JUDGMENT : N.V. ANJARIA, J. Heard learned advocate Mr.Bharat Jani for the petitioner and learned advocate Ms.Nalini Lodha for the respondent No.1 Bank. For the second respondent-Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, though served, none appeared. 2. Present petition is directed against order dated 06th June, 2014 passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai rejecting the application of condonation of delay filed by the petitioner. The delay was of 112 days and the principal ground furnished for condoning it was the reason of financial constraint. 3. The facts in the background may be noticed in brief. The petitioner who was engaged in the business of Timber, appears to have been granted various credit facilities by the respondent No.1- Punjab National Bank. As the dues could not be cleared and the petitioner failed to repay the assistance to the Bank, Bank invoked the powers of recovery under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, issued notice under Section 13(2) of the said Act, and thereafter a further notice for possession under Section 13(4) of the Act was issued. The said measures taken by the respondent Bank came to be challenged by the petitioner by filing Securitisation Application No.63 of 2009 on 14th November, 2009. On 29th October, 2012, the Tribunal dismissed the said Securitisation Application. 3.1 Against the said order of Debts Recovery Tribunal, petitioner preferred Appeal No.282 of 2013 along with Miscellaneous Application No.677 of 2013 before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, for condonation of delay. Miscellaneous Application No.676 of 2013 was also filed for waiver of pre-deposit of the amount. It further appears that the proceedings before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) were taken out to declare the first petitioner company as sick industry, however the Reference and the Appeal came to be dismissed. Special Civil Application NO.17465 of 2014 is pending, which are the facts to be noted for completing narration. 3.2 Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 deals with appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The period of 30 days is provided to prefer appeal. Section 18 of the Act reads as under. “18. Special Civil Application NO.17465 of 2014 is pending, which are the facts to be noted for completing narration. 3.2 Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 deals with appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The period of 30 days is provided to prefer appeal. Section 18 of the Act reads as under. “18. Appeal to Appellate Authority.-(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. Of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso. Of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and rules made thereunder.” 3.3 Looking at the condonation of delay application, seeking to explain the delay of 112 days, following main reasons are stated in support of condonation of delay-(i) there was a sister concern of the appellant company named Nakoda Logistics which was financially stronger than the petitioner, yet was proceeded against under the SARFAESI Act; (ii) Appellants were busy and they were required to undertake day-to-day follow up of the repayment; (iii) Appeal had to be filed at Mumbai which required at least three days to instruct lawyer; (iv) Due to winter holidays lawyers were out of town; (v) In the meantime, Review Application was preferred before the Tribunal as it was the opinion of the advocate on record that there was an error apparent on the face of the order; (vi) Review Petition remained pending without progress; (vii) 13 properties were involved and relevant papers were required to be gone into which was time consuming; (viii) Lastly it was stated that appellant was financially weak, finding lawyer was difficult since the appellant was not in a position to pay and deposit the fees of the advocate. 4. The prayer for condonation of delay was contested by the respondent Bank before the Appellate bench of the Tribunal detailing the facts of various litigations pursued by the petitioner and it was submitted that the alleged plea of financial constraint was misconceived. In this petition also, by filing reply affidavit, the contention has been elaborated that the petitioner preferred several litigations since 2009 and in that there were prompted. It was submitted that they did not pay single penny till date and the outstanding dues have mounted colossus to more than Rs.60 crores. It was submitted that the explanation for delay was required to be seen in light of conduct of the petitioner. It was submitted that they did not pay single penny till date and the outstanding dues have mounted colossus to more than Rs.60 crores. It was submitted that the explanation for delay was required to be seen in light of conduct of the petitioner. 5. Amongst the grounds pleaded in the Application as above, ground of financial viability of the sister concern, bulky record and engagement of lawyer, consumption of time in instructing and reading record are also non-germane and of clumsy kind of explanation which litigant may furnish to explain sufficient cause. It appeared in the totality of facts that ground of filing of review, etc., also was an eye-wash. The main noticeable ground which was pleaded and urged in the hearing to explain the passage of time, was the financial condition. The genuineness of the said ground is required to be examined with closeness. 5.1 It was pointed out that petitioners had started and persuaded the following legal proceedings which falsify their ground of being in financial difficulty-(i) against order dated 07th June, 2010 rejecting interim relief passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the petitioner preferred Appeal No.149 of 2010, in which the matter was remanded by order dated 23rd August, 2010 and Bank was restrained from taking physical possession of the secured assets; (ii) This Court in Special Civil Application No.10969 of 2010 filed by the Bank stayed the aforesaid order dated 23rd August, 2010 of the Tribunal; (iii) against that, petitioner moved Supreme Court by filing SLP in which, by order dated 13th September, 2010 the Apex Court directed to maintain status quo qua the properties of the petitioners involved in the Securitisation Appeal No.63 of 2009; (iv) Special Civil Application No.10969 of 2010 was disposed of by quashing the decision of the Tribunal in entertaining the Appeal without predeposit of 50%; (v) against this order also, petitioner preferred SLP No.36346 of 2011. The said SLP was disposed of and the orders were vacated; (vii) by order dated 25th March, 2011 the Tribunal passed order in another Miscellaneous Appeal NO.195 of 2011 in the very Securitisation Application whereby the petitioner was directed to deposit amount claimed in notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 within eight weeks; (viii) Special Civil Application No. 9225 of 2012 came to be filed by the petitioners challenging the aforesaid order dated 23.05.2012. This Court in which this Court passed order dated 16.07.2012; (ix) Against the order passed in aforementioned Special Civil Application, Letters Patent Appeal No. 991 of 2012 was preferred and withdrawn. Special Leave (Civil) Petition No. 26471 of 2012 filed against the aforesaid order was also withdrawn; (x) Miscellaneous Appeals No. 195 of 2011 and 174 of 2012 came to be dismissed by the Tribunal on 05.05.2012. 5.2 On the basis of above uncontroverted facts, it could be successfully contended that during the pendency of the Securitisation Application No.63 of 2009, petitioners initiated several legal proceedings before the Tribunal, before this Court and before the Apex Court. It was averred that in all the proceedings, huge amount was spent for litigation. Reply filed by the Bank figures on record (Annexure- R8, Page 194 to 201). 5.3 Special Civil Application No.9225 of 2012 was filed seeking waiver of condition of deposit, in which the interim relief was turned down by order dated 16.07.2012 wherein the court observed inter alia, “7. The contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner requires consideration. At the same time to test the bonafide of the petitioner, the court has given a suggestion to Mr. A.L. Shah to pay 50% of the principal loan amount for continuation of interim relief during the pendency of the petition, the same was not acceptable to petitioner. The principal amount is huge amount of 40 crores, therefore, only with a view to avoid repayment legal contention is raised. 8. In my view no discretion is required to be exercised in favour of the petitioner. Interim relief refused. It is clarified that proceedings before DRT is not stayed by this court nor any order of D.R.T is stayed.” 6. The Appellate Tribunal reasoned as under for refusing to condone the delay, “6. From the submissions made by both the parties, it is seen that the bank has issued notice under the SARFAESI Act which notice has been challenged by the appellants by filing S.A. with declaration that the appellants have filed application before the B.I.R.R. which application has been dismissed. Thereafter, the appellants approached A.A.I.F.R. Where the matter has been stayed. Further so far as the delay is concerned, the contention that due to financial difficulties the appellants could not file the appeal within limitation cannot be considered. Thereafter, the appellants approached A.A.I.F.R. Where the matter has been stayed. Further so far as the delay is concerned, the contention that due to financial difficulties the appellants could not file the appeal within limitation cannot be considered. Since the appellants have filed petition before B.I.F.R. Delhi as well as in other courts, therefore, i am not agreeing with the reasons mentioned by the appellants for condonation of delay. I, therefore, reject the application for condonation of delay.” 7. Mere cause shown is not a sufficient cause shown. A sufficient cause is not just some explanation given on facts. In order to make a sufficient cause, it must have an element of genuineness reflected in the explanatory reasons. The explanation and the supportive facts should have the character of bona fide also. In this sense, the concept of sufficient cause to be applied for the purpose of condonation of delay, is a connotation with intake of legal parameters. In absence of satisfactory explanation given and sufficient cause shown, delay cannot be condoned. Adverting to the facts of the present case and the explanation offered, what is stated that the petitioner was financially hard pressed because of which he could not filed the appeal. From the series of litigations before the different forums including the High Court and the Supreme Court indulged into and pursued by the petitioner, the explanation could not countenanced that the petitioner was not financially well off. On the contrary, the details of the litigations mentioned hereinabove indicated that the cause sought to be advanced by the petitioner was incorrect as the facts were suggestive otherwise. Therefore, the explanation of the petitioner turned out not only to be false, but it lacked the bona fide. In the facts and circumstances, merely asserting that the petitioner had financial difficulties, could hardly be seen as making out a sufficient cause. 8. In the aforesaid view, the explanation of the petitioner about the occurrence of delay is not tenable on facts, therefore could not be accepted. Not only that the sufficient cause is miserably not made out, from the facts of the litigations, it could be further be easily inferred that the petitioner could not be said to be without knowledge in respect of the procedural requirements including the observance of limitation in approaching the higher forum. Not only that the sufficient cause is miserably not made out, from the facts of the litigations, it could be further be easily inferred that the petitioner could not be said to be without knowledge in respect of the procedural requirements including the observance of limitation in approaching the higher forum. Passage of time leading to delay, though of 112 days, had no justification and was not backed by some bona fide conduct which prevented the petitioner from preferring appeal. Liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay may be justified where some genuine bona fide cause exists. In absence of it, every explanation merely offered without substance cannot be weighed with a liberal approach. 9. In the aforesaid view, it could be hardly said that a case was made out before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal for condoning the delay. The delay of 112 days was clearly found, in light of the above discussed reasons, not to be backed by a sufficient cause. The case turned out to be a fit case where delay should not be condoned. No exception could be taken to the order of the Appellate Tribunal. 10. The petition is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. Notice is discharged. Petition dismissed.