JUDGMENT & ORDER : T. Vaiphei, J. This criminal jail appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18-3-2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sonamura, West Tripura in Sessions Trial (Type-II) No. 8 of 2014 convicting the appellant U/s 326 IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and, in default thereof, to suffer another six months of rigorous imprisonment. The co-accused was, however, acquitted. 2. The facts giving rise to the appeal may be briefly noted at the outset. It is the case of the prosecution that on 2-6-2012 at 17.30 hrs, one Muklesh Miah of Khedabari (Jolaibari) village within the jurisdiction of Sonamura Police Station lodged a written ejahar to the Officer-in-Charge, Sonamura Police Station against the appellant and one other, namely, Saddam Hossain stating that on 1-6-2012 at about 7 PM, when his younger brother, namely, Samsul Haque, along with other villagers were enjoying TV programme in the verandah of the shop of one Mano Miah, the appellant with Saddam Hossain, armed with dagger, suddenly appeared thereat and struck at Samsul Haque on his belly by a dagger due to land dispute, which resulted in causing serious injuries and punctured wound on his abdomen. The victim was immediately taken to Melaghar Hospital, but was referred to GBP Hospital, Agartala the same night for better treatment. On the basis of the ejahar lodged, the police registered Sonamura P.S. Case No. 98 of 2012 dated 2-6-2012 U/s 326/307/34 IPC against the appellant and the said Saddam Hossain and took up investigation of the case. On completion of the investigation, the police charge-sheeted the appellant and the co-accused before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sonamura to stand the trial. As the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the case was committed to and placed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sonamura for trial. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, having found a prima facie case, framed the charges against the appellant and the co-accused for commission of the offences punishable U/s 326/307/34 IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty to and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to bring home the charges against the appellant and non-appellant. However, PW-12 (Mohd. Jahangir Hossain) was declared hostile. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to bring home the charges against the appellant and non-appellant. However, PW-12 (Mohd. Jahangir Hossain) was declared hostile. After conclusion of the trial, the trial court convicted and sentenced the appellant to imprisonment and acquitted the non-appellant as indicated earlier. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, this appeal has been preferred by the appellant. 3. Assailing the impugned judgment, Mr. P.K. Biswas, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, firstly, submits that he trial court has completely overlooked the glaring fact that there was inordinate delay in lodging FIR by the informant and that the explanation of the delay given by the informant in the FIR that they were busy with giving treatment to the victim is not satisfactory, more so, when the informant did not even accompany the victim to the hospitals, more so, when the police station is close by: such inordinate and unexplained delay alone is sufficient to acquit the appellant. He secondly contends that the statement of the victim (PW-11) was recorded by the IO of the case only some twelve days of the incident without explanation of the delay, but the trial court has not given any consideration to the delayed recording of the victim thereby creating serious doubt on the case of the prosecution. He maintains that the main prosecution witnesses are all partisan witnesses as they either are the near relatives of the victim or belong to the camp of the victim: in the absence of corroboration from independent witnesses, it will not be safe to sustain the conviction of the appellant. On the other hand, Mr. R.C. Debnath, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, supports the impugned judgment and submits that the trial court passed the judgment after meticulously going through the evidence on record, which does not call for the interference of this Court. According to the learned State counsel, independent witnesses like PW-8 and PW-9, who are not the relatives of the victim, have corroborated the evidence of the remaining witnesses in material particulars and the legality of the conviction of the appellant based on their evidence cannot be seriously assailed by the defense. He, therefore, strenuously urges this Court to uphold the conviction and dismiss the appeal. 4. He, therefore, strenuously urges this Court to uphold the conviction and dismiss the appeal. 4. At the outset, we proceed to refer to the statement of PW-3, who is the informant, and elder brother of PW-11 (the victim), deposed that on hearing the scream of pain of PW-11 from a place in front of the shop of Mano Miah (PW-8), he rushed to the spot and found PW-11 with bleeding injuries. On being asked by him, testified PW-3, PW-11 and others told him and others that the appellant had stabbed him (PW-11) by a dagger and then fled the place of occurrence towards the northern direction. He further deposed that he and his brother-in-law Md. Billai Miah and others shifted PW-11 to Sonamura CHC where-from he was sent to Melaghar Sub-Divisional Hospital and thence to GBP Hospital for better treatment. According to PW-3, the appellant committed the crime due to the land dispute he had with PW-11. He got the ejahar written by one Mojjafar Hossain as per his version and put his signature at the foot of the ejahar after satisfying himself about the correctness of the contents thereof. In the cross-examination, he admitted that he lodged the FIR at Sonamura PS on the following day. At this stage, it may be noted that the FIR was lodged by him at the Sonamura Police Station on 2-6-2012 at 5.30 PM though the incident occurred at about 7 PM of 1-6-2012; in fact, the police station is located about 8/9 kilometres away from the place of occurrence. What is worthy of notice is that there is a gap of twenty-two and half hours between the time of occurrence and the lodging of the FIR by PW-3 despite the location of the police station, which cannot be said to be too far. No explanation for the delay is offered by him. PW-3 firmly denied the suggestion that on the day of occurrence, he did not lodge the FIR since no eye-witness could identify the actual culprit due to darkness at the place of occurrence. What is the effect of such delay? 5. Normally, delay in lodging FIR per se is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. However, there is a rider to this proposition of law, that is, the delay has to be satisfactorily explained. What is the effect of such delay? 5. Normally, delay in lodging FIR per se is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. However, there is a rider to this proposition of law, that is, the delay has to be satisfactorily explained. What is the explanation offered for the delay of twenty-two and half hours in lodging the FIR? This was sought to be explained by the informant in the FIR towards the end of the FIR by stating that they were busy with the treatment of the victim and for taking him, firstly, to Sonamura, thence to Melaghar Sub-Divisional Hospital and thereafter to GBP Hospital, Agartala on reference. It is interesting to note that PW-3 in his statement in Court revealed that he did not accompany the injured to any hospital. He admitted in cross that he went to Sonamura CHC to see his injured brother and returned home when he was shifted to Melaghar Sub-Divisional Hospital for treatment purpose. If that is so, why he waited till 5.30 PM of the following day to lodge the FIR? The Injury Report at Ext.-7 also shows that the injured was admitted to GBP Hospital on 1-6-2012 at 10-02 PM. This means that throughout the night of 1-6-2012 up to 5.30 PM of 2-6-2012, he chose to keep silent and decided to lodge the FIR only thereafter. In our opinion, this strengthens the case of the defence that on the day of occurrence, he did not lodge the FIR since no eyewitness could identify the actual culprit due to darkness of the place of occurrence. As the victims were watching TV program at the time of the incident, it was quite possible that there was no adequate light. In any case, no attempt was made by the prosecution that there was sufficient light at the place of occurrence at the time of the incident, which took place at around 7 PM. The fact that the absence of satisfactory explanation for delayed lodging of FIR can be fatal to the case of the prosecution, has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi, (2007) 12 SCC 641 . This is what it said: "9. In criminal trial one of the cardinal principles for the court is to look for plausible explanation for the delay in lodging the report. This is what it said: "9. In criminal trial one of the cardinal principles for the court is to look for plausible explanation for the delay in lodging the report. Delay sometimes affords opportunity to the complainant to make deliberation upon the complaint and to make embellishment or even make fabrications. Delay defeats the chance of the unsoiled and untarnished version of the case to be presented before the court at the earliest instance. That is why if there is delay in either coming before the police or before the court, the courts always view the allegations with suspicion and look for satisfactory explanation. If no such satisfaction is formed, the delay is treated as fatal to the prosecution case. 10. In Thulia Kali v. State of T.N. (1972) 3 SCC 393 : 1972 SCC(Cri) 543 : AIR 1973 SCC 501 it was held that the delay in lodging the first information report quite often results in embellishment as a result of afterthought. On account of delay, the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but also danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. 11. In Ram Jag v. State of U.P. (1974) 4 SCC 201 : 1974 SCC(Cri) 370 : AIR 1974 SC 606 the position was explained that whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the seeds of the prosecution case must depend upon a variety of factors which would vary from case to case. Even a long delay can be condoned if the witnesses have no motive for implicating the accused and/or when plausible explanation is offered for the same. On the other hand, prompt filing of the report is not an unmistakable guarantee of the truthfulness or authenticity of the version of the prosecution." 6. Be that as it may, let us also examine as to whether there are sufficient evidence to prove the case of the prosecution. Coming now to the deposition of PW 11, who is the injured, he testified that about three years earlier, one Friday at about 1 PM after offering 'Namaj', he had an altercation with the appellant, who happened to be his nephew, over their land dispute and on the intervention of his elder brothers, the dispute was temporarily settled. Coming now to the deposition of PW 11, who is the injured, he testified that about three years earlier, one Friday at about 1 PM after offering 'Namaj', he had an altercation with the appellant, who happened to be his nephew, over their land dispute and on the intervention of his elder brothers, the dispute was temporarily settled. He further testified that on the same day at about 7 PM, he went to the shop of Mano Miah (PW-8) at Jolaibari and was enjoying TV programme with his co-villagers by sitting in front of the said shop and all of a sudden, the appellant and the non-appellant appeared there and then the appellant stabbed him by a dagger on the right side of his belly which caused him serious cut and punctured injuries and screamed with pain. He deposed that after assaulting him, the appellant and the non-appellant fled from the place of occurrence to different directions. According to PW-11, the non-appellant is the brother-in-law of the appellant; that after the incident, all the people present there became alarmed, while his brothers rushed to the PO on hearing his cry and that he was subsequently shifted to Sonamura Hospital by a Maruti car where he was given 3 stitches on his wound by the Medical Officer. He went on to depose that on the same day, he was referred to Melaghar Sub-Divisional Hospital where the Medical Officer therein gave another stitch on his belly and referred him to GBP Hospital, Agartala for better treatment where he was admitted and was discharged after 12 days. One thing is clear: PW-11, in his examination-in- chief, did not make any whisper of statement to the effect that he ever disclosed to PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-8, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-12 that the appellant had stabbed him by a dagger and then took to his heels towards the northern direction. 7. Therefore, to reassure ourselves that the version of the victim is not incorrect, we proceed to examine the depositions of PW-4, PW-5, PW-8, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-12, who were also alleged to have been at the place of occurrence at or just after the stabbing incident. 7. Therefore, to reassure ourselves that the version of the victim is not incorrect, we proceed to examine the depositions of PW-4, PW-5, PW-8, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-12, who were also alleged to have been at the place of occurrence at or just after the stabbing incident. PW-4 is also the elder brother of the victim (PW-11) and seeks to corroborate the evidence of PW-3 by testifying that at about 7 PM, he heard the PW-11 screaming from the direction of the shop of PW-8 whereupon he rushed to the spot where he found the victim with bleeding injury on his abdomen lying on the ground in front of the shop of PW-8. He deposed that PW-11 told him that the appellant had stabbed him by a dagger where after they shifted him to Sonamura CHC, where after he was shifted to Melaghar Sub-Divisional Hospital for better treatment, but was eventually referred to GBP Hospital, Agartala where he was admitted for a period of more than one month. This then takes us to the statement of PW-5, who is also the elder brother of PW-11. This witness also seeks to corroborate the testimony of PW-11 by stating that at about 7 PM of the fateful day, he heard the shrieking sound of his brother coming from the direction of the shop of PW-8 and when he rushed there, he found PW-11 pressing a part of his abdomen by his palm and also saw blood oozing out from that place. He also testified that PW-11 told him that the appellant stabbed him by a dagger and fled from the scene of occurrence. 8. PW-8 is the owner of the shop where the alleged stabbing incident took place. He also testified that on the date of occurrence at about 7 PM, while he was busy attending to his customer, he heard PW-11 suddenly screaming with pain and uttering the words that the appellant had stabbed him by a dagger and was at the same time pressing a part of his belly with his palm and saw blood oozing out from that part of his body. He identified the appellant to be the nephew of the victim and deposed that the victim ran out of his shop and in the course of which he hit one boiling pot belonging to his shop. He identified the appellant to be the nephew of the victim and deposed that the victim ran out of his shop and in the course of which he hit one boiling pot belonging to his shop. PW-9 also seeks to corroborate the story of PW-11 by stating that at about 7 PM, he heard the scream of pain coming from the direction of the tea stall of PW-8 and on rushing to the spot, he saw PW-11 shouting and uttering that the appellant had stabbed him by a dagger by pressing a part of his belly by palms. He went on to testify that they shifted PW-11 to hospital by a vehicle. PW-10 testified that he had gone to the shop of PW-8 to have a cup of tea; that the victim was sitting on a stool behind him and all of a sudden started screaming with pain by uttering that the appellant had stabbed him by a knife where after he was sent to hospital by a vehicle. In his cross-examination, he, however, disclosed that he was never examined by the IO of the case in connection with this case. Therefore, the aforesaid statements are made for the first time in Court; he was never examined by the IO of the case during investigation. He seeks to corroborate the evidence of PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-8 and PW-9 to the extent that he heard the victim telling that the appellant had stabbed him by a dagger and found him howling in pain while pressing a part of his belly by palms. 9. This then takes us to the testimony of PW-12, who deposed that on the day of occurrence at about 7/7.30 PM, while he was returning home from the shop of PW-8 at Jolaibari, he heard the scream of pain coming from his back side at a distance of about 300 cubits whereupon he returned to the shop and found a large gathering thereat. According to this witness, at that time, he came to learn from his brothers and family members of PW-11 that the appellant had stabbed PW-11 by a dagger, but he did not see the appellant at the place of occurrence. It was after he stated that he did not see the appellant at the place of occurrence that he was declared hostile permitting the prosecution to cross-examine him. It was after he stated that he did not see the appellant at the place of occurrence that he was declared hostile permitting the prosecution to cross-examine him. On closer scrutiny of the evidence of PW-3, P-4, PW-5, PW-8, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-12, the common thread which runs through their respective statements is that all of them claimed to have heard the victim disclosing to them just after the incident that it was none but the appellant who stabbed him on his belly by a dagger. As already noticed, PW-11 never stated in his evidence that he told PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-8, PW-9, PW-12 that it was the appellant who stabbed him by a dagger. It may be noted that the statement of PW-11 was recorded by the IO of the case (PW-13) only on 13-6-2012 as revealed by him: he admitted that he did not make any attempt to meet the victim at GBP Hospital to examine him. PW-11 himself admitted in his cross-examination that the police recorded his statement on the following day of his discharge from GBP Hospital, Agartala and that no police officer ever met him at the hospital during his treatment as injured patient. The Medical Officer (PW-14) deposed that PW-11 was discharged on 12-6-2016. In fact, PW-13 admitted that he never recorded the statement of PW-3 (the informant) as he narrated the same story mentioned by him in the FIR. 10. Apart from delayed lodging of FIR, as already noticed, the IO of the case (PW-13) in his cross-examination admitted in his cross-examination that during investigation, he did not make any attempt to meet the victim at GBP Hospital, Agartala to examine him; he recorded the statement of PW-11 only on 13-6-2012 i.e. some 12 days after the stabbing incident. It is not the case of the prosecution that PW-13 was not aware of the fact that PW-11 was admitted to GBP Hospital for the stabbing injury nor is it their case that the victim was not in a position to make a statement; in fact, PW-14 deposed that the victim was conscious when he was admitted to the Hospital. It is not the case of the prosecution that PW-13 was not aware of the fact that PW-11 was admitted to GBP Hospital for the stabbing injury nor is it their case that the victim was not in a position to make a statement; in fact, PW-14 deposed that the victim was conscious when he was admitted to the Hospital. In fact, the two unexplained delays, namely, delay in lodging the FIR and the delay in recording the statement of PW-11 i.e. the victim, have probablized the case of the defence that the FIR was not lodged as no eyewitness could identify the actual culprit due to darkness at place of occurrence. On the contrary, such unexplained delayed lodging of FIR and delaying recording of the statement of PW-11 coupled with the absence of any statement made by PW-11 that he told PW-3, PW-4, PW-8, PW-9, PW- 10 and PW-12 that he was assaulted by the appellant with a dagger strengthen the case of the defence that PW-11 was unable to establish the identity of the assailant when he was stabbed with a dagger. To what extent, delayed recording the statement of a witness can be fatal to the case of the prosecution once again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Sheo Shankar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 3 SCC 654 . The Apex Court therein observed: "66. The legal position is well settled that mere delay in the examination of a particular witness does not, as a rule of universal application, render the prosecution case suspect. It depends upon the circumstances of the case and the nature of the offence that is being investigated. It would also depend upon the availability of information by which the investigating officer could reach the witness and examine him. It would also depend upon the explanation, if any, which the investigating officer may offer for the delay. It depends upon the circumstances of the case and the nature of the offence that is being investigated. It would also depend upon the availability of information by which the investigating officer could reach the witness and examine him. It would also depend upon the explanation, if any, which the investigating officer may offer for the delay. In a case where the investigating officer has reasons to believe that a particular witness is an eyewitness to the occurrence but he does not examine him without any possible explanation for any such omission, the delay may assume importance and require the court to closely scrutinise and evaluate the version of the witness but in a case where the investigating officer had no such information about any particular individual being an eyewitness to the occurrence, mere delay in examining such a witness would not ipso facto render the testimony of the witness suspect or affect the prosecution version. (Underlined for emphasis) 11. That apart, it was only the victim who claimed to have seen the appellant stabbing him with a dagger, whereas no other witnesses claimed to have seen the appellant stabbing the victim with the dagger. The only evidence by which the appellant is sought to be convicted is the evidence of PW-3, PW-4, PW-8, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-12 who testified that the victim told them that it was the appellant who stabbed him with a dagger. Now, the version of PW-11 itself has been become suspect for the reason already noticed earlier. If, as projected by the prosecution, the victim could really identify his assailant immediately, what prevented PW-3 from filing the FIR on the same night on the disclosure made to him by PW-11 that he was stabbed by the appellant with a dagger? One piece of unreliable evidence cannot be used to corroborate another piece of unreliable evidence. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. It is also interesting to note that the village is divided between two rival groups, one belonging to the victim and the other belonging to appellant group. It cannot be overlooked that PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-6 and PW-7 are admittedly the near relatives of the victim, whereas PW-12 has turned hostile. True, there is no rule of presumption that the evidence of a related witness will always be interested one or that such witness will have only a hostile attitude towards the accused facing trial. The legal position in this field is reiterated by the Apex Court in Seeman v. State, (2005) 11 SCC 142 in the following manner: "4. It is now well settled that the evidence of witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is a related witness or the sole witness, or both, if otherwise the same is found credible. The witness could be a relative but that does not mean to reject his statement in totality. In such a case, it is the paramount duty of the court to be more careful in the matter of scrutiny of evidence of the interested witness, and if, on such scrutiny it is found that the evidence on record of such interested sole witness is worth credence, the same would not be discarded merely on the ground that the witness is an interested witness. Caution is to be applied by the court while scrutinising the evidence of the interested sole witness. The prosecution's non-production of one independent witness who has been named in the FIR by itself cannot be taken to be a circumstance to discredit the evidence of the interested witness and disbelieve the prosecution case. It is well settled that it is the quality of the evidence and not the quantity of the evidence which is required to be judged by the court to place credence on the statement." 12. In the instant case, the appellant was alleged to have attacked PW-11 with a dagger. The FIR was not lodged immediately though the police station is located nearby. In the instant case, the appellant was alleged to have attacked PW-11 with a dagger. The FIR was not lodged immediately though the police station is located nearby. The statement of PW-13 confirmed that no the dagger alleged to have been used in assaulting the victim was ever seized from the appellant. As already noticed, the possibility of all the prosecution witnesses reaching the scene of occurrence just after the incident on hearing the scream of pain of the victim are simply invented to corroborate the version of the informant. On the other hand, whatever testimony given by PW-10 is first time statement in court and cannot be believed in the absence of corroboration from a reliable witness. PW-8 did not see the incident, but like other prosecution witnesses, he claimed to have heard the victim uttering the words that the appellant had stabbed him by a dagger. As already noticed, the unreliable statement of PW-11 cannot be corroborated by an equally unreliable statement of PW-8. Similarly, the unreliable statement of PW-8 cannot be corroborated an equally unreliable statement of PW-10. In light of our above findings, the unexplained long delay of about 22 hours in registering the FIR and the inordinate delay of about 13 days in recording the statement of PW-11 (the victim), therefore, rendered the story of the prosecution doubtful. One more aspect about the significance of delay in this case is that there is past enmity between the victim side and that of the appellant. This is admitted by PW-8, who in his testimony, admitted that long before the incident, an incident of scuffling and physical assault had taken place in their village between one group belonging to the appellant and the other belonging to the victim. Similarly, PW-4 in his evidence disclosed that there was land dispute between the brother of the victim and the appellant. Delay in lodging FIR has great importance when enmity between the parties stands admitted.-See Om Prakash v. State of UP, (2008) 17 SCC 249 . Thus, when this case is conspicuous by the existence of delayed lodging of FIR and delayed recording of the statement of the victim (PW-11) without satisfactory explanation by the prosecution, the possibility that a false FIR was lodged by the informant against appellant due to previous enmity. Thus, when this case is conspicuous by the existence of delayed lodging of FIR and delayed recording of the statement of the victim (PW-11) without satisfactory explanation by the prosecution, the possibility that a false FIR was lodged by the informant against appellant due to previous enmity. In fairness, however, it can still be said that the appellant might have been the real culprit, but when there is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, we cannot simply convict him; to do so would result in grave miscarriage of justice. After all, in a criminal jurisprudence, there is a long distance to travel between "may be" and "must be". We are not oblivious of the fact that the sentiment of the victim and his relatives would be hurt by this reversal of conviction, but then this Court cannot return a verdict of guilt when the prosecution is unable to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As there is reasonable doubt in the story of the prosecution about the guilt of the appellant, he must, therefore, get the benefit of doubt. In the view that we have taken, it is difficult to sustain the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court. 13. The result of the foregoing discussion is that we allow this appeal by extending the benefit of doubt to him. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sonamura, West Tripura Judicial District in Sessions Trial (Type-II) No. 8 of 2014 is, therefore, set aside. The appellant is, accordingly, set at liberty forthwith unless he is required in connection with some other case. Transit the L.C. record forthwith.