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Uttarakhand High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 219 (UTT)

Sarva Singh Chauhan v. Union of India

2016-05-13

K.M.JOSEPH, U.C.DHYANI

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.M. Joseph, J. These three writ petitions being connected, we are disposing of the same by this common judgment. Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011: 2. The petitioners seek to quash order dated 23.09.2011 (Annexure No. 15). They further seek a mandamus directing the State of Uttarakhand not to interfere in their peaceful working and to pay them salary on monthly basis. 3. Very briefly put, the case of the petitioners is as follows: i. In the erstwhile State of Uttar Pradesh, an Advertisement was issued on 07.10.1998 by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”). The Advertisement was issued for the purpose of recruitment to the Lower Subordinate Services. The post of Excise Inspector was one of the posts, which was advertised. The petitioners applied for the said post. The result of the written examination was declared on 20.12.1999 and the petitioners were declared successful. On 11.08.2000, after verification of the credentials of the petitioners and other formalities, recommendation was sent by the Commission to the State of Uttar Pradesh for appointing the petitioners. The Excise Commissioner, by communication dated 11.08.2000, informed the petitioners about the fact of the recommendation. It is while so that the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) came to be passed. The said Act provided for creation of State of Uttaranchal and the State of Uttar Pradesh as successor States as a result of the reorganisation. The Act was passed and received the assent of the President on 25.08.2000. The Government of India, it appears, issued certain guidelines in the meantime. According to the petitioners, in terms of the guidelines, actual appointment to the posts, including the post in question, was not effected and the procedure was kept in abeyance. Resultantly, petitioners were not appointed on or before 09.11.2000 “the appointed day”. On the basis of the guidelines issued, however, appointment orders were issued to the petitioners after 09.11.2000. Petitioners, by order dated 15.02.2001, were asked to join the State of Uttarakhand on various dates. Petitioners were asked for their willingness to serve in the State of Uttarakhand by communication dated 13.06.2003. Petitioners had domicile in the State of Uttarakhand and they expressed their willingness, which was communicated by the Government of Uttarakhand to the Reorganisation Cell. Petitioners, by order dated 15.02.2001, were asked to join the State of Uttarakhand on various dates. Petitioners were asked for their willingness to serve in the State of Uttarakhand by communication dated 13.06.2003. Petitioners had domicile in the State of Uttarakhand and they expressed their willingness, which was communicated by the Government of Uttarakhand to the Reorganisation Cell. According to the petitioners, at the instance of certain persons, who were though junior to the petitioners in the cadre of Excise Inspector and who felt aggrieved by the inclusion of the petitioners in the State of Uttarakhand, steps were taken to get the petitioners relieved in the year 2004. An order was passed by the Secretary to relieve them. The said order dated 17.08.2004 came to be challenged before this Court by filing Writ Petition (S/S) No. 943 of 2004. An interim order was passed by this Court on 19.08.2004 providing that the petitioners will not be relieved. After exchange of pleadings, the writ petition came to be finally disposed of on 03.05.2007. Since much may turn on the impact of the said judgment, we deem it appropriate to extract the same as under: “Heard Sri S.N. Babulkar, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ravi Babulkar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Paresh Tripathi, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing of the order dated 17th August 2004 passed by the Secretary Excise Department, Govt. of Uttarakhand, by which the petitioners were directed to be relieved for the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioners were selected as Excise Inspectors and were appointed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, after creation of State of Uttarakhand. After providing appointments to the petitioners, they were relieved for State of Uttarakhand and were directed to join in the Excise Department in the State of Uttarakhand. A decision was taken by the State Advisory Committee on 1st July 2004 that the petitioners who have been appointed by the State of Uttar Pradesh after creation of State of Uttarakhand, should be relieved for State of Uttar Pradesh consequently, by the impugned order dated 17th August 2004 the petitioners have been directed to be relieved for State of Uttar Pradesh. Stand of the petitioners is that after being appointed in Excise Department, they have opted for State of Uttarakhand and consequently this court on 19.08.2004 has stayed relieving of the petitioner, which was extended on 03.09.2004. On the basis of the interim order, the petitioners are still working in the State of Uttarakhand. Govt. of India, Ministry of Personnel Training, Personnel Grievances and Pension, New Delhi has issued a Circular dated 15th September 2004 to the Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh as well as Uttarakhand to the effect that a large number of representations have been received from personnel requesting for consideration of their mutual transfer with another consenting State services personnel. Since the central Government has already issued final allocation list, it finds no reason to entertain such requests. However, it is open to the successor State Govt. to consider requests of mutual transfer based on broad consensus arrived at between the State Governments, inter-alia, either defining the terms and conditions for such consideration or by finding suitable Rules for this purpose. The petitioners are now intending to get benefit of the Circular issued on 15th September 2004 by Govt. of India. The petitioners alongwith their rejoinder affidavit have annexed a joint application as annexure no.3. From perusal this annexure no. 3 it reveals that the petitioners who are 6 in numbers and those of 6 Excise Inspectors who are serving in the State of Uttar Pradesh and have allocated for State of Uttarakhand have jointly requested that they wants to remain in State of Uttar Pradesh whereas, the petitioners wants to remain in State of Uttarakhand on the basis of mutual transfer policy. According to the petitioners, similar application has been submitted before the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioners now claiming benefit on the basis of the Circular dated 15th September 2004 issued by Govt. of India wherein the Govt. of India has left it open to the successor State Governments to consider requests of mutual transfer based on broad consensus arrived at between the State Governments, inter-alia, either defining the terms and conditions in such consideration or by finding suitable Rules for this purpose. It is not disputed that the petitioners were appointed by State of Uttar Pradesh, after creation of State of Uttarakhand. It is not disputed that the petitioners were appointed by State of Uttar Pradesh, after creation of State of Uttarakhand. The action of State of Uttar Pradesh for relieving the petitioners to State of Uttarakhand unilaterally was not correct, as such, I do not find any illegality in passing the impugned order dated 17th August 2004 by State of Uttarakhand, however considering the fact that the Central Govt. has issued Circular leaving it open to the State Govt. to consider the cases of mutual transfers and the fact that the petitioners who are 6 in numbers and are working in State of Uttarakhand and 6 persons who are also working in State of Uttar Pradesh as Excise inspectors have jointly applied for mutual transfers, I do not find any ground to direct the respondents not to relieve the petitioners for State of Uttar Pradesh. However it is expected from Govt. of Uttarakhand to consider the claim of the petitioners and pass speaking order on the joint application moved by the petitioners as well as by 6 persons working as Excise Inspectors in State of Uttar Pradesh for their mutual transfer, prior relieving the petitioners for State of Uttar Pradesh and after consulting State of Uttar Pradesh, in case, both the State Governments have reached to a consensus in respect of mutual transfer, as per the policy framed by Govt. of Uttarakhand in pursuance to the directions of Union of India and further, in case, the State of Uttarakhand comes to the conclusion that the State Govt. is in need of petitioners services. With these directions, the writ petition is finally disposed of. No order as to costs.” ii. It appears that, even after the judgment, petitioners were allowed to continue in the State of Uttarakhand. Thereafter, on 13.09.2011, the State of Uttarakhand, taking into consideration Clause 5(c) of the communication of the Central Government, absorbed/transferred the services of the petitioners to the State of Uttarakhand from the date of their joining. However, within the space of 10 days thereafter, by the impugned order dated 23.09.2011, the earlier order was cancelled and it is, accordingly, that the petitioners are before us. 4. Pleadings have been exchanged in this case. Wherever necessary, we will advert to the same. Writ Petition (S/B) No. 264 of 2013: 5. However, within the space of 10 days thereafter, by the impugned order dated 23.09.2011, the earlier order was cancelled and it is, accordingly, that the petitioners are before us. 4. Pleadings have been exchanged in this case. Wherever necessary, we will advert to the same. Writ Petition (S/B) No. 264 of 2013: 5. This writ petition is filed calling in question order dated 05.08.2013 passed by respondent No. 1 (Union of India). The party respondents in this case are the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011. 6. The case of the petitioners, in short, is that the party respondents not being the employees of the State of Uttar Pradesh as on the appointed day, they could not have been allocated to the State of Uttarakhand. It is their case that they would suffer if the party respondents are allowed to continue in the State of Uttarakhand as a result of intrusion into their right to seniority. It is, accordingly, that they seek to challenge the order, which we have adverted to. The said order reads as follows: “F. No. 27/21/2011-SRS Government of India Ministry of Personnel, P.G. & Pensions Department of Personnel & Training 3rd Floor, Lok Nayak Bhavan Khan Market, New Delhi Dated 5 Aug, 2013 To, The Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. The Chief Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand Uttarakhand. Sub:- Appointment of personnel, who were not considered for allocation under the Reorganization Act because of their entry into Govt. Service after the appointed day. Sir, I am directed to say that a case of six Excise Inspectors of the Excise Deptt., Namely S/Sh. Sarv Singh Chauhan, Kalyan Singh, Amar Singh Bounal, Devendra Singh Rawat, Ramesh Ram and Sanjay Kumar, have come into the notice of the Central Government, who were recruited for a recruitment period prior to be appointed day i.e. 09.11.2000, but were not allocated under the Reorganization Act because they were appointed into service after the appointed day. On their initial appointment, they were posted in Uttarakhand as per their option and domicile. However, the Govt. of Uttarakhand relieved them for UP on the assumption that since they have not been finally allocated to Uttarakhand by the Central Govt. they are deemed to be allocated to U.P. Consequently, they joined in UP and are working there at present. However, these Excise Inspectors have represented for revision of allocation to Uttarakhand. However, the Govt. of Uttarakhand relieved them for UP on the assumption that since they have not been finally allocated to Uttarakhand by the Central Govt. they are deemed to be allocated to U.P. Consequently, they joined in UP and are working there at present. However, these Excise Inspectors have represented for revision of allocation to Uttarakhand. Since these employees were validly appointed to Uttarakhand as per their option and domicile, their relieving for UP is not in order. The Govt. of Uttarakhand may, therefore, cancel the relieving order so that they could be repatriated to Uttarakhand by UP in terms of their appointment in the State. It has also been decided that in all similar cases where the employees were recruited for recruitment years prior to the appointed day but were not finally allocated in terms of the Reorganization Act because of their entry into service after the appointed day, these employees shall be considered to be validly appointed to the State of their appointment on option of domicile basis and are not to be relieved by the successor States of UP or Uttarakhand assuming them to be allocated under the Reorganization Act. This issues with the approval of Secretary (P). Yours faithfully Sd/- (Monika Singh) Director Copy to:- 1. Principal Secretary, UP Reorganization Coord. Deptt. R. No. 46 Bahukhandi Bhavan, Secretariat, Lucknow. 2. Secretary, Reorganization, Govt. of Uttarakhand, Secretariat, Dehradun.” Writ Petition (S/B) No. 184 of 2014: 7. This writ petition does not relate to the Excise Department, which is the Department, which is the subject matter of the other two writ petitions. It relates to the Public Works Department. Therein also, petitioners call in question four orders dated 26.06.2013, 06.09.2013, 20.02.2014 and 22.02.2014. 8. In a nutshell, the case of the petitioners is that the party respondent therein was the employee of the State of Uttar Pradesh. He continued to be so till order dated 26.06.2013, by which he was allocated to the State of Uttarakhand. Furthermore, by the other impugned orders, reckoning the seniority of the party respondent acquired by him on his appointment in the State of Uttar Pradesh, petitioners’ seniority is sought to be disturbed. Therefore, in short, the allocation order and the orders determining the inter se seniority of the petitioners and the party respondent are questioned. 9. We have heard Mr. Furthermore, by the other impugned orders, reckoning the seniority of the party respondent acquired by him on his appointment in the State of Uttar Pradesh, petitioners’ seniority is sought to be disturbed. Therefore, in short, the allocation order and the orders determining the inter se seniority of the petitioners and the party respondent are questioned. 9. We have heard Mr. Manoj Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011; Mr. Sharad Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 264 of 2013; and Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 184 of 2014. We have also heard Mr. B.S. Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand; Ms. Beena Pande, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh; and Mr. Sanjay Bhatt, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India. Arguments by Mr. Manoj Tiwari, Senior Advocate: 10. Mr. Manoj Tiwari would submit that this is a case, where the Court must bear in mind that, when the new State was being created under the aegis of the Act, petitioners had already applied for being recruited pursuant to the Advertisement issued by the Commission. The Advertisement was issued in the year 1998. Petitioners applied. At that time, the State was undivided. The Government of India stepped in and issued guidelines. These guidelines are sought to be rested on the provisions of Section 77 of the Act. He would submit that the resultant position was that the States, which were obliged to obey the command of the guidelines, did not proceed to fill-up the vacancies though the recruitment was complete at the hands of the Commission. For no fault of theirs, petitioners could not be appointed before the appointed day. He would submit that the petitioners are all having their domicile within the State of Uttarakhand. In fact, according to the petitioners, they belong to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. For no fault of theirs, petitioners could not be appointed before the appointed day. He would submit that the petitioners are all having their domicile within the State of Uttarakhand. In fact, according to the petitioners, they belong to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. At this juncture, it is apposite to notice one of the main arguments advanced by the petitioners and that is as follows: The petitioners, if they are sent away from the State of Uttarakhand to the State of Uttar Pradesh, will lose all the rights flowing from the notification of their caste in the Presidential Order qua the State of Uttarakhand. In other words, in order to enjoy the fruits of the Presidential Order, it is absolutely indispensable that the petitioners continue in the State of Uttarakhand. They belong to the State of Uttarakhand. The inevitable consequence of their claims being discountenanced would be that they would cease to enjoy the benefits. This will cause grave hardship to them and their progeny in future, as they would be deprived of the benefits. 11. It is pointed out that the Government of India, in fact, found substance in their grievance and that is how the order came to be passed, which is impugned in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 264 of 2013. It is, therefore, the case of the petitioners that the writ petition filed by them may be allowed and they may be allowed to continue. Arguments by Mr. Sharad Sharma, Senior Advocate: 12. Per contra, Mr. Sharad Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 264 of 2013, would contend that the facts unambiguously establish that the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 had not been appointed before 09.11.2000. The Government of India was functus officio in the matter. It had no authority to issue the impugned order. The impugned order cannot be issued. Emphasis is laid on the clear provisions of Section 73 of the Act in this regard. The guidelines cannot be canvassed to defeat the clear provisions of the statute, runs the argument. It is also pointed out that the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 had approached this Court earlier when the Government had decided to pack them off to the State of Uttar Pradesh in the year 2004. Though an interim order was obtained, finally the writ petition was dismissed. It is also pointed out that the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 had approached this Court earlier when the Government had decided to pack them off to the State of Uttar Pradesh in the year 2004. Though an interim order was obtained, finally the writ petition was dismissed. He would, therefore, submit that it is inconceivable how the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 could be brought back again to the State of Uttarakhand on the strength of the order of the Government of India, which was without any authority. Arguments by Mr. M.C. Pant, Advocate: 13. As far as the third writ petition is concerned, in which Mr. M.C. Pant, Advocate is appearing on behalf of the petitioners, the arguments would essentially run on similar lines as addressed by Mr. Sharad Sharma, Senior Advocate, namely, that the Government of India has no authority in the matter beyond what is provided under the provisions of the Act. In this regard, reliance is placed on the Bench decision of this Court in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 1313 of 2005 (Ashok Kumar & others vs. State of Uttaranchal & others). It is contended that, in this case, the party respondent was appointed in the State of Uttar Pradesh after the appointed day and he continued to work there till 2013 when he was allocated to the State of Uttarakhand. The bringing in of the party respondent to the State of Uttarakhand is unauthorised in law. 14. Mr. Manoj Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the party respondent in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 184 of 2014, defended the orders. Here also, the party respondent is a Schedule Tribe, who hails from the Chakrata Region of Dehradun and similar arguments are raised. Arguments by the Deputy Advocate General on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand and the Standing Counsel on behalf of the State of U.P.: 15. The learned Deputy Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand would submit that the order passed in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 relieving the petitioners therein for the State of Uttar Pradesh was fully justified having regard to the fact that the petitioners were not appointed by the State of Uttar Pradesh as on the appointed day. 16. 16. The learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh also addressed the arguments in regard to the question relating to the effect of allocation and it being overturned qua the caste issue, which we will advert to at the appropriate stage. Findings: 17. It is apposite to take notice of the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act received the assent of the President on 25.08.2000 and was published in the Gazette on the same day. “Appointed day” has been defined as the day on which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. It is not in dispute that the said day has been notified in the Gazette as 09.11.2000. Therefore, the Act came into force effectively with reference to the appointed day, namely, 09.11.2000. What is relevant for our purpose in this case is Part VIII, which comes under the heading “Provisions as to Services”. We may straightaway go to Section 73, as Section 72 deals with All India Services and it need not detain us. Section 73 reads as follows: “73. Provisions relating to other services.- (1) Every person who immediately before the appointed day is serving in connection with the affairs of the existing State of Uttar Pradesh shall, on and from that day provisionally continue to serve in connection with the affairs of the State of Uttar Pradesh unless he is required, by general or special order of the Central Government to serve provisionally in connection with the affairs of the State of Uttaranchal: Provided that every direction under this sub-section issued after the expiry of a period of one year from the appointed day shall be issued with the consultation of the Governments of successor States. (2) As soon as may be after the appointed day, the Central Government shall by general or special order, determine the successor State to which every person referred to in sub-section (1) shall be finally allotted for service and the date with effect from which such allotment shall take effect or be deemed to have taken effect. (2) As soon as may be after the appointed day, the Central Government shall by general or special order, determine the successor State to which every person referred to in sub-section (1) shall be finally allotted for service and the date with effect from which such allotment shall take effect or be deemed to have taken effect. (3) Every person who is finally allotted under the provisions of sub-section(2) to a successor State shall, if he is not already serving therein be made available for serving in the successor State from such date as may be agreed upon between the Governments concerned or in default of such agreement, as may be determined by the Central Government.” 18. Section 74 equally appears to, in the main part, preserve the applicability of Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution. It also provides that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day in the case of any person deemed to have been allocated to the State of Uttar Pradesh or to the State of Uttaranchal under Section 73 shall not be varied to his disadvantage, except with the previous approval of the Central Government. Section 75 relates to continuance of officers in the same post. It also contemplates persons, who, immediately before the appointed day, are holding or discharging duties on a post or office. Section 76 provides for an Advisory Committee. It reads as follows: “76. Advisory Committees.- The Central Government may, by order, establish one or more Advisory Committees for the purpose of assisting it in regard to- (a) the discharge of any of its functions under this Part; and (b) the ensuring of fair and equitable treatment to all persons affected by the provisions of this Part and the proper consideration of any representations made by such persons.” 19. Thereafter, there is Section 77, around which provision much of the arguments of Mr. Manoj Tiwari will revolve. It reads as follows: “77. Power of Central Government to give directions. – The Central Government may give such directions to the State Government of Uttar Pradesh and the State Government of Uttaranchal as may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the foregoing provisions of this Part and the State Government shall comply with such directions.” 20. Power of Central Government to give directions. – The Central Government may give such directions to the State Government of Uttar Pradesh and the State Government of Uttaranchal as may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the foregoing provisions of this Part and the State Government shall comply with such directions.” 20. Finally, there is Section 78, which deals with Public Service Commission and, with that, provisions in Part VIII come to an end. 21. Within the framework of these Sections, it becomes our duty to explore the questions, which have been debated before us by the learned counsel. The main case of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 is built around the guidelines issued by the Government of India. The relevant guideline, which is thrust upon before us, is as follows: “5(c). All recruitments against vacancies in the interim i.e. till issue of the final allocation orders may be kept in abeyance. Wherever panels have been drawn but not published, they may be kept in abeyance till reorganization of states is given effect to. Wherever panels have been recently published, selected candidates may be notified that their services in the existing State of Bihar/Madhya Pradesh/Uttar Pradesh may not be required beyond the ‘Appointed Day’ and that they are liable to serve in the Successor State of Jharkhand/Chhattisgarh/Uttaranchal after Reorganization, as the case may be.” 22. Therefore, the argument of Mr. Manoj Tiwari is that, having regard to the guidelines, which were issued by the Government, and the fact that the petitioners could not be appointed before the appointed day, petitioners cannot be faulted or deprived of the right to be allocated to the State of Uttarakhand, where they have their domicile and, far more importantly, where their caste status would be preserved and all benefits due to them would accrue. Any other view would have disastrous consequences for the petitioners, as they would be in peril of being driven to the State of Uttar Pradesh, where they would not enjoy the benefits of their caste status. It is, at this juncture, that we need to take notice of a few decisions, which are relevant for this purpose, brought to our notice by Mr. Manoj Tiwari. It is, at this juncture, that we need to take notice of a few decisions, which are relevant for this purpose, brought to our notice by Mr. Manoj Tiwari. They are as follows: (i) Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao vs. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College & others, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 130 ; (ii) Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra & another vs. Union of India & another, reported in (1994) 5 SCC 244 ; and (iii) U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad vs. Sanjay Kumar Singh, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 657 . 23. In the first of these decisions, i.e. (1990) 3 SCC 130 , the Apex Court, inter alia, held as follows: “The petitioner is not entitled to be admitted to the Medical College on the basis that he belongs to Scheduled Tribe in his original State. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes belonging to a particular area of the country must be given protection so long as and to the extent they are entitled in order to become equal with others. But equally those who go to other areas should also ensure that they make way for the disadvantaged and disabled of that part of the community who suffer from disabilities in those areas. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes say of Andhra Pradesh do require necessary protection as balanced between other communities. But equally the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes say of Maharashtra in the instant case, do require protection in the State of Maharashtra, which will have to be in balance to other communities. This must be the basic approach to the problem.” 24. The question, again, came up for consideration at the hands of a Constitution Bench in (1994) 5 SCC 244 , wherein the court followed the earlier judgment and held as follows: “On a plain reading of clause (1) of Articles 341 and 342 it is manifest that the power of the President is limited to specifying the castes or tribes which shall, for the purposes of the Constitution, be deemed to be Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in relation to a State or a Union Territory, as the case may be. Once a notification is issued under clause (1) of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, Parliament can by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, specified in the notification, any caste or tribe but save for that limited purpose the notification issued under clause (1), shall not be varied by any subsequent notification. The castes or tribes have to be specified in relation to a given State or Union Territory. That means a given caste or tribe can be a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in relation to the State or Union Territory for which it is specified. Considerations for specifying a particular caste or tribe or class for inclusion in the list of Scheduled Castes/Schedule Tribes or backward classes in a given State would depend on the nature and extent of disadvantages and social hardships suffered by that caste, tribe or class in that State which may be totally non est in another State to which persons belonging thereto may migrate. Coincidentally it may be that a caste or tribe bearing the same nomenclature is specified in two States but the considerations on the basis of which they have been specified may be totally different. So also the degree of disadvantages of various elements which constitute the input for specification may also be totally different. Therefore, merely because a given caste is specified in State A as a Scheduled Caste does not necessarily mean that if there be another caste bearing the same nomenclature in another State the person belonging to the former would be entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits admissible to a member of the Scheduled Caste of the latter State “for the purposes of this Constitution”. This is an aspect which has to be kept in mind and which was very much in the minds of the Constitution-makers as is evident from the choice of language of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution.” 25. We notice that in (1990) 3 SCC 130 , the Apex Court had occasion to hold as follows: “23. This is an aspect which has to be kept in mind and which was very much in the minds of the Constitution-makers as is evident from the choice of language of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution.” 25. We notice that in (1990) 3 SCC 130 , the Apex Court had occasion to hold as follows: “23. Having construed the provisions of Article 341 and 342 of the Constitution in the manner we have done, the next question that falls for consideration, is, the question of the fate of those scheduled caste and scheduled tribe students who get the protection of being classed as scheduled caste or scheduled tribes in ’the States of origin when, because of transfer or movement of their father or guardian’s business or service, they move to other States as a matter of voluntary transfer, will they be entitled to some sort of protective treatment so that they may continue or pursue their education. Having considered the facts and circumstances of such situation, it appears to us that where the migration from one State to other is involuntary, by force of circumstances either of employment or of profession, in such cases if students or persons apply in the migrated State where without affecting prejudicially the rights of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes in those States or areas, any facility or protection for continuance of study or admission can be given to one who has so migrated then some consideration is desirable to be made on that ground. It would, therefore, be necessary and perhaps desirable for the legislatures or the Parliament to consider appropriate legislations bearing this aspect in mind so that proper effect is given to the rights given to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes by virtue of the provisions under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, This is a matter which the State legislatures or the Parliament may appropriately take into consideration.” 26. We do also notice that in the case of State of Uttaranchal vs. Sandeep Kumar Singh & others, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 794 , a Bench of two Judges, after referring to the judgments in Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao vs. Seth G.S. Medical College reported in (1990) 3 SCC 130 , Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to SCs/STs vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 5 SCC 244 and S. Pushpa vs. Sivachanmugavelu reported in (2005) 3 SCC 1 , took a slightly different view. The court further noted the judgment in Subhash Chandra vs. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 458 and directed constitution of a larger Bench. 27. Mr. Manoj Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel, in fact, would also draw our attention to an unreported judgment of the Full Bench of Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 6060 of 2008 (Kum. Shweta Santalal Lal vs. the State of Maharashtra & others), wherein the court held as follows: “2. The question framed for consideration reads as under:- “Whether a person who was not ordinarily resident as on the date of the relevant Presidential Notification in the area that now constitutes the State of Maharashtra will be entitled to the benefit of reservation in the State.” 26. Having said so, we may now answer the Reference. In case of a migrant belonging to a Scheduled Caste, not ordinarily resident as on 10.3.1950 in the area that now constitutes the State of Maharashtra and in a case of S.T., considering Rule 5, on 6.9.1950, would not be entitled to benefits of reservation as SC/ST in the State of Maharashtra. They and their progeny will continue to get the benefits of reservation in the State of origin. Reference answered accordingly.” 28. They and their progeny will continue to get the benefits of reservation in the State of origin. Reference answered accordingly.” 28. Therefore, the upshot of the appreciation of the above case-law would be as follows: In a case, where a person belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community in one State ‘A’ migrates to another State ‘B’, the mere fact that the caste to which he belongs, be it Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, referable to Article 341 or Article 342 of the Constitution, as the case may be, finds mention under the same nomenclature in State ‘B’ in a Notification under Article 341 or Article 342, as the case may be, the person in State ‘A’, who migrates, would not be entitled to claim benefit of the caste status in the State to which he has migrated. No doubt, this is subject to the observations made in paragraph 23 of the judgment in (1990) 3 SCC 130 , which we have referred to above. 29. It is this aspect, which is considerably emphasised upon by Mr. Manoj Tiwari in an endeavour to persuade us that the plea of the State and of Mr. Sharad Sharma be not accepted. 30. Mr. Manoj Tiwari would also draw support from the Government of India communication dated 24.06.2010, which reads as follows: “No. 27/26/2006-SR(S) Ministry of Personnel, P G & Pensions (Department of Personnel & Training) Government of India ******** 3rd Floor, Lok Nayak Bhawan, New Delhi Dated: 24.06.2010 To, The Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh Lucknow. The Chief Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand, Dehradun. Subject: Clarification on allocation of SC/ST employees between the successor States in connection with reorganization of States-regarding. Sir, I am directed to refer to the above mentioned subject and to say that instructions were issued vide this department’s communication of even number dated 28/29.07.2008 stating that SC/ST employees would be allocated only to the State where their caste is listed in the schedule of the State or as per their option. 2. Sir, I am directed to refer to the above mentioned subject and to say that instructions were issued vide this department’s communication of even number dated 28/29.07.2008 stating that SC/ST employees would be allocated only to the State where their caste is listed in the schedule of the State or as per their option. 2. Large number of representations have been received in this department from individual employees and also from the National Commission for Schedule Tribes/National Commission for Schedule Castes stating that, in view of the Article 341(1) and 342(1) of the Constitution, the benefits of reservation to the dependents of the SC/ST employees would not be available in the matter of admission to the educational institutions and appointment to the service of the State, if they are not permanent or ordinary residents of that State, even though their caste is listed in the schedule of that State. 3. The matter has again been examined by this Department in consultation with the Department of Legal Affairs Min. of Law & Justice and it has been decided with the approval of the competent authority, that as far as possible, the allocation of SC/ST employees would be made to the State of their domicile or o option basis. To this extent para 2 of the communication of even number dated 28.07.2008 is amended. Yours faithfully Sd/- (V Peddanna) Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of India Tele Fax 01124623711” 31. He would, therefore, submit that, in the light of the aforesaid view of the Government of India, it must be followed that a person belonging to Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe has a liberty to exercise option and to opt for the State, where he can enjoy the benefits of his caste status. Undoubtedly, a person may give it up and prefer to go to the State, where he may not enjoy it. But, if he opts to go to a State, where he could avail the benefits of caste status, in terms of the decision of the Apex Court, then this Court may not countenance a plea against the said right. 32. Mr. Sharad Sharma, on the other hand, in respect of the case based on the benefits of caste not being available in the State of Uttar Pradesh in respect of communities in question, would rely on a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dr. 32. Mr. Sharad Sharma, on the other hand, in respect of the case based on the benefits of caste not being available in the State of Uttar Pradesh in respect of communities in question, would rely on a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dr. Anjana Parmar vs. State of U.P. & others, reported in (2013) 3 UPLBEC 2293. It is the case of Mr. Sharad Sharma and Mr. M.C. Pant that these castes had been notified by the Presidential Order in the year 1967 as castes in the State of Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, even if the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 and the private respondent in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 184 of 2014 are sent back to the State of Uttar Pradesh, they will not suffer any loss, as apprehended by Mr. Manoj Tiwari. It is submitted that there is no migration as such involved in this case, as, in 1967, the State of Uttar Pradesh was undivided and it is also pointed out that, in the year 2003, the State of Uttar Pradesh had actually extended, by Act No. 10 of 2003, the 1967 Order. The same reads as follows: “THE CONSTITUTION (SCHEDULED TRIBES) (UTTAR PRADESH) ORDER, 1967 (C.O. 78) In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of article 342 of the Constitution of India, the President, after consultation with the Governor of the State of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to make the following Order, namely:- 1. This order may be called the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) (Uttar Pradesh) Order, 1967. 2. The tribes or tribal communities, or parts of, or groups within, tribes or tribal communities, specified in the Schedule to this order, shall, for the purposes of the Constitution of India, be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to the State of Uttar Pradesh so far as regards members thereof resident in that State. THE SCHEDULE 1. Bhotia 2. Buksa 3. Jannsari 4. Raji 5. Tharu [6. Gond, Dhuria, Nayak, Ojha, Pathari, Raj, Gond (in the districts of Mehrajganj, Sidharth Nagar, Basti, Gorakhpur, Deoria, Mau Azamgarh, Jonpur Balia, Gazipur, Varanasi, Mirzapur and Sonbhadra) 7. Kharwar, Khairwar (in the districts of Deoria, Balia, Ghazipur, Varanasi and Sonbhadra) 8. Saharya (in the district of Lalitpur 9. Parahiya (in the district of Sonbhadra) 10. Baiga (in the district of Sonbhdra) 11. Kharwar, Khairwar (in the districts of Deoria, Balia, Ghazipur, Varanasi and Sonbhadra) 8. Saharya (in the district of Lalitpur 9. Parahiya (in the district of Sonbhadra) 10. Baiga (in the district of Sonbhdra) 11. Pankha, Panika (in the districts of Sonbhadra and Mirzapur 12. Agariya (in the district of Sonbhadra) 13. Patari (in the district of Sonbhadra) 14. Chero (in the districts of Sonbhadra and Varanasi) 15. Bhuiya, Bhuinya (in the district of Sonbhadra)].” 33. Having set out the contentions and also having referred to the case-law in regard to the caste status, time is now ripe for us to actually discern the impact of the case-law and the law in the facts of the case and apply it. Admittedly, all the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 and the party respondent in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 184 of 2014 were not in the service of the State of Uttar Pradesh as on 09.11.2000. There is no dispute that the said date assumes greatest significance being the appointed day under the Act. Section 73 of the Act is clear that it contemplates persons being in the service of the State of Uttar Pradesh as on the appointed day being the subject matter of the subsequent attention by the Legislature not only in the said provision, but also in all the provisions in the said Part. Unless and until a person, in other words, is appointed and is in service as on 09.11.2000, there would not arise a question of allocation to the successor States as such. Section 73 clearly contemplates that a person, who is in service as on the appointed day, namely, 09.11.2000, will continue to serve in the affairs of the State of Uttar Pradesh. State of Uttar Pradesh is defined as a successor State along with Uttaranchal in Section 2(j) of the Act, which reads as follows: “2(j) “successor State”, in relation to the existing State of Uttar Pradesh, means the State of Uttar Pradesh or Uttaranchal.” 34. Thereafter, Section 73 provides that this continuance of an employee of the State of Uttar Pradesh is subject to the condition that he may be required, by general or special order of the Central Government, to serve provisionally in connection with the affairs of the State of Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand). Thereafter, Section 73 provides that this continuance of an employee of the State of Uttar Pradesh is subject to the condition that he may be required, by general or special order of the Central Government, to serve provisionally in connection with the affairs of the State of Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand). This direction will cease to have effect on the expiry of one year from the appointed day. Further, it is to be issued in consultation with the Governments of both the States. Sub-Section (2) of Section 73 contemplates power of the Government, by general or special order, to determine the successor State to which every person under Sub-Section (1) is to be finally allotted. The date of effect of such allotment is also to be indicated. Sub-Section (3) of Section 73 contemplates that every person, who is finally allotted under Sub-Section (2) shall, if he is not serving therein, be made available to the successor State from such date, which is a matter of mutual agreement or, in default, on the basis of the decision of the Central Government. This, in short, is the scheme of Section 73. 35. As we have noted, we need not be detained by the provisions of Sections 74 and 75 of the Act. Thereafter, we deem it appropriate to notice Section 76, which provides for the Advisory Committee. The relevant portion is only clause (b), as it provides for the function of the Advisory Committee being to assist the Central Government for ensuring fair and equitable treatment of all persons affected by the provisions of Part VIII and the proper consideration of any representation made by such persons. The words “all persons affected by the provisions of this Part and the proper consideration of any representation made by such persons” could possibly be interpreted in two ways. One way to interpret the said provision is in accord and harmony with Section 73, which means that it empowers the Advisory Committee to assist the Central Government in the matter of fair and equitable treatment of all persons, who, being members of the State of Uttar Pradesh as on the appointed day, are to be continued either in the State of Uttar Pradesh or the other successor State, namely, Uttaranchal on the basis of the interim allocation under Sub-Section (1) or the final allocation under Sub-Section (2) of Section 73. Of course, it would also include the questions, which all flow from Sections 72, 74 & 75. The other way to interpret is that it would embrace within its scope the authority to advise the Central Government in regard to fair and equitable treatment to all persons affected by the provisions of this Part and the proper consideration of any representation made by such persons; meaning thereby, even they be persons, who were not in service as on 09.11.2000. Insofar as the Act has brought about the creation of two successor States, in regard to the question relating to persons, who may not have been appointed as on that day, and including persons like the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011, who were awaiting appointment and who have been appointed subsequently, could it not be said that they are also the persons, who are affected by the provisions of this Part. 36. In order to give a complete and proper answer to this question, we must pass on to the words used in Section 77 as well, as it is the immediately neighbouring provision. Section 77 clothes the Central Government with authority to direct both the successor States insofar as it appears to be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the foregoing provisions of the Part and the State is to comply with the same. The guidelines have been traced, in fact, to Section 77. We would think that the words used in Section 77 do not admit any ambiguity, inasmuch as, it provides the authority with the Central Government to give directions to successor States, which are binding, but limited in its scope to give effect to the foregoing provisions of Part VIII. Therefore, the Legislature was very clear that it intended to make the provisions of Part VIII exhaustive and a self-contained code in relation to the “provisions as to services”, the chapter heading of the bunch of provisions, which we have dealt with. In other words, by the issuance of the directions by the Central Government, it could not enlarge the scope of its own authority to take in matters, which are foreign to Section 77. In other words, the directions could be only to give effect to the other provisions contained in Part VIII. The only other provision, which is relevant for this purpose, is Section 73. In other words, the directions could be only to give effect to the other provisions contained in Part VIII. The only other provision, which is relevant for this purpose, is Section 73. As already noticed, Section 73 contemplates persons being in service in the State of Uttar Pradesh as on the appointed day, namely, 09.11.2000. Without a person being in service of the State of Uttar Pradesh on the appointed day, there cannot be a question of the Central Government employing its power under Section 77 of the Act to deal with a person, who was not in service as on that day. When we have interpreted Section 77, as we have done, whatever ambiguity was there in the provisions of Section 76 in relation to the two possible interpretations, which could be placed on the words contained in the said Section, stands removed. There is clear light shed by Section 77 that even the Advisory Committee could assist the Central Government only for dealing with persons, who were already in service as on the appointed day. 37. Once we have culled-out the intention of the Legislature in regard to Part VIII and the legal framework is gleaned, we must consider whether it was open to the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 to resist being sent to the State of Uttar Pradesh on the strength of the impugned order therein. 38. It is true that Mr. Manoj Tiwari would point out that, within the space of 10 days, the earlier order dated 13.09.2011 was overturned and the impugned order was passed without notice to the petitioners; but, we would think that no purpose would be served in complying with the provisions of natural justice in view of the discussion we have had and the matter being argued before this Court at great length and the law, which is being laid down by this Court also. Even if the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 were afforded an opportunity of hearing, it would be futile. 39. Petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 had, admittedly, approached this Court in the year 2004, when they were about to be turned away to the State of Uttar Pradesh. Even if the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 were afforded an opportunity of hearing, it would be futile. 39. Petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 had, admittedly, approached this Court in the year 2004, when they were about to be turned away to the State of Uttar Pradesh. Though they had secured an interim order and continued on the strength of the same, in the year 2007, we have already noticed the manner in which their case was finally disposed of, as extracted by us. In substance, we would think that the learned Single Judge took the view that the petitioners have no legal right to remain in the State of Uttarakhand. The learned Single Judge, no doubt, makes some reference to transfers on mutual consent. But the fact that the petitioners continued appears to be more of a fait accompli, which is accomplished without there being authority of any law or decision of the competent body. Thereafter, as already noticed, in September, 2011, in quick succession, two orders have been passed, which included the impugned order. We would think that the petitioners have not made out any case for continuance as such. 40. It is, at this juncture, that we would also wish to notice the order, which is impugned in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 264 of 2013. We have already extracted the same. In substance, the Government of India has referred to clause 5(c) of the guidelines. Clause 5(c) falls into two parts. In the first part, the Government of India had directed that, in respect of cases pending selection, appointments be not made. The second part of Clause 5(c) provides that the States have been asked to inform the officers that their service in the State of Uttar Pradesh may not be required after the appointed day and that they shall be foretold that they may be required to serve in the State of Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand). 41. The Act was enacted and it received assent on 25.08.2000. The guidelines were issued on 13.09.2000. At the time when the guidelines were issued, the appointed day was not announced. The appointed day being 09.11.2000 was notified subsequently. In regard to the first part of the guideline, on which considerable stress is laid by Mr. 41. The Act was enacted and it received assent on 25.08.2000. The guidelines were issued on 13.09.2000. At the time when the guidelines were issued, the appointed day was not announced. The appointed day being 09.11.2000 was notified subsequently. In regard to the first part of the guideline, on which considerable stress is laid by Mr. Manoj Tiwari, it is no doubt true that the Government had given direction purporting to draw authority from Section 77 of the Act that pending recruitments may be kept in abeyance and appointment orders be not issued. But, as on that day, the appointed day had not been announced. We have already noticed the ambit of Section 77 as being limited to guidelines being issued for the purpose of giving effect to the other provisions of Part VIII of the Act. The only relevant part, as far as we are concerned, is contained in Section 73. We have already elucidated the scope of Section 73 and held that it is confined to persons, who were in service as on 09.11.2000. Therefore, the guidelines, in other words, could be issued only for the purposes of securing, both, fair and equitable treatment and disposal of representations (see Section 76) on the basis of the advice of the Advisory Committee and to make orders of allocation, be it temporary or final, of persons, who were in service as on 09.11.2000. This we would understand as the meaning ascribed to the words “giving effect to the foregoing provisions of the Part”. Once this is understood as the true scope of Section 73, read with Sections 76 & 77, the guidelines also must be interpreted in harmony with the same and the guidelines cannot be understood as meaning, by way of obedience to the same, if an appointment is kept on hold beyond the appointed day, it would still clothe the employee concerned with right to invoke the benefit of Section 73 and seek allocation to the State of Uttarakhand. Such a view would render the guidelines ultra vires the provisions contained in Section 73 of the Act and we would eschew doing that. 42. Such a view would render the guidelines ultra vires the provisions contained in Section 73 of the Act and we would eschew doing that. 42. The more important thing is that a perusal of the impugned order in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 264 of 2013 would show that the authority has placed reliance on the later part of Clause 5(c), which provides for warning the employees that their continuance beyond the appointed day would be subject to the condition that they can be called upon to work in the State of Uttarakhand. In other words, it contemplates a person being in service as on 09.11.2000 and his being asked to continue in the State of Uttarakhand beyond that day. This part of the guideline is clearly in conformity with the provisions contained in Section 73 of the Act and, since the Union of India was aware of Section 73 at the time when it issued the guidelines, it is only intended to be an executive reminder of the impact of the statutory provisions. In other words, it cannot contemplate a situation, where a person was not in service as on 09.11.2000 and his being asked to continue beyond that date in the successor State, namely, Uttaranchal. However, the Government of India has proceeded on the basis as if the case of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 is squarely covered by the later provision. It clearly betrays an erroneous appreciation of the guidelines and also the legal position. Therefore, in short, the impugned order dated 05.08.2013 has no legs to stand on and it must perish in the light of the statutory provisions. 43. The result cannot be any different in Writ Petition No. 184 of 2014. Therein also, by the allocation order, the party respondent, who was working in the State of Uttar Pradesh and who had been appointed after the appointed day, was sought to be accommodated in the State of Uttarakhand on the basis of his domicile and his option. But the said allocation is clearly contrary to the authority available under the Act. This resulted in the petitioners calling in question the impugned orders. By the impugned order, petitioners’ seniority is affected. Therefore, the consequential orders are also passed, which are challenged. But the said allocation is clearly contrary to the authority available under the Act. This resulted in the petitioners calling in question the impugned orders. By the impugned order, petitioners’ seniority is affected. Therefore, the consequential orders are also passed, which are challenged. Once it is found that the allocation is bad in law, then it follows that the seniority position cannot stand and the allocation orders also cannot stand. 44. We would think that the note we have struck in this case is not discordant with the view expressed by the two Bench decisions of this Court, one of which is unreported judgment in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 79 of 2008 (M.C. Joshi & others vs. State of Uttarakhand & others), even though it is pointed out that the issue that arose therein may be slightly different. More on point is the judgment of the Bench of this Court passed in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 1313 of 2005 (Ashok Kumar & others vs. State of Uttaranchal & others). Therein, the Court held as follows: “In the year 1999, an advertisement was published by the Public Service Commission, State of Uttar Pradesh. The advertisement talked about existing vacancies in the posts of Personal Assistants available in the State’s Secretariat. State of Uttar Pradesh had only one Secretariat situated at Lucknow. The private respondents, namely respondent Nos. 6 to 9, responded to the advertisement and their response succeeded. On 24th March, 2000, the Public Service Commission, State of Uttar Pradesh, announced such success of the said respondents. On 9th November, 2000, State of Uttar Pradesh was bifurcated into two States, namely, State of Uttar Pradesh and the State of Uttarakhand. On and from 9th November, 2000, a Secretariat for the State of Uttarakhand came into existence. 2. On 29th January, 2001, respondent Nos. 6 to 9 were appointed by the State of Uttar Pradesh and were asked to join their duties in the Secretariat of the State of Uttar Pradesh situated at Lucknow. Respondent Nos. 6 to 9, accordingly, joined the services of the State of Uttar Pradesh at its Secretariat at Lucknow. Subsequent thereto, it appears that respondent Nos. 6 to 9 were asked to discharge their duties as Personal Assistants attached to State Secretariat in the Secretariat of the State of Uttarakhand situated at Dehradun. Subsequently, respondent Nos. Respondent Nos. 6 to 9, accordingly, joined the services of the State of Uttar Pradesh at its Secretariat at Lucknow. Subsequent thereto, it appears that respondent Nos. 6 to 9 were asked to discharge their duties as Personal Assistants attached to State Secretariat in the Secretariat of the State of Uttarakhand situated at Dehradun. Subsequently, respondent Nos. 6 to 9 wanted to permanently remain as employees of the State of Uttarakhand and, accordingly, while purported to exercise options to become members of the cadre of the State of Uttarakhand, approached the Union of India to allocate them to the State of Uttarakhand. Inasmuch as respondent Nos. 6 to 9 were appointed by the State of Uttar Pradesh subsequent to the creation of the State of Uttarakhand, the Central Government, in terms of the provisions contained in the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000, had no authority to deal with the said respondents. The Central Government, accordingly, in writing, communicated the same to the said respondents. Subsequently, it appears that the State of Uttar Pradesh expressed that it has no objection in the event State of Uttarakhand takes respondent Nos. 6 to 9 as Personal Assistants attached to Secretariat for the State Secretariat of the State of Uttarakhand situated at Dehradun. It seems that the State of Uttarakhand, on the basis of such no objection, is purporting to treat respondent Nos. 6 to 9 as its employees. 3. We asked the learned counsel for the State of Uttarakhand as well as the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 6 to 9 to show us any law in terms whereof one State can appoint permanently an employee of another State. Both the counsel failed to bring to our notice any such law. It must be kept in mind that although the State is authorised to make laws, it is also obliged to obey and follow such law. There being no law authorising one State to appoint an employee of another State as its employee, presumption or assumption on the part of the State of Uttarakhand, on the basis of the said no objection of the State of Uttar Pradesh that respondent Nos. 6 to 9 may be treated as employees of the State of Uttarakhand, is baseless. 4. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of by declaring that respondent Nos. 6 to 9 may be treated as employees of the State of Uttarakhand, is baseless. 4. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of by declaring that respondent Nos. 6 to 9 were not, nor are employees of the State of Uttarakhand and, accordingly, cannot be treated as employees of the State of Uttarakhand. They having been appointed by and for the State of Uttar Pradesh, they were and shall remain employees of the State of Uttar Pradesh.” 45. Time is, now, ripe to consider the question based on the caste status of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 and the party respondent in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 184 of 2014. We have already set out the decisions of the Apex Court in this matter. We have also adverted to the judgment cited by Mr. Sharad Sharma. There is a peculiar dimension in this case. State of Uttarakhand was born in the year 2000 under the aegis of the Act. The Presidential Notification, relied on by Mr. Sharad Sharma and Mr. M.C. Pant, had its initial origins in 1967 with the Presidential Proclamation. Apparently, it has been continued in the year 2003 by the State of Uttar Pradesh after the State of Uttarakhand was created. The Apex Court was not dealing with cases, where States were created by any Reorganisation Act. The stand of Mr. Sharad Sharma and Mr. M.C. Pant is that the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 would continue to get the benefits in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In this regard, a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court is brought to our notice. It, certainly, is a matter, which creates considerable heartburn, if, being a member of the most deprived class, namely, a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, the fruits flowing from the constitutional provisions and the presidential proclamation do not reach the deserving classes; but, in this case, we would think that, since the main question to be decided is whether the allocation of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 and also the party respondents in the other two writ petitions to the State of Uttarakhand is legally valid, we need not finally pronounce on the issue of the impact of our holding that the allocation is bad. Whichever way the matter is decided, it cannot alter the fate of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 and the party respondents in the other two writ petitions. In other words, the obstacles caused, according to the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 and the party respondents in the other two writ petitions, in the path to their enjoying the fruits of the constitutional provisions in their favour cannot be the premise for us to countenance action, which is patently ultra vires the statute, namely, the Act. 46. In such circumstances, having come to the conclusion that the allocation of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 and the party respondents in the other two writ petitions to the State of Uttarakhand cannot be justified, we would leave it open to them to work out their rights in regard to caste status in the State of Uttar Pradesh in the competent forum. 47. In such circumstances, Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 will stand dismissed. Writ Petition (S/B) No. 264 of 2013 will stand allowed and the impugned order therein will stand quashed. Writ Petition (S/B) No. 184 of 2014 will also stand allowed and the impugned orders therein will also stand quashed. The seniority of the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 184 of 2014 shall be restored. No order as to costs. 48. Mr. Manoj Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011, who is also appearing for the party respondents in the other two writ petitions, immediately upon pronouncement of the judgment, made a request for grant of certificate under Article 134A of the Constitution of India. We are of the view that there is a specific question of law of general importance, which, in our opinion, needs to be decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court, insofar as the question relating to the deprivation of benefits flowing from the caste status of the persons in the context of creation of the two States under the Act is involved in these cases. Accordingly, we are inclined to grant Certificate for Appeal to the petitioners in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 274 of 2011 and the party respondents in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 264 of 2013 and Writ Petition (S/B) No. 184 of 2014 under Article 134A, read with Article 133(1), of the Constitution of India. The Registry will issue the requisite Certificate.