JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—Heard Sri Somesh Khare, learned counsel for the appellant, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 2. This special appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 9.12.2011 passed by learned Single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4560 of 2003 - Gyanendra Singh v. Joint Director of Education, Meerut and others, whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant was dismissed. 3. The relief sought by means of this special appeal is that the judgment and order dated 9.12.2011 passed by learned Single Judge be set aside and the writ petition be allowed. 4. Brief facts giving rise to aforesaid appeal are : 4.1 There is an institution namely Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College, Lodhipur, District Ghaziabad, governed by the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the salary of the teachers and its employees are being paid under the provision of U.P. High School and Intermediate Education (Payment of Salaries to its Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff) Act, 1971. 4.2. On account of death of one Sukhbir Singh, Lecturer, a post of lecturer fell vacant and since no person was eligible to be promoted on the post of lecturer from the teachers working in the institution in C.T.Grade, the Committee of Management of the Institution passed a resolution on 17.7.1991 to fill up the aforesaid vacancy by way of direct recruitment under the provisions of Section 18 of U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission Act, 1981. 4.3 Pursuant to the aforesaid resolution, a number of candidates appeared before the selection committee duly constituted by the Committee of Management of the Institution for selecting suitable candidate for the vacant post. The petitioner-appellant was found suitable for the aforesaid post i.e. Lecturer in Sociology and therefore an appointment letter was issued on 18.7.1991 and pursuant thereto, petitioner-appellant joined the duties with effect from 26.7.1991. 4.4 After the appointment papers were sent to the District Inspector of Schools (hereinafter referred to “DIOS”) for according financial approval to the appointment of the petitioner-appellant but no response was given. 4.4 After the appointment papers were sent to the District Inspector of Schools (hereinafter referred to “DIOS”) for according financial approval to the appointment of the petitioner-appellant but no response was given. 4.5 When neither financial approval was accorded nor any decision was taken in this regard, the petitioner-appellant filed writ petition No. nil of 1992 (Gyanendra Singh v. State of U.P. and others) before this Court in which an order was passed on 14.7.1992 whereby DIOS was directed to make payment of salary to the petitioner-appellant upto 30.6.1992 within a month. The DIOS, Ghaziabad was further directed to take a decision on the papers for approval sent to him by the Management, within two weeks from the date of receipt of the order. 4.6 Pursuant to the order passed by this Court, DIOS passed order on 29.8.1992 whereby financial approval to the appointment of the petitioner-appellant on the post of lecturer in the institution was rejected on the ground that the vacancy was not notified within a period of 90 days from the date of death and that the post comes under the quota of Schedule caste candidate. 4.7 Thereafter the petitioner-appellant moved a representation dated 30.3.1995 requesting DIOS to recall his earlier order. 4.8 When no response was received, the petitioner-appellant filed writ petition No. 1680 of 1996 and this Court vide order dated 12.1.1996 directed the respondents to decide the representation of petitioner-appellant within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of order. 4.9 A notice dated 26.3.2002 was received by the petitioner-appellant whereby DIOS asked the petitioner-appellant to show-cause as to why payment of salary should not be stopped. 4.10 After receipt of notice, the petitioner-appellant submitted his reply dated 9.4.2002 mentioning therein that the post on which petitioner-appellant has appointed was a sanctioned post in the institution and therefore the proceedings initiated against him be dropped. 4.11 The DIOS passed an order on 30.12.2002 whereby financial approval according to the petitioner-appellant was set aside, whereagainst writ petition No. 4560 of 2003 was filed, which was dismissed by learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 9.12.2011. 4.12 Hence this special appeal has been filed. 5. 4.11 The DIOS passed an order on 30.12.2002 whereby financial approval according to the petitioner-appellant was set aside, whereagainst writ petition No. 4560 of 2003 was filed, which was dismissed by learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 9.12.2011. 4.12 Hence this special appeal has been filed. 5. The petitioner-appellant has assailed the impugned judgment and order on the following grounds : 5.1 Learned Single Judge has not considered the validity of selection as well as appointment of the petitioner-appellant and has not taken care that by order impugned, order of approval granted in favour of petitioner-appellant was cancelled. He has also not considered that power which was exercised by DIOS in passing the order impugned almost after the lapse of 8 years from granting approval and almost after the lapse of 12 years from the date of initial appointment of the petitioner-appellant it is not open for him to pass order impugned since neither under the Act nor Regulation there are any power conferred to DIOS and only the Director of Education have power to deal with such dispute under Section 16-E(10) of the Act. 5.2 The claim of the petitioner-appellant has wrongly been rejected by the order impugned on the ground that procedure required under the statute has not been followed and the Court failed to consider that once the appointment was accorded by DIOS, who is competent person, any infirmity/irregularity which was committed at the time of selection the same has been merged in the order of approval; that the writ Court failed to consider that DIOS was not discharging the judicial functions as such he cannot take action suo-moto as the order impugned has been passed by him and that the petitioner-appellant is continuously working in the institution in question since the date of his joining and he has elapsed about 20 years in the institution. 6. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the State supported the order passed by learned Single Judge on the basis of reasoning given therein and states that the petitioner-appellant was appointed by the Management without following the procedure prescribed under paragraph 5 of U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981 and therefore appointment of the petitioner-appellant is void ab initio. 7. 7. In rebuttal, counsel for the petitioner-appellant could not show anything to persuade this Court to take a different view than what has been taken by learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. 8. The relevant portion of the impugned judgment and order reads thus: “I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties. The procedure for making ad hoc appointment by direct recruitment against the substantive vacancy has been provided for in the First Removal of Difficulties Order. In the present case, ad hoc appointment has been made by direct recruitment and, therefore, paragraph 5 of the First Removal of Difficulties Order, which provides the procedure, is quoted below : “5. Ad hoc appointment by direct recruitment.—(1) Where any vacancy cannot be filed by promotion under Paragraph 4, the same may be filled by direct recruitment in accordance with clauses (2) to (5). (2) The management shall, as soon as may be, inform the District Inspector of Schools about the details of the vacancy and such Inspector shall invite applications from the local Employment Exchange and also through public advertisement in at least two newspapers having adequate circulation in Uttar Pradesh. (3) Every application referred to in clause (2) shall be addressed to the District Inspector of Schools and shall be accompanied— (a) by a crossed postal order worth ten rupees payable to such Inspector; (b) by a self addressed envelope bearing postal stamp for purposes of registration. (4) The District Inspector of Schools shall cause the best candidates selected on the basis of quality points specified in Appendix. The compilation of quality points may be done on remunerative basis by the retired Gazetted Government servants under the personal supervision of such Inspector. (5) If more than one teacher of the same subject or category is to be recruited for more than one institution, the names of the selected teachers and the names of the institutions shall be arranged in Hindi alphabetical order. The candidate whose name appears on the top of the list shall be allotted to the institution the name whereof appears on the top of the list of the institution. This process shall be repeated till both the lists are exhausted. Explanation.—In relation to an institution imparting instruction to women the expression “District Inspector of Schools” shall mean the ‘’Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools”. This process shall be repeated till both the lists are exhausted. Explanation.—In relation to an institution imparting instruction to women the expression “District Inspector of Schools” shall mean the ‘’Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools”. Perusal of the averments made in the writ petition indicates that the Management, on its own, made the appointment and the procedure as prescribed in paragraph 5 of the First Removal of Difficulties Order was not followed. Infact what has been stated in the writ petition is that on 17th July, 1991, the Committee of Management of the Institution resolved to fill up the vacant post of Lecturer by direct recruitment and on 18th July, 1991, the appointment order was issued to the petitioner who joined the Institution on 26th July, 1991. It is, therefore, clear that neither the District Inspector of Schools was informed, as was required under Clause 5(2) of the First Removal of Difficulties Order and nor any advertisement in two newspapers was issued. The other procedure prescribed in the First Removal of Difficulties Order for making the selection has also not been followed. It is, therefore, apparent that the appointment of the petitioner was not made in accordance with the provisions of the First Removal of Difficulties Order. The effect of an appointment which has not made in accordance with the First Removal of Difficulties Order has to be considered. This matter was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Radha Raizada and others v. Committee of Management, Vidyawati Darbari Girls Inter College and others, (1994) 3 UPLBEC 1551 . The Full Bench held that if the contingency arises for ad hoc appointment by direct recruitment, the procedure provided for under the First Removal of Difficulties Order has to be followed and if the management makes an ad hoc appointment without following the procedure laid down in paragraph 5, the District Inspector of Schools would be justified in stopping the payment of salary of such a teacher. It has further been held that if the procedure is not followed in making the appointment, the appointment is void and cannot confer any right on the person so appointed. It has further been held that if the procedure is not followed in making the appointment, the appointment is void and cannot confer any right on the person so appointed. The Supreme Court also had an occasion to examine the validity of the ad hoc appointments which were not made in accordance with the procedure provided for under paragraph 5 of the First Removal of Difficulties Order in the case of Prabhat Kumar Sharma and others v. State of U.P. and others, (1996) 10 SCC 62 and it was clearly held that any ad hoc appointment not made in accordance with paragraph 5 of the First Removal of Difficulties Order is an illegal appointment and is void and confers no right on the appointee. It may be useful to reproduce a passage from the judgment made in the context of paragraph 5 of the First Removal of Difficulties Order and it is as follows : “It is an inbuilt procedure to avoid manipulation and nepotism in selection and appointment of the teachers by the management to any post in an aided institution. It is obvious that when the salary is paid by the State to the Government aided private educational institutions, public interest demands that the teachers’ selection must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act read with the First 1981, Order”. The Supreme Court in Shesh Mani Shukla v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria and others, (2009) 15 SCC 436 , has also examined the validity of the appointment not made in accordance with the procedure prescribed in paragraph 5 of the First Removal of Difficulties Order and has observed that any appointment made dehors the provisions of paragraph 5 of the First Removal of Difficulties Order is void-ab-initio and no exception can be taken even if such person has worked for a long time. In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it has to be held that the appointment of the petitioner having been made in utter violation of the provisions of the First Removal of Difficulties Order is void and does not confer any right upon the petitioner and is liable to be ignored. Such being the position, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.” 9. Such being the position, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.” 9. From perusal of order passed by learned Single Judge it is evident that after considering the judgment rendered by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Radha Raizada and others v. Committee of Management, Vidyawati Darbari Girls Inter College and others, (1994) 3 UPLBEC 1551 and also judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the Case of Prabhat Kumar Sharma and others v. State of U.P. and others, (1996) 10 SCC 62 and Shesh Mani Shukla v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria and others, (2009) 15 SCC 436 , has came to the conclusion that appointment of the petitioner-appellant was made in utter violation of the provisions of the First Removal of Difficulties Order and therefore is void and does not confer any right upon him. 10. Even as per own case of the petitioner-appellant, the Management has passed resolution on 17.7.1991 to fill up the vacancy by way of direct recruitment under the provisions of Section 18 of U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission Act, 1981. Appointment letter was issued to him on very next day i.e. 18.7.1991 and pursuant thereto, he joined the duties with effect from 26.7.1991 and thereafter papers were sent to DIOS for according financial approval, who vide order dated 29.8.1992, declined to accord financial approval to the appointment of petitioner-appellant on the post of lecturer in the institution mentioning that vacancy was not notified within a period of 90 days from the date of death. 11. A perusal of the record reveals that in the entire writ petition there is no averment showing that procedure prescribed in Paragraph 5 of the First Removal of Difficulties Order has been followed or was ever observed. As such it is evident that procedure prescribed in First Order has not at all been observed and therefore in view of the law laid down by Apex Court in the case of Prabhat Kumar Sharma (supra) and Shesh Mani Shukla (supra), appointment of the petitioner-appellant was void ab initio. 12. As such it is evident that procedure prescribed in First Order has not at all been observed and therefore in view of the law laid down by Apex Court in the case of Prabhat Kumar Sharma (supra) and Shesh Mani Shukla (supra), appointment of the petitioner-appellant was void ab initio. 12. We are not impressed by the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that since appellant has continued working for long period of last more than two decades therefore, at this stage, he should not be left in lurch and some leniency should be shown in his favour because due to non observance of paragraph 5 of First Removal of Difficulties Order and appointment of petitioner-appellant was made in very hasty manner on 18.7.1991, on the very next day of passing of resolution to fill up the vacant post of Lecturer by direct recruitment. The vacancy was not notified within a period of 90 days from the date of death and even papers were sent thereafter to DIOS for according financial approval. 13. In recent decade a strict approach has been shown by Apex Court which is more apt to adhere to rule of law. The kind of sympathy sought in this case has been termed as “misplaced sympathy”. The view of the Court is that anything acquired illegally if allowed to remain with the person so acquired it would amount to confer a premium upon him of such illegality. This would encourage the people to go ahead with such kind of illegalities with expectations in the context of similar precedence that if they are successful in continuing long time, the judicial forums may not interfere and allow them to continue with their illegally obtained benefits. This has been seriously castigated and held to benefit more the violators and cause a permanent deprivation to law abiders. 14. In State of Orissa and another v. Mamata Mohanty, 2011(3) SCC 436 , the Apex Court says that an order bad from inception would not get sanctified at a later stage. No subsequent action or development can validate an action which was not lawful at its inception for the reason that illegality strikes at the root of order. It goes on to say that it would be beyond the competence of any authority to validate such an order. No subsequent action or development can validate an action which was not lawful at its inception for the reason that illegality strikes at the root of order. It goes on to say that it would be beyond the competence of any authority to validate such an order. Relying and referring to its earlier decisions in Upen Chandra Gogoi v. State of Assam and others, AIR 1998 SC 1289 ; Mangal Prasad Tamoli (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Narvadeshwar Mishra (Dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 2005 SC 1964 ; and Ritesh Tiwari and another v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2010 SC 3823 , the Court in para 20 of the judgement said: “It is a settled legal proposition that if an order is bad in its inception, it does not get sanctified at a later stage. A subsequent action/development cannot validate an action which was not lawful at its inception, for the reason that the illegality strikes at the root of the order. It would be beyond the competence of any authority to validate such an order. It would be ironic to permit a person to rely upon a law, in violation of which he has obtained the benefits. If an order at the initial stage is bad in law, then all further proceedings consequent thereto will be non est and have to be necessarily set aside. A right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin.” 15. Furthermore, learned Single Judge also in the impugned judgment has considered this aspect of the matter and made an observation that no exception can be taken even if such person has worked for a long time. 16. We have also looked into this matter in full detail find nothing wrong in the findings recorded by learned Single Judge warranting interference by this Court. 17. In view of above discussion and exposition of law, the special appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. 18. There is no order as to costs. ——————— 93. A minority institution may have its own procedure and method of admission as well as the selection of students but it has to be a fair and transparent method. The State has the power to frame regulations which are reasonable and do not impinge upon the basic character of the minority institutions. ——————— 93. A minority institution may have its own procedure and method of admission as well as the selection of students but it has to be a fair and transparent method. The State has the power to frame regulations which are reasonable and do not impinge upon the basic character of the minority institutions. This Court, in some of the decisions, has taken the view that the width of the rights and limitations thereof of unaided institutions, whether run by a majority or by a minority, must conform to the maintenance of excellence and with a view to achieve the said goal indisputably, the regulations can be made by the State. 94. It is also equally true that the right to administer does not amount to the right to mal-administer and the right is not free from regulations. The regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration. The regulatory measures can be laid down by the State in the administration of minority institutions. The right of the State is to be exercised primarily to prevent mal-administration and such regulations are permissible regulations. These regulations could relate to guidelines for the efficiency and excellence of educational standards, ensuring the security of the services of the teachers or other employees, framing rules and regulations governing the conditions of service of teachers and employees and their pay and allowances and prescribing course of study or syllabi of the nature of books etc. Some of the impermissible regulations are refusal to affiliation without sufficient reasons, such conditions as would completely destroy the autonomous status of the educational institution, by introduction of outside authority either directly or through its nominees in the Governing Body or the Managing Committee of minority institution to conduct its affairs etc. These have been illustrated by this Court in the Case of State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, (1970) 2 SCC 417 , All Saints High School v. Government of A.P., (1980) 2 SCC 478 and T.M.A. Pai’s case (supra). 95. Even in the Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case (supra), referred for opinion by the President under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, this Court while answering question No. 2 emphasized upon the freedom and extent of protection available to the minority institutions. 95. Even in the Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case (supra), referred for opinion by the President under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, this Court while answering question No. 2 emphasized upon the freedom and extent of protection available to the minority institutions. Referring to the fact that Articles 29 and 30 are set out in Part-III of the Constitution, which guarantees fundamental rights, the text and margin notes of both the Articles show that their purpose is to confer those fundamental rights on certain sections of community, which constitute minority communities. The Court held that Article 30(1) cannot be limited and should equally operate in favour of educational institution, whether established pre or post the commencement of the Constitution. The Bench repelled the contention that by admission of an outsider, the minority institution will loose its character as such, and held: “22.........To say that an institution which receives aid on account of its being a minority educational institution must not refuse to admit any member of any other community only on the grounds therein mentioned and then to say that as soon as such institution admits such an outsider it will cease to be a minority institution is tantamount to saying that minority institutions will not, as minority institutions, be entitled to any aid”. 96. While admitting non-members, the institution does not shed its character or ceases to be a minority institution. The freedom of minority institutions was further explained by the Bench by saying that it is the choice of the minority institution, to establish such educational institutions as well serve both purposes that of conserving their religion, language or culture and also the purpose of giving a thorough good general education to their children. So, they could even impart education in their own language or in any other language, which choice essentially has to be left to the minority institution. The constitution itself uses the word ‘choice’ in Article 30(1), which indicates the extent of liberty and freedom, the framers of the Constitution intended to grant to the minority community. Thus, there arises no occasion for the Court to read restrictions into such freedom on the ground of policy. It may amount to intrusion into the very minority character and protection available to the community in law. The right to frame regulations, therefore, is not itself an unregulated right. Thus, there arises no occasion for the Court to read restrictions into such freedom on the ground of policy. It may amount to intrusion into the very minority character and protection available to the community in law. The right to frame regulations, therefore, is not itself an unregulated right. It has its own limitations and sphere within which such regulations would be framed and made operative. 97. It is not necessary for us to examine the extent of power to make regulations, which can be enforced against linguistic minority institutions, as we have already discussed the same in the earlier part of the judgment. No doubt, right conferred on minorities under Article 30 is only to ensure equality with the majority but, at the same time, what protection is available to them and what right is granted to them under Article 30 of the Constitution cannot be diluted or impaired on the pretext of framing of regulations in exercise of its statutory powers by the State. The permissible regulations, as afore-indicated, can always be framed and where there is a mal-administration or even where a minority linguistic or religious school is being run against the public or national interest, appropriate steps can be taken by the authorities including closure but in accordance with law. The minimum qualifications, experience, other criteria for making appointments etc are the matters which will fall squarely within the power of the State to frame regulations but power to veto or command that a particular person or class of persons ought to be appointed to the school failing which the grant-in-aid will be withdrawn, will apparently be a subject which would be arbitrary and unenforceable. 98. Even in T.M.A. Pai’s case (supra), which view was reiterated by this Court in the case of Secy. Malankara Syrian Catholic College (supra), it was held that the conditions for proper utilization of the aid by the educational institution was a matter within the empowerment of the State to frame regulations but without abridging or diluting the right to establish and administer educational institutions. In that case, while dealing with the appointment of a person as Principal, the Court clearly stated the dictum that the freedom to choose the person to be appointed as Principal has always been recognized as a vital facet to right to administer the educational institution. In that case, while dealing with the appointment of a person as Principal, the Court clearly stated the dictum that the freedom to choose the person to be appointed as Principal has always been recognized as a vital facet to right to administer the educational institution. It being an important part of the administration and even if the institution is aided, there can be no interference with the said right. The power to frame regulations and control the management is subject to another restriction which was reiterated by the Court in P.A. Inamdar’s case (supra) stating that it is necessary that the objective of establishing the institution was not defeated. 99. At last, what is the purpose of granting protection or privilege to the minorities in terms of Article 29, and at the same time, applying negative language in Article 30(2) in relation to State action for releasing grant-in-aid, as well as the provisions of DSE Act, 1973 and the rules framed thereunder? It is obvious that the constitutional intent is to bring the minorities at parity or equality with the majority as well as give them right to establish, administer and run minority educational institutions. With the primary object of Article 21A of the Constitution in mind, the State was expected to expand its policy as well as methodology for imparting education. DSE Act, as we have already noticed, was enacted primarily for the purpose of better organization and development of school education in the Union Territory of Delhi and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Thus, the very object and propose of this enactment was to improve the standard as well as management of school education. It will be too far fetched to read into this object that the law was intended to make inroads into character and privileges of the minority. Besides, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, the Court is also duty bound to advance the cause or the purpose for which the law is enacted. Different laws relating to these fields, thus, must be read harmoniously, construed purposively and implemented to further advancement of the objects, sought to be achieved by such collective implementation of law. While, you keep the rule of purposive interpretation in mind, you also further add such substantive or ancillary matters which would advance the purpose of the enactment still further. Different laws relating to these fields, thus, must be read harmoniously, construed purposively and implemented to further advancement of the objects, sought to be achieved by such collective implementation of law. While, you keep the rule of purposive interpretation in mind, you also further add such substantive or ancillary matters which would advance the purpose of the enactment still further. To sum up, we will term it as ‘doctrine of purposive advancement’. 100. The power to regulate, undisputedly, is not unlimited. It has more restriction than freedom particularly, in relation to the management of linguistic minority institutions. The rules, which were expected to be framed in terms of Section 28 of the DSE Act, were for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. Even, otherwise, it is a settled principle of law that Rules must fall within the ambit and scope of the principal legislation. Section 21 is sufficiently indicative of the inbuilt restrictions that the framers of the law intended to impose upon the State while exercising its power in relation to a linguistic minority school. 101. To appoint a teacher is part of the regular administration and management of the School. Of course, what should be the qualification or eligibility criteria for a teacher to be appointed can be defined and, in fact, has been defined by the Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and within that specified parameters, the right of the linguistic minority institution to appoint a teacher cannot be interfered with. The paramount feature of the above laws was to bring efficiency and excellence in the field of school education and, therefore, it is expected of the minority institutions to select the best teacher to the faculty. To provide and enforce the any regulation, which will practically defeat this purpose would have to be avoided. A linguistic minority is entitled to conserve its language and culture by a constitutional mandate. Thus, it must select people who satisfy the prescribed criteria, qualification and eligibility and at the same time ensure better cultural and linguistic compatibility to the minority institution. 102. A linguistic minority is entitled to conserve its language and culture by a constitutional mandate. Thus, it must select people who satisfy the prescribed criteria, qualification and eligibility and at the same time ensure better cultural and linguistic compatibility to the minority institution. 102. At this stage, at the cost of repetition, we may again refer to the judgment of this Court in T.M.A. Pai’s case (supra), where in para 123, the Court specifically noticed that while it was permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe qualifications of a teacher, once the teachers possessing the requisite qualifications were selected by the minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have no right to veto the selection of the teachers. Further, the Court specifically noticed the view recorded by Khanna, J. in reference to Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case (supra), and to clauses 11 and 12 of the Bill in particular, where the learned Judge had declared that, it is the law declared by the Supreme Court in subsequently contested cases as opposed to the Presidential reference, which would have a binding effect and said: “123.........109........The words ‘as at present advised’ as well as the preceding sentence indicate the view expressed by this Court in relation to Kerala Education Bill, 1957, in this respect was hesitant and tentative and not a final view in the matter.” What the Court had expressed in para 123 above, appears to have found favour with the Bench dealing with the case of T.M.A. Pai (supra). In any case, nothing to the contrary was observed or held in the subsequent judgment by the larger Bench. 103. The concept of equality stated under Article 30(2) has to be read in conjunction with the protection under Article 29 and thus it must then be given effect to achieve excellence in the field of education. Providing of grant-in-aid, which travels from Article 30(2) to the provisions of the DSE Act and Chapter VI of the Rules framed thereunder, is again to be used for the same purpose, subject to regulations which themselves must fall within the permissible legislative competence. The purpose of grant-in-aid cannot be construed so as to destroy, impair or even dilute the very character of the linguistic minority institutions. All these powers must ultimately, stand in comity to the provisions of the Constitution, which is the paramount law. The purpose of grant-in-aid cannot be construed so as to destroy, impair or even dilute the very character of the linguistic minority institutions. All these powers must ultimately, stand in comity to the provisions of the Constitution, which is the paramount law. The Court will have to strike the balance between different facets relating to grant-in-aid, right to education being the fundamental right, protection available to religious or linguistic minorities under the Constitution and the primary object to improve and provide efficiency and excellence in school education. 104. In our considered view, it will not be permissible to infringe the constitutional protection in exercise of State policy or by a subordinate legislation to frame such rules which will impinge upon the character or in any way substantially dilute the right of the minority to administer and manage affairs of its school. Even though in the case of Mohinder Kaur (supra), the Bench of this Court held that upon restoration of the minority character of the institution, the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder would cease to apply to a minority institution. We still would not go that far and would preferably follow the view expressed by larger Bench of this Court in T.M.A. Pai’s case (supra) and even rely upon other subsequent judgments, which have taken the view that the State has the right to frame such regulations which will achieve the object of the Act. Even if it is assumed that there is no complete eclipse of the DSE Act in the Rules in the case of minority institutions, still Rule 64(1)(b), if enforced, would adversely effect and dilute the right and protection available to the minority school under the Constitution. 105. ................. 111. A linguistic minority has constitution and character of its own. A provision of law or a Circular, which would be enforced against the general class, may not be enforceable with the same rigors against the minority institution, particularly where it relates to establishment and management of the school. It has been held that founders of the minority institution have faith and confidence in their own committee or body consisting of the persons selected by them. Thus, they could choose their managing committee as well as they have a right to choose its teachers. Minority institutions have some kind of autonomy in their administration. It has been held that founders of the minority institution have faith and confidence in their own committee or body consisting of the persons selected by them. Thus, they could choose their managing committee as well as they have a right to choose its teachers. Minority institutions have some kind of autonomy in their administration. This would entail the right to administer effectively and to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. There is a fine distinction between a restriction on the right of administration and a regulation prescribing the manner of administration. What should be prevented is the mal-administration. Just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character and content of the minority institutions, similarly, regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration. 112. Every linguistic minority may have its own socio, economic and cultural limitations. It has a constitutional right to conserve such culture and language. Thus, it would have a right to choose teachers, who possess the eligibility and qualifications, as provided, without really being impressed by the fact of their religion and community. Its own limitations may not permit, for cultural, economic or other good reasons, to induct teachers from a particular class or community. The direction, as contemplated under Rule 64(1)(b), could be enforced against the general or majority category of the Government aided school but, it may not be appropriate to enforce such condition against linguistic minority schools. This may amount to interference with their right of choice and, at the same time, may dilute their character of linguistic minority. It would be impermissible in law to bring such actions under the cover of equality which in fact, would diminish the very essence of their character or status. Linguistic and cultural compatibility can be legitimately claimed as one of the desirable features of a linguistic minority in relation to selection of eligible and qualified teachers. 113. A linguistic minority institution is entitled to the protection and the right of equality enshrined in the provisions of the Constitution. The power is vested in the State to frame regulations, with an object to ensure better organization and development of school education and matters incidental thereto. Such power must operate within its limitation while ensuring that it does not, in any way, dilute or impairs the basic character of linguistic minority. The power is vested in the State to frame regulations, with an object to ensure better organization and development of school education and matters incidental thereto. Such power must operate within its limitation while ensuring that it does not, in any way, dilute or impairs the basic character of linguistic minority. Its right to establish and administer has to be construed liberally to bring it in alignment with the constitutional protections available to such communities. The minority society can hardly be compelled to perform acts or deeds which per se would tantamount to infringement of its right to manage and control. In fact, it would tantamount to imposing impermissible restriction. A school which has been established and granted status of a linguistic minority for years, it will not be proper to stop its grant-in-aid for the reason that it has failed to comply with a condition or restriction which is impermissible in law, particularly, when the teacher appointed or proposed to be appointed by such institution satisfy the laid down criteria and/or eligibility conditions. The minority has an inbuilt right to appoint persons, which in its opinion are better culturally and linguistically compatible to the institution.” 33. Regulations can be framed but in reference of minority institution, such regulations should not have the tenets of impinging on the character of institution or in any way substantially diluting the right of minority to administer and manage its affairs. 34. On the said parameters, from the perspective and point of view of minorities right to administer, we find, in the present case, that Chancellor necessarily will have to be an outsider, thus forcing the members of the minority community to have a Chancellor outside from their society or the trust, in our considered opinion, would certainly impinge upon the right to administer as the Chancellor, who would be an outsider, may be as per their choice, as per the provisions that have been so introduced, but even then he/she will have the authority to decide the dispute in reference of question whether any person has been dully nominated or appointed, as or is entitled to be a member of any authority or any committee of the institution deemed to be university, including the issue of disqualification. A forum has been provided to an outsider for deciding such a dispute certainly has the tenets of impinging Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. A forum has been provided to an outsider for deciding such a dispute certainly has the tenets of impinging Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. There is fine distinction in between restriction on the right of administration and a regulation in the matter of administration. Present clause 5.02 in effect is not at all regulatory vis-a-vis minority institution rather it has the tenets of restricting to administer as per their own choice by thrusting an outsider with the right to intervene in certain contingencies. Said regulation clearly offends Article 30(1) of the Constitution and cannot be pressed qua minority institutions. 35. Once such is the factual situation that is so emerging that after UGC [Institutions Deemed to be Universities] Regulation 2010 has been enforced, accepted position is that till today the said provisions in question have not at all been incorporated rather after receiving the same a detailed reply has been submitted by AAI mentioning therein that there are various provisions that are infringing upon the minority rights and the most unfortunate part of the same is that UGC, in the present case, has been sitting tight over the matter and has been writing letters after letters without considering this aspect of the matter as to whether regulations in question, that have been sought to be enforced upon the university in any way impinges upon the minority rights. Once the minority institution is resisting the enforcement of UGC [Institutions Deemed to be Universities] Regulation 2010 on certain scores by clearly mentioning therein that such part of the regulations has the offending effect of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, then UGC was duty bound to take a call instead of proceeding to write letters after letters by mentioning that same is applicable on all institutions whether minority or non-minority. The fact of the matter is that in reference of minority institution in case regulations sought to be introduced has the effect of impingement of right of administration, then UGC was duty bound to consider such matters. 36. The fact of the matter is that in reference of minority institution in case regulations sought to be introduced has the effect of impingement of right of administration, then UGC was duty bound to consider such matters. 36. Here UGC has not at all considered the UGC [Institutions Deemed to be Universities] Regulation 2010 from the perspective and point of view of minority rights, in view of this, to presume that UGC [Institutions Deemed to be Universities] Regulation 2010 can be ipso facto pressed as per Regulation 1.2 wherein it has been mentioned that these regulations shall apply to every institution seeking declaration as an institution deemed to be university as well as the institution who has already declared as an institution deemed to be university under Section 3 of the UGC Act, 1956 cannot be accepted and once an issue was being raised then such an issue certainly ought to have been addressed instead of sitting tight over the matter and insisting upon enforcement of the same. 37. Moreover, Apex Court in the case of Kalyani Mathivanan v. K.V. Jeyraj, 2015(6) SCC 363 , in reference of UGC (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations 2010, wherein also issue of appointment of Vice-Chancellor has been raised by praying for writ of quo warranto for the removal of Vice-Chancellor, view has been taken that the UGC Regulations 2010 are mandatory to teachers and other academic staff in all the Central Universities and Colleges thereunder and the institutions deemed to be universities whose maintenance expenditure is met by UGC. Here accepted position is that no maintenance expenditure is met by the UGC in reference of AAI. Accordingly, to say that provisions of UGC (Institutions Deemed to be Universities) Regulation 2010 would ipso facto apply cannot be accepted vis-a-vis minority institutions. UGC will have to take final call once objections are raised and after final call is taken, then, thereafter, directives issued by the UGC if are not being complied with then UGC is free to take action in accordance with law i.e. under Section 14 of UGC Act, 1956 and institute is also free to assail the validity of action, so taken, in accordance with law, at appropriate forum. 38. 38. In view of this as far as appointment of Chancellor is concerned, who holds Ph.D. Degree from East Georgia University USA, to say that he is continuing in public office contrary to UGC [Institutions Deemed to be Universities] Regulation 2010, cannot be accepted by us. 39. Now coming to the issue in reference of Vice-Chancellor of the university concerned. In order to appreciate this aspect of the matter, we would have to examine the Model Constitution (Memorandum of Association & Rules) that has been approved by the UGC while recommending for declaration of AAI as deemed university, at the point of time when AAI was declared to be deemed university it was specifically provided that the present Principal/Director of the Institute shall be the first Vice-Chancellor of the University, who shall continue on the post till the age of 65 years. Article XV (A) of the Memorandum of Association and Rules of Allahabad Agricultural Institute which deals with the selection procedure and Article XVIII (C) which deals with the tenure of the Vice-Chancellor are reproduced hereunder for convenient perusal of the Hon’ble Court : “Article XV (A)(i)Selection Committee for appointing Vice-Chancellor of the Institute/Deemed University 1. President of the Deemed University - Chairman 2. Three members of the Board of Directors nominated for the purpose by the Board of Directors - Member 3. Three outside experts appointed by the Board of Directors not below the rank of Director/Professor/Eminent Educationist - Member 4. A nominee of Chairperson, UGC (Preferably representing the area of Agricultural Science & Technology) - Member (ii) The Committee shall submit its recommendation to the Board of Directors for appointment. The Board of Directors may also consider for appointment as Vice-Chancellor, any of the Directors/Registrar (if they fulfill qualifications) directly. The Board of Directors may also invite Eminent Christian Scholars/Scientists/Administrator (if he/she fulfills qualifications) from within India or outside and offer him/her an appointment directly. For appointing Vice-Chancellor, Directors, Registrar and Finance Comptroller or any other Executive Officer it shall be absolute power of the Board of Directors of Allahabad Agricultural Institute. The Board of Directors may also invite Eminent Christian Scholars/Scientists/Administrator (if he/she fulfills qualifications) from within India or outside and offer him/her an appointment directly. For appointing Vice-Chancellor, Directors, Registrar and Finance Comptroller or any other Executive Officer it shall be absolute power of the Board of Directors of Allahabad Agricultural Institute. As far as the first Vice-Chancellor is concerned, the existing Director/Principal of the Institute shall be the Vice-Chancellor of the Deemed University till retirement as stipulated in the Article XVIII (C).” “Article XVIII (C) - Powers and Duties of Vice-Chancellor— The Vice-Chancellor shall be a whole time salaried officer of the Institute/Deemed University and shall be appointed by the Board of Directors. In the absence of Vice-Chancellor due to retirement/resignation/illness/leave or any other reason, the Registrar/or Director authorized by the Board shall officiate in his place. However, under normal circumstances, the Vice-Chancellor may authorize Registrar or any one of the Directors to officiate in his place during his absence from Allahabad. Ordinarily the Vice-Chancellor shall superannuate at the age of prescribed for teaching staff from time to time, but the Board of Directors may extend his appointment for a maximum period of five years more years or upto 65 years of age whichever is higher.” 40. The present Vice-Chancellor came to be appointed in the institution as Principal of the AAI, an associate college of the University of Allahabad, under Statute 11.13-A of the First Statutes of the University of Allahabad, 1976, with effect from 4.10.1997 after selection for the post of Principal, Allahabad Agricultural Institute was done in accordance with the provisions of Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 and the Statute 13.13-A of the First Statutes of the University of Allahabad, 1976. Application for the post of Principal, Allahabad Agricultural Institute was invited through advertisement published in the Newspapers ‘’The Pioneer’, ‘’The Northern India Patrika’ and ‘’Aaj’ published from Allahabad on 6/7/8.8.1997. Since Dr. Application for the post of Principal, Allahabad Agricultural Institute was invited through advertisement published in the Newspapers ‘’The Pioneer’, ‘’The Northern India Patrika’ and ‘’Aaj’ published from Allahabad on 6/7/8.8.1997. Since Dr. Rajendra Bihari Lal fulfilled the eligibility criteria for the appointment of Principal of a Post-graduate Associate College of the University of Allahabad, he applied for the post of Principal, AAI and interview for the post of Principal, AAI was held on 4.10.1997, wherein recommendation made by Selection Committee has been as follows : “Recommendation of the Selection Committee : Considering the provisions of Allahabad University Statute 1976, 11.13 A [2] (a) and (b) : other necessary qualifications and specialized experience in the field of Agricultural Science and Technology and on the basis of performance in the interview, the Selection Committee unanimously recommends appointment of Dr. Rajendra B. Lal to the post of Principal of the Institute.” 41. Thereafter, by letter No. C-1825/VC-97, dated 4.10.1997, the Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad, was pleased to approve the recommendation of the Selection Committee, appointing Dr. Rajendra Bihari Lal as Principal of the Institute. Letter No. C-1825/VC-97, dated 4.10.1997, written by the Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad, is reproduced hereunder : “With reference to your letter dated 4th October, 1997, I am desired to inform you that the Vice-Chancellor has been pleased to approve the recommendation of the Selection Committee in appointing Dr. Rajendra B. Lal as the Principal of the Institute. You may please issue an appointment letter in favour of Dr. R.B. Lal and send a copy of the same for our record.” 42. On receipt of approval from the University of Allahabad, the Chairman, Board of Directors, AAI by his letter dated 4.10.1997 appointed the Dr. Rajendra Bihari Lal as Principal, AAI. Relevant extract of letter dated 4.10.1997 written by the Chairman, Board of Directors, AAI to Dr. Rajendra Bihari Lal is reproduced hereunder : “With the approval of Selection Committee recommendations by the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors, AAI, vide Resolution No. 97-47, and the approval of the Vice-Chancellor vide his letter No. C-1824/VC/97 and No. C-1825/VC/97, dt. 04/10/1997, I am happy to appoint you as Principal of Allahabad Agricultural Institute with effect from the date you join on this post. I am confident that you will perform your duties diligently and efficiently in order to upheld and carry on the vision of this Christian Minority Institution. 04/10/1997, I am happy to appoint you as Principal of Allahabad Agricultural Institute with effect from the date you join on this post. I am confident that you will perform your duties diligently and efficiently in order to upheld and carry on the vision of this Christian Minority Institution. Further, vide Resolution No. 97-48 of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors, AAI, you shall also continue to function as Director & Executive Secretary of AAI.” 43. On being declared a Deemed to be University the State Government by G.O. No. 1100/12-8-2001-900(3)/97, dated 13.11.2001, upgraded the post of the Principal, AAI to the post of Vice-Chancellor, AAI (Deemed-to-be-University). Since Dr. Rajendra Bihari Lal was appointed as Principal, AAI, he was appointed the first Vice-Chancellor of the Deemed University, in concurrence of the University Grants Commission and the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India. Accordingly, the post of Principal was upgraded by the State Government. Thereafter, by letter dated 24.3.2000 issued by the Chairman, Board of Directors and President, AAI-Deemed University, the post of Director was redesignated as Vice-Chancellor. Relevant extract of letter dated 24.3.2000 issued by the Chairman, Board of Directors and President, AAI-Deemed University is reproduced hereunder : “In accordance with the Board Action BD 99-18 dated 29.1.1999, the new amended Constitution for Deemed University comes into effect from the date the Central Government declared Allahabad Agricultural Institute as Deemed University. Thus the new Constitution has come into effect from 15th March, 2000. The Board of Directors in its meeting held on 29.1.1999 took the following decision: “(C) Consequent to the declaration of Deemed University status to Allahabad Agricultural Institute with effect from the date of Notification, the Article XV (ii) of the amended Constitution shall become operative, and the existing Director/Principal of the Institute shall become the Vice-Chancellor of the Deemed University. It is further resolved that the post of Director/Principal be redesignated as Vice-Chancellor and the present incumbent Professor (Dr.) Rajendra B. Lal who was earlier appointed as Director of the Institute is redesignated as Vice-Chancellor with effect from the date of notification.” The current academic status of Vice-Chancellor is as follows; 1. B. Sc. (Ag.) - First Class, University of Allahabad in 1976 2. M. Sc. Agronomy - First Class, University of Allahabad in 1978 3. Ph.D. Agricultural Botany - Kanpur in 1983 4. B. Sc. (Ag.) - First Class, University of Allahabad in 1976 2. M. Sc. Agronomy - First Class, University of Allahabad in 1978 3. Ph.D. Agricultural Botany - Kanpur in 1983 4. Ph.D. Soil Science - Kansas State University, U.S.A. in 1990 5. P.D.F. - Kansas State University, U.S.A. in 1991 Further, the respondent has been honoured as under : (i) Fellow - Bioved Research Society in 1995. (ii) Member of Gamma Sigma Delta, A Honour Society of Agriculture, U.S.A. in 1988 (iii) S.T.E.P. Award winner, Soil Science Society of America in 1989 (iv) Olson’s Award from Kansas State University, U.S.A. in 1989 (v) Fellow Award, Indian Society of Agricultural Chemists. (vi) Educational Pioneer Award, A.I.A.C.H. E. in 2000 (viii) Jai Jawan Jai Kisan, S.U.C.O. in 2001 (viii) Vidya Bhushan Award, INDIAN PRESS COUNCIL, Andhra Pradesh Chapter, Hyderabad in 2004 (ix) Most Prestigious Fellow Award, 4th National Extension Education Congress in 2007. (ix) Fellow, Indian Chemical Society in 2013 (x) President, Indian Agricultural Universities Association. (xii) President, Indian Universities Association (xiii) President, All India Association for Christian Higher Education 44. Once such is the factual situation that by virtue of being the Principal of the institution concerned Dr. Rajendra Bihari Lal is holding the post of Vice-Chancellor of the university in question and till date he has not at all attained the age of 65 years, then to say that the said incumbent is holding the post without any authority of law, cannot be subscribed in the facts of the case, in view of this, the challenge that is being made on both the scores i.e. in reference of appointment of Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor, both have no merit and bound to fail as writ of quo warranto can be issued, as per the judgment of Apex Court in the case of B. Sriniwas Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board, 2006 (11) SCC 711, only when there is clear violation of law. Here there is none. Consequently, writ petition is dismissed. ———————