JUDGMENT : (PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI) 1. This appeal is filed by the original accused challenging the judgment of learned Sessions Judge dated 26.7.2012. 2. Prosecution case in brief is that deceased Rupali was residing with her husband and three children at Anjar. They lived in a joint family with the younger and elder brothers of the husband. On 9.4.2008, there was a quarrel between the husband and wife. The brothers of husband were also instigating the husband. Accused no.1 Janakbhai Ramjibhai, husband of the deceased, poured kerosene over Rupali when the other two accused caught her. Accused no.3 then lit a matchstick and set her on fire. She was rushed to the hospital where she died at about 8:30 the next morning. The husband and other inlaws had also in the past harassed and troubled the woman. Charge was framed at exh.2 against all the accused for having committed offence punishable under section 302 of the IPC as well section 498A of the IPC. 3. The prosecution case relies mainly on two dying declarations, one oral and another written, made by the deceased. First one was orally made to Dr. Abhishek Kiritbhai Shah, PW1, exh.6/C. Second dying declaration was made to the Executive Magistrate Shri Pranshankar Amrutlal Raval, PW16, exh. 97/C, which was reduced in writing and on which the thumb impression of the deceased was also obtained. This dying declaration was produced at exh.99. The prosecution relies on various corroborative pieces of evidence, which we would notice as we go along recording the summary of evidence. However, it may be noted that this case relies primarily on the genuineness and reliability of the said dying declarations. 4. Dr. Abhishek Kiritbhai Shah, PW1, exh.6/C, was on emergency duty at the Community Health Centre, Anjar. According to him, at about quarter to 11 on 9.4.2008, Rupali was brought to the hospital with 90% burns. She told him that she had been burnt by her husband and two brothers-in-law. The husband poured kerosene on her and his elder brother set her on fire with a matchstick. Doctor thereupon informed the police and started the treatment. When the Deputy Mamlatdar came for recording the dying declaration, he had given a certificate that Rupali was conscious and was able to give her statement. He also identified his signature on the bottom of the dying declaration. Doctor thereupon informed the police and started the treatment. When the Deputy Mamlatdar came for recording the dying declaration, he had given a certificate that Rupali was conscious and was able to give her statement. He also identified his signature on the bottom of the dying declaration. He was also present when Rupali had given her version in presence of senior doctor Shri Hitesh Thakkar. This statement made by Rupali to Dr. Hitesh Thakkar was recorded on a mobile video. In this statement also, Rupali had implicated her husband and his brothers. This doctor had also treated Pradeep, minor son of Rupali who had received minor injuries on the shoulder. He had also participated in the postmortem. The postmortem note was produced at exh.22 in which the cause of death was shown as neurological shock and vascular shock following extensive burns (90%). This witness was subjected to lengthy cross examination, principally, on three aspects of the matter namely, whether the patient was conscious and in a position to give a statement before the Executive Magistrate, whether there was any negligence in treating the patient and whether the alleged dying declarations were actually and voluntarily made by the deceased. He denied all suggestions of the defence. In particular, he denied the suggestion to the effect that the patient was not given proper medical treatment. He was also questioned on an endorsement made by him on the police Yadi exh.10 in which he had certified that the patient was not conscious and was not in a state to make any statement. He clarified that this endorsement was made at 1 O' clock. 5. Dr. Leenaben Kantibhai Chauhan, PW2, exh.30, was the medical officer at CHC, Medarda. She had treated accused no.1 on 10.4.2008 at night for minor burns on his palm and left knee. She was also part of panel of two doctors who had carried out the postmortem. 11.11.2016 She gave the detailed procedure carried out during such postmortem. She stated that the death occurred due to 90% burns received by the patient. This doctor was also cross examined on the question of medical negligence in treating the patient. Such suggestions were denied. 6. Dr. Hiteshbhai Dineshbhai Thakkar, PW17, exh.108/C, was the Medical Superintendent, Community Health Centre, Anjar at the relevant time. She stated that the death occurred due to 90% burns received by the patient. This doctor was also cross examined on the question of medical negligence in treating the patient. Such suggestions were denied. 6. Dr. Hiteshbhai Dineshbhai Thakkar, PW17, exh.108/C, was the Medical Superintendent, Community Health Centre, Anjar at the relevant time. He deposed that on 9.4.2008, when he was at home, he received a phone call from the referral hospital regarding a burn patient. He therefore, went for hospital for treatment. He had examined the patient during which time she was screaming for help and giving the name of her husband's elder brother and two other names making allegations against them. He however, did not remember those names. He had recorded this on his mobile phone and out of which the hospital clerk Yogesh Thakkar had prepared a CD which was handed over to the police. This witness was also cross examined on the question of defective and insufficient medical treatment. He was also crossed on the videography suggesting that the witness had not videographed such instances in the past. 7. Manguben Kalabhai Mohanbahi, PW3, exh.42, was the mother of the deceased girl. She deposed that her daughter Rupali had come to Mumbai last year because her husband had driven her out and stayed with her for about four months. The husband had kept the children with him. With the intervention of members of the community she sent her daughter back to her matrimonial home. Her husband's elder and younger brothers were residing together with her family. They all used to quarrel with her and torture her. After the incident of burning, Rupali's husband Janak had come to Gandhidham at about 1 O' clock and told her that Rupali has poured little bit of kerosene over her and she got burnt but she is otherwise, alright. She reached to the Government hospital at about 2:30. Her daughter had given her statement in the hospital. This chief examination was recorded on 11.2.2009. No sooner did the cross examination begin, after only a few questions, further cross examination was adjourned on an adjournment application exh.44. The cross examination resumed on 23.3.2009 and once again after only one question by the advocate of the accused no.1, it was adjourned on the basis of adjournment application exh.48. Further cross examination resumed only on 15.6.2009. No sooner did the cross examination begin, after only a few questions, further cross examination was adjourned on an adjournment application exh.44. The cross examination resumed on 23.3.2009 and once again after only one question by the advocate of the accused no.1, it was adjourned on the basis of adjournment application exh.48. Further cross examination resumed only on 15.6.2009. Intrigued by such frequent and long adjournments, after the examination-in-chief was recorded in full and even the cross examination had begun, we tried to locate the original applications for adjournment. Interestingly, the adjournment application exh.44 is dated 12.2.2009, though the examination-in-chief and the adjournment, both were dated 11.2.2009. In this adjournment application, it was stated by the advocates for the accused no.1 and 3 that the complainant has given her examination-in-chief but few necessary information is not yet obtained from the accused especially accused no.1 who is not present and therefore, one date may be granted. Interestingly, we find a pursis exh.41 also dated 12.2.2009 in which the advocate for accused no.1 had declared that the said accused was not present due to illness. However, he has no objection if the trial is conducted in his absence. More interesting are the contents of application exh.48 dated 23.3.2009 which was filed by the complainant Manguben stating that since talks of settlement are going on between the parties, the trial may be adjourned. More interestingly, this application was presented by APP in charge of the trial. In fact, the record further reveals that between the two said dates also trial had come up on 25.2.2009 when the complainant gave an application exh.45 for adjournment stating that she is unwell. Even after adjournment of 23.3.2009, several adjournments were granted for some reason or the other and eventually the cross examination was conducted on 15.6.2009. In the cross examination, witness substantially changed her position from that in the original examination-in-chief. She made two significant changes. One, she virtually withdrew all the accusations against the son-in-law ill-treating her daughter. Second, she stated that the brothers of the husband resided separately. This shift in the stand by the witness and the adjournments noted above are closely connected and present a sorry and painful state of affairs. To this aspect of the matter, we would refer at a later stage while appreciating the evidence. 8. Second, she stated that the brothers of the husband resided separately. This shift in the stand by the witness and the adjournments noted above are closely connected and present a sorry and painful state of affairs. To this aspect of the matter, we would refer at a later stage while appreciating the evidence. 8. Dying declaration of the lady was recorded by Pranshankar Amrutlal Raval, PW16, exh.97/C. He was the Deputy Mamlatdar, Anjar at the relevant time. On 9.4.2008, at about 12 O' clock, he received a police Yadi for recording dying declaration. Upon reaching the Community Health Centre at about 12:15, he recorded her dying declaration between 00:24 hours to 00:45 hours. Rupali told him that on that day since morning there were quarrels. Her husband Janak had poured kerosene over her and his brothers had caught her. Gopal the elder brother had set her on fire with a matchstick. They were instigating her husband. He had obtained the thumb impression of the patient. Before recording the dying declaration, he had verified with the doctor that the patient was completely conscious. In token thereof, the doctor had also put his signature. He produced Yadi at exh.98 and dying declaration at exh.99. In the dying declaration, the Executive Magistrate had asked the patient about her name, age, caste and address. He then asked about the incident to which she stated that she was residing in Janta colony. Since morning there were quarrels in the house. Her husband poured kerosene over her. His brothers Gopal and Vinod had caught her. Gopal had then set her on fire with the matchstick. These people were instigating her husband since morning. They resided in a joint family. The incident took place at her house. The dying declaration contains the certificate of the doctor that Rupali Parmar was completely conscious and was in a position to give her dying declaration. This dying declaration at the end contains a left hand thumb impression of Rupali, signature of the Medical Officer Dr. Abhishek Kiritbhai Shah, PW1 and that of the Executive Magistrate. This witness was also subjected to lengthy cross examination during which the witness reiterated that Rupali was in a conscious state and was able to give audible answers. He was also questioned about the time consumed in recording the dying declaration. Abhishek Kiritbhai Shah, PW1 and that of the Executive Magistrate. This witness was also subjected to lengthy cross examination during which the witness reiterated that Rupali was in a conscious state and was able to give audible answers. He was also questioned about the time consumed in recording the dying declaration. It was suggested that since the patient was unable to speak clearly, recording of the dying declaration took 21 minutes. 9. Panchnama of the scene of incident was produced at exh.58. Though the panch witness Arvind Chandulal Solanki PW4, exh.57/C, turned hostile, he did not dispute his signature in the panchnama. Under this panchnama, the investigating agency also collected the burnt clothes of the deceased lying on the floor. These articles were sent for forensic analysis. The report at exh.152 recorded presence of petroleum hydrocarbon in the clothes of the deceased lady. 10. This in the nutshell is the evidence on record. 11. On the basis of such evidence, learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that : (1) The dying declarations were not reliable. The version of one of the declaration being recorded and being videographed is highly unbelievable. In any case, there is no proof of genuineness of such videography eliminating any doubt about tampering. The fact that it took 21 minutes for the Executive Magistrate to record the dying declaration would show that patient was unable to speak with clarity. It would therefore, not be safe to base conviction solely on the basis of such dying declarations. (2) The defence theory that the lady could have accidentally got burnt was highly probable. The scene of incident showed presence of stove. It was entirely therefore, possible that the deceased would have caught fire cooking on the stove or on the gas. (3) The doctors did not indicate that the patient or the dead body was smelling of kerosene. (4) There was no evidence suggesting that brothers of the husband of the deceased resided with them. In fact, Manguben, the complainant, and mother of the deceased in the cross examination admitted that her daughter and her husband lived separately. She also stated that husband was not ill-treating Rupali. 12. On the other hand, learned APP submitted that the evidence on record unerringly point to the involvement of all the accused. Multiple dying declarations including one recorded by the Executive Magistrate cannot be discarded. She also stated that husband was not ill-treating Rupali. 12. On the other hand, learned APP submitted that the evidence on record unerringly point to the involvement of all the accused. Multiple dying declarations including one recorded by the Executive Magistrate cannot be discarded. The trial Court has properly considered all the aspects of the matter. 13. The evidence regarding the incident comprises primarily of dying declarations stated to be made by the deceased. First in point of time was made to Dr. Abhishek Kiritbhai Shah, PW1. Rupali after getting severely burnt was brought to the Community Health Centre at Anjar where she was first treated by Dr. Abhishek Shah to whom Rupali had narrated the incident of being burnt by her husband and brothers after pouring kerosene. Doctor therefore, immediately informed the police and also made arrangements for the dying declaration to be recorded. Before the Magistrate arrived, the patient was treated by Dr. Hiteshbhai Dineshbhai Thakkar, PW17, who was the Superintendent of CHC, Anjar. He also stated that the lady had implicated the three accused in setting her on fire. Most significant dying declaration however, is one recorded by the Executive Magistrate. In this dying declaration exh.99, she had given a precise and clear version of the events. She was asked her name, age, caste and address, the details of which she supplied accurately. About the incident, she had stated that she was residing in Janta colony. Since morning the quarrel was going on in the house. Her husband had poured kerosene over her. His brother had caught her. His elder brother had set her on fire with the matchstick. Since morning the brothers were instigating the husband. They lived in a joint family. This dying declaration, as noted, was recorded by the Executive Magistrate after obtaining the certificate from Dr. Abhishek Shah that patient was conscious and in a position to give her statement. The doctor had also signed at the bottom of dying declaration which contains thumb impression of the deceased and signature of the Executive Magistrate. 14. We have no reason to discard such dying declarations. It is true that being an exception to the normal rule of hearsay evidence not being admissible in evidence, dying declaration is subjected to minute scrutiny before it can form the sole basis for conviction. 14. We have no reason to discard such dying declarations. It is true that being an exception to the normal rule of hearsay evidence not being admissible in evidence, dying declaration is subjected to minute scrutiny before it can form the sole basis for conviction. Nevertheless, no rule of law or one propounded by the Court, provides that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis for conviction. If on minute scrutiny, it is found that the declaration was made out of free volition, declarant was free from any tutoring and that statement was truthful and reliable, the conviction can surely be based on such dying declaration. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision of Supreme Court in case of Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi reported in (2010) 9 Supreme Court Cases 1, It was held and observed as under: “22 The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that, (i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. (ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.” In case of Lakhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2010) 8 SCC 514 , it was observed that a dying declaration recorded by a competent Magistrate would stand on a much higher footing than the declaration recorded by officer of lower rank, for the reason that the competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person named in the dying declaration of the victim. It was further observed as under : “21. In view of the above, the law on the issue of dying declaration can be summarized to the effect that in case, the Court comes to the conclusion that the dying declaration is true and reliable, has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration and it has not been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting; it can be the sole basis for recording conviction. In such an eventuality no corroboration is required. In case, there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, generally, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon, provided that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness. In case, there are circumstances wherein the declaration had been made, not voluntarily and even otherwise, it is not supported by the other evidence, the Court has to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.” 15. The chain of events would lend credence to the dying declarations. The incident took place at about 11:30. The patient was brought to the hospital shortly thereafter, upon which, the doctor incharge immediately started treating the patient and also communicated to the police authority. The chain of events would lend credence to the dying declarations. The incident took place at about 11:30. The patient was brought to the hospital shortly thereafter, upon which, the doctor incharge immediately started treating the patient and also communicated to the police authority. The Executive Magistrate received the Yadi at about 12 O' clock, upon which, he reached the site at 12:15 and started recording the dying declaration at 12:24 at night. These events took place in quick succession and in fact, as records would reveal dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate even before the relatives of the girl i.e. the mother, the complainant arrived at the hospital. If at all, till then, she was with the husband and his relatives, thus, completely eliminating any possibility of tutoring. 16. Before confirming the conviction, we must dispel doubts sought to be raised by the defence. The presence of hydrocarbon in the clothes of the deceased found from the spot would eliminate the possibility of accidental burn injuries. Reliance on the cross examination of the complainant, PW3, needs a closer scrutiny. In the examination-in-chief, this witness had alleged that husband of deceased was ill-treating her on account of which Rupali was once driven out of the house without her children and she spent close to four months with her at her house. She had also stated that Rupali was residing with her husband and his brothers in the same house. This examination-in-chief was recorded on 11.2.2009. After brief cross-examination, the application for adjournment was given by the advocate for the accused barely stating that accused no.1 was not present and that some more information was to be collected. This application exh.44 is dated 12.2.2009 and therefore, clearly made after 11.2.2009. Even if we ignore this discrepancy, the disturbing factors are that before this application we find a pursis exh.41 by some advocate that he does not mind the examination of witness in absence of accused no.1 who was absent due to ill-health. The casual manner in which the learned Judge granted such an application is also disturbing. On further dates of hearing, it was the complainant who gave applications for adjournment citing personal reasons. On 23.3.2009, once again after only one question by the advocate for the accused, application exh.48 came to be filed by the complainant. This was tendered to the Court by the learned APP. On further dates of hearing, it was the complainant who gave applications for adjournment citing personal reasons. On 23.3.2009, once again after only one question by the advocate for the accused, application exh.48 came to be filed by the complainant. This was tendered to the Court by the learned APP. The contents of the application, as noted, were extremely disturbing. It was stated that talks for settlement were going on therefore, the matter should be adjourned. More disturbing is the fact that the learned Judge granted adjournment relying on such an application. 17. Two things are totally unacceptable. First and foremost, we fail to understand how a case of murder could be subject matter of settlement. Even if the witnesses, the accused and God forbid even learned Public Prosecutor was unaware about such basic and fundamental question, we do not understand how the learned Sessions Judge missed the whole point. Adjournment for attempt to compromise an offence as serious, as heinous, as cruel as taking away human life, was allowed by the learned Sessions Judge. He thus virtually presided over an unholy attempt to settle a case in which law provides that there cannot be any settlement. Quite apart from being a non-cognizable offence, it was also a serious offence against the society. If the learned Judge accepted the request for adjournment on the ground that the compromise talk is going on, we wonder what would have been his approach, had the appellants later on reverted back to him that compromise has been arrived at. Would he have recorded the compromise and released the accused or would he have turned a blind eye to the witnesses after witnesses turning hostile and gleefully accepted an easy disposal? 18. The second disturbing aspect of the matter is that time and again, Supreme Court has been deprecating the tendency of long adjournments, after chief examination of an important witness has been recorded. Such adjournments casually granted give unlimited scope for pressure or winning over the witness by unfair or foul means, once contents of examination-in-chief have been revealed. Statutory provisions contained in Criminal Procedure Code and the judicial pronouncements, to some of which, we would presently refer make this position wholly untenable. 19. Such adjournments casually granted give unlimited scope for pressure or winning over the witness by unfair or foul means, once contents of examination-in-chief have been revealed. Statutory provisions contained in Criminal Procedure Code and the judicial pronouncements, to some of which, we would presently refer make this position wholly untenable. 19. In case of Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab reported in (2015) 3 SCC 220 , the Supreme Court criticized the tendency of permitting long adjournments for cross examination once the examination-in-chief is recorded. It was observed that adjournments were granted for non acceptable reasons. Calling a witness for cross examination after a long span of time is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. In the preamble to the judgment, it was observed as under : “2. The instant case frescoes and depicts a scenario that exemplifies how due to passivity of the learned trial Judge, a witness, despite having stood embedded absolutely firmly in his examination-in-chief, has audaciously and, in a way, obnoxiously, thrown all the values to the wind, and paved the path of tergiversation. It would not be a hyperbole to say that it is a maladroit and ingeniously designed attempt to strangulate and crucify the fundamental purpose of trial, that is, to arrive at the truth on the basis of evidence on record. The redeeming feature is, despite the malevolent and injurious assault, the cause of justice has survived, for there is, in the ultimate eventuate, a conviction which is under assail in this appeal, by special leave. 3. The narration of the sad chronology shocks the judicial conscience and gravitates the mind to pose a question, is it justified for any conscientious trial Judge to ignore the statutory command, not recognize “the felt necessities of time” and remain impervious to the cry of the collective asking for justice or give an indecent and uncalled for burial to the conception of trial, totally ostracizing the concept that a civilized and orderly society thrives on rule of law which includes “fair trial” for the accused as well as the prosecution.” 20. Referring to long line of judgments on the point, it was observed as under : “57. Before parting with the case we are constrained to reiterate what we have said in the beginning. Referring to long line of judgments on the point, it was observed as under : “57. Before parting with the case we are constrained to reiterate what we have said in the beginning. We have expressed our agony and anguish the manner in which trials in respect of serious offences relating to corruption are being conducted by the trial courts. 57.1 Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for cross-examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note of. 57.2 As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurize the witness and to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. 57.3 There is no cavil over the proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the trial to be guided by the mandate of the law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected in law to follow the command of the procedure relating to trial and not yield to the request of the counsel to grant adjournment for non-acceptable reasons. 57.4 In fact, it is not all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination after such a long span of time. It is imperative if the examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination should be completed on the same day. If the examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. 57.4 In fact, it is not all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination after such a long span of time. It is imperative if the examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination should be completed on the same day. If the examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such a long time. It is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. 57.5 The duty of the court is to see that not only the interest of the accused as per law is protected but also the societal and collective interest is safeguarded. It is distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. How long shall we say, "Awake! Arise!". There is a constant discomfort. Therefore, we think it appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating the same among the learned trial Judges with a command to follow the principles relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be remembered that law cannot allowed to be lonely; a destitute. 21. In case of Akil alias Javed v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2013) 7 SCC 125 , it was observed as under : “34. Keeping the various principles, set out in the above decisions, in mind when we examine the situation that had occurred in the case on hand where PW.20 was examined-in-chief on 18.09.2000 and was cross examined after two months i.e. on 18.11.2000 solely at the instance of the appellant’s counsel on the simple ground that the counsel was engaged in some other matter in the High Court on the day when PW.20 was examinedinchief, the adjournment granted by the trial Court at the relevant point of time only disclose that the Court was oblivious of the specific stipulation contained in Section 309 of Cr.P.C. which mandate the requirement of sessions trial to be carried on a day to day basis. The trial Court has not given any reason much less to state any special circumstance in order to grant such a long adjournment of two months for the cross-examination of PW.20. Everyone of the caution indicated in the decision of this Court reported in Rajdeo Sharma V. State of Bihar 1998 Crl. L.J. 4596 was flouted with impunity. In the said decision a request was made to all the High Courts to remind all the trial Judges of the need to comply with Section 309 of the Code in letter and spirit. In fact, the High Courts were directed to take note of the conduct of any particular trial Judge who violates the above legislative mandate and to adopt such administrative action against the delinquent judicial officer as per the law. 43. It is unfortunate that in spite of the specific directions issued by this Court and reminded once again in Shambhu Nath (2001) 4 SCC 667 such recalcitrant approach was being made by the trial Court unmindful of the adverse serious consequences affecting the society at large flowing therefrom. Therefore, even while disposing of this appeal by confirming the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the learned trial Judge, as confirmed by the impugned judgment of the High Court, we direct the Registry to forward a copy of this decision to all the High Courts to specifically follow the instructions issued by this Court in the decision reported in Rajdeo Sharma (supra) and reiterated in Shambhu Nath (supra) by issuing appropriate circular, if already not issued. If such circular has already been issued, as directed, ensure that such directions are scrupulously followed by the trial Courts without providing scope for any deviation in following the procedure prescribed in the matter of a trial of sessions cases as well as other cases as provided under Section 309 of Cr.P.C. In this respect, the High Courts will also be well advised to use their machinery in the respective State Judicial Academy to achieve the desired result. We hope and trust that the respective High Courts would take serious note of the above directions issued in the decisions reported in Rajdeo Sharma (supra) which has been extensively quoted and reiterated in the subsequent decision of this Court reported in Shambhu Nath (supra) and comply with the directions at least in the future years.” 22. We hope and trust that the respective High Courts would take serious note of the above directions issued in the decisions reported in Rajdeo Sharma (supra) which has been extensively quoted and reiterated in the subsequent decision of this Court reported in Shambhu Nath (supra) and comply with the directions at least in the future years.” 22. As noted, the complainant in her examination-in-chief supported the prosecution on both the aspects of the matter namely, of the ill-treatment of her daughter by her husband and that husband was residing with his brothers in the same house. It was only in the cross-examination conducted after more than four months that she shifted her stand and softened the accusations against the husband and stated that brothers in any case were not residing with the husband. In between, applications were given by the lady herself suggesting that talks of compromise were going on. These aspects therefore, cannot blur our vision so far as the veracity of dying declarations is concerned. 23. We have not placed any reliance on the videographed statement of the lady. Question of authenticity and tamper proof method of recording the CD need not be gone into. 24. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. R&P be transmitted back to the concerned trial Court.