JUDGMENT : K.M.THAKER, J. Heard learned advocates for the petitioner and the respondent. 2. In this petition, the petitioner workman has challenged award dated 30-6-2007 passed by learned Industrial Tribunal, Bhavnagar in Reference (IT) No.42 of 2003 whereby the learned Tribunal for the reasons recorded in the award, dismissed the reference. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the learned Tribunal, the workman has taken out this petition. 3. So far as factual aspect is concerned, it has emerged from the record that the petitioner herein i.e. original claimant raised industrial dispute against order of termination of his service passed by the respondent corporation. He alleged that the respondent-Corporation illegally terminated his service. With the said allegation, the petitioner demanded reinstatement with all consequential benefits. 3.1. The appropriate government referred the dispute for adjudication to learned Industrial Tribunal, Bhavnagar which was registered as Reference (I.T.) No.42 of 2003. The terms of the reference read thus:- “Whether the penalty imposed by order dated 24-8-2001 against the claimant should be set aside and the employer should be directed to pay all consequential benefits with interest.” 3.2. In respect of the said dispute, the claimant alleged in his statement of claim that he was employed by the opponent corporation and he worked as conductor. At the relevant time, he was posted at Dhari depot. He alleged that he was member of union. The corporation had grudge against him and that therefore, he was victimized. He alleged that only with a view to victimize him, the corporation had issued charge sheet and thereafter, imposed penalty vide order dated 24-8-2001. He alleged that the order of penalty is unjust and arbitrary. Therefore, the penalty order deserves to be set aside and all consequential benefits should be granted to him. 3.3. The opponent corporation opposed the reference and denied the allegations by the claimant. The corporation narrated factual details in his written statement stating, inter alia, that on 3-3-1998, the claimant was on duty and he was aboard the bus which was plying enroute from Dhandhuka to Bapunagar and during his shift on the said bus, he had collected fare from 4 members, but he did not enter/reflect the sale of the tickets in the statement (way bill). The said misconduct was reported. Therefore, charge sheet dated 6-5-1998 was issued and pursuant to said charge sheet, domestic inquiry was conducted. The said misconduct was reported. Therefore, charge sheet dated 6-5-1998 was issued and pursuant to said charge sheet, domestic inquiry was conducted. Upon conclusion of the inquiry, the workman was visited with penalty of stoppage of two increments with permanent effect. The corporation also mentioned that even during past service the workman was visited with penalties when misconduct of similar nature were reported. The corporation also clarified that the disciplinary authority had imposed fine of Rs.50/- and that therefore, the matter was taken in review by the reviewing authority / first appellate authority. A notice for review of the case was issued and the petitioner was heard by the reviewing authority / first appellate authority in review case No.106 of 1998 and thereafter, penalty of stoppage of two increments with permanent effect was passed. 3.4. Upon conclusion of the stage of pleadings, the learned Tribunal received evidence from both sides. After the parties closed the evidence, the learned Tribunal heard learned advocates for the claimant and the corporation and thereafter, the learned Tribunal passed the order and dismissed the reference. 4. Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that originally the disciplinary authority had imposed penalty of only fine to the tune of Rs.50/- and thereafter, quantum of penalty was enhanced by reviewing authority/appellate authority. He submitted that the petitioner did not commit any misconduct but inadvertent mistake was committed in punching the tickets and it is not the case of not issuing tickets after collecting fare. He submitted that the penalty imposed by the corporation is harsh and should have been set aside by the learned Tribunal, however, the learned Tribunal committed error in dismissing the reference. 5. Learned advocate for the respondent corporation submitted that there is no error in the order. The learned Tribunal has taken into account evidence on record and has also taken into account that the reviewing authority / appellate authority had examined the material and passed order of penalty and that in light of gravity of the misconduct and in light of past service record of the petitioner, the learned Tribunal found that the penalty was just and proper and cannot be termed excessive or disproportionate and that therefore, the learned Tribunal rejected the reference. Learned advocate for the respondent submitted that any ground for reduction of penalty is not made out and the order passed by the learned Tribunal does not warrant interference. 6. I have considered rival submissions by learned advocates for the petitioner and the respondent. I have also examined the material available on record and the reasons recorded by learned Tribunal. 7. It has emerged from the record that the allegation against the petitioner was that he had not reflected the sale of tickets in the statement (way bill). 7.1. It has also emerged from the record that during past period of petitioner's service, several instances of misconduct were reported against the petitioner and he was even visited with different penalties for the instances/ misconduct reported against him. 7.2. It has also emerged from the award that in paragraph Nos.7 to 9 of the award, the learned Tribunal has discussed the evidence and has also discussed the justification in respect of the penalty imposed by the competent authority. 7.3. The learned Tribunal has recorded that the claimant had received Rs.135/- for the tickets Nos.9742290 to 9742293 and Rs.30/- each and ticket No.7720577 for Rs.15/-, however, the said details of sale were not reflected in column No.22 of the way bill. 7.4. The learned Tribunal also examined other details with regard to the charge levelled against the claimant. 7.5. The learned Tribunal also considered the details with regard to the inquiry conducted against the workman during which the workman/his representative did not conduct cross examination of the witness examined by the corporation and the workman also declared that he did not want to examine any witness in his support and defence. 7.6. The learned Tribunal did not find any illegality or defect in the inquiry. 7.7. The learned Tribunal thereupon reached to the conclusion that the allegation against the workman are proved and the findings of the inquiry officer are not perverse. 7.8. The learned Tribunal thereafter considered the decision of the disciplinary authority with regard to penalty. 7.9. In paragraph No.9 of the award, the learned Tribunal has taken into account the quantum of penalty originally determined by the disciplinary authority and the fact that the corporation found that the penalty determined by the disciplinary authority was not commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and the past service record of the claimant. 7.10. 7.9. In paragraph No.9 of the award, the learned Tribunal has taken into account the quantum of penalty originally determined by the disciplinary authority and the fact that the corporation found that the penalty determined by the disciplinary authority was not commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and the past service record of the claimant. 7.10. The learned Tribunal also took into account the fact that the reviewing authority examined all relevant details and evidence including the past service record of the claimant. 7.11. The learned Tribunal also took into account the fact that in the appeal/review, the reviewing authority had passed order of termination against the claimant, however, in the second (departmental) Appeal, (which was filed by the claimant), the appellate authority reviewed the penalty and reduced the penalty to stoppage of two increments with permanent effect and the period during which the termination order remained in operation is treated as leave without salary. It was against the said final order of penalty which was challenged by the petitioner before the learned Tribunal. 8. The learned Tribunal examined the quantum of penalty in backdrop of the proved charge against the claimant and also in light of the past service record of the claimant. Having carefully examined the material on record, the learned Tribunal found that the quantum of penalty imposed against the claimant cannot be termed arbitrary or excessive and there was no justification to interfere with the quantum of penalty. Therefore, the learned Tribunal dismissed the reference. 9. When the decision of learned Tribunal is examined in light of the proved misconduct of the claimant and the fact that the past service record of the claimant is tainted, it emerges clearly that the learned Tribunal's order does not warrant interference. The learned Tribunal has not committed any error in dismissing the reference on the ground that the penalty imposed by the competent authority cannot be termed to be arbitrary or excessive. 10. In the decision in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Prabhashanker K. Acharya [ 1992 (2) GLH 354 ], this Court has held that when the penalty imposed by the employer is sort of dismissal or discharge, then, the learned Industrial Tribunal or learned Labour Court does not have jurisdiction or authority to interfere with such penalty. In the said decision, the Court has observed, inter alia, that:- “1. In the said decision, the Court has observed, inter alia, that:- “1. ...The moot questions for consideration are: (I) What is the extent and ambit of jurisdiction of Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal to interfere in finding by the employer-management regarding misconduct of workman; (2) Whether the jurisdiction and powers of the Labour Court Industrial Tribunal under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act to interfere with the order imposing punishment is confirmed to only the punishment of discharge or dismissal or also extend to the punishments other than the said punishments; (3) If not, whether the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal can interfere with the punishment other than that of the discharge or dismissal passed 11 by the management under the provisions of Sections 7, 7A and 15 of the Industrial Dispute Act. If yes, (4) what is the extent of the jurisdiction and power of Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal and under what circumstances the order of such punishment can be interfered with? 18. The powers and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal to interfere with the finding of misconduct and order imposing the punishment other than the punishment of discharge or dismissal is restricted even though the Labour Court or Tribunal had wider powers than revisionist powers. It cannot exercise the powers of an appellate authority and reappraise the evidence and set aside the finding only because the other view is possible or even plausible. The Labour Court or the Tribunal also cannot interfere with the nature or the quantum of the punishment casually because it considers to impose other kind of punishment or to impose lesser punishment than the one awarded by the management. The Tribunal can interfere with the finding of misconduct or the nature and the quantum of the punishment only under the circumstances as set out above and specifically by various judicial pronouncements. The Tribunal can interfere with the finding of the management in the following circumstances : (1) Want of good faith. (2) Victimisation or unfair labour practise. (3) Basic error or violation of principles of natural justice. (4) Finding completely baseless or perverse. The Tribunal can interfere with the finding of the management in the following circumstances : (1) Want of good faith. (2) Victimisation or unfair labour practise. (3) Basic error or violation of principles of natural justice. (4) Finding completely baseless or perverse. (5) Colourable exercise of power or want of bona fide, and (6) Punishment shockingly disproportionate regard being had to the particular conduct or the past record or is such that no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances unless he is actuated by considerations of victimisation or natural labour practise. The above circumstances are illustrative and not exhaustive and the Tribunal can interfere with the finding or the punishment in circumstances alike also, but the Tribunal cannot interfere with the finding or nature and quantum of punishment casually or as if exercising appellate jurisdiction. 19. The submission of Shri Shelat learned Advocate for the management, that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction at all to interfere with the order in inquiry in which the punishment other than that of the discharge or dismissal is imposed, cannot be accepted. Shri Shelat submits that provisions of Section 11A, Industrial Disputes Act only empower the Tribunal to interfere with the order in which the punishment of discharge or dismissal is imposed and in no other order and, therefore, the Tribunal cannot interfere with any other order in which the other punishment is imposed. There is no provision under the Act prohibiting the Tribunal in exercising the jurisdiction except in the case of punishment of discharge or dismissal. We have extensively discussed the provisions of Sections. 7, 7A and 15, and the Schedule, and it is evident that the Tribunal has jurisdiction even to interfere with the order imposing the punishment other than that of discharge or dismissal. Even prior to the incorporation of Section 11 A, Industrial Disputes Act, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment is recognised and accepted by the courts, of course, that is only under certain circumstances as discussed above. The acceptance of the submission would lead to absurd results and even in case of punishment other than that of discharge or dismissal which may lead to victimisation, the Tribunal will not be in a position to interfere and give proper justice to the workman.” 10.1. In the said judgment Hon'ble Mr. The acceptance of the submission would lead to absurd results and even in case of punishment other than that of discharge or dismissal which may lead to victimisation, the Tribunal will not be in a position to interfere and give proper justice to the workman.” 10.1. In the said judgment Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M.Ahmadi (as His Lordship then was) added below mentioned further observations:- “3. ...To put it differently, is it within the ambit of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal's jurisdiction to interfere with the employer's discretion in the field of disciplinary jurisdiction and reduce the penally imposed by the employer after the charge of misconduct was proved at a properly held domestic enquiry even when the punishment imposed is short of dismissal or discharge and the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the enquiry was in accordance with the principles of natural justice and finding of guilt was not perverse or mala fide? Such a power is specifically conferred in cases of discharge op dismissal under the newly inserted Section 14 A by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1071 (45 of 1971) with effect from December 15,1971. .....But this power is specifically confined to cases of discharge or dismissal and not to other case where the punishment imposed is short of that. That would ordinarily mean that the Legislature intended to permit interference in managerial discretion by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in cases where the punishment results in termination of employment and not in all cases. In other words, cases of punishment other than discharge or dismissal would continue to be governed by the law laid down by judicial pronouncements prior to the insertion of Section 11A in the Act. It would, therefore, be advantageous to examine the case law in this behalf as obtaining Section 11A was placed on the statute book. 5. ...t is, therefore, clear from this decision that while the Supreme Court recognised the power of adjudicatory forums to interfere in matters of discipline to the limited extent of the case falling within one of the four stipulations delineated above, it at the same time cautioned that the role of such forums was not of appellate nature, meaning thereby, that it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the employer even if any one of the four conditions did not exist. In view of this decision and having regard to the recommendation No. 119 of the I.L.O. the legislature slopped in by introducing Section 11A on the statute book. By this new provision the limitation placed by the Supreme Court was sought to be lifted by permitting the adjudicatory authorities to interfere in cases of discharge or dismissal if the concerned authority found that the order was not justified and has entitled the said authority to substitute the punishment. Since Section 11A is limited in scope, in that, it governs cases of punishment of discharge or dismissal only, it follows by necessary implication that the legislature did not intend to clothe the adjudicatory authorities with similar power where the punishment is other than discharge or dismissal. The legislative intent is obvious, namely, it did not desire that the managerial prerogative of taking disciplinary action against the erring workmen should be absolute or unlimited even in cases of termination of service presumably because it was apprehended that such extreme, unchecked and unfettered power may not be conducive to maintenance of industrial peace. 7. It will be seen from the above discussion that the position in law before and after the insertion of Section 11A has been consistent in so far as cases other than termination of service by dit order of discharge or dismissal are concerned. It is only in cases of discharge or dismissal that the legislature enlarged the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory forums to interfere with the order of punishment by introducing Section 11-A in the Act, The tendency of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to lightly interfere with the order of punishment, in cases where the punishment inflicted is short of dismissal or discharge, as if it were exercising appellate jurisdiction must be deprecated. It must be remembered that the quantum of punishment cannot be measured in golden scales and will offer from individual to individual depending on his notions of discipline but the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal will not be justified in interfering with the employer's order of punishment merely because it would have visited the workmen with a lighter punishment if it were wearing the employer's shoes. It is only in cases where the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be stated in writing, that the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the proved misconduct, that it may interfere with the order of punishment. It is only in cases where the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be stated in writing, that the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the proved misconduct, that it may interfere with the order of punishment. Such cases would be far and few. Unfortunately, we have noticed that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal freely interferes with the quantum of punishment, some of the cases on hand are examples of unwarranted interference, which has been responsible for generating a lot of avoidable litigation. That is why it was thought that the time was ripe for clearly stating the jurisdictional parameters of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in such cases. However, a word of caution for the managements seems necessary, namely, that it must act in a responsible manner in the choice of punishment from the wide range of censure to dismissal if it does not want the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to interfere on the ground that the severity of the punishment betrays victimisation.” 11. In view of above quoted observations in the said decision and in light of the facts and circumstances of the case, any ground to interfere with the decision of the learned Tribunal and/or to disturb the final decision of the learned Tribunal is not made out. The petitioner has failed to point out any error or infirmity in the award. 11.1 On careful examination of the award, it becomes clear that the award does not suffer from any infirmity and learned Tribunal has not committed any error of law or jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, the petition does not deserve to be entertained. Consequently, the petition is rejected. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.