Nav Sarjan Industrial Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Secretary Urban Land Ceiling Tribunal Ahmedabad
2016-12-01
BELA M.TRIVEDI
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Both the petitions have been filed by the same petitioner i.e. Nav Sarjan Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. in respect of the same land in question and therefore both the petitions were heard together and this common order is being passed. 2. Special Civil Application No.6148 of 1999 has been filed by the petitioner challenging the legality and validity of the order dated 26.05.1986 passed by the Respondent No.-2 Competent Authority (Annexure-C) and the order dated 09.05.1989 passed by the Respondent No.1-ULC Tribunal (Annexure-D).The petitioner had amended the petition to further pray for the grant of the land to the petitioner under section 23 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “the ULC Act” for short). 3. Special Civil Application No.3370 of 2004 has been filed by the petitioner challenging the show cause notice dated 19.01.2004 issued by the Mamlatdar, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat under section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tenancy Act’ for short). 4. A few facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the present petitions are that the petitioner is a society registered under the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act. The petitioner-Society had purchased the lands bearing Survey Nos.76 and 79 situated at village Bhesan, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat in the auction held by the Special Recovery Officer as per the order dated 27.01.1981 (Annexure-A). The mutation entry was also posted in the revenue records in respect of said purchase made by the Society (Annexure-B). It appears that the petitioner-Society had also purchased the other lands bearing Survey Nos.74 and 71 in some other auction proceedings, and had planned for the construction of factory unit on the said lands. 5. It is further the case of the petitioner that the Respondent No.3-Chhotubhai Morarbhai Patel, the original owner of the lands bearing Survey Nos.76 and 79, had shown the said lands as his holdings in the form filled in by him under section 6(1) of the ULC Act. According to the petitioner, though the petitioner had purchased the lands in question pending the said ULC proceedings, the Respondent No.2-Competent Authority without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-Society, declared that the land admeasuring 38182 sq. mtrs. out of Survey No.76 and 79 was the excess vacant land, vide the order dated 26.05.1982 (Annexure-C).
According to the petitioner, though the petitioner had purchased the lands in question pending the said ULC proceedings, the Respondent No.2-Competent Authority without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-Society, declared that the land admeasuring 38182 sq. mtrs. out of Survey No.76 and 79 was the excess vacant land, vide the order dated 26.05.1982 (Annexure-C). It was held by the Competent Authority in the said order that the auction sale was in violation of section 42 of the ULC Act. Being aggrieved by the said order passed by the Competent Authority, the original owner-the Respondent No. 3 had preferred an appeal before the ULC Tribunal, who vide the order dated 09.05.1989 dismissed the said appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Competent Authority. It is further case of the petitioner that in furtherance of the order passed by the Respondent No.1, the Respondent No.2 had issued the notice dated 31.08.1989 to the Respondent No.3 under the provisions contained in section 10(5) of the ULC Act calling upon the Respondent No.3 to handover possession of the lands in question. The petitioner-Society claiming to be in possession of the said lands in question therefore filed the Special Civil Application No.6148 of 1990 praying for the prayers as stated hereinabove. 6. It appears that the Court while issuing Rule in the petition had passed the following order on 31.08.1990 : “Prima facie it seems that there is no substance in this matter in view of section 42 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Still, however, as Letters Patent Appeal No.45 of 1989 is pending, Rule. To be heard along with Letters Patent Appeal No.45 of 1989. Ad-interim relief in terms of Paragraph No. 9(e). Direct service is permitted.” 7. It further appears that the said Letters Patent Appeal No.45 of 1989 arising out of Special Civil Application No.5951 of 1988 filed by one Suryanagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., was withdrawn by the said appellant as per the order dated 25.06.1996. Thereafter, the present petition was disposed of by the Single Bench vide the order dated 07.05.1999, which reads as under: “The petitioner in this petition has challenged the order passed by the authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The authorities have not taken the possession of the land in question from the petitioner, which is not in dispute.
The authorities have not taken the possession of the land in question from the petitioner, which is not in dispute. In view of the fact that the dispute involved in this petition is directly covered under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Repeal Act, 1999 (Act No.15 of 1999) repealing the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976 which is also adopted by the State Government by passing a resolution dated 30.03.1999, this petition has abated and consequently the impugned order passed against the petitioner also stands abated. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.” 8. The said order passed by the Single Bench was challenged by the respondent authorities by filing the Letters Patent Appeal being No.511 of 2003. The Division Bench vide the order dated 27.03.2014 allowed the said Letters Patent Appeal and set aside the order dated 07.05.999 passed by the Single Bench and remanded the matter to the Single Bench for deciding the same afresh. The petitioner thereafter had filed further affidavit along with certain documents on 10.10.2014 to contend that the possession of the lands in question was not taken over by the respondent authorities and therefore, the proceedings under the ULC Act had stood abated in view of section 4 of the ULC Repeal Act, 1999. 9. The Respondent No.2-Competent Authority has resisted the petition by filing reply contending inter alia that the order passed by the ULC Tribunal on 09.05.1989 in the appeal filed by the Respondent No.3-Chhotubhai, having not been further challenged by him, the same had become final. Thereafter, the notice under section 10(5) was issued to the Respondent No.3 on 31.08.1989, which was received by him. According to the said Respondent, the possession of the lands in question bearing Survey Nos.76 and 79 was taken over by the State Government after drawing panchnama on 16.03.1990 (Annexure-A9) and the communication of taking over the possession was also issued to the said Chhotubhai on 09.08.1990. Thereafter, the order under section 11 was also passed fixing the amount of compensation in respect of the said lands in question as per the order dated 28.08.1990 (Annexure-A11). The mutation entry No.1321 was also made in the revenue records entering the name of the Government (Annexure-A12). 10.
Thereafter, the order under section 11 was also passed fixing the amount of compensation in respect of the said lands in question as per the order dated 28.08.1990 (Annexure-A11). The mutation entry No.1321 was also made in the revenue records entering the name of the Government (Annexure-A12). 10. At this juncture, it is required to be noted that during the time, when the petitioner filed Special Civil Application No.6148 of 1990 challenging the orders passed by the Competent Authority and the ULC Tribunal in the case of Respondent No.3-Chhotubhai, the petitioner-Society had also filed Special Civil Application No.5516 of 1990 challenging the order dated 17.11.1988 passed by the Collector, holding the auction proceedings conducted by the Special Recovery Officer, selling the lands in question to the petitioner-Society as illegal. During the course of hearing of these petitions, the Court had called for the original record of Special Civil Application No.5516 of 1990 and interestingly it was found that the said petition was filed on 30.07.1990, the Court had issued “Rule” on 31.07.1990 permitting to delete the name of the original owner Chhotubhai from the cause title of the petition, and on the returnable date i.e. on 17.08.1990, the petition was allowed in absence of the respondents. It is further pertinent to note that the present petition was filed by the petitioner-Society on 25.07.1990, in which the petitioner had not disclosed the fact that the collector vide his order dated 17.11.1988 had already set aside the auction sale held by the Special Recovery Officer in favour of the petitioner. Meaning thereby, when the petitioner filed the present petition being Special Civil Application No.6148 of 1990, the said order dated 17.11.1988 of the Collector was in force, whereby the auction sale in favour of the petitioner was set aside, and therefore, the petitioner did not have the locus standi to challenge the orders passed by the ULC authorities in case of Chhotubhai under the guise that it had purchased the lands in question in the said auction sale. The petitioner was fully aware about the said order of Collector, however the said fact was suppressed by the petitioner while filing the present petition.
The petitioner was fully aware about the said order of Collector, however the said fact was suppressed by the petitioner while filing the present petition. This was a material suppression of fact by the petitioner inasmuch as when the petitioner was challenging the orders of ULC authorities on the ground that it had purchased the lands in question in the auction sale held by the Special Recovery Officer, it was incumbent on the part of the petitioner to disclose the correct facts that the said auction sale was already held by the Collector as illegal being in contravention of the ULC Act and was set aside. It is needless to say that the petitioner invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was bound o disclose all true and correct facts, and the petitioner having suppressed the material facts relating to the locus standi of the petitioner and very the maintainability of the petition, the Special Civil Application No.6148 of 1990 deserves to be dismissed on that ground alone. 11. It is also further pertinent to note that the petitioner had also not disclosed true and correct facts in the Special Civil Application No.5516 of 1990 more particularly the fact that the ULC authorities had already declared the lands in question as the excess vacant land. When the said petition being Special Civil Application No.5516 of 1990 was being disposed of on the very first returnable date i.e. on 17.08.1990, without waiting for the respondent authorities to file their appearance, it was the duty of the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner Society, who was the same advocate in both the petitions, i.e. Special Civil Application No.5516 of 1990 and Special Civil Application No.6148 of 1990 to inform the Court that the said lands were already declared as the excess vacant lands by the ULC authorities an that their orders were challenged by the petitioner-Society in Special Civil Application No.6148 of 1990. Such a conduct on the part of the petitioner-Society and suppression of material facts had mislead the Court to pass the ex-parte order in Special Civil Application No.5516 of 1990 in contravention of the provisions contained in ULC Act. 12.
Such a conduct on the part of the petitioner-Society and suppression of material facts had mislead the Court to pass the ex-parte order in Special Civil Application No.5516 of 1990 in contravention of the provisions contained in ULC Act. 12. So far as the merits of the petitions are concerned, it may be noted that the Special Civil Application No.6148 of 1990 was ordered to be heard along with Letters Patent Appeal No.45 of 1989 arising out of Special Civil Application No.5951 of 1988 filed by one Surya Prakash Cooperative Society. The said Special Civil Application No.5951 of 1988 was dismissed by the Single Bench observing that the borrowers and guarantors with a view to circumvent the provisions of ULC Act, were allowing the banks to auction their mortgaged properties through the Special Recovery Officers. The said Society having preferred Letters Patent Appeal being No.45 of 1989 and the facts of Special Civil Application No.6148 of 1990 being similar, the Court after observing that there was no substance in the matter in view of section 42 of the ULC Act had ordered to hear the petition along with Letters Patent Appeal No.45 of 1989. However, subsequently the said Letters Patent Appeal came to be withdrawn by the said Surya Prakash Society. 13. Be that as it may, even as per the case of the petitioner society, the land in question was purchased by the petitioner-Society in the auction held by the Special Recovery Officer as per the order dated 27.01.1981 i.e. after coming into operation of the ULC Act. It is pertinent to note that the section 27 of the ULC Act prohibited the transfer of any urban or urbanisable land except wit the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority, and that the contravention of the provisions contained in the said Act entailed penal consequences as contemplated under section 38 thereof. As per Section 42, the provisions of ULC Act had the effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being i force, or any decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or other Authority. Hence, the purchase of land in question by the petitioner in the auction sale was clearly in violation of the provisions contained in the ULC Act and therefore, the said sale was null and void.
Hence, the purchase of land in question by the petitioner in the auction sale was clearly in violation of the provisions contained in the ULC Act and therefore, the said sale was null and void. It is further pertinent to note that order passed by the Tribunal was not challenged by the original owner-Chhotubhai. The receipt of notice issued by the Respondent Authorities under section 10(5) of the ULC Act was also not disputed by the petitioner, as the same has been admitted in the memo of the petition itself. The proceedings under section 11 of the ULC Act with regard to the award of compensation to the original owner have also not been disputed. Therefore, the lands in question declared as the excess vacant lands, were deemed to have been acquired by and vested in the State Government. Further by making the prayer to allot the subject lands to the petitioner under section 23 of the ULC Act, the petitioner had accepted the fact that the lands in question were already acquired by and had vested in the State Government at the time of filing of the petition. 14. The Respondent No.2-Competent Authority in its reply has specifically stated that the notice issued under section 10(5) was received by the Respondent No.2 on 31.08.1989 and thereafter, the possession of the land in question was taken over on 16.03.1990 by drawing the panchnama, the communication of which was also issued to the Respondent No.3-Chhotubhai on 09.08.1990.Thereafter, the amount of compensation was also fixed under section 11 as per the order dated 20.08.1990. The mutation entry being No.1321 in respect thereof was made in the revenue record. Though it has been contended by learned Senior Counsel Mr. Kavina for the petitioner relying upon the certain documents annexed to the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner in October, 2014 that the members of the petitioner-Society were in possession of the lands in question, even after the said possession was taken over by the State Government by drawing panchnama, the said submission cannot be accepted.
Kavina for the petitioner relying upon the certain documents annexed to the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner in October, 2014 that the members of the petitioner-Society were in possession of the lands in question, even after the said possession was taken over by the State Government by drawing panchnama, the said submission cannot be accepted. When the receipt of notice issued under section 10(5) of the ULC Act and taking over possession of the lands in question from the original owner Respondent No.3Chhotubhai has not been disputed by the said Respondent, the petitioner-Society who had purchased the lands in question in contravention of the provisions of ULC Act, cannot be permitted to raise the contention that the possession was not taken over from the original owner in accordance with aw. As per the position of law settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar Vs. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in (1996) 4 SCC 212 , and in the case of Banda Development Authority, Banda Vs. Motilal Agarwal and Ors. reported in (2011) 5 SCC 394 , when a possession is to be taken of a large track of land, then it is permissible to take possession by a properly executed Panchnama. If any person is subsequently found to be in possession of such land, such possession could not be said to be a legal possession. 15. It is further pertinent to note that the dispute with regard to the possession was raised by the petitioner only in the affidavit filed on 10.10.2014 i.e. about 15 years after the ULC Repeal Act came into effect, for raising the plea inter alia that the proceedings had abated in view of section 4 of the said Repeal Act. In this regard, a very pertinent observation made by the Supreme Court in case of State of Assam vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Ors., reported in (2015) 5 SCC 321 , is required to be reproduced, which reads as under: “16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5).
The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile land owner on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged in the present case any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure.” 16. In view of the above stated position of law settled by the Supreme Court, it is too late in the light of the day for the petitioner to contend that the possession of the land in question was not taken over by the respondents in accordance with law. Even otherwise, the Court having found that the petitioner-Society had suppressed the material facts from the Court, the petitioner would not be entitled to grant of any equitable relief in the writ petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The Special Civil Application No.6148 of 1990 deserves to be dismissed on the ground of suppression of material facts as well as on merits. 17. So far as the Special Civil Application No.3370 of 2004 is concerned, the same has been filed by the petitioner challenging the show cause notice dated 19.04.2004 issued by the Mamlatdar in the inquiry under section 84C of the Tenancy Act. The petitioner instead of responding to the said notice and without exhausting the alternative remedy available to it rushed t this Court by filing the present petition. It was contended by learned Senior Counsel Mr.
The petitioner instead of responding to the said notice and without exhausting the alternative remedy available to it rushed t this Court by filing the present petition. It was contended by learned Senior Counsel Mr. Kavina that the said notice was issued without any jurisdiction and without any authority of law by the Mamlatdar and ALT and tat too after a gross delay. Though there is some substance in the said submission, the Court is not inclined to accept the said submission at this juncture as all such contentions can be raised by the petitioner before the said authority by filing reply to the said show cause notice. It is needless to say that the Mamlatdar and ALT has the authority and jurisdiction to make the inquiry under section 84C of the Tenancy Act, if the Mamlatdar has reason to believe that any transfer or acquisition of any land was invalid under the provisions of Tenancy Act. The show cause notice itself would not create any cause of action as the authority after considering the reply of the petitioner may drop the proceedings. In that view of the matter, without expressing any opinion on the merits on the impugned show cause notice, the Court is not inclined to interfere with the same at this juncture. 18. For the reasons stated above, both the petitions being devoid of merits are dismissed. Rule is discharged in both the matters. 19. Learned Counsel Mr. Harnish Darji for the petitioner requests to extend the order of interim relief for a reasonable period to enable the petitioner to approach the higher Forum. In view of the reasons stated above, the request of learned Counsel Mr. Darji cannot be accepted. Order accordingly.