JUDGMENT : S.G. SHAH, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. K.V. Pujara for the petitioner and learned AGP Ms. Amita Shah for the respondents. 2. Petitioner has challenged the actions of the respondents, denying to condone the alleged breaks in service by their orders dated 21.12.2011, 21.2.2009, 23.1.2009 and 30.5.2012 with the direction to the respondents to treat the petitioner to be in continuous service from 16.1.1984 to 31.3.2008 and to fix his seniority accordingly and to give effect of promotion from the post of Dy. Director of Information to the post of Jt. Director of Information and from that post to the post of Addl. Director of Information with effect from the dates on which his junior Mr. Dalpatsinh Padhiyar was given such promotion and to grant him all other consequential benefits. The petitioner has also prayed for a direction to the respondents to pay him all retirement benefits, including pension, commuted pension, gratuity and all other benefits by considering his qualifying pensionable service of 24 years right from the date of his appointment 16.1.1984 to the date of superannuation i.e. 31.3.2008 with further direction to pay the consequential amount of pension and other arrears with interest @ 18%. The petitioner has also prayed to direct the respondents to revise the petitioners pension and all other retirement benefits by considering the qualifying pensionable service of 24 years from 16.1.1984 to 31.3.2008 and to pay such amount immediately. 3. The factual details are very much relevant to realise the controversy, which can be recollected in following manner:- (a) The petitioner was appointed on the post of Dy. Director with the Information, Broadcasting and Tourism Department of the State Government by order dated 9.12.1983. The petitioner’s name in such select list is at Sr. No. 3, whereas Dalpatsinh Padhiyar stands at Sr. No. 4. Therefore, petitioner was senior of Dalpatsinh Padhiyar on date of his initial appointment. Such appointment was provisional and petitioner was on probation for two years. (b) It seems that petitioner could not complete his probation and therefore, after a long time of more than four years, he was terminated from services by order dated 10.10.1988. (c) The petitioner has challenged such order of termination by filing Special Civil Application No. 6870 of 1988 before this Court. However, it seems that such petition has been withdrawn by him pursuant to his appointment by order dated 14.12.1990. (c) The petitioner has challenged such order of termination by filing Special Civil Application No. 6870 of 1988 before this Court. However, it seems that such petition has been withdrawn by him pursuant to his appointment by order dated 14.12.1990. The appointment order dated 14.12.1990 makes it clear that though he was terminated on the ground that his services are not satisfactory, he was again appointed on probation for six months in place of a vacant post of Dy. Director of Information when one J.M. Thakkar has either been transferred or has retired and thereby, there was one post vacant. However, he was considered as a fresh appointee by such order and seniority list as on 1.1.1988 shows his name at Sr. No. 15 as direct recruitee. However, the statement prepared on 31.12.1991 regarding status of the Class-I Officers of the department, copy of which is produced on page 29, makes it clear that seniority of the petitioner is to be considered after disposal of Special Civil Application No. 6870 of 1988. (d) Unfortunately again by order dated 17.8.1995, services of the petitioner has been terminated on considering that he has failed to clear pre-service training examination. The order shows that petitioner has failed in first attempt in the year 1991 and remained absent in second and third attempt in 1992; whereas, again he failed in fourth special attempt in the year 1995. (e) Petitioner has challenged such order of termination by filing Special Civil Application No. 5796 of 1996. It was dismissed by the Single Judge. (f) Whereas, Letters Patent Appeal No. 1164 of 1996 against the judgment in Special Civil Application No. 5796 of 1996 was allowed by judgment and order dated 23.12.1996. In such judgment, the Division Bench of this Court has observed that during the examination between October 21, 1992 to October 23, 1992, petitioner was not given seat number at the said examination and therefore, the said examination should not have been treated as a chance to the petitioner, though he was given a chance thereafter in the year 1994. Therefore, practically, petitioner was not given a special chance as disclosed in his letter of termination dated 17.8.1995. Therefore, practically, petitioner was not given a special chance as disclosed in his letter of termination dated 17.8.1995. In view of such fact, the Division Bench of this Court has granted opportunity to the appellant to make representation and/or application to appropriate authority for giving him additional chance, which would be fourth chance in accordance with law and directed the authority to consider peculiar facts and circumstances and to decide such application as expeditiously as possible and preferably within four weeks’ from the date of receipt of such application. (g) Pursuant to such decision, petitioner has represented his case by letter dated 31.1.1997. (h) It seems that thereafter petitioner has cleared the examination held between 10.3.1997 to 12.3.1997 and pursuant to his request for appointment dated 5.5.1997, he has been appointed again as Dy. Director, Information by order dated 25.6.1997. 4. However, such order dated 25.6.1997 is now disclosing some irrelevant and illegal condition, by disclosing entire history and the factual details of the petitioner’s services right from the date 9.12.1983. Therefore, it is quite clear and certain that respondents are well aware about the length of service and other details of the petitioner and therefore, it is quite clear and obvious that the condition No. 2 in such order is nothing, but arbitrary and irrelevant as well as illegal condition in such order. It is not disputed that by such order dated 25.6.1997, now, petitioner is again appointed as Dy. Director, Class-I, but with a condition that he will not ask for seniority or promotion or any other benefits pursuant to his undertaking dated 1.3.1997. 5. However, respondent – Department fails to realise the basic fact that such appointment is purely and solely based upon the clearance of pre-service training examination by the Department and therefore, it cannot be said that it is absolutely new appointment of a new recruitee, who is yet to train himself and to clear the examination as per the Rules. It is also undisputed fact that the date of birth of petitioner is 3.3.1950 and therefore, he was almost above 47 years of age on such date of appointment and therefore also, it can never be said as a fresh appointment by any stretch of imagination, but it is in fact a continuous appointment pursuant to direction in the Letters Patent Appeal, when petitioner has cleared requisite examination. Even otherwise, if we peruse the so-called undertaking, copy of which is produced at Annexure-K by the petitioner, so also at Annexure-R2 by the respondents with their affidavit in reply, it makes it clear that such undertaking was not with reference to any rules, notification, ordinance or office order or direction by any competent judicial or administrative authority. Moreover, it is quite clear from the record that though petitioner has in his own handwriting in a plain paper submitted and undertaking, it becomes clear that such undertaking has been obtained by the concerned officer of the respondent by pressure and coercion, when such undertaking has endorsement immediately below it that it is being taken on plain paper only from the petitioner and no such undertaking was taken from anybody prior to it. This goes to show that this undertaking is taken at the relevant time with pressure or coercion that if such undertaking is not given, petitioner may not be allowed to appear in the examination. It is also clear that such undertaking is prior to the date of examination and not on the date of appointment letter. 6. The order of appointment dated 25.6.1997 though referring such undertaking, and thereby denying the legitimate right of the petitioner, to seek equality in case of seniority, promotion and all other financial benefits with other similarly situated persons, the order nowhere discloses that why such condition has been imposed and how it is permissible under the law or Rules applicable to such appointment. Therefore, such condition needs to be treated as arbitrary, and being against the law and thus, null and void. 7. Therefore, such condition needs to be treated as arbitrary, and being against the law and thus, null and void. 7. At this stage it would be relevant to refer the decision of Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer, Chandigarh vs. Hari Om Sharma and Others, AIR 1998 SC 2909 wherein with reference to the service conditions Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India has held that - “Apart from the fact that the Government in its capacity as a model employer cannot be permitted to raise such an argument, the undertaking which is said to constitute an agreement between the parties cannot be enforced at law” so also the judgment in the case of Union of India Thr’ Director General vs. Ahmedhusen Mohmedbhai Momin, 2013 (2) GCD 1301 wherein also the Division Bench of this Court has while relying on the case of Hari Om Sharma’s case (supra) held that the applicant before it is entitled to the salary to the post. Unfortunately, even thereafter, when petitioner has joined on 7.7.1997, at the time of his retirement on 31.3.2008, now, respondents have came forward to deny the continuation of services of the petitioner, if not from 9.12.1983, then atleast from 14.12.1990 when he was reappointed and thereafter, when there is no fault on his part for any reason whatsoever so as to consider the actual break in service of one year 10 months and 20 days, as no break in services for considering all service benefits in his favour. 8. Therefore, petitioner has repeatedly requested the respondents to release his pension and other benefits considering his service as continuous service, but it seems that all his efforts have gone in vain, when respondents have failed to release all service benefits as if petitioner is in continuous service as pleaded and pressed by him. Thereby, respondents have paid him relevant service benefits as if he is in service only from 25.6.1997, though he has served the department from 9.12.1983 to 10.10.1988 and again from 14.12.1990 to 17.8.1995. Therefore, though total length of service of the petitioner is almost 24 years, the respondents have considered that he is in service only for 11 years and calculated and paid pensionary and other benefits accordingly. Therefore, though total length of service of the petitioner is almost 24 years, the respondents have considered that he is in service only for 11 years and calculated and paid pensionary and other benefits accordingly. Therefore, petitioner has no option, but to prefer this petition when he could not redress his issues even after repeated representations and when though he was in Government service, he was restrained to seek several information from his parent department under the Right to Information Act. This fact also needs to be strictly dealt with that how and why the department, which is otherwise required to act as guardian of its employees, is hiding and not disclosing the correct facts as and when necessary and why people have to file an application under the Right to Information Act to seek several information. 9. In view of above facts and circumstances, it becomes clear that there was no fault on the part of the petitioner when he could not serve the department between 17.8.1995 till 25.6.1997 i.e. one year, 10 months and 20 days because respondent-department has wrongly terminated him considering that he has not cleared the pre-service training examination though proper number of chances were not offered to him to clear such examination and such chance was offered only after the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1164 of 1996. Ultimately, when chance was offered, as per the direction by the judgment in the said L.P.A. it was offered with coercion whereby undertaking was taken from him that he will not claim other service benefits on the basis that he is in continuous service. 10. Ultimately, when chance was offered, as per the direction by the judgment in the said L.P.A. it was offered with coercion whereby undertaking was taken from him that he will not claim other service benefits on the basis that he is in continuous service. 10. Therefore, above two judgments would be applicable in such cases to confirm and hold that such undertaking cannot be enforced at law and in view of such clarity by the decision in Hari Om Sharma’s case (supra), if the undertaking and thereby the condition in order of appointment dated 25.6.1997 is ignored, then, petitioner is entitled to all the consequential benefits of his service as if he was in continuous service atleast from 14.12.1990, because for the period between 10.10.1988 to 14.12.1990, though he has preferred Special Civil Application No. 7870 of 1988, pursuant to his reappointment by order dated 14.12.1990, when he has withdrawn such Special Civil Application, it is to be considered that he has let-go his right of claiming continuous service for the period from 9.12.1983 till 14.12.1990. 11. Whereas, learned advocate for the petitioner has relied upon the disclosure by the respondent in a list prepared on 31.12.1991 (page 29) that seniority of the petitioner would be subject to outcome of the Special Civil Application No. 6870 of 1988 and shown the date of joining on the post for continuous service as 16.1.1984 and he should be treated in service from such date itself. However, I am of the opinion that when petitioner has withdrawn his Special Civil Application No. 6870 of 1988 and more particularly, when appointment on 14.12.1990 was reappointment and not reinstatement as pleaded by the petitioner, in absence of proper evidence regarding his entitlement to continue on service after 10.10.1988, even though he was able to perform sufficiently, he cannot claim continuity of service right from 9.12.1983. One more aspect needs to be considered at this stage i.e. even if his services are considered from 14.12.1990, then also, he would complete 28 years of service when retired on 31.3.2008, instead of considering only 11 years of service as done by the department from 25.6.1997 to 31.3.2008. 12. One more aspect needs to be considered at this stage i.e. even if his services are considered from 14.12.1990, then also, he would complete 28 years of service when retired on 31.3.2008, instead of considering only 11 years of service as done by the department from 25.6.1997 to 31.3.2008. 12. Therefore, it would be appropriate to hold that petitioner is certainly entitled to be considered as in continuous services of the respondents from 14.12.1990 till 31.3.1980 because his appointment on 25.6.1997 was not fresh appointment since he was aged about 47 years on that date and that such appointment was solely based upon the fact that petitioner has cleared the pre-service training examination and that for attending such examination as per applicable rules, it was not his fault, if he was not given requisite chance as per the rules by the respondents. Thereby, when respondents have committed a blunder in stating in the dismissal order dated 17.8.1995 that petitioner has not cleared the pre-service training examination and thereafter, when petitioner has cleared the examination, he was taken on duty again, the period of services rendered by the petitioner prior to such termination i.e. from 14.12.1990 till 17.8.1995 cannot go in vain so as to consider continuous service of the petitioner. Similarly, the period of break between 17.8.1995 till 25.6.1997 was not because of mistake or blunder committed by the respondent and therefore I hold that petitioner is to be treated in continuous service right from 14.12.1990 till 31.3.2008 and thereby, petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits including difference in salary, deemed promotion from the deemed date and consequential pensionary and other retirement benefits as if he was in continuous service for such period. 13. Petitioner has also claimed 18% interest on all such amounts, which is due. For the purpose, he is relying upon the decision in the case of Vijay L. Mehrotra vs. State of U.P. AIR 2000 SC 3513 (2) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that in case of an employee retired after having rendered services, it is expected that all the payment of retiral benefits should be paid on the date of retirement or soon thereafter if for some unforeseen circumstances the payments could not be made on the date of retirement. In the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, it is observed by the Court that there is absolutely no reason or justification for not making the payments for months together because the appellant before the Court was retired from service on 31.8.1997 but the requisite amount was not paid in time and different amounts were paid between the period from 27.11.1997 till 5.11.1999 i.e. in all department took years in releasing all the payments. Therefore, probably Hon’ble Supreme Court has awarded 18% simple interest on such amount, which is not paid, immediately. However, in the present case, when there is an issue regarding break in service and more particularly, atleast when there is knowledge of the petitioner that he has agreed that he will not claim such difference if he is appointed, atleast to that extent, unless there is a determination on such point by competent authority, petitioner is not entitled to interest and therefore, this judgment would not be applicable in the present case. However, at the same time, it cannot be ignored that when respondents have not acted in time in deciding the representation of the petitioner and when ultimately petitioner has to seek certain information under the Right to Information Act only for filing the present petition, petitioner is entitled to reasonable amount of interest on arrears if any to be recovered. 14. In view of above peculiar facts and circumstances, the petition is allowed and thereby, the orders dated 21.12.2011 and 21.2.2009 are hereby quashed and set-aside. Thereby, now, petitioner is to be treated in continuous service from 14.12.1990 till his superannuation on 31.3.2008. The respondents are further directed to fix his seniority accordingly and to give effect of deemed promotion from the post of Dy. Director of Information to the post of Jt. Director of Information and if he is eligible and if at all such promotion is due, then also to the post of Addl. Director of Information w.e.f. the date on which he is so granted and to grant him all consequential benefits by considering his qualifying pensionary service from 14.12.1990 till 31.3.2008 with 6% interest on arrears. The respondents are also directed to revise the pension of the petitioner as if his services are continuous from 14.12.1990 to 31.3.2008 and to pay arrears of pension with 6% interest and revised pension regularly herein after. 15. Rule is made absolute. The respondents are also directed to revise the pension of the petitioner as if his services are continuous from 14.12.1990 to 31.3.2008 and to pay arrears of pension with 6% interest and revised pension regularly herein after. 15. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted. Rule made absolute.