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2016 DIGILAW 2215 (HP)

State of H. P. v. Natter Singh

2016-10-18

SANJAY KAROL, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

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Singh Chauhan, J. This petition under Section 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the award passed by the learned Presiding Judge, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla on 26.9.2015 whereby it allowed the application filed by the respondent under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘Act’) and directed the petitioners to pay full wages to the respondent w.e.f. 1.10.2010 to 8.8.2011 within a period of three months, failing which the petitioners were held liable to pay an interest @ 9% per annum. 2. The respondent was initially engaged as daily paid casual labourer on 1.6.1993 with the petitioners and worked as such till 2001, when his services came to be dispensed with. He approached the Conciliation Officer and on failure of conciliation, a reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (for short ‘Tribunal’) and the same was answered in favour of the respondent vide its award dated 10.9.2010 and the petitioners were directed to reinstate the respondent in service with seniority and continuity but without back wages from the year, 2001 and the petitioners were further directed to consider his claim for regularization sympathetically. 3. Pursuant to the award passed by the learned Tribunal, the respondent approached the petitioners for his joining, but the same was not accepted by respondent No. 2 purportedly for want of appropriate approval of the competent authority and he was eventually allowed to join his duties only on 10.8.2011 after getting the approval from the competent authority. 4. Since the respondent was not permitted to join his duties in terms of the award passed in his favour for nearly ten months, he again approached the learned Tribunal by filing an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act and the same was allowed on 26.9.2015 and the petitioners were directed to pay full wages to the respondent for the period w.e.f. 1.10.2010 to 8.8.2011 at the rates fixed for daily wagers by the Government, from time to time, within a period of three months, failing which the same was to carry interest @ 9% per annum. 5. Aggrieved by the award passed by the learned Tribunal initially on 10.9.2010 and thereafter on 26.9.2015, the petitioners have filed the instant petition. We have heard Mr. Shrawan Dogra, learned Advocate General for the petitioners and have gone through the material placed on record. 6. 5. Aggrieved by the award passed by the learned Tribunal initially on 10.9.2010 and thereafter on 26.9.2015, the petitioners have filed the instant petition. We have heard Mr. Shrawan Dogra, learned Advocate General for the petitioners and have gone through the material placed on record. 6. At the outset, it may be observed that the petition is bereft of any specific ground. However, what can be gathered from a reading of the petition is that the petitioners appear to be mainly aggrieved by the initial award passed by the learned Tribunal on 10.9.2010, but then it is too late in the day for them to assail the same as not only the award stands implemented in its letter and spirit, but that apart, the initial award has already merged in the later award passed by the learned Tribunal in application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act on 26.9.2015. 7. Section 33-C (2) of the Act reads thus: “Section 33-C. Recovery of money due from an employer.- 1. xx xx xx (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a period not exceeding three months]. Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.” 8. It is evident from the aforesaid Section that the same is in the nature of execution proceeding and can be filed to execute any award, settlement or order of an authority where the relief granted need to be computed in terms of money. It is equally settled that a workman can proceed under Section 33-C (2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33-A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. 9. It is equally settled that a workman can proceed under Section 33-C (2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33-A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. vs. Suresh Chand (1978) 2 SCC 144 held that a proceeding under Section 33- C (2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from the employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. 10. Concededly there has already been adjudication in the present case and, therefore, the petitioners have no option but to implement the award passed by the learned Tribunal i.e. on 10.9.2010 in its letter and spirit and cannot be permitted to rake-up issues that have attained finality. 11. Apart from the above, the only other visible ground which one could notice while going through the petition is that it is only on account of the opinion rendered by the Finance Department that the present petition appears to have been filed as is evident from para 5 of the petition which reads thus: “5. That pursuant to the award passed by Ld. Court, the applicant approached the department for his joining but the same was not accepted by the Divisional Forest Officer, Rajgarh for want of appropriate approval of the competent authorities and he was allowed to join his duties on 10.08.2011 after getting the approval of competent authority in consultation with Law Department conveyed vide Addl. Chief Secretary (Forests) to the Government of H.P. letter No. FFE-A(E)2-186/2011 dated 08.07.2011 in which it was requested to implement the directions of the Hon’ble Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Camp at Solan.” 12. We are at a complete loss to appreciate as to how the opinion of the Finance Department could be a ground to indulge in this frivolous litigation especially when the petitioners have not assailed the main award and had rather implemented the same by permitting the respondent to join his duties on 10.08.2011. We are at a complete loss to appreciate as to how the opinion of the Finance Department could be a ground to indulge in this frivolous litigation especially when the petitioners have not assailed the main award and had rather implemented the same by permitting the respondent to join his duties on 10.08.2011. That apart, the respondent was permitted to join his duties only after getting the approval from the competent authority in consultation with the Law Department conveyed by the Additional Secretary (Forests) to the Government of H.P. vide his letter No. FFE-A(E)2-186/2011 dated 08.07.2011 as finds mention in para -5 of the writ petition. 13. That apart, the petitioners have specifically averred in para-7 that the case had been examined in the Law Department, wherein the Law Department had clearly opined that the case was unfit for further agitation. It is high time that the State implements the ‘H.P. State Litigation Policy’ in its letter and spirit with a view to save time and money on the one hand and at the same time, relieves the burden of the Court from being clogged with frivolous litigation. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed in limine. Though, this was a fit case where the petitioners ought to be burdened with heavy costs, but we refrain from doing so as we have not issued any notice to the respondent. 15. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition stands disposed of, so also the pending applications, if any.