, 1995 that the suit property is Waqf property. 29. In rejoinder-affidavit, Sri W.H. Khan, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner asserted that no second appeal lies against the findings recorded by the first appellate Court. Initially the petitioner filed a second appeal but had to withdraw it for the reason that it was not maintainable. These are several litigations pending between the parties in different forums/Courts and in case, the findings of the appellate Court are allowed to stand without giving right to the petitioner to challenge the same, this will seriously prejudice the interest of the petitioner/defendant No. 5. 30. There was no occasion for the petitioner/defendant No. 5 to file an appeal against the order of the trial Court, the findings regarding Waqf being in its favour. The trial Court has categorically recorded that the suit property is a Waqf property. The Waqf deed could not be said to have been cancelled by the alleged document of cancellation executed in the year 1948. Admittedly, the Waqf deed has not been cancelled by a competent Court of law. The suit property was in possession of defendant No. 4 Nizamuddin in the capacity of Mutwalli of Waqf. He himself admitted this fact in the year 1995 when he filed suits for eviction of the tenants. 31. Admittedly, the Waqf deed has not been cancelled by a competent Court of law. The suit property was in possession of defendant No. 4 Nizamuddin in the capacity of Mutwalli of Waqf. He himself admitted this fact in the year 1995 when he filed suits for eviction of the tenants. 31. The name of Sharifan Bibi was recorded as Mutwalli in the municipal records in the year 1950-55. From 1955-1960, 1962-1965 onwards name of Quammaruddin was recorded as Mutwalli whereas in 1972-89, 1989-2002 name of Dr. Nizamuddin defendant No. 4 was mutated/recorded as Mutwalli. The Khasras to establish the said facts were filed in the present suit and were duly examined by the trial Court to record a finding as to the existence of the Waqf. Merely because name of Sharifan Bibi was not reflected from 1932-1950 as Mutwalli it would not mean that the suit property was not a Waqf property. The municipal records may not be proof of title of a person in the suit property but the Waqf deed is on record and was examined by the trial Court to arrive at a categorical finding that the suit property is property of Waqf Alalaulad Musammat Sharifan Bibi created by a registered/valid Waqf deed. 32. Placing reliance upon the judgments of other High Courts in Munnir Mohammad v. Noor Mohammad and others, AIR 2003 Raj 48 and M/s Ram Mohan & Co. and another v. M/s Ganesar Ginning Co. P. Ltd. Coimbatore and others, AIR 2000 Mad 1 , it is submitted that an appeal lie only against the decree or order for which an appeal is expressly provided under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC and no appeal can be maintained against a mere finding, more so, when the decree is not based upon the finding. So far as the refusal of relief of declaration sought by the plaintiff is concerned, the petitioner in whose favour the proceedings have been ended had no occasion or reason to file a cross appeal before the first appellate Court. The refusal to cancel the sale-deed was at the instance of the plaintiffs as such cannot operate as res judicata, in an appropriate proceeding undertaken by the petitioner/defendant No. 5 for cancellation of sale-deed. The trial Court has categorically observed that such relief can be pressed by New Mutwalli or beneficiaries of the Waqf. 33. The refusal to cancel the sale-deed was at the instance of the plaintiffs as such cannot operate as res judicata, in an appropriate proceeding undertaken by the petitioner/defendant No. 5 for cancellation of sale-deed. The trial Court has categorically observed that such relief can be pressed by New Mutwalli or beneficiaries of the Waqf. 33. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The submission that the finding of the trial Court that the sale-deeds cannot be cancelled operate against the petitioner/defendant No. 5, as it has not been challenged by filing a cross appeal by the respondent and as such the petitioner cannot challenge the finding on other issues recorded by the trial Court by means of this petition, is misconceived. The reason behind is that the petitioner initially filed second appeal but he had to withdraw it on the objection raised regarding its maintainability. Further it is no longer res integra that an appeal does not lie against a mere finding for the simple reason that the code does not provide for any such appeal. (See. Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others, AIR 1974 SC 1126 ; Ramesh Chandra v. Shiv Charan Dass and others, 1990 (Supp) SCC 633). Before going into the correctness of the impugned judgment and order passed by the first appellate Court, the question raised by learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 8/plaintiffs regarding maintainability of the proceedings before the first appellate Court needs to be adjudged. 34. The question raised is whether the appellate Court could have examined the dispute raised by the appellant/defendants regarding existence of Waqf and whether the bar created by Section 85 of the Waqf Act is absolute. 35. To answer this question, the entire scheme of the Waqf Act, 1995 is to be examined. The object of Waqf Act, 1995 is to be provided better management of the Waqf and for matters connected or incidentally thereto. Section 2 provides that the Act applies to all Waqfs whether created before or after the commencement of the Act. Sections 4, 5 and 6 contained in Chapter II provides for preparation of list after preliminary survey of Waqf, publication of list of Waqf. Section 2 provides that the Act applies to all Waqfs whether created before or after the commencement of the Act. Sections 4, 5 and 6 contained in Chapter II provides for preparation of list after preliminary survey of Waqf, publication of list of Waqf. Section 6 says that in case, any question arises whether a particular property specified as Waqf property in the list of Waqf is Waqf property or not it can be only decided by the Tribunal and its decision shall be final. Section 36 deals with the registration of Waqf which provides to record description of the property, the annual income of the property, estimate of expenses, salary and allowances, the amount set apart for difference purposes. Section 37 provides for particulars which are required to be mentioned in the register of Waqf. Section 40 of the Act again says that the Board may collect information regarding any property which it has reason to believe to be Waqf property and if any question arises whether or not a particular property is Waqf property, it may, after making an enquiry decide the question. The decision of the Board may be revoked or modified by the Tribunal. Chapter VI deals with the Maintenance of Accounts of Waqf, duties of Mutwalli, alienation of the Waqf property with the sanction of the Board, the power of the Board for removal of Mutwalli etc. Section 85 says that no suit or other legal proceeding shall lie in any Civil Court, revenue Court or any other authority in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any Waqf, Waqf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by the Tribunal. 36. From a conjoined reading of these provisions, it is clear that object of the Act, 1995 is to ensure better management of the Waqf property, which has been surveyed, enlisted and registered under the Act. 37. So far as the jurisdiction of Tribunal regarding disputes under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, it is confined to the question that are specifically enumerated therein, the bar is not complete so as to extend to all other questions that may arise in relation to the wakf property. What is noteworthy is that as per Section 6(1), a suit in a Tribunal can be instituted by the Board, Mutwalli or any “person aggrieved”. What is noteworthy is that as per Section 6(1), a suit in a Tribunal can be instituted by the Board, Mutwalli or any “person aggrieved”. It further says if a question arises whether a particular property specified as Waqf property in the list of Waqf is a Waqf property or not or whether it is Shia Waqf or Sunni Waqf, a suit can be instituted before the Tribunal whose decision shall be final. Thus it would be reasonable to infer that this provision would apply with respect to the dispute relating to properties listed in the list prepared under Section 5 of the Waqf Act. 38. The question in the present case is not that whether the suit property belongs to Waqf or not, rather the question is whether with respect to the suit property, a Waqf was created under a valid Waqf deed dated 26.2.1932. 39. Section 85 of the Act also bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any legal proceeding in relation to a Waqf property. A plain reading of Section 85 of the Act would show that the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is excluded only in case “where the matter in dispute is required by or under this Act” to be determined by the Tribunal. The words “which is required or by or under this Act to be determined by the Tribunal” hold the key to the question whether or not all dispute concerning the Waqf property stand excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The bar under Section 85 is different from that what is contained in Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The express bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court even under Section 85 is also not absolute. It is limited only to the matters that are required by the Act to be determined by the Tribunal. So long as the dispute or question raised before the Civil Court does not fall within the four corners of the powers vested with the Tribunal under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit or proceeding in relation to any such question can be said to be barred. 40. So long as the dispute or question raised before the Civil Court does not fall within the four corners of the powers vested with the Tribunal under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit or proceeding in relation to any such question can be said to be barred. 40. Under the scheme of the Act, the Mutwalli of a Waqf and the Waqf Board are under obligation to manage/maintain the Waqf property so that it can be used as per the intention of the Waqif disclosed in the Waqf deed. The power and duties of the Waqf Board are provided under Act. After enumerating the duties of Mutwalli, Section 51 says that any alienation of the Waqf property contrary to what has been contained in the Waqf deed shall be void unless such alienation is made with the prior sanction of the Board. Penalty for alienation without sanction of the Waqf Board has been provided in Section 52-A. 41. There is a provision for removal of encroachment from the Waqf property etc. In case of failure of Mutwalli in discharge of his duties strictly in terms of the Act, penalties are to be imposed under Section 61 of the Act. Section 64 provides for removal of Mutwalli for various reasons/grounds enumerated therein. 42. Thus these provisions clearly show that the entire scheme of the Act is for better management of the Waqf property and the dispute, the question or other matter to any Waqf property which arises during the course of management of the Waqf property or connected or incidental thereto can only be determined by the Tribunal constituted under the Act. 43. A question which goes beyond the four corners of the Waqf Act, 1995 would not be a question to be examined by the Tribunal. Civil Court’s jurisdiction in such matter would not be barred or ousted. 44. It is well-settled that the Civil Courts have the jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those entertainment whereof is expressly or impliedly barred. The jurisdiction of Civil Courts to try suits of civil nature is very expansive. Any statute which excludes such jurisdiction is, therefore, an exception to the general rule that all disputes shall be triable by a Civil Court. Any such exception cannot be readily inferred by the Courts. The jurisdiction of Civil Courts to try suits of civil nature is very expansive. Any statute which excludes such jurisdiction is, therefore, an exception to the general rule that all disputes shall be triable by a Civil Court. Any such exception cannot be readily inferred by the Courts. The Court would lean in favour of the construction that would uphold the retention of jurisdiction of Civil Courts and shift the onus of proof to the parties that assert that Civil Court’s jurisdiction is ousted. 45. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Bal Mukund Bairwa(2), 2009 (4) SCC 299 , the Apex Court has observed in paragraphs ‘9’, ‘13’ and ‘14’ which are quoted as under : “9. The jurisdiction of a Civil Court is governed by Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as under: 9 - Courts to try all civil suits unless barred :The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” The jurisdiction of the Civil Court in terms of the aforementioned provision is a plenary one. The provision relating to bar to entertain a suit must therefore be laid down by a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. 13. The Civil Court, furthermore, being a Court of plenary jurisdiction has the jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction upon considering the averments made in the plaint but that would not mean that the plaintiff can circumvent the provisions of law in order to invest jurisdiction on the Civil Court although it otherwise may not possess. For the said purpose, the Court in given cases would be entitled to decide the question of its own jurisdiction upon arriving at a finding in regard to the existence of the jurisdictional fact. 14. It is also well-settled that there is a presumption that a Civil Court will have jurisdiction and the ouster of Civil Court’s jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. A person taking a plea contra must establish the same. Even in a case where jurisdiction of a Civil Court is sought to be barred under a statute, the Civil Court can exercise its jurisdiction in respect of some matters particularly when the statutory authority or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction.” 46. In Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) Through LRs. A person taking a plea contra must establish the same. Even in a case where jurisdiction of a Civil Court is sought to be barred under a statute, the Civil Court can exercise its jurisdiction in respect of some matters particularly when the statutory authority or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction.” 46. In Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) Through LRs. v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Waqf, 2010 (8) SCC 726 , making reference of Rajasthan SRTC (supra) it was observed in paragraph ‘13’ as under : “13. Even in cases where the statute accords finality to the orders passed by the Tribunals, the Court will have to see whether the Tribunal has the power to grant the reliefs which the Civil Courts would normally grant in suits filed before them. If the answer is in negative, exclusion of the Civil Courts jurisdiction would not be ordinarily inferred. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2), (2009) 4 SCC 299 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed : “There is a presumption that a Civil Court has jurisdiction. Ouster of Civil Court’s jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. A person taking a plea contra must establish the same. Even in a case where jurisdiction of a Civil Court is sought to be barred under a statute, the Civil Court can exercise its jurisdiction in respect of some matters particularly when the statutory authority or tribunal acts without jurisdiction.” 47. In Ramesh Gobindram (supra), the dispute was whether the question that the Waqf Tribunal can entertain and adjudicate upon a dispute regarding eviction of a tenant holding Waqf property under the Waqf Board would depend upon the scheme of the Waqf Act, 1995 and or there is an express or implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain any such dispute. The question if the Act excludes the jurisdiction of all Civil Courts and whether the exclusion is absolute and all pervasive or limited only to a particular class of disputes was also considered/addressed as an incidental question. After having gone through the entire scheme of the Act, answer given therein is that in terms of Section 85, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court shall stand excluded in relation to only such matters as are required by or under this Act to be determined by the Tribunal. 48. After having gone through the entire scheme of the Act, answer given therein is that in terms of Section 85, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court shall stand excluded in relation to only such matters as are required by or under this Act to be determined by the Tribunal. 48. The test laid down in paragraph ‘34’ is that the “the crucial question that shall have to be answered in every case where a plea regarding exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is raised is whether the Tribunal is, under the Act or the Rules, required to deal with the matter sought to be brought before a Civil Court. If it is not, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not excluded. But if the Tribunal is required to decide the matter the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would stand excluded”. 49. It is held that the Act does not provide for any proceedings before the Tribunal for determination of a dispute concerning the eviction of a tenant in occupation of the Waqf property or the rights and obligations of the lessor and the lessee in such property. The suit seeking eviction of the tenants from what is admittedly a Waqf property could, therefore, be filed only before the Civil Court and not before the Tribunal. 50. In Bhanwar Lal and another v. Rajasthan Board of Muslim Waqf and others, AIR 2014 SC 758 , it was held that in so far as the relief of cancellation of sale-deed is concerned, this is to be tried by the Civil Court for the reason that it is not covered under the Act. Moreover, relief of possession, which can be given by the Civil Court, depends upon the question as to whether the sale-deed is valid or not. Thus, the issue of sale-deed and possession being inextricably mixed with each other can only be granted by the Civil Court. So far as the suit pertaining to removal of trustees and rendition of accounts is concerned it would fall within the domain of the Tribunal. 51. Thus, the issue of sale-deed and possession being inextricably mixed with each other can only be granted by the Civil Court. So far as the suit pertaining to removal of trustees and rendition of accounts is concerned it would fall within the domain of the Tribunal. 51. In Akkode Jumayath Palli Paripalana Committee v. P.V. Ibrahim Haji and others, AIR 2013 SC 3530 , considering the view taken by the Apex Court in Ramesh Gobindram (supra) and Board of Waqf, West Bengal and another v. Anis Fatma Begum and another, 2010 (4) SCC 588, it was held that the dispute that arises for consideration therein was with regard to the management and peaceful enjoyment of the Mosque and Madrassa and the assets which relate to the Waqf. Looking to the nature of the dispute, it was held that the Waqf Tribunal had got jurisdiction to decide those disputes. 52. In Board of Waqf, West Bengal v. Anis Fatma Begum and another (supra), it was held that the dispute regarding demarcation of the Waqf property is a matter which fell under the purview of the Waqf Act, only the Waqf Tribunal has jurisdiction in such matter and not the Civil Court. 53. In view of the legal position discussed above, it is to be seen as to whether in the instant case wherein the dispute is regarding creation of the Waqf through a registered deed dated 26.2.1932 by Musammat Sharifan Bibi, the jurisdiction of Civil Court is ousted. 54. The plaintiffs pleaded that they are legal tenants of the Waqf property created by the abovenoted Waqf deed which was through out upon managed by Mutwalli as per the scheme of the Waqf deed. Two sets of defendants contested the suit. One set of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and defendant No. 4 say that the Waqf created by Smt. Sharifan Bibi was later on cancelled as she never intended to create a Waqf with respect to the suit property. The property belonged to defendant No. 4 as his personal property. He has alienated it to defendant Nos. 1 to 3 under a valid sale-deed. Thus a doubt/dispute is created regarding existence of the Waqf which is a question which cannot be said to be a question covered or incidental question to be examined under the Waqf Act. The property belonged to defendant No. 4 as his personal property. He has alienated it to defendant Nos. 1 to 3 under a valid sale-deed. Thus a doubt/dispute is created regarding existence of the Waqf which is a question which cannot be said to be a question covered or incidental question to be examined under the Waqf Act. The provisions of Waqf Act will only be applicable with the coming into existence of the Waqf. Where the question is of existence of Waqf, the Civil Court and not the Tribunal would be competent to decide as this is not a question to be examined by the Tribunal within the meaning of Section 85 of the Act. The appellate Court, therefore, cannot be said to have erred in proceeding with the matter. 55. Even otherwise, the objection regarding jurisdiction of the appellate Court has been taken by the plaintiffs who themselves approached the Civil Court for grant of relief of injunction in their favour on the plea that the suit property is Waqf property. They cannot now say that the Civil Court has erred in proceeding with the suit after they could not succeed finally. 56. Reliance placed by Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Advocate appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 8 upon the judgment of the Apex Court Haryana Waqf Board v. Mahesh Kumar, 2013 Legal Eagle (SC) 805, is misdirected. 57. Now on merits, the appellate Court has upset the findings on issue Nos. 2 and 7 recorded by the trial Court on the ground that Smt. Sharifan Bibi, the creator of Waqf had executed a registered deed dated 7.4.1948 for cancellation of the Waqf deed for the reason that the Waqf deed was an out come of fraud. It was never acted upon by the Waqif and the cancellation deed being a registered document is valid and admissible in evidence. No one had objected to the cancellation deed. Merely because Nizamuddin the then Mutwalli filed eviction suits referring him as Mutwalli it could not be concluded that the suit property was Waqf property. 58. Nizamuddin was in occupation of the suit property as his personal property and the sale-deeds were got executed by defendant Nos. 1 to 3 namely the respondent No. 9 to 11 in good faith. 59. 58. Nizamuddin was in occupation of the suit property as his personal property and the sale-deeds were got executed by defendant Nos. 1 to 3 namely the respondent No. 9 to 11 in good faith. 59. However, the appellate Court had refused to interfere in the conclusion of the trial Court that the plaintiffs being legal tenants cannot be evicted from the suit property at the instance of the defendants. The injunction was, accordingly, granted by the trial Court that the defendants shall not dispossess the plaintiff except adopting legal procedure was affirmed in appeal and it was dismissed. 60. Submission of Sri W.H. Khan, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that a valid Waqf deed cannot be cancelled by a deed of cancellation. Once the Waqf is created, the creator is divested of the property and it vests in Allahtala (God). The principle is, Once a Waqf always a Waqf. Even a Waqif cannot turn around and afterwards says that he had no intention to create a Waqf, nor can his heirs or persons deriving the title from him can say that it was pretended Waqf and that at the time of making dedication, the creator had no intention of making a real Waqf. 61. On the other hand, submission of Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent Nos. 9 to 11 is that the validity of a Waqf involves examination of a question whether there was an intention to dedicate on the part of the Waqif. Where there is evidence that a Waqfnama has been retained by the Waqif and the Waqf was never acted upon and that the property comprises therein has been dealt with by the Waqif as his own. Such evidence may led to an inference for no dedication to Waqf was ever intended. Here in this case, the Waqif was a Pardanasheen lady, she was living with her brother. Before going to “Hajj” she expressed concern to her brother regarding management of her property. Her brother got the Waqf deed registered by fraud and her signatures were obtained on the Waqf deed on mistaken fact though she never expressed her intention to create a Waqf. The Waqf deed thus is an out come of fraud played by the brother of Waqif. Her brother got the Waqf deed registered by fraud and her signatures were obtained on the Waqf deed on mistaken fact though she never expressed her intention to create a Waqf. The Waqf deed thus is an out come of fraud played by the brother of Waqif. As soon as she came to know, she cancelled the Waqf deed by a registered document of cancellation which is admissible for collateral purposes. 62. Referring to Section 186 of the Old Waqf Act, he submits the intention of the founder of the Waqf cannot be inferred from the mere declaration of Waqf nor by delivery of possession. The evidence of intention of Waqif is always admissible if the Waqf is not created by a document. However, if it is created by a document or the deed, a creator of course is always entitled to show that the Waqf was created to defraud the creditors. Importance of subsequent conduct and circumstances at the time of the execution of the Waqf deed cannot be ignored, in a case where the Waqif himself is a mutwalli and no transfer of physical possession is required. 63. Reliance is placed upon the Privy Council Judgment in Mohammad Ali Mohammad Khan v. Mt Bismillah Begam, 1930 AIR (PC) 255, wherein it was found that there was no intention of the Waqif to create Waqf rather it was created to defraud the claim of the creditors. Looking to the real intention for which the document was to be utilised it was held that the Waqif executed the deed of Waqf, but without any intention of divesting himself of his ownership of the property. His real intention was to utilise the document as a shield against claims that the appellant/creditor might have been against him either then or at any future time. This ruling is clearly distinguishable on the facts of the present case. 64. Another judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is Beli Ram v. Chaudri Mohammad Afzal, 1948 AIR (PC) 168, wherein the question arises as to whether the deed of Waqf was a mere paper transaction never intended to be acted upon. It was held that the question of validity of the Waqf involves that there was an intention to dedicate on the part of the Waqif. An effective dedication in Waqf cannot be revoked. 65. It was held that the question of validity of the Waqf involves that there was an intention to dedicate on the part of the Waqif. An effective dedication in Waqf cannot be revoked. 65. In paragraph ‘19’ of the above report, it was held that the Waqif did understand the nature of the Waqf and there was no such circumstance that the Waqfnama was executed to defraud or defeat his creators. It was, therefore, held that there was an intention on the part of the Waqif to dedicate the property to Waqf. 66. Thus it is noteworthy that the well established principle of law is that once there is an effective dedication in Waqf, it cannot be revoked even on the ground of breach of trust on the part of a trustee. The intention of the founder of a Waqf is one of the factor which is relevant in an enquiry into the existence of a valid Waqf. The intention is to be seen from the expression in the Waqf deed itself. If the intention is expressed in the deed as disputed, a party claiming that it really did not exist has to prove, the onus will lie upon him. If there was a genuine intention, the subsequent conduct of Waqif which may be due to reversal of the original intention to create Waqf is absolutely immaterial and ineffective against God in whom the property has already vested. 67. The party, if disputes, he may prove by reference to the “subsequent event” and will have to show that the subsequent conduct was influenced not by reversal of the original intention but by very non-existence of it at the time of the alleged creation of Waqf. Whether a person had particular intention or not can be proved by his own subsequent conduct but not by the subsequent conduct of another person. Once a particular property is dedicated, the right of the Waqif is extinguished for ever. The possession of the Waqif, thereafter, is only of Mutwalli, in case, the Waqif herself/himself is Mutwalli. Considering this legal position the act of Sharifan Bibi in execution of the cancellation deed dated 7.4.1948 by itself cannot be treated as sufficient to hold that she had no real intention in the beginning to create the Waqf. 68. The possession of the Waqif, thereafter, is only of Mutwalli, in case, the Waqif herself/himself is Mutwalli. Considering this legal position the act of Sharifan Bibi in execution of the cancellation deed dated 7.4.1948 by itself cannot be treated as sufficient to hold that she had no real intention in the beginning to create the Waqf. 68. The appellate Court, therefore, has committed grave error of law in holding that the Waqf deed was cancelled by a registered deed dated 7.4.1948 executed by the Waqif and, therefore, the suit property cannot be said to be Waqf property. 69. However, the subsequent circumstance of execution of the cancellation deed can be looked into to throw light on the intention of the Waqif at the time of creation of Waqf or execution of the Waqf deed. In case, the defendants are able to show that the “subsequent conduct” does not mean revocation of the intention of Waqif to create Waqf rather it is reflection of her original intention, they may be able to prove their case. It is, therefore, open for them to rely upon “subsequent conduct” of Sharifan Bibi in order to prove that she had no intention of creating Waqf at the time when she purported to create it. 70. In Anjuman Islamia through Zahur Uddin v. Latafat Ali and others, AIR 1950 ALL 109 , it is held by Division Bench of this Court that no hard and fast rule can be laid down for distinguishing between subsequent conduct influenced by the absence of intention to create Waqf and that influenced by a reversal of the intention existing in the beginning. It is difficult for the opposite party to satisfy the Court that the subsequent conduct was really the result of the absence of intention in the beginning. Relevant paragraph ‘20’ is of the report quoted as under : “20. In Zainuddin Hossain v. Abdul Rahim, AIR (20) 1933 Cal 102 : (140 IC 799), it was stated that subsequent circumstances may be looked into only if they throw any light on the intention of the waqif. According to Ebratannessa Bibi v. Sarat Chandra Sen, AIR (21) 1934 Cal 14 : (160 IC 386), the waqif’s subsequent conduct. In Zainuddin Hossain v. Abdul Rahim, AIR (20) 1933 Cal 102 : (140 IC 799), it was stated that subsequent circumstances may be looked into only if they throw any light on the intention of the waqif. According to Ebratannessa Bibi v. Sarat Chandra Sen, AIR (21) 1934 Cal 14 : (160 IC 386), the waqif’s subsequent conduct. “if it is merely in continuation of his conduct at the time and of a piece with it,” is relevant in any inquiry into the existence of intention, If the evidence is about his conduct at a time which is separated from the time of the execution of Waqf by an interval in which the intention could have undergone a change, it cannot be said that the subsequent conduct was necessarily influenced by the want of intention in the very beginning. Jonabali Sardar v. Saleha Khatun, AIR (25) 1938 Cal 257 : (177 IC 307), lays down that: “Where the intention is clear from the surrounding circumstances, it is unnecessary to look into the subsequent conduct to find out the intention.” It is stated by Amir Ali in his “Mohammedan law,” vol. I, p. 323 (1912) ; Once a particular property is dedicated, the right of the waqif is extinguished for ever. He cannot turn round and say afterwards that he had no intention of creating a Waqf, nor can his heirs or creditors, or other person deriving title from him say that it was ‘pretended’ Waqf ; that at the time of making the dedication he had no intention of making a “real” Waqf.” When Amir Ali refers to the waqifs turning round, he evidently means his revoking the intention to create Waqf. The property is not dedicated unless there was an intention to dedicate it, and, so far as this Court is concerned, possession was delivered to the mutwalli. When one is making an inquiry into the very existence of the intention, the above quoted statement has no application. So it was open to the defendants to rely upon the subsequent conduct of Wilayat Ali in order to prove that he had no intention of creating Waqf at the time when he purported to create it. They have, however, failed to refer to any such subsequent conduct as could not be attributed to a reversal of the intention. So it was open to the defendants to rely upon the subsequent conduct of Wilayat Ali in order to prove that he had no intention of creating Waqf at the time when he purported to create it. They have, however, failed to refer to any such subsequent conduct as could not be attributed to a reversal of the intention. I also think that they could rely upon the conduct of only Wilait Ali, who purported to create the Waqf; they could not rely upon the conduct of his heirs. Whether a person had a particular intention or not, can be proved by his own subsequent conduct but not by the subsequent conduct of another person. The defendants did not point out any subsequent conduct of a positive nature on the part of Wilait Ali. The defendants’ allegation that Wilait Ali made a show of creating a Waqf when he had no real intention of creating it, is one charging him with fraud and must be proved strictly. There must be evidence; it need not be direct, but it must be definite. Its place cannot be taken by surmises or suspicions. I find a total lack of evidence proving that Wilait Ali was guilty of fraud against the public. In the result I hold it as proved that Wilait Ali created a valid Waqf in January 1927.” 71. In the instant case, the opposite party have relied upon the cancellation deed dated 7.4.1948 to plead that there was no intention of Waqif to create trust in the beginning. This question has not been examined by both the Courts below. The trial Court has held that the suit property is a Waqf property on the ground that no suit for cancellation of the Waqf deed was filed by the Waqif. The cancellation deed though may be registered, the valid Waqf cannot be revoked by a cancellation deed. The appellate Court has committed a grave error of law in holding that the Waqf deed was cancelled by the Waqif by a deed which is registered document, therefore, there is no Waqf. 72. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the suit wherein these contrary findings have been arrived at, is a suit filed by the plaintiffs who are tenants and claimed injunction to save them from eviction against the purchasers on the ground that the suit property is a Waqf property. 72. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the suit wherein these contrary findings have been arrived at, is a suit filed by the plaintiffs who are tenants and claimed injunction to save them from eviction against the purchasers on the ground that the suit property is a Waqf property. The relief of cancellation of the sale-deeds was also preferred by the plaintiffs. The trial Court though recorded a finding that the suit property is a Waqf property, however, has refused to grant declaration against the defendants purchaser on the ground that they got a sale-deed under bona fie belief that the property belongs to Nizamuddin, the defendant No. 4. The defendant No. 5 namely the petitioner herein had relied upon the Waqf deed and adopted arguments of the plaintiffs to assert that the suit property was Waqf property. The trial Court rightly refused to cancel the sale-deeds at the instance of the plaintiff giving reasoning that only the Waqf Board, the Mutwalli or the persons interested in the Waqf could seek relief of cancellation of sale-deed. The plaintiffs being the tenants in the suit property had no right to seek cancellation of the sale-deeds. Issue No. 4 framed by the trial Court was, accordingly, decided. 73. On issue No. 11, for grant of relief to the defendants, it is noteworthy that the counter claim of permanent injunction sought by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was also refused on the ground that the plaintiff are in possession of the suit property legally in the capacity of tenants. The counter claim for damages of defendant No. 3 on the plea of defamation was also rejected while deciding issue No. 6 as he did not pay the requisite Court fee. The suit was thus partly decreed with the direction to the defendants not to dispossess the plaintiffs without taking recourse of due process of law. 74. Now the question remains as to what would be the effect of the findings of the trial Court on the question of existence of Waqf. It is seen that the suit for injunction has been allowed only on the ground that the plaintiffs being tenants cannot be evicted except in accordance with law, whereas the relief of cancellation of sale-deed has been refused. It is seen that the suit for injunction has been allowed only on the ground that the plaintiffs being tenants cannot be evicted except in accordance with law, whereas the relief of cancellation of sale-deed has been refused. The trial Court ultimately has concluded in favour of the defendants that they are bona fide purchasers though the suit was partly decreed in favour of the plaintiffs/tenants. The real dispute is between the petitioner namely defendant No. 5 and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 (respondent Nos. 9 to 11 herein) regarding existence of Waqif. 75. The issues raised by the defendants purchasers namely respondent Nos. 9 to 11 herein is that no valid Waqf deed is in existence and, therefore, their sale-deeds are valid. The trial Court has left it open for the New Mutwalli, the Waqf Board or the beneficiaries to challenge the sale-deed in an appropriate proceeding. 76. Looking to the pleadings of the parties and the fact that the suit ultimately had gone in favour of the defendants, it can be concluded that the findings of the trial Court against the defendants/purchasers would not operate as res judicata. The appeal was filed by the defendants purchasers for the reason that their counter claim for permanent injunction was rejected. It is settled law that a mere finding against a party in whose favour the suit has ultimately been concluded cannot operate as res judicata. This view taken by the Court finds support from the judgment of the Apex Court in Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others, AIR 1974 SC 1126 ; Ramesh Chandra v. Shiv Charan Dass and others, AIR 1990 (Supp) SCC 633, followed in M/s Ram Mohan & Co. (supra). 77. Thus while affirming the findings of the trial Court wherein it is held that the suit property is a Waqf property and the plaintiffs/respondent Nos. 1 to 8 (herein) are in legal occupation of the suit property as tenants, it is observed that the findings on issue No. 2 and 7 i.e. on the question of Waqf will not come in the way of the contesting parties namely the petitioner/defendant No. 5 and respondents/defendant Nos. 1 to 4 in any other proceedings/suit between the parties, before any other forum/Court of law. 78. 1 to 4 in any other proceedings/suit between the parties, before any other forum/Court of law. 78. Last submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the question to be answered whether the Waqf was created or revoked or cancelled require appreciation of evidence on the question of facts which cannot be done in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 79. Reliance is placed upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, 2009 (5) SCC 616 , paragraph ‘9’ (emphasis added) and Suresh Chandra Mishra v. State of U.P. and others, 2015(7) ADJ 521 , paragraph ‘27’ (emphasis added) 80. Referring to the abovenoted judgments and the pronouncements of the Apex Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 (SC) 137 and Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 (SC) 233 , it is submitted that an erroneous decision where the error is not being an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be interfered by the High Court as it cannot assume appellate power to correct any mistake of law. It may be an erroneous decision but cannot be corrected by the High Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However, where there is a question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in the procedure or any breach of any rule of natural justice, the Court can interfere. 81. This arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent that the finding of the appellate Court cannot be upturned in exercise of powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not tenable inasmuch as the Appellate Court has committed a material illegality in recording finding on the question of Waqf. If these findings are allowed to sustain, this would cause material injustice to the persons who are interested in the Waqf without adjudication of the real issue in dispute. 82. In view of the above discussion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that the appellate Court had overreached its jurisdiction in arriving at a finding that the Waqf was not in existence as it was cancelled by a registered deed of cancellation executed by the Waqif. 83. 82. In view of the above discussion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that the appellate Court had overreached its jurisdiction in arriving at a finding that the Waqf was not in existence as it was cancelled by a registered deed of cancellation executed by the Waqif. 83. This approach of the appellate Court is absolutely misguided, against the settled principles of law. 84. In order to advance the ends of justice the power under Article 227 of the constitution of India has to be invoked/exercised in the instant case. 85. With the above observations and directions, the judgment and order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 17, Allahabad in Civil Appeal No. 88 of 2004 (Manish Prakash and others v. Dr. Prabhu Saran Rajvedi and others) is set aside. The petition is allowed.