JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. The petitioner is a District Panchayat, a local statutory body is challenging the legality, validity and propriety of the award dated 10.8.2004 passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Bhavnagar in Reference (LCB) Case No.370 of 1990 by way of the present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. The brief facts are as under: 2.1 The petitioner is a statutory body duly constituted under the provisions of Gujarat Panchayat Act and in its discharge of its statutory obligations, the persons were being employed on permanent as well as temporary or in case of contingency on a daily rated basis. The respondent-workman herein was engaged as a daily wager purely on a adhoc basis and his tenure was depending upon requirement of work and resultantly when the respondent was engaged in 1984, the days on which his work was in demand, he was assigned the work. The respondent was working for few days in the year 1984-85 and he worked upto the year 1986 only. To demonstrate as to how many days the respondent-workman has worked, the chart is produced which was also produced before the Labour Court which indicates that in none of the years, the respondent has worked for more than a period of 240 days in a year. The details which are provided on record indicate that he was assigned the work depending upon the exigency and was purely as a daily rated employee. From May, 1987, the respondent had not worked and subsequently after almost a period of more than three years, the respondent raised industrial dispute by asserting his claim that he has continuously worked in 1984-85 and has been discontinued without any cause in May, 1987 and it was also asserted that he has completed long tenure and was illegally discontinued from services and therefore it appears that in June, 1990, an industrial dispute came to be raised which was ultimately referred to the Labour Court for its adjudication. To summarize, the dispute was precisely raised that without any procedure in May, 1987 the respondent has been discontinued which has violated the statutory provisions contained under Sections 25(F)(G) and (H) and ultimately claimed to be reinstated with full back wages and other incidental benefits. To summarize, the dispute was precisely raised that without any procedure in May, 1987 the respondent has been discontinued which has violated the statutory provisions contained under Sections 25(F)(G) and (H) and ultimately claimed to be reinstated with full back wages and other incidental benefits. 2.2 In the said industrial dispute vide Exh.3 a claim statement came to be submitted by respondent contending that he has completed a tenure of five years service continuously and as per the Government resolutions he is entitled to have benefits as are available to the permanent employees. It was also contended that he has drawing a monthly salary of Rs.400/- and has been discontinued with effect from May, 1987 without any just reason, without any notice pay nor was paid any retrenchment compensation and therefore has contended that in view of the fact that the petitioner establishment has violated the provisions contained under Sections 25(F)(G) and (H) of the Industrial Disputes Act `the Act for short) requested to reinstate with all consequential benefits. 2.3 Upon receipt of the said claim statement submitted by the respondent herein, the present petitioner Panchayat has filed its reply at Exh.4 inter alia contending that he was not working as a permanent employee nor has completed five years tenure. He was merely working as a daily rated employee and has never completed 240 days in a year and therefore mainly it has been contended that in view of provisions of Sections 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, such discontinuance cannot be treated as retrenchment merely and therefore there is no question of violation of Sections 25(F)(G) and (H) and since there is no retrenchment in view of the aforesaid definition, the respondent is not entitled to seek any relief. 2.4 During the course of adjudication, the respondent-workman had filed a list of documents at Exh.6 and the petitioner Panchayat has submitted documentary evidence vide Exh.7 and so far as oral evidence is concerned, the deposition of workman is at Exh.8 and one witness on behalf of the petitioner was examined is Mr.Gunvantrai Rathod vide Exh.14 and after leading these documentary and oral evidence, the closing pursis have been submitted by both the sides vide Exhs.18 and 13 respectively. 2.5 After considering this evidence on record and after hearing the parties, the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court on 10.8.2004 passed an award and partially allowed the claim of the respondent, whereby the petitioner was ordered to reinstate the respondent on his original post with continuity and with 50% back wages with effect from 9.7.1990 and it is this award which is challenged by way of the present petition. 2.6 This petition came up for hearing before this Court, wherein on 16.12.2004 the petition came to be admitted and interim relief has been granted in terms of paragraph 6(C) subject to the compliance of the provisions of Section 17(B) of the Act, and now the matter came up for consideration before this Court for final hearing. 3. Learned advocate Mr.Munshaw appearing for the petitioner has contended mainly that the respondent herein was merely working as a daily rated employee and looking to the exigency of work, the respondent was being offered the work. It was also contended that in none of the years, respondent has completed even 240 days and for that purpose, counsel relied upon the documents attached to the petition the attendance sheet produced at Annexure `A' to the petition. 3.1 Learned counsel further contended that since the respondent has not completed 240 days in a year, there is no question of violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. In addition to it, counsel submitted that in view of the definition of retrenchment, spelt out from Section 2(oo) and 2(pp) of the Act, such discontinuance cannot be termed as retrenchment and therefore the counsel has urged that the learned Presiding Officer has not examined this aspect though specifically pointed out in its true perspective. Learned counsel further contended that respondent-workman has left the work on his own and at his convenient time has raised the industrial dispute after almost a period of around four years and therefore the counsel submitted that findings arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer is perverse and not in consonance with law and recorded and therefore the order of reinstatement and back wages is required to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel submitted that after 1998, no new daily wager has been appointed nor the respondent has even proved such aspect that after his discontinuance any new daily wager was appointed and therefore since the status of respondent was merely a daily rated employee and has not worked for even 240 days in any of the years, hence it is not open for the respondent to seek any relief as prayed for and the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer is erroneous, based upon perverse findings and as such not tenable. The learned counsel further contended that by now a passage of more than 30 years has passed on and therefore to grant such relief of reinstatement and back wages would be nothing but manifest injustice to the petitioner herein. The petitioner is a statutory local body and cannot be thrust upon a huge liability after more than a period of 30 years by now. The counsel submitted that there are several decisions whereby reinstatement and back wages award can be moulded by awarding appropriate amount of compensation and for that purpose, the learned counsel has relied upon following decisions: (1) Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division, Kota v. Mohan Lal reported in 2013 (10) Scale 431 . (2) Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation and Another v. Gitam Singh, reported in 2013 (5) SCC 136 . (3) Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation v. Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri, reported in 2013 (14) SCC 456 . These decisions relied upon will be dealt with at a later point of time in this judgment. To summarise the contention of the petitioner, award passed by the learned Presiding Officer is erroneous, perverse to the record and based upon sheer non-application of mind and such invalid award cannot be allowed to stand in the eye of law and ultimately requested the Court to grant the relief as prayed for. 4. To oppose the petition, learned advocate Mr.Mishra appearing for of the respondent-workman has submitted that undisputedly the respondent-workman has worked for almost a period of five years as a daily rated employee and therefore since this aspect has been examined by the learned Presiding Officer the finding may not be disturbed in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is categorical finding arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer about violation of Sections 25(F) and (G). Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is categorical finding arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer about violation of Sections 25(F) and (G). It would not be open for the petitioner to just take a plea that reinstatement and back wages cannot be awarded. The counsel has relied upon the decision in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, reported in 2010 (3) SCC 192 and contended that since there is a violation of statutory provision as referred to above, the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer may not be disturbed. The learned counsel has further drawn attention of this Court to the decision delivered in LPA 2290 of 2010 dated 30.12.2010 wherein the Division Bench of this Court has propounded that irrespective of any number of years the workman has undergone in the service, once there is a violation, relief has to be granted and by relying upon this decision, learned counsel has submitted not to exercise extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Learned counsel has further drawn the attention to the position of the workman namely respondent and pointed specifically that in an identical situation one workman has been reinstated namely Shri Mukesh Manilal Mandavia and was also discontinued in the similar way and the learned Presiding Officer in Reference No.290 of 1989 passed an award on 4.6.1997 whereby the reinstatement is ordered with 75% back wages. The said award stated to have been taken up to this Court wherein in Special Civil Application No.8087 of 1997 vide order dated 18.1.1997 the reinstatement is confirmed. However, in that mere relief of back wages came to be modified and restricted upto 50% of back wages and therefore relying upon this decision, learned counsel for the respondent stated that equal treatment be meted out to the respondent. However, a fact to be taken note of is that none of the side has produced the order of this Court nor any material to examine this award upon which equal treatment is claimed by the respondent. Be that as it may. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no error apparent on the face of the record, the extra ordinary jurisdiction may not be exercised. Be that as it may. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no error apparent on the face of the record, the extra ordinary jurisdiction may not be exercised. Along with the contention, a short synopsis is produced by learned counsel for the respondent attached with few decisions of various Courts including the Hon'ble Apex Court and relying upon these decisions, the counsel has submitted not to disturb the award. The said decisions are the decisions delivered in LPA No.2290 of 2010 delivered on 30.12.2010, Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak and others, reported in 2013 (139) FLR 541 , Devinder Singh v. Municipal Counsil, Sanaur, reported in 2011 (6) SCC 584 , Anoop Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No.1, Panipat (Haryana), reported in 2010 (5) SCC 497 and the decision delivered by this Court in case of Rajula Nagarpalika through Chief Officer v. Kamleshbhai Bhikhubhai Mehta, in Special Civil Application No.12519 of 2010 decided on 25.11.2014. By referring to these decisions, learned counsel submitted to dismiss the petition. No other submissions made. 5. Having heard learned advocates representing both the sides and having gone through the material on record, few facts are emerging from the record which are worth to be taken note of. 6. The record of the petition reveal that the attendance register extract produced by the petitioner Panchayat which is part of the Labour Court proceedings reflects that right from August, 1984 till July, 1986, the number of days which are mentioned in column no.3 are not exceeding in any case beyond 240 days. 7. It is also revealed from the record that there is a specific plea taken by the petitioner establishment that the reference is lodged at a belated stage and it is also disputed that prior to May, 1987, the respondent-workman has not completed five years and it was also revealed in the said reply submitted by the petitioner that there is a specific plea taken that of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act and a fact is specifically mentioned that the respondent has not completed 240 days in any of the year, but none has been dealt with in its true perspective. 8. It is also reflected from the record more particularly from the deposition of respondent-workman that he has admitted that his work would continue in monsoon season. 8. It is also reflected from the record more particularly from the deposition of respondent-workman that he has admitted that his work would continue in monsoon season. It was also pleaded that junior employees Mr.Pathan, Mr.Jani, Mr.Macwana have been continued, even after the respondent being discontinued. However, this deposition revealed that no particulars nor details with respect to these employees are adequately given. It is also revealed from his deposition that he has not applied for any job elsewhere nor has registered himself in employment exchange of District Selection Seva Mandal. It is also revealed that this respondent-workman has pleaded complete ignorance about the claim of being equally treated compared with other employees named by him. It is also appearing from bare reading of the award that while coming to the conclusion of violation of Section 25(G) as well as (H), There appears to be no explanatory, cogent reason. It is also emerging from the record that even the learned Presiding Officer appears to have accepted that the reference has been raised after almost a period of three years and while giving finding on 25(G) and (H), even Section 2(oo)(bb) has not been dealt with though specifically pressed into service. 9. A bare reading of the impugned award also suggests no reasons as to on which yardstick the learned Presiding Officer has come to a conclusion of awarding 50% back wages and that too with effect from 9.7.1990. 10. It is also emerging from the record that the plea of claiming equal treatment on the basis of same award which has been mentioned that of Mr.Mukesh Mandavia, upon inquiry of the Court none of the side is having any material either the award or the order passed by this Court dated 18.1.1997 and therefore both the learned advocates have pleaded ignorance on this issue and therefore it is not possible for this Court to examine the background of facts of said Mr.Mukesh Mandavia. 11. In view of the aforesaid state of affairs of the present proceedings, it is appearing that since 1987, the respondent workman had not worked in the petitioner establishment. He raised reference at a much belated stage and the award impugned came to be passed in 2004 and the petition has come for final disposal in the year 2016. 11. In view of the aforesaid state of affairs of the present proceedings, it is appearing that since 1987, the respondent workman had not worked in the petitioner establishment. He raised reference at a much belated stage and the award impugned came to be passed in 2004 and the petition has come for final disposal in the year 2016. This length of period is approximately more than 12 years and therefore considering this passage of time to grant an order of reinstatement with continuity and full back wages would result in manifest injustice to the petitioner. It is settled position of law that though there is no period of limitation prescribed in raising an industrial dispute, but nonetheless, belated reference would not automatically permit the respondent to claim reinstatement as a matter of right. For this purpose, the decisions which have been pointed out are worth to be considered to arrive at a just decision and therefore the same are being dealt with hereunder. 12. In case of Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with an issue related to claim of workman of reinstatement and consequential benefits on the premise of Section 25H and G being violated and upon analysing the position prevailing on record of that Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that violation of Section 25H can be inferred only if the workman establishes that he is retrenched, meaning thereby the retrenchment as defined under Section 25F must has been established. The Hon'ble Apex Court has considered that for ascertaining violation of Section 25F, G and H, the relevant provision contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) is also to be taken into consideration and for that purpose, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held like this: "7. We are of the view that the Labour Court as well as the High Court have completely misunderstood the scope of Sections 2(oo), (bb), as well as Sections 25-G and 25-H of the ID Act. The contract of employment and the terms and conditions contained therein are crucial in the application of the above mentioned provisions. The facts would clearly indicate that the respondent had worked only for 54 days in two fixed periods and on expiry of the second term his service stood automatically terminated on the basis of the contract of appointment. The contract of employment and the terms and conditions contained therein are crucial in the application of the above mentioned provisions. The facts would clearly indicate that the respondent had worked only for 54 days in two fixed periods and on expiry of the second term his service stood automatically terminated on the basis of the contract of appointment. A reference to the contract would be useful to understand the nature of appointment of the respondent. 9. The above order was signed by the respondent and, therefore, bound by the terms and conditions of the office order. The question is, whether termination of the service of the respondent on the expiry of the periods mentioned above would amount to retrenchment? Facts in this case clearly show, so found by the Labour Court itself that the respondent had not worked continuously for 240 days in a year to claim the benefit of Sections 25- F, G and 25-H of the ID Act. Therefore, the only question to be considered is whether termination of service of the respondent on the basis of the contract of appointment would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 25-H of the ID Act so as to claim reinstatement." 13. It is further held in paragraph 12 of the said judgment that Section 25(G) will apply only if the respondent establishes that there had been retrenchment. The Supreme Court having found no retrenchment in view of Section 2(oo) (bb) and has held that violation of Section 25(H) will not apply at all. The said paragraph reads as under: "12. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the respondent is entitled to the benefit of Sections 25-G and 25-H, the same are extracted herein below: "25-G. Procedure for retrenchment- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman. 25-H. Re-employment of retrenched workmen- Where any workmen are retrenched and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re-employment, and such retrenched workmen who offer themselves for re-employment shall be preference over other persons." 13.1 Here, the only distinction is that there is no written contract available on record. The fact is undisputed that respondent was merely working on daily rated employee and has worked intermittently only during the span of his tenure from 1983 to 1987 and more particularly fact is also not in dispute that he has never completed 240 days in any year and therefore when the facts on hand are clearly establishing that respondent has not worked for 240 days or more in any of the year, the question of applicability of Section 25 hardly comes into play and if Section 25F is not cogently established on record, there appears to be no violation of Sections 25H and G. Here, despite an overwhelming evidence on record, learned Presiding Officer in a casual manner held without examining crux of the issue that Section 25F is violated and while coming to this conclusion, the Labour Court has not at all examined the issue from the angle of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act and therefore the finding arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer appears to be erroneous, perverse to the record. Therefore, deserves to be interfered with. 14. In a further decision, the Apex Court in case of Gitam Singh (supra), wherein upon examination of the record, the reinstatement with continuity in service and 25% back wages award came to be converted into a compensation of Rs.50,000/-. After considering several decisions in the aforesaid decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court in granting award of reinstatement found to be erroenous and a lumpsum amount of Rs.50,000/- came to be awarded, the relevant paragraph of this direction is reproduced hereinafter. "29. In light of the above legal position and having regard to the facts of the present case, namely, the workman was engaged as daily wager on 1-3-1991 and he worked hardly for eight months from 1-3-1991 to 31- 10-1991, in our view, the Labour Court failed to exercise its judicial discretion appropriately. "29. In light of the above legal position and having regard to the facts of the present case, namely, the workman was engaged as daily wager on 1-3-1991 and he worked hardly for eight months from 1-3-1991 to 31- 10-1991, in our view, the Labour Court failed to exercise its judicial discretion appropriately. The judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court suffers from serious infirmity. The Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High court also erred in not considering the above aspect at all. The award dated 28-6-2001 directing reinstatement of the respondent with continuity of service and 25% back wages in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be sustained and has to be set aside and is set aside. In our view, compensation of Rs.50,000 by the appellant to the respondent shall meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. Such payment shall be made to the respondent within six weeks from today failing which the same will carry interest @9% per annum." 15. So far as the plea with regard to Section 2(oo) (bb) raised by the petitioner Panchayat specifically, it appears that this plea which had been raised ought to have examined in detail particularly when the same is touching to the route of controversy. In view of this definition of retrenchment contained under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, it appears from the record of the case on hand that respondent was merely a daily rated employee who has worked for few years only and had never completed 240 days in any of the year. His discontinuance cannot be as such termed as retrenchment. Learned Presiding Officer has not examined this issue and therefore the finding arrived of violation of Section 25F of the Act cannot be just and proper and it is perverse to the record. 16. Yet in another decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kripa Nanad Singh & Anr., reported in AIR 2014 SC 3653 , on the issue of back wages found that if the employee has not made any effort for a period of five years to get appointed elsewhere the same cannot be termed as waiting period and therefore not entitled to a salary for that period. v. Kripa Nanad Singh & Anr., reported in AIR 2014 SC 3653 , on the issue of back wages found that if the employee has not made any effort for a period of five years to get appointed elsewhere the same cannot be termed as waiting period and therefore not entitled to a salary for that period. Therefore in sum and substance, no work no pay principle can be made applicable if no efforts are being done by an employee to get employment and therefore paragraph 9 being relevant reproduced hereunder. "9. In the Judgment dated 31.01.2002, the first round of litigation in CWJC 16087 of 2001, the High Court had made it clear that his entitlement for salary for the period between 24.02.1986 to 16.07.1991 would depend on whether he was at fault or not to in joining any post during the period in question. His conduct speaks volumes to show that he was at fault. He waited for five years to get another posting. He had not made any representation during the said period for joining duty in any other place. His writ petition itself is after ten years of his joining duty at a place apparently of his choice. Though the order is dated 05.02.1986, he had joined duty only on 17.07.1991. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the period between 24.02.1986 to 16.07.1991 is to be treated as a compulsory waiting period. It is in fact a voluntary waiting period." 17. In the backdrop of this principle, if we see the record of the present case, it would be quite clear that no efforts are found from record that steps were initiated by the respondent employee over this much period and from 1987 even no representation is either made nor any of his efforts are reflected to get employment elsewhere. This would clearly indicate that the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court can be applied in the background of the present facts. One further fact is to be noted that it is an assertion on the part of the petitioner that no new appointments have taken place on daily rated basis. If we peruse the deposition of the respondent-workman, it has been stated by him that upto 1987, there is no material available with him that he has continuously worked. One further fact is to be noted that it is an assertion on the part of the petitioner that no new appointments have taken place on daily rated basis. If we peruse the deposition of the respondent-workman, it has been stated by him that upto 1987, there is no material available with him that he has continuously worked. It was also admitted by him that for the purpose of getting employment, he has not applied and has also not registered himself with the District Selection Seva Mandal. It was also admitted by him in his deposition at Exh.8 that he is not having any particulars to indicate that Mr.Makwana as well as other person have joined the services on which day and has admitted that there is no material or proof available with him with respect to those employees and therefore keeping this half hearted evidence of workman in mind, it prima facie transpires that the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has not attempted to examine the contentions in detail and has just opined that since there is no retrenchment compensation, every section is violated as alleged and therefore this finding on the part of the learned Presiding Officer is nothing but perverse to the record. 18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a decision reported in General Manager (P), Punjab & Sind Bank and others v. Daya Singh, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 233 `perverse' word is well defined and looking to the proposition of law on the issue, the award impugned in the petition can be said to be perverse to the record and therefore in exercise of jurisdiction, it is rather desirable to set aside the impugned award. "xxxx A perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would arrive at/ This has been held by this Court long back in Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE. Unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration the finding cannot be said to be perverse. The legal position in this behalf has been recently reiterated in Arulvelu v. State. The decision of the High Court cannot therefore be sustained." 19. Unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration the finding cannot be said to be perverse. The legal position in this behalf has been recently reiterated in Arulvelu v. State. The decision of the High Court cannot therefore be sustained." 19. In addition to this, a bare look of the statutory provisions contained under Section 25F what right is crystallized for a workman is a right of compensation. Therefore, as a natural corollary as held in one of the decisions of Apex Court, the mere fact of violation of Section 25F would not ipso facto automatically entitle the workman to get reinstatement. The Apex Court while dealing with such a situation in case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation & Anr. v. Gitam Singh, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 136 has propounded like this and relevant observations contained in Para.28 are reproduced hereinafter : "28. We may also refer to a recent decision of this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Man Singh. That was a case where the workmen, who were daily wagers during the year 1984-85, were terminated without following Section 25-F. The industrial dispute was raised after five years and although the Labour Court had awarded reinstatement of the workmen which was not interfered by the High Court, this Court set aside the award of reinstatement and ordered payment of compensation. In paragraphs 4 and 5 (pg.559) of the Report this Court held as under: "4. This Court in a catena of decisions has clearly laid down that although an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not be passed. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. 5. In view of the aforementioned legal position and the fact that the respondent workmen were engaged as "daily wagers" and they had merely worked for more than 240 days, in our considered view, relief of reinstatement cannot be said to be justified and instead, monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice." 20. In another decision of the Apex Court in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Ors. v. Kailash Narayan Sharma, reported in (2014) 16 SCC 440 also, similar proposition is reiterated. In another decision of the Apex Court in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Ors. v. Kailash Narayan Sharma, reported in (2014) 16 SCC 440 also, similar proposition is reiterated. Relevant observations are as under : "9. In last few years it has been consistently held by this Court that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature maybe appropriate. (See U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479 ; Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, (2007) 9 SCC 353 ; State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, (2007) 1 SCC 575; M.P. Admn. v. Tribhuban, (2007) 9 SCC 748 ; Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, (2008) 5 SCC 75 ; Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai, (2006) 11 SCC 684 ; GDA v. Ashok Kumar, (2008) 4 SCC 261 and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula, (2008) 1 SCC 575 ). x x x 11. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the fact that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers about 25 years back and they worked hardly for 2 or 3 years, relief of reinstatement and back wages to them cannot be said to be justified and instead monetary compensation would sub serve the ends of justice. In our considered view, the compensation of Rs. 40,000/- to each of the workmen (respondent nos. 1 to 14) shall meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. Such payment shall be made within 6 weeks from today, failing which the same shall carry interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum." 21. In yet another decision delivered by A.P. High Court in the case of Venkataiah (supra), wherein the High Court has examined the issue almost similar to this and has held that since Section 25F is not violated as workman had not completed 240 days, there is no question of award being upheld. While taking this view, the High Court of A.P. has considered the several decisions including that of Hon'ble Supreme Court and then has opined like this and therefore relevant extract contained in paragraphs 45,46 and 47 are reproduced hereunder: "45. While taking this view, the High Court of A.P. has considered the several decisions including that of Hon'ble Supreme Court and then has opined like this and therefore relevant extract contained in paragraphs 45,46 and 47 are reproduced hereunder: "45. In Tarun Kundu (supra), the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held thus: ...Law nowhere states that if a person has worked for more than 240 days in a year he is entitled to be regularised in service. Provision contained in Chapter V of the Industrial Disputes Act had been enacted merely to protect the right of workman from being illegally dismissed from service. Section 25-F of the said Act merely contemplates payment of compensation at the rate of 15 days wages per each year of completion of service, and only in that context, it has been provided that such year of completion of service shall be deemed to have been completed if a person has worked for more than 240 days in a year. Section 25 of the said Act, therefore, does not contemplate creation of any right of absorption in favour of any person. It appears that the petitioners have proceeded on a wrong premise.... (emphasis supplied). 46. Thus mere completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year cannot, by itself, form the basis for directing regularisation of services of a workman when his appointment is not in accordance with the extant rules. Section 25-F does not create any right of absorption in favour of such an employee. The Award of the Tribunal, directing reinstatement of the 1st respondent as a Group-D employee, is liable to be set aside. 47. The Award of the Tribunal is beyond the scope of the reference and, inasmuch as the 1st respondent did not complete 240 days of service within the 12 months period prior to his termination from service on 1.4.1986, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The impugned award of the Tribunal, in directing his reinstatement as Group-D employee with full back wages and protection of his seniority among the employee of Mahaboobnagar District, is quashed. It is however made clear that, in terms of the order of the petitioner dated 7.7.2000, the 1st respondent shall be entitled to continue in service as a temporary status majdoor." 22. It is however made clear that, in terms of the order of the petitioner dated 7.7.2000, the 1st respondent shall be entitled to continue in service as a temporary status majdoor." 22. In another decision in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal v. Santosh Kumar Seal and others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 773 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with a case of daily wager having been retrenched while applying Section 25F of the Act has held that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages not automatic even if termination of the employee is found to be illegal or in contravention of the procedure. In that case also, a situation was erupted that after almost a period of more than 25 years, a situation had arisen to reinstate the workman with back wages who has hardly worked for 2-3 years and therefore in such a situation when even if there was violation of Section 25F, a monetary compensation came to be awarded. The relevant paragraphs are as under: "7. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant then submitted that vide order dated 10-2-1987, the services of the workmen were not terminated but they were redeployed in the office of AE (Cables) CTX, Bhopal; the workmen, however, did not join their duty there and they abandoned their service. The Tribunal referred to the cross-examination of the appellant's witness Shri A.K.Saxena in this regard and did not find any merit in this submission. The High Court found no justification to interfere with the said finding of the Tribunal. We have no justifiable reason to take a different view on facts found by the Tribunal. 9. In the last few years it has been consistently held by this Court that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate. 10. In a recent judgment authored by one of us (R.M.Lodha,J) in Jagbir Singh v.Haryana State Agriculture Mktg.Board, the aforesaid decisions were noticed and it was stated: "7. 10. In a recent judgment authored by one of us (R.M.Lodha,J) in Jagbir Singh v.Haryana State Agriculture Mktg.Board, the aforesaid decisions were noticed and it was stated: "7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. * * * * * * * * * * 14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 7 (2008) 4 SCC 261 8 (2008) 1 SCC 575 9 (2009) 15 SCC 327 6 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee". 11. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the fact that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers about 25 years back and they worked hardly for 2 or 3 years, relief of reinstatement and back wages to them cannot be said to be justified and instead monetary compensation would subserve the ends of justice. In our considered view, the compensation of Rs. 40,000/- to each of the workmen (respondent nos. 1 to 14) shall meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. Such payment shall be made within 6 weeks from today failing which the same shall carry interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum." 23. In our considered view, the compensation of Rs. 40,000/- to each of the workmen (respondent nos. 1 to 14) shall meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. Such payment shall be made within 6 weeks from today failing which the same shall carry interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum." 23. The present situation is also attracting one another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chief Administrator, Housing Board, Haryana v. Diwan Chand, reported in 2014 (15) SCC 353 , wherein the respondent workman was not in service for a pretty long period. The award of the Labour Court was modified by substituting and awarding the compensation of Rs.1 lac and therefore the trend is that one cannot get the reinstatement back wages as a matter of right and so casually when there is a long lapse of period between discontinuance and therefore when such situation is erupting the trend is to convert the reinstatement in the order of compensation. Now, if we revert back to the facts of the present case, it is quite clear that a long lapse of 30 years period has passed and now the respondent-workman if allowed to insist for reinstatement the same would have an adverse impact on the set up of the Panchayat and to pay the idle wages of all these years would be nothing but an undue burden on public exchequer. There are several decisions mentioned above which have taken the view that no automatic reinstatement be permitted more particularly when in case on hand the present workman had a meagre intermittent tenure of service to his credit, therefore in view of such a situation the Court is of the opinion that the award in the form of present one which is challenged in the petition cannot be confirmed. 24. In view of the aforesaid background of facts, there appears to be a strong case in favour of the petitioner and the ultimate analysis of the material on record and the reasons which have been assigned by the learned Presiding Officer are not possible to be accepted. Learned advocate representing the respondent has submitted as if it is a matter of right that when there is violation of Section 25F held by the Labour Court, the workman has an absolute right to get himself to be absorbed in the service. Learned advocate representing the respondent has submitted as if it is a matter of right that when there is violation of Section 25F held by the Labour Court, the workman has an absolute right to get himself to be absorbed in the service. In fact, in reality the background of present facts suggests that there is no violation of Section 25F of the Act as undisputedly the respondent-workman has not completed even 240 days in any of the years. Therefore, when the retrenchment itself is not established, it is hardly possible to consider the so called violation of Section 25F and G of the Act. There are no particulars cogently available on record which would even remotely justify that there is some violation of Section 25F and G as well. The established legal issue which has been pin pointed by the petitioner of Section 2(oo) (bb), the learned Judge conveniently appears to have brushed aside without giving any finding or consideration to the said issue which was touching the root of the controversy. Therefore, background of these facts suggests that the judgment which have been tried to be relied upon are not possible to be made advantageous to the respondent workman. With this background in mind stated herein before, the decisions which have been relied upon are dealt with hereinafter. 25. The counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon one decision of this Court delivered on 30.12.2010 in Letters Patent Appeal No.2290 of 2010 and contended that even if there is a long lapse of time to approach the Labour Court and to raise the industrial dispute, the same may not be considered disadvantageous to the respondent. By referring to the said decision, the counsel contended that in the case on hand, even if the respondent has approached the authority after beyond a period of three years, the said factor may not come in his way. By referring to the said decision, the counsel contended that in the case on hand, even if the respondent has approached the authority after beyond a period of three years, the said factor may not come in his way. Going through the aforesaid decision referred to by the counsel, it appears that the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court had passed an order which went before the learned Single Judge in the form of writ petition and the learned Single Judge of this Court has modified the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer in which the finding with respect to violation of Section 25H came to be confirmed and in the said case which has been referred to in which there were nine employees who were dealt with in an identical manner and therefore in the background of that situation, later the Division Bench of this Court has disposed off the appeal whereas here in the case on hand, there appears to be no violation of provision of Section 25F of the Act and therefore in view of aforesaid situation, the background of facts appearing to be quite distinct in that case which has been referred and therefore the same is not applicable. 26. In another decision referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with a situation whereby it was established from the record that there was violation of Section 25F of the Act and therefore though the ratio is well respected, the background of present facts are distinct and therefore as a straight jacket formula, the same is not possible to be applied to the advantage of the respondent. The principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case referred is respected to but the background of the present facts is quite distinct wherein the respondent employee has not completed 240 days in any of the year during his tenure and of a consequence it is not established on record that there is violation of Sections 25F,G and H and therefore the judgments referred to above is of no avail to the respondent. 27. 27. Similarly, another decision came to be relied upon by the respondent workman in case of Devinder Singh (supra), in which the workman had already completed more than 240 days within the meaning of Section 25B of the I.D.Act and the Labour Court had held that the termination was illegal whereas in the case on hand, the workman had not indisputably completed 240 days in any year and therefore question of violation of Section 25F is no longer appearing and therefore since the Hon'ble Apex Court in the context of that scenario has dealt with the provision and passed the order and therefore though the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court are benevolent still however the background of facts is not permitting the Court to straightaway apply the same. 28. Yet in another decision in the case of Anoop Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the situation of violation of Section 25F of the Act and in the said case, the concerned workman had worked for more than 2 years and was discontinued without notice or pay in lieu of retrenchment compensation and the juniors were retained in the service. The establishment in which the concerned workman was working in that case, number of employees were about 400 and the workman was not a daily rated employee. In the backdrop of that situation, the Hon'ble Apex Court examined the issue related to Section 25F of the Act and then propounded that finding with respect to violation of Section 25F arrived at by the Labour Court was found to be just. In the context, the Hon'ble Apex Court was examining the issue which is quite distinct from the background of the facts of the present case. 29. In another decision delivered by this Court dated 25.11.2014 in Special Civil Application No.12519 of 2010, the Hon'ble Court was examining the case of the petitioner wherein pursuant to the direction issued by Director of Municipalities, the excess staff was ordered to be reduced and therefore services came to be terminated. In the said case, such direction issued by the Director of Municipalities which was the subject matter of challenge in yet another writ petition bearing no. In the said case, such direction issued by the Director of Municipalities which was the subject matter of challenge in yet another writ petition bearing no. Special Civil Application No.11241 of 2000 wherein the order came to be passed on 25.2.2002 and later on the discontinuance of those excess staff was the subject matter of reference being Reference No.14 of 2006. In the said case, the workman was initially engaged on daily wage basis but thereafter was made permanent and continued and was drawing a regular monthly salary as well. In the background of that situation, since the Court found that there is violation of Section 25F of the Act and therefore it was in a way justified to allow the petition. But here, if we revert back to the background of the fact of respondent-employee, it is quite clear that the respondent-workman had worked from 1983-87 intermittently admittedly less than a period of 240 days in every year and further though Section 2(oo)(bb) was specifically pressed into service, the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court appears to have not dealt with the issue. Resultantly, the conclusion arrived at of violation of Section 25F of the Act and then consequently held that the petitioner has not complied with even Section 25 H and G of the Act appears to be not correct. In this background situation, it appears that the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Court in the aforesaid decisions referred to have no bearing since the Hon'ble Court was dealing with a case in which the employee was made permanent and continued after his earlier status of daily wage employee and therefore since the facts are quite distinct, it is reflecting that the said decision may not be applied as a straight jacket formula. 30. In view of the above situation, it is quite emerging that the conclusion which was arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer is perverse, not substantiated by any material and on the contrary, the crux of the matter specifically raised before it has not been dealt with. 30. In view of the above situation, it is quite emerging that the conclusion which was arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer is perverse, not substantiated by any material and on the contrary, the crux of the matter specifically raised before it has not been dealt with. As stated above, had there been any established illegal retrenchment, the question could have been examined further but from the initial stage itself, it is appearing that there is no violation of Section 25F of the Act in view of position prevailing on record and therefore it appears that the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer is not just and proper. So far as the conclusion about violation of Section 25G and H is concerned, it is quite apparent that there seems to be no retrenchment at the behest of the petitioner and therefore question of violation of Sections 25H and G would not arise. However, since the issue related to Section 2(oo)(bb) has not been adequately dealt with by the learned Presiding Officer, it seems that the conclusion arrived at cannot be said to be sound. Essentially, Section 25H of the Act is depending upon the establishment of an issue of retrenchment and from the record it appears that such violation of Section 25F is not sounded. The question of violation of Section 25H would not arise and so far as violation of Section 25G is concerned, there seems to be no cogent or adequate material except bald desertion which cannot be said to be sufficient factor to arrive at an ultimate conclusion and therefore the background of fact indicates that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer is not germane to law. Under the normal circumstances, on the issue which has been pressed into service and not examined, the Court would have remitted the matter back to the Court below but the fact that long time has elapsed and therefore it would not be proper to send the matter back to the Court below to examine again, more particularly, when after discontinuance of 1987, more than a period of 30 years have passed and therefore the background of fact is such that the award in question since not supported by germane reasons, it appears to this Court that the relief is required to be moulded. 31. 31. From the over all background of facts, the next question comes before the Court is whether in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction, an award can be disturbed or not. It is settled position of law by now in catena of decisions that no doubt the extra ordinary jurisdiction cannot be exercised to substitute the finding but there is also an exception that if there is manifest injustice reflecting from the award and if there is a perverse finding which results in miscarriage of justice, certainly inherent jurisdiction can be exercised. There is no blanket proposition that in no circumstances, once the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has passed an award, the conclusion cannot be interfered with. A bare reading of the award coupled with the documents prevailing on record indicates that the finding arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer are perverse, not sustainable and reflect clear non-application of mind. Since the award is not supported by cogent reasons, the Court is inclined to interfere with the said award. Another circumstance is also to be taken note of is that the said discontinuance which has been alleged is of May, 1987. The said discontinuance was made the subject matter of reference after almost a period of three years by respondent workman and then the award came to be passed by the learned Presiding Officer on the basis of such laconic reasons in the year 2004 and now in the year 2016 even if some flaw is found at the instance of petitioner while dealing with respondent-workman, to order reinstatement after a lapse of more than 30 years and to award back wages as ordered to the extent of 50% is nothing but a miscarriage of justice. A public body created under the statute cannot be allowed to put to such detriment which would have an adverse bearing on public exchequer. A public body created under the statute cannot be allowed to put to such detriment which would have an adverse bearing on public exchequer. The background of fact suggests that such award of reinstatement and 50% back wages is not possible to be allowed to sustain in the eye of law, more particularly, when the respondent-workman has intermittently worked only for a period of about 3-4 years and therefore keeping these factors in mind, this Court is of the opinion that award in question is required to be modified, substituted by awarding lumpsum amount of compensation and this view is adopted in view of the fact that there is some reference though not substantiated cogently that some workmen are continued and some differential treatment is given. There appears to be some element of irregularity at the behest of petitioner in dealing with the respondent-workman but that irregularity is not fatal which would permit the respondent workman to be reinstated with 50% back wages as awarded and therefore in view of such background of facts, the Court is of the opinion that a lumpsum amount of Rs.1,10,000/- would be an adequate amount to justify the substitution of the impugned award in respect of reinstatement and 50% back wages. This opinion is formulated by this Court on the basis of recent trend on the issue so as to take such a course of action to be adopted. In recent decision delivered by the Apex Court in case of Raj Kumar v. Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, reported in (2016) 7 SCC 582 in which also the Apex Court was of the view that in lieu of reinstatement and back wages, the relief can be moulded. Para.2 of the said decision since relevant is quoted hereinafter: "2. Having regard to the period of work starting from 1984 though intermittently upto the year 1993, we are of the view that the interest of justice should be advanced in case the compensation is slightly enhanced and fixed at Rs.2,00,000/-. Therefore, it is ordered that the appellant shall be entitled to compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- and there shall be no further claim with respect to the appellant's engagement with the respondent. We make it clear that this is in addition to whatever has already been paid to the appellant. The amount shall be paid within six weeks from today." 32. Therefore, it is ordered that the appellant shall be entitled to compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- and there shall be no further claim with respect to the appellant's engagement with the respondent. We make it clear that this is in addition to whatever has already been paid to the appellant. The amount shall be paid within six weeks from today." 32. Yet in another recent decision in case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Anr., reported in 2015 AIAR (Civil) 980, the Apex Court has almost in similar situation has propounded like this and therefore, relevant extract of the said decision since profitable to quote is reproduced hereinafter : "19. On the reading of these judgments, which are discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there was no time prescribed to exercise power Under Section 10 of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of time to revive matters which had since been settled or had to become stale. We would like to refer to these judgments at this juncture. 20. As early as in 1959, this Court in the case of Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1960 1 SCR 150 pointed out that there is no limitation prescribed in making a reference of disputes to Industrial Tribunal Under Section 10(1) of the Act. At the same time, the Court also remarked that the dispute should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed. In that case, reference was made after four year of dispute having arisen. In these circumstances, this Court held that relief of reinstatement should not be given to the discharged workmen in such a belated and vague reference. 21. In that case, reference was made after four year of dispute having arisen. In these circumstances, this Court held that relief of reinstatement should not be given to the discharged workmen in such a belated and vague reference. 21. Again, in Western India Match Company Ltd.3, though upholding the reference of dispute made nearly six years after the previous refusal to make the reference, the Court observed that in exercising its discretion to make reference, the Government will take into consideration the time which had lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it in the interest of justice and industrial peace. Following observations from this judgment need to be noticed for the purposes of the present case: 8. From the words used in Section 4(k) of the Act there can be no doubt that the Legislature has left the question of making or refusing to make a reference for adjudication to the discretion of the Government. But the discretion is neither unfettered nor arbitrary for the section clearly provides that there must exist an industrial dispute as defined by the Act or such a dispute must be apprehended when the Government decides to refer it for adjudication. No reference thus can be made unless at the time when the Government decides to make it an industrial dispute between the employer and his employees either exists or is apprehended. Therefore, the expression "at any time", though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the conciliation officer has made a failure report. But the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed. In an urgent case, it can "at any time", i.e., even when such proceedings have not begun or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression "at any time" thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed. As already stated, the expression "at any time" in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. As already stated, the expression "at any time" in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. No reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance, where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence. xxx 13. It is true that where a Government reconsiders its previous decision and decides to make the reference, such a decision might cause inconvenience to the employer because the employer in the meantime might have acted on the belief that there would be no proceedings by way of adjudication of the dispute between him and his workmen. Such a consideration would, we should think, be taken into account by the Government whenever, in exercise of its discretion, it decides to reopen its previous decision as also the time which has lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it. These are matters which the Government would have to take into account while deciding whether it should reopen its former decision in the interest of justice and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its jurisdiction Under Section 4(k) of the Act. Whether the intervening period may be short or long would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and therefore, in construing the expression "at any time" in Section 4(k) it would be impossible to lay down any limits to it. 22. Again in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh,1964 1 LLJ 622, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that reference made nearly six years after the dispute amounted to inordinate, unreasonable and unjustifiable. 23. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavnkutty & Ors., 2000 2 SCC 455 , the Court cautioned that power of reference should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a mechanical fashion. It was specifically observed that power to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory limitation period. It was specifically observed that power to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory limitation period. The Court not only reiterated that the courts had power of judicial review, though to limited extent, but also made following pertinent observations on delay: 6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers Under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the Respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference Under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made Under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference In question was made. The only ground advanced by the Respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the Respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the Respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after a lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the Respondent. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after a lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the Respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. The Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power Under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question. 8. It was submitted by the Respondent that once a reference has been made Under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that is certainly subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. The High Court can exercise its powers Under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2000 (1) SCC 371 this Court observed: 24. It will be thus seen that High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal Under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in Its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in Its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference. 24. Even in Sapan Kumar Pandit 4, the Court emphasised that limitation period for making the reference is co-extensive with the existence of dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. In the facts of that case, the Court found that dispute remained alive and, therefore, reference was legally made. What is significant is that the Court in that judgment interpreted the words 'at any time' occurring in Section 10 of the Act and clarified that though these words, prima facie, indicate that there is no time limit for making the reference, but such a meaning cannot be assigned to these words and the real test is the existence of a dispute on the date of reference for adjudication. We would like to reproduce paras 8 and 9 elaborating this principle: 8. The above section is almost in tune with Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the difference between these two provisions does not relate to the points at issue in this case. Though no time limit is fixed for making the reference for a dispute for adjudication, could any State Government revive a dispute which had submerged in stupor by long lapse of time and rekindled by making a reference of it to adjudication? The words "at any time" as used in the section are prima facie indicator to a period without boundary. But such an interpretation making the power unending would be pedantic. There is inherent evidence in this Sub-section itself to indicate that the time has some circumscription. The words "where the Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended" have to be read in conjunction with the words "at any time". They are, in a way, complimentary to each other. There is inherent evidence in this Sub-section itself to indicate that the time has some circumscription. The words "where the Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended" have to be read in conjunction with the words "at any time". They are, in a way, complimentary to each other. The Government's power to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication has thus one limitation of time and that is, it can be done only so long as the dispute exists. In other words, the period envisaged by the enduring expression "at any time" terminates with the eclipse of the industrial dispute. It, therefore, means that if the dispute existed on the day when the reference was made by the Government, it is idle (sic - ideal) to ascertain the number of years which elapsed since the commencement of the dispute to determine whether the delay would have extinguished the power of the Government to make the reference. 9. Hence the real test is, was the industrial dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then the Government's power to make a reference would have extinguished. On the other hand, if the answer is in positive terms the Government could have exercised the power whatever be the range of the period which lapsed since the inception of the dispute. That apart, a decision of the Government in this regard cannot be listed (sic) on the possibility of what another party would think, whether any dispute existed or not. The section indicates that if in the opinion of the Government the dispute existed then the Government could make the reference. The only authority which can form such an opinion is the Government. If the Government decides to make the reference, there is a presumption that in the opinion of the Government, there existed such a dispute. 25. In Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, 2014 10 SCC 301 , this Court scanned through most of the available case law on the subject and emphasised that the words 'at any time' occurring in Section 10 of the Act would imply that law of limitation did not apply. 25. In Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, 2014 10 SCC 301 , this Court scanned through most of the available case law on the subject and emphasised that the words 'at any time' occurring in Section 10 of the Act would imply that law of limitation did not apply. On facts, the Court held that the State Government had rightly exercised its power and referred the dispute to Labour Court within reasonable time considering circumstances in which the Appellant therein was placed. In fact, the Court accepted the explanation for delay given by the workman in raising the dispute. In that case, it was found that there was a criminal case pending against the workman and further the Management had assured him that he would be reinstated on his acquittal. It was also noticed that even despite delay, there was no loss or unavailability of evidence due to the said delay. 26. The aforesaid case law depicts the following: (a) Law of limitation does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (b) The words 'at any time' used in Section 10 would support that there is no period of limitation in making an order of reference. (c) At the same time, the appropriate Government has to keep in mind as to whether the dispute is still existing or live dispute and has not become a stale claim and if that is so, the reference can be refused. (d) Whether dispute is alive or it has become stale/nonexistent at the time when the workman approaches the appropriate Government is an aspect which would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be any hard and fast rule regarding the time for making the order of reference. 27. If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments. At the same time, in some cases the Court did not hold the reference to be bad in law and the delay on the part of the workman in raising the dispute became the cause for moulding the relief only. On the other hand, in some other decisions, this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the reference should be refused. On the other hand, in some other decisions, this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the reference should be refused. Which parameters are to be kept in mind while taking one or the other approach needs to be discussed with some elaboration, which would include discussion on certain aspects that would be kept in mind by the courts for taking a particular view. We, thus, intend to embark on the said discussion keeping in mind the central aspect which should be the forefront, namely, whether the dispute existed at the time when the appropriate Government had to decide whether to make a reference or not or the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal to decide the same issue coming before it. 36. It is now a well recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities". 37. This principle is applied in those cases where discretionary orders of the Court are claimed, such as specific performance, permanent or temporary injunction, appointment of receiver etc. These principles are also applied in the writ petitions filed Under Articles 32 and 226 of Constitution of India. In such cases, Courts can still refuse relief where the delay on the Petitioner's part has prejudiced the Respondent even though the Petitioner might have come to Court within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act. 40. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under: An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2A of the Act. Reference is made Under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that 'any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended'. Reference is made Under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that 'any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended'. The words 'industrial dispute exists' are of paramount importance unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. Dispute or difference arises when one party make a demand and other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary pre-condition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exist. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute seized to exist. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute seized to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances discloses that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the labour authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy Under Section 2A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. Take another example. A workman approaches the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. Take another example. A workman approaches the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an 'existing dispute'. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted. 41. We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the Court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the Court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the Court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. We are of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. 42. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference Under Section 10(1) of the Act, yet it is for the 'appropriate Government' to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words 'at any time' used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the Act. The words 'at any time' used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry." 33. Therefore, in the background of aforesaid facts and circumstance prevailing on record, this Court deems it proper to adopt such a course to be adopted to grant a lumpsum compensation and the amount which has been determined is on the basis of earlier emoluments which the respondent was getting and therefore, this Court is of the opinion that relief deserves to be moulded. Hence, accordingly the proposition is accepted. 34. It is the opinion of this Court that now after almost a period of approximately 30 years to give a relief of reinstatement would disturb the set up of the petitioner and the background of fact of undisputed situation is not on the contrary permitting the Court to confirm the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer and therefore in view of settled position of law that such kind of belated awards can be substituted by awarding lumpsum compensation and therefore keeping that proposition in mind, the Court is of the opinion that if lumpsum amount as stated above is awarded to the respondent-workman, the same would meet the ends of justice. In the background of aforesaid facts and circumstances the award of the learned Presiding Officer dated 10.8.2004 is modified and lumpsum compensation to be paid to the respondent-workman to the extent of Rs.1,10,000/- and the said amount is to be paid to the respondent-workman by petitioner Panchayat within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the order. 35. The petition is disposed off in aforesaid terms. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.