JUDGMENT : Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. Jurismania is a neologism employed by Paul F. Campos to describe what the learned author called the Madness of American Law. Very recently, a jurist of repute and former Chief Justice of India, Venkatachellayya, J. has, after quoting from Prof. Robert Heron Bork's The Tempting of America, cautioned thus: "A Judge is acting where an executive officer should act. 'Shift an electric pole from this place to that place' - all this is an executive decision. 'You can't have transformers in the middle of the footpath, a train must come to a place at this point of time' - there are many judgments of this kind. Some of them are ego trips, erecting your prejudices into principles. This is where we fumble." (emphasis supplied) 2. Zany as the expression 'jurismania' sounds, it however captures the entire spirit of the litigation in this writ petition: The petitioner seeks a mandamus to the respondent Bank that it should extend a loan to the petitioner on the terms it has chosen, rather than those chosen by the Bank, the creditor. The petitioner would like to reverse the received wisdom: No man can afford to be impatient with his creditor. I may profitably quote Benjamin Disraeli, who has said "Debt is a prolific mother of folly and of crime". Here it may be folly, though not a crime. 3. Coming to the facts, the petitioner, an Educational Society, has six colleges under its management. In the course of time, as it required necessary funds to provide some infrastructure in two colleges, it approached the respondent Bank, with whom it has been all along banking, for a loan of Rupees one crore. Along with Ext. P1 application, it has submitted Ext. P2 project report as well. In reply, the respondent Bank, through Ext. P3, demanded the petitioner to produce for its verification certain documents in original. In turn, the petitioner, through Ext. P4, replied that it lost the originals of its immovable property but it had already taken steps to trace them. The petitioner, however, has undertaken to produce the certified copies of the original title deeds. 4. Later, questioning what is said to be inordinate delay by the respondent Bank, the petitioner has submitted Ext. P5 representation before the Hon'ble Minister for Co-operation, who in turn forwarded it along with his reference letter to the Joint Registrar. 5. The petitioner, however, has undertaken to produce the certified copies of the original title deeds. 4. Later, questioning what is said to be inordinate delay by the respondent Bank, the petitioner has submitted Ext. P5 representation before the Hon'ble Minister for Co-operation, who in turn forwarded it along with his reference letter to the Joint Registrar. 5. As seen from the record, while the issue was pending with the Joint Registrar, the petitioner filed WP (C) No. 1924/2015 and invited Ext. P6 judgment, through which this Court directed the Joint Registrar to take an appropriate decision on the petitioner's Ext. P5 representation. Eventually, the Joint Registrar passed Ext. P7 order directing the third respondent to process the petitioner's application in accordance with law, an innocuous order, though. 6. At any rate, soon after obtaining Ext. P7 directive from the Joint Registrar, the petitioner has, however, submitted Ext. P8 representation before the third respondent. Its efforts not bearing any fruit, the petitioner has approached this Court. 7. Having taken me through the entire record, Sri. Shyamkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the counsel on record, with zeal and enthusiasm, has submitted that though there is no definite communication from the respondent Bank either accepting or rejecting the petitioner's proposal, the petitioner has come to know that unless it produces the originals, the respondent Bank is not willing to grant the loan. 8. The learned counsel has drawn my attention to Exts. P9 and P10, which are said to be the loan agreements entered into by the third respondent with other similar societies. According to him, in those cases, the Banks have not insisted on the petitioner's producing the title deeds in the original. He has drawn my attention particularly to condition No. 14 in Ext. P9. 9. The learned counsel has submitted that Bank's refusal to grant a loan to the petitioner offends Article 14 of the Constitution for it is clearly arbitrary and discriminatory. 10. First, this Court is of the definite opinion that the petitioner has been barking up a wrong tree: writ petition is hardly the correct course the petitioner could take recourse to. Even going by the judicial dictum in Association of Milma Officers v. State of Kerala, 2015 (1) KHC 779 : ILR 2015 (1) Ker. 861 : 2015 (1) KLT 849 : 2015 (2) KLJ 410 : AIR 2015 Ker. Even going by the judicial dictum in Association of Milma Officers v. State of Kerala, 2015 (1) KHC 779 : ILR 2015 (1) Ker. 861 : 2015 (1) KLT 849 : 2015 (2) KLJ 410 : AIR 2015 Ker. 137 rendered by a learned Special Bench, there ought to be a statutory violation on the Co-operative Bank's part, so that the aggrieved could make it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a private commercial contract, I see no statutory infraction, more particularly when all that the creditor Bank has done is, insist on certain conditions to ensure a safe recovery. Thus, on the singular ground of lack of jurisdiction, this Court is inclined to dismiss the writ petition. 11. I may, in passing though, as well address the issue of discrimination or arbitrariness the respondent Bank has been accused of. It is too well established a principle of business practise to be called in question that a creditor may as well impose conditions on the debtors commensurate with their creditworthiness, as well as their past relationship. In the present instance, it is entirely in the commercial wisdom of the respondent Bank to insist that the petitioner comply with certain conditions. The Court cannot substitute the bank's commercial wisdom and policy with its own - even if it has any. Merely because some other bank has accepted the loanee's proposal on relaxed conditions, the respondent Bank's action per se cannot be termed as either discriminatory or arbitrary. Thus, on the said aspect, too, the petitioner's contention has to fail; and it has. 12. Even otherwise, through judicial interpretation, the Courts have consistently held that a cooperative society is not a State, nor is it an instrumentality of the State in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution. On the other hand, for the limited purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ becomes maintainable if there is a specific statutory infraction, as has already been observed. 13. So long as a cooperative society is neither State nor instrumentality, the question of our applying any fundamental rights 'vertically' does not arise. In the facts and circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed.