JUDGMENT Manoj Kumar Gupta,J. The petitioner has filed the instant petition challenging advertisement dated 27.5.2016 inviting bids for settlement of fishing rights by auction for a period of five years. Thereunder, the auction is to be held on 27.6.2016. A further prayer has been made for restraining the respondents from holding auction on that date and from interfering in the right of the petitioner in carrying out fishing in the pond no. 122 area .498 hectare. 2. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the fishing right was settled in favour of the petitioner, on the basis of approval granted in his favour on 29.9.2009 although auction was held on 22.2.2006. The period of lease in favour of the petitioner being ten years, it has yet not expired and thus the respondents are not justified in proceedings to conduct auction in respect thereof. 3. Admittedly, in pursuance of the auction held in favour of the petitioner, a lease agreement was executed between the petitioner and the Gaon Sabha, whereunder the duration of lease has been disclosed as 22.2.2006 to 21.2.2016. The aforesaid stipulation in the lease deed is not under challenge in the instant petition. 4. In such view of the matter, this Court is unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that the period of lease shall be deemed to have commenced from the date approval was granted. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sri Ram Kishun Vs State of U.P. and others (1994) RD 19. In that case, the plea of the petitioner that the period of lease shall be deemed to have commenced from the date the approval was granted, was repelled by holding as under : - "12. The lease-deed filed as Annexure-1 to the Supplementary affidavit prescribes the period of ten years with effect from 28.8.1993 to 27.8.1993, thus the period of lease has already come to an end on 28.8.1993, and in the lease deed itself it has been mentioned that lease shall be for a period of ten years with effect from 28.8.1983, and therefore even if for formal sanction papers were forwarded to higher revenue authorities it has not been brought on record or suggested that the petitioner has not operated the lease with effect from 28.8.1983 and therefore his period is liable to be extended.
Since petitioner?s case is not covered by statutory period as order passed by the revenue authorities revoking the period of lease beyond ten years certainly comes within the purview of administrative orders, and in this regard we may observe that every administrative order cannot be subjected to the rigorous of the principles of natural justice. (See Union of the India Vs. Adrik Singh AIR 1991 SC 564 ). Therefore, the submission that without affording any opportunity of hearing the period of lease has been curtailed or shortened has no force as in the lease deed itself the period has been mentioned. 13. Besides this, if this is the petitioner's case that he was not permitted to operate the lease with effect from 28.8.1983 but was only permitted to operate the same with effect from 25.7.1985, it requires investigation of facts and the same cannot be gone into and adjudicated upon in the writ jurisdiction." 6. The Division Bench specifically held that the period of the lease shall be construed as per the stipulation in the lease deed unless it could be proved that the lessee was not able to operate the lease during the period anterior to the date of execution of the lease deed. In the instant case, there is no such evidence on record to support such claim. Further, such a plea which requires investigation of facts cannot be gone into in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court is unable to find any merit in the submission of the petitioner. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.