JUDGMENT : 1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicants – original accused persons call in question the legality and validity of the order dated 26th July 2016 passed by the Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar in the Criminal Revision Application No.42 of 2016. 2. The facts giving rise to this application may be summarized as under:- 2.1 The respondent No.2 herein lodged a complaint in writing in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mansa for the offence punishable under Sections 120B, 409, 420, 467, 468, 470, 471 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code. In the said complaint, the applicants herein have been shown as the accused persons. The learned Magistrate thought fit to pass an order directing the police to investigate the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2.2 Pursuant to the order passed by the learned Magistrate directing the police to register the F.I.R. and undertake the investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the First Information Report came to be registered at the Mansa Police Station as the M. Case No.1 of 2016. 2.3 The applicants herein, being dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Magistrate of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., thought fit to challenge the same by filing the Criminal Revision Application No.42 of 2016 in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge at Gandhinagar. 2.4 In the course of the hearing of the revision application, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the State as well as the original complainant as regards the maintainability of the revision application. It was submitted before the Revisional Court that an order passed by the Magistrate of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is an interlocutory order and the revision would be barred by virtue of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. 3. The Revisional Court upheld the objection and rejected the revision application. Being dissatisfied, the applicants have come up with this application invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Mr. Parthiv Bhatt, the learned counsel appearing for the applicants vehemently submitted that the Revisional Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned order. Being dissatisfied, the applicants have come up with this application invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Mr. Parthiv Bhatt, the learned counsel appearing for the applicants vehemently submitted that the Revisional Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned order. He would submit that an order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. passed by the learned Magistrate cannot be termed as an interlocutory order, but is a final order. In other words, the order directing investigation made by the Magistrate in the proceeding under Section 156(3) of the Code would be final so far as the Magistrate is concerned. 5. Mr. Bhatt submits that the Revisional Court committed a serious error by placing reliance on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Father Thomas vs. State of U.P. and another reported in 2011 CrLJ 2278 . According to the learned counsel, the said decision is clearly distinguishable since the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court did not advert to the fact of termination of the proceeding under Section 156(3) of the Code after passing of the order of the Magistrate thereunder and thus, the said proceeding ending into a final order. 6. Mr. Bhatt submits that after passing of the order under Section 156(3) of the Code, the Magistrate has nothing further to do and the proceeding under Section 156(3) of the Code gets terminated. Nothing remains pending before the Magistrate after such order is passed. Mr. Bhatt would submit that despite the termination of the proceeding under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and in light of the principle “ubi jus ibi remedium”, the applicants herein cannot be denied the statutory remedy of revision under Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. read with Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. 7. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Bhatt, the learned counsel appearing for the applicants prays that the impugned order be quashed and it be held that a revision is maintainable against the order of the Magistrate to register the F.I.R. and undertake the investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Mr. Bhatt prays that after holding so, the matter may be remitted to the Revisional Court for a decision on merits. 8. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by the learned A.P.P. appearing for the State. Bhatt prays that after holding so, the matter may be remitted to the Revisional Court for a decision on merits. 8. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by the learned A.P.P. appearing for the State. The learned A.P.P. would submit that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the Revisional Court in rejecting the revision application on the ground of its maintainability. The learned A.P.P. submits that by any stretch of imagination, an order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be said to be a “final order” or even an “intermediate order”. 9. The learned A.P.P. would submit that an order passed by the Magistrate, in exercise of power under Section 156(3) of the Code, is not open to challenge by filing a revision application since it is purely an interlocutory order. According to the learned A.P.P., if a revision application against mere registration of the F.I.R. by the police is not maintainable, then such revision would not be maintainable when the Magistrate only directs the registration of the F.I.R. According to the learned A.P.P., if the revision application is held to be maintainable before the Sessions Court against an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., and if such revision is allowed, it would have the effect of quashing the F.I.R. The Sessions Court has no such power, otherwise it cannot do so by entertaining a revision against an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code. 10. The learned A.P.P, vehemently submitted that for the purpose of exercising revisional power under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., the Court, whose order is sought to be revised, must have recorded such finding, order or sentence or have drawn a proceeding which is exfacie illegal or without jurisdiction. While directing the police investigation to investigate the matter, the Magistrate neither records any finding nor passes any order or sentence against the accused, because at that stage the registration of F.I.R. is only against the prospective accused. 11. The learned A.P.P., in the last, submitted that if it is held that an order under Section 156(3) of the Code is revisable, the same would amount to conferring the power upon the Sessions Court to quash the F.I.R. or investigation. 11. The learned A.P.P., in the last, submitted that if it is held that an order under Section 156(3) of the Code is revisable, the same would amount to conferring the power upon the Sessions Court to quash the F.I.R. or investigation. Such power is conferred only on the High Courts under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226, 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. The learned A.P.P., in support of her submissions, has placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court rendered by a learned Single Judge in the case of C.B.I. vs. State of Gujarat (Criminal Revision Application No.138 of 2001 decided on 13th August 2001). 13. Reliance is sought to be placed on the following observations:- “#. Shri BM Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent no.1, however, raised a preliminary objection that the revision is not maintainable, because it is directed against an interlocutory order. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Madras High Court in Nathan Vs. Vaithinathan & Ors., 1975 CrLJ 994 . It was held in this case that an order of a Magistrate forwarding a complaint for an offence under sec.307, Penal Code, to Police for investigation and report under sec.156(3), is an interlocutory order to which sec.397(2) will apply. No revision lies against such order. Of course, if the impugned order is found to be an interlocutory order, no revision will lie as provided under sec.397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, it has to be seen, whether the impugned order is an interlocutory order or it is a final order. On the face of it, the impugned order seems to be an interlocutory order, inasmuch as, it was passed under sec.156(3) of the Code. However, when the very jurisdiction of the Special Judge to pass such an order has been challenged, it is difficult to accept the contention that the impugned order is an interlocutory order. An order is said to be interlocutory in nature when it does not decide the case or rights and obligations of the parties finally. A final order is one which decides the matter finally one way or the other. An order is said to be interlocutory in nature when it does not decide the case or rights and obligations of the parties finally. A final order is one which decides the matter finally one way or the other. In the instant case, if the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to issue direction, acting under sec.156(3) of the Code, to the CBI to investigate and report, then such order can not be said to be an interlocutory order. The CBI is duty bound to comply with the orders which can be passed legally by a Court. The CBI is neither legally nor morally bound to comply with the order of a Court which is patently without jurisdiction. If, the CBI goes on to comply with orders which are passed without jurisdiction, it will amount to compliance of nonest order or an order which is nullity. If it is found that the order is nonest or is nullity or is voidabinitio, it can not be said that the revisional Court can not interfere in such matters only on the ground that the order is seemingly of an interlocutory nature. If it is found that the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to issue such direction to the CBI, then certainly, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, such order can be quashed and set aside, because such order will be illegal and contrary to law and also contrary to the observations of this Court and the Apex Court in two cases. I, therefore, do not find any force in the preliminary objection that the impugned order is an interlocutory order. The revision is, therefore, maintainable.” 14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Revisional Court committed any error in passing the impugned order. 15. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, I should look into few relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. in this regard. 16. Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. reads thus:- “156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case: (1) ….. (2) ….. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned.” 17. Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. reads thus:- “397. 16. Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. reads thus:- “156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case: (1) ….. (2) ….. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned.” 17. Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. reads thus:- “397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision- (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation:- All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 398. (2) The powers of revision conferred by subsection (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. 18. Section 399 of the Cr.P.C. reads thus:- “399. Sessions Judge's powers of revision- (1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by himself, the Sessions Judge may exercise all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under subsection (1) of section 401. (2) Where any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a Sessions Judge under subsection (1), the provisions of subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 401 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said subsections to the High Court shall be construed as references to the Sessions Judge. (2) Where any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a Sessions Judge under subsection (1), the provisions of subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 401 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said subsections to the High Court shall be construed as references to the Sessions Judge. (3) Where any application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in relation to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other Court.” 19-20. There are three types of orders, which ordinarily, the Court of law has to deal with. First the “final order”, secondly the “intermediate order”, and thirdly the “interlocutory order”. 21. The legal wrangle began when different Courts gave their interpretations in the absence of any precise definition of the words “interlocutory order” occurring in the Code. The same not having been either illustratively or exhaustively defined, came to be given different shades on the facts of a case in which the said words were sought to be interpreted. 22. The expression "interlocutory order" has not been defined either in the Code or elsewhere. However, its meaning and implications have been considered by various courts both English and Indian. In para 506, Halsbury's Laws of England, 26th Volume (Fourth Edition), it is stated that:- "An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations or right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed "interlocutory". An interlocutory order, even though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals." 23. Para 504 of the said treatise amplifies the position further stating that:- "......a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory fox" another, or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. It is impossible to lay down principles about what is final and what is interlocutory. Para 504 of the said treatise amplifies the position further stating that:- "......a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory fox" another, or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. It is impossible to lay down principles about what is final and what is interlocutory. It is better to look at the nature of the application and not at the nature of the order eventually made." 24. The last part of the aforesaid statement rests on the observations of Lord Denning M.R. in Salter Rex and Co. v. Ghosh, (1971) 2 AllER 865. In the course of his speech, the learned Law Lord observed :- "In Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange, (1877) 3 CPD 67 and Salaman v. Warner, (1891) 1 QB 734 and 735, Lord Esher MR said that the test was the nature of the application to the court and not the nature of the order which the court eventually made. But in Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council, (1903) 1 KB 547, the Court said that the test was the nature of the order as made. Lord Alverstone C.J. said that the test is : Does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties?' Lord Alverstone C.J. was right in logic but Lord Esher MR was right in experience. Lord Esher MR's test has always been applied in practice." 25. The meaning and ambit of the expression "interlocutory order" as used in Section 397(2) has been considered by the Supreme Court in several decisions. In Smt. Parmeshwari Devi v. The State, AIR 1977 SC 403 : 1977 CrLJ 245 , the petitioner Smt. Parmeshwari Devi had in response to an order under Section 94 of the old Code filed a reply expressing her inability to produce the documents stating the circumstances pertaining thereto. She was not a party to the trial but even then the Magistrate issued order on 8th August, 1974 i.e. after coming into force of the Code, directing her to attend the Court so as to enable it to put her a few questions for satisfying itself regarding the whereabouts of the documents. The said order was challenged in revision invoking the bar of Section 397(2) of the Code. The said order was challenged in revision invoking the bar of Section 397(2) of the Code. The Supreme Court observed :- "The Code does not define an interlocutory order, but it obviously is an intermediate order, made during the preliminary stages of an enquiry or trial. The purpose of subsection (2) of Section 397 is to keep such an order outside the purview of the power of revision so that the enquiry or trial may proceed without delay. This is not likely to prejudice the aggrieved party for it can always challenge it in due course if the final order goes against it. But it does not follow that if the order is directed against a person who is not a party to the enquiry or trial, and he will have no opportunity to challenge it after a final order is made affecting the parties concerned, he cannot apply for its revision even if it is directed against him and adversely affects his rights." (Emphasis supplied) 26. The Supreme Court also adverted to the following observations appearing in its earlier decision in Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker v. State of Gujarat AIR 1968 SC 733 : 1968 CrLJ 876 :- "An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals." It then said : "It may thus be conclusive with reference to the stage at which it is made, and it may also be conclusive as to a person, who is not a party to the enquiry or trial, against whom it is directed." 27. In Amar Nath vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 : 1977 CrLJ 1891 , the Supreme Court was dealing with an order summoning the appellants in a complaint case, the appellants having been earlier exonerated by the police in their report under S. 173 of the Code. A question arose whether the order of summoning was an interlocutory order within the meaning of S. 397(2). The Supreme Court observed :- "Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in S. 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in S. 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important, rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under S. 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.” 28. Again the very same question cropped up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 : 1978 CrLJ 165 . On an examination of several decisions both of Indian and English Courts including the decision of the Federal Court in S. Kuppuswami Rao vs. The King, AIR 1949 FC 1 : 1948-49 CrLJ 625, the Supreme Court said : "But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by S. 397(1)........In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being converse of the words "final order". If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by S. 397(1)........In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being converse of the words "final order". There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case, AIR 1949 FC 1 : 194849 CrLJ 625 (supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in subsection (2) of S. 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Art. 134 of the Constitution yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of S. 397(2)." 29. The Supreme Court concluded by saying :- "We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of subsection (2) of Section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course." 30. In the said case the Sessions Court had vide the impugned order rejected the application of the accused-petitioner challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the trial on various grounds, for instance, want of sanction for prosecution by the competent authority. It was in this context that the Supreme Court applying the test, "If the order in question is reversed would the action have to go on?" concluded that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2). 31. Still later the Supreme Court explained the nature and scope of an interlocutory order in V.C. Shukla v. State, AIR 1980 SC 962 : 1980 CrLJ 690 . 31. Still later the Supreme Court explained the nature and scope of an interlocutory order in V.C. Shukla v. State, AIR 1980 SC 962 : 1980 CrLJ 690 . While reaffirming its earlier decision in Amar Nath, 1977 CrLJ 1891 (SC) (supra) and expressing its agreement with the exposition of law by the learned Judges in Madhu Limaye, 1978 CrLJ 165 (SC) (supra), S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. who spoke for the majority, observed :- "We might reiterate here even at the risk of repetition that the term "interlocutory order" used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial because the bar contained in S. 397(2) of the Code would apply to a variety of cases coming up to the courts not only being offences under the Penal Code but under numerous Acts. If, therefore, the right of revision was to be barred, the provision containing the bar must be confined within the four corners of the spirit and the letter of the law. In other words, the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final." 32. His Lordship summed up the legal position saying that the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. 33. Bearing in mind the guidelines enunciated in the ratio of various judicial pronouncements, the scheme of the Code in that behalf, the object for enacting or incorporating the said provision and the basic concept of the term in question, the following propositions would logically follow :- (1) That the term "interlocutory order" has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or realistic sense. (2) That it merely denotes an order of purely interim or temporary nature. The emphasis in this category is on the word "purely", which would again highlight the concept that the nature of the order must be pure and simple, temporary or interim in character and ostensibly deceptive appearance of a temporary character should not be confused with the real and outright temporary nature. The emphasis in this category is on the word "purely", which would again highlight the concept that the nature of the order must be pure and simple, temporary or interim in character and ostensibly deceptive appearance of a temporary character should not be confused with the real and outright temporary nature. (3) Such orders pertaining to some matters in the proceeding which merely and purely assume the character of stepsinaid of the proceeding can be embraced by the said terminology, which again affords a pointer about the nature and categories of the orders that re purely temporary or interim without actually affecting or even touching substantially any right or material aspect of the proceeding. (4) Though a stamp of finality to the proceeding or termination of the proceeding may be quite a relevant and important consideration, yet it is not a sole criterion of the test in that behalf. (5) So also, the potential capacity to terminate proceeding or to give it a label of finality is also not the only and conclusive criterion though it by itself is a relevant feature. (6) Therefore, the fact that the main proceeding is kept alive that does not ipso facto give a stamp to several such orders as "interlocutory order". (7) Consequently it is not permissible to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being the converse of the term "final order". (8) An order of moment would obviously be lifted out of the sweep of the said terminology. (9) Irrespective of the order bearing stamp of finality, there may be an intervening stage which can be called as 'intermediate stage' at which an order may be passed which in turn may be called as 'intermediate order', which neither gives the finality to the proceeding nor is purely interim or temporary and as such is not an interlocutory order, but would fall in between and in certain cases such order can be said to be not interlocutory. (10) An order which (a) decides; or (b) even touches the important rights or liabilities of the parties; cannot be said to be interlocutory. (11) An order which (a) substantially affects the rights of the parties; or (b) decides certain rights of the parties : cannot be termed as 'interlocutory'. (10) An order which (a) decides; or (b) even touches the important rights or liabilities of the parties; cannot be said to be interlocutory. (11) An order which (a) substantially affects the rights of the parties; or (b) decides certain rights of the parties : cannot be termed as 'interlocutory'. (12) So also, an order which (a) adjudicates; or (b) even affects (i) either the rights of the parties : (ii) even any particular aspect of the trial or the proceeding cannot be also termed as 'interlocutory order'. 34. At this stage, let me look into the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Father Thomas (supra) taking the view that an order under Section 156(3) is an “interlocutory order” and a revision against the said order is barred, under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. The Revisional Court in the case at hand has placed strong reliance on this decision in taking the view that the revision application is not maintainable. I may quote the relevant observations as under:- “33. It was observed by the learned Single Judge that as no substantive rights and liabilities of the accused are involved at the stage when an order is passed by the Magistrate directing the police merely to investigate into a cognizable offence in exercise of powers under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and only the informant and the police are in the picture, the said proceedings are purely interlocutory in nature, and are not revisable. It is only after investigation when a report under section 173 (2) of the Code is submitted by the police, that the Magistrate makes up his mind whether to take cognizance or to drop the proceedings. 34. S. 397 (2) of the Code reads as follows. "The powers of revision conferred by subsection (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding." 35. Only if cognizance is taken and process issued that the accused gets a right of hearing. Before that stage according to the learned Single Judge, any order, including an order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C, will be interlocutory in nature. 36. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of S. 397(2) as contained Clause (d) of paragraph 5 of the accompanying the 1973 Code. Before that stage according to the learned Single Judge, any order, including an order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C, will be interlocutory in nature. 36. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of S. 397(2) as contained Clause (d) of paragraph 5 of the accompanying the 1973 Code. runs thus: "the powers of revision against interlocutory orders are being taken away, as it has been found to be one of the main contributing factors in the delay of disposal of criminal cases." 37. In support of his contention that a direction by the Magistrate to the police under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to register and investigate a criminal offence may not amount to an interlocutory order, but it could at best be described as an intermediate order, Sri D.S. Mishra Advocate has placed reliance on the Apex Court decision in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 (15) ACC 184 : AIR 1978 SC 47 . 38. Madhu Limaye (supra) no doubt lays down that orders, such as the order in that case issuing process against the accused could not be described as a final order, but it was also not an interlocutory order, which could have attracted the bar to the maintainability of the criminal revision in view of section 397 (2) of the Code, because if the plea of the accused was rejected on a point which when accepted could have concluded the particular proceedings. Rather according to the said decision it should be described as a type of intermediate order falling in the middle course. In Madhu Limaye an objection had been raised by the appellant that the cognizance taken by the Sessions Court without commitment of the case to it in exercise of powers under section 199(2) Cr.P.C., on a complaint under section 500 IPC by the Public Prosecutor based on the sanction by the State Government under section 199(4) Cr.P.C. was incompetent, as no complaint had been made by the aggrieved person Sri A.R. Antulay, the Chief Minister, and the alleged defamatory statements related to acts done in his personal capacity, and not in the discharge of his public duties. If this contention was accepted, it would have resulted in the order of cognizance passed by the Sessions Judge without the case being committed to him, being set aside. If this contention was accepted, it would have resulted in the order of cognizance passed by the Sessions Judge without the case being committed to him, being set aside. Hence, this objection would go to the root of the matter, and could not be ignored only by describing the order as interlocutory in nature. 39. In Amar Nath v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 2185 interlocutory orders have been described thus in paragraph 6:- "It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in S. 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. 40. In Amar Nath, AIR 1977 SC 2185 the order summoning the appellants in a mechanical manner after the police had submitted a final report against them leading to their release by the Judicial Magistrate, and the revision against that order before the Additional Sessions Judge preferred by the complainant had also failed. Even the subsequent complaint by the complainant had been dismissed on merits. Against the latter dismissal of the complaint when the complainant preferred a revision, the Sessions Judge set aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate and ordered further inquiry, whereupon the Magistrate straightaway summoned the appellants for trial. Even the subsequent complaint by the complainant had been dismissed on merits. Against the latter dismissal of the complaint when the complainant preferred a revision, the Sessions Judge set aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate and ordered further inquiry, whereupon the Magistrate straightaway summoned the appellants for trial. This order which appeared to infringe substantial rights acquired by the appellants was considered an order of moment and not a mere interlocutory order, which would invite the bar to entertaining the revision under S. 397(2) of the Code. 41. An order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. passed by the Magistrate directing the police officer to investigate a cognizable case on the other hand is no such order of moment, which impinges on any valuable rights of the party. Where any objection to the issuance of such a direction to be accepted (though it is difficult to visualize any objection which could result in the quashing of a simple direction for investigation), the proceedings would still not come to an end, as it would be open to the complainant informant to move an application under section 154(3) before the Superintendent of Police (S.P.) or a superior officer under section 36 of the Code. He could also file a complaint under section 190 read with section 200 of the Code. This is the basic difference from the situations mentioned in Madhu Limaye, AIR 1978 SC 47 and in Amar Nath's cases, AIR 1977 SC 2185 , where acceptance of the objections could result in the said accused being discharged or the summons set aside, and the proceedings terminated. Also the direction for investigation by the Magistrate is but an incidental step in aid of investigation and trial. It is thus similar to orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, orders granting bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of pending proceedings which have been described as purely interlocutory in nature in Amar Nath (supra). 42. In this connection it has been aptly noted in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. Narayan Reddy, AIR 1976 SC 1672 , that "an order made under subsection (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156 (1)." 43. 42. In this connection it has been aptly noted in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. Narayan Reddy, AIR 1976 SC 1672 , that "an order made under subsection (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156 (1)." 43. The power conferred under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. is of the same nature as the power under section 156(1), which is the power conferred on a police officer incharge of a police station to investigate any cognizable case to investigate a case, without orders of the Magistrate, which the Magistrate of the local area would have power to inquire into or try. The police officer records an FIR in accordance with the procedure mentioned in section 154(1) of the Code. In the event of the failure of the police officer to record the information, the aggrieved informant has been given a right to approach the Superintendent of Police under section 154(3) for a direction for investigation. Such powers may also be exercised by any officer superior in rank to an officer incharge of a police station in view of S. 36 of the Code. The powers of a Magistrate for giving directions under section 156(3) is thus allied to the powers of police officers under sections 154(1), 154(3) and 36 of the Code. It would thus be highly illogical to suggest that the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere in a criminal revision or other judicial proceedings with the decision of the police officer incharge of the police station to lodge an FIR under section 154(1) of the Code or by a superior officer under section 154(3), or the actual investigation conducted by the police under the aforesaid provisions, but the initial order of the Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. peremptorily reminding the police to perform its duty and investigate a cognizable offence could be subject to challenge in a criminal revision or other judicial proceeding. 44. 44. We thus see that the orders for investigation are only an ancillary step in aid of the investigation or trial, and are clearly interlocutory in nature, similar to orders granting bail, or calling for records, or issuing search warrants, or summoning witnesses and other like matters which infringe no valuable rights of the prospective accused, and are not amenable to challenge in a criminal revision, in view of the bar contained in section 397(2) of the Code. 45. Also the situations in Madhu Limaye, AIR 1978 SC 47 or in Amar Nath's cases, AIR 1977 SC 2185 are clearly distinguishable, where refusal to consider the objections raised on behalf of the accused may have prevented his being discharged and may have caused him to be summoned to face trial, resulting in the orders being described as neither final nor interlocutory, but intermediate in nature. Revisions against the said intermediate orders would therefore not attract the bar under section 397(2). Acceptance of the objection to the direction for investigation under section 156(3) at the precognizance stage, would however not result in the closure of the proceedings against the accused, as the complainant/ informant could have sought summoning of the accused by filing a complaint under section 190(a) read with 200 or by moving an application for investigation before the S.P. or other superior officer under section 154(3) or S. 36 of the Code (if that step had not earlier been taken). From the above discussion it follows that the said orders are clearly interlocutory in nature, and not revisable in view of the bar contained in section 397(2) of the Code. 46. As the direction for investigation passed by the Magistrate under section 156(3) is purely interlocutory in nature, and involves no substantial rights of the parties, we are of the view that the bar under section 397(2) Cr.P.C. to the entertainment of a criminal revision can also not be circumvented by moving an application under section 482 Cr.P.C. As observed in State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641 in paragraph 29:- "29........This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment." 47-48. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment." 47-48. An application under section 482 Cr.P.C. would also not lie against an order for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., which is an adjunct to the police power to investigate in Chapter XII of the Code, because as held in Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and others., AIR 2008 SC 1614 (paragraph 22, and Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal and Anr., AIR 1972 SC 2639 , (paragraph 35), whilst conducting an investigation into a cognizable offence the police authorities are exercising their statutory powers under sections 154 and 156 of the Code, and even the High Court in its inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot interfere with the exercise of this statutory power. 49. Moreover the said inherent power needs to be utilized very sparingly and with circumspection and as held by the Apex Court while considering the jurisdiction of the High Court in Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229 , (paragraph 2): "It ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases." 50. In para 9 in single judge decision in the case of Prof. Ram Naresh Chaudhary v. State of U. P., 2008 CrLJ 1515 : 2008 (2) ALJ 55 the following observations have been made :- "At this stage accused does not come into picture at all, nor can he be heard. He has no locus to participate in the proceedings. He can at the most stand and watch the proceedings. It must be remembered that it is precognizance stage. The nature of the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. directing registration and investigation of case is only a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its power of investigation under Section 156(1) Cr. P. C, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Devarappalli Lakshaminarayana Reddy and others v. Narayana Reddy and others, 1976 ACC 230 : AIR 1976 SC 1672 . How such a reminder is subject to revisional power of the Court is something which goes beyond comprehension. P. C, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Devarappalli Lakshaminarayana Reddy and others v. Narayana Reddy and others, 1976 ACC 230 : AIR 1976 SC 1672 . How such a reminder is subject to revisional power of the Court is something which goes beyond comprehension. From the nature of the order itself, it is clear that it is an interlocutory order, not amenable to revisional power of the Court. Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. specifically bars revision filed against interlocutory orders." 51. Likewise in Rakesh Puri and Anr. v. State of U.P., 2007 (1) ALJ 169 (supra), Smt. Rekha Verma and others v. State of U. P. and others, 2007 (57) ACC 241 : 2007 (1) ALJ (NOC) 123 and Abdul Aziz v. State of U.P., Paragraph 13 (supra) it has been held by single Judge decisions of this Court that neither a Criminal Revision nor an Application under section 482 Cr.P.C. would lie against the direction of the Magistrate to register and investigate an FIR in exercise of powers under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. In Abdul Aziz it has further been held that only after an FIR can an accused move the High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the FIR, but prior to the registration of the F.I.R., the prospective accused has no right to challenge that order. 52. Piqued by the over flowing dockets of petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C. on miscellaneous matters, which have created a huge back log affecting disposal by the High Court of grave matters under section 302 IPC etc., because the circumspection and caution required before admitting such petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C. is not being exercised, Hon'ble G.P. Mathur, J. speaking for the Bench has expressed his disquiet thus in paragraph 38 of Hamida Vs. Rashid, AIR 2007 (Supp) SC 361:- "38......... Rashid, AIR 2007 (Supp) SC 361:- "38......... Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent in hearing those appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at an interlocutory stage which are often filed with some oblique motive in order to circumvent the prescribed procedure, as is the case here, or to delay the trial which will enable the accused to win over the witnesses by money or muscle power or they may become disinterested in giving evidence, ultimately resulting in miscarriage of justice." 53. As we have observed that the direction under section 156(3) of the Code refers to a precognizance stage, it does not strictly relate to proceedings pending in a Court, but as mentioned hereinabove it only relates to directions to the police to carry out the investigation in a cognizable case under Chapter XII of the Code. In this context it has been clarified in State of W.B. and Ors. v. Sujit Kumar Rana, (2004) 4 SCC 129 : AIR 2004 SC 1851 , that inherent powers of the High Court come into play only where an order has been passed by the Criminal Court which is required to be set aside to secure the ends of justice or where the proceedings pending before a court amounts to abuse of the process of Court.” 35. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Avinash Trimbakrao Dhondage [Criminal Writ Petition No.159 of 2014 decided on 21st October 2015] had the occasion to consider the issue in hand. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court took into consideration the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Father Thomas (supra). The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has taken the view that the order under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order, but is a final order terminating the proceeding under Section 156(3) of the Code and that the revision under Section 397 or Section 401 of the Code would lie. 36. The observations made by the Division Bench are as under:- “9. 36. The observations made by the Division Bench are as under:- “9. From the two decisions quoted above, it is clear that after making of the order u/s 156(3) of the Code, it is the duty of the officer-in-charge of the Police Station to register FIR regarding cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint and then to proceed to make investigation, which would end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. It is noteworthy that the Magistrate, after having made an order u/s 156(3) of the Code does not have any control on the manner of investigation, making of arrest of the accused or not etc. However, the investigation after completion would end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code and it is on that report thereafter, the procedure contemplated by Section 173 of the Code or rather the power of the Magistrate would come into play. In other words, the order directing investigation made by the Magistrate in the proceeding u/s 156(3) of the Code would be final insofar as the Magistrate is concerned. The Supreme Court clearly made a distinction in relation to the power of the Magistrate u/s 202(1) of the Code namely to direct an investigation to be made by a Police Officer or by such other person, is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. Therefore, such a direction for investigation contemplated by Section 202(1) of the Code should not be confused with the direction to investigate u/s 156(3) of the Code and the same is independent having no relationship with the order of investigation u/s 156(3) of the Code. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Laxminarayan Vishwanath Arya v. State of Maharashtra & others, 2007 (5) MhLJ 7 on the basis of the decision in the case of M.C. Abraham & Others vs. Maharashtra & others (2003 Bom.C.R. (Cri), 650 (SC) stated thus in paragraph no.21 as under:- "21. The provisions of Section 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, hereinafter referred to as "the Code", provides for arrest by a Police Officer without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant. A distinct and different power under Section 44 of the Code empowers the Magistrate to arrest or order any person to arrest the offender. The provisions of Section 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, hereinafter referred to as "the Code", provides for arrest by a Police Officer without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant. A distinct and different power under Section 44 of the Code empowers the Magistrate to arrest or order any person to arrest the offender. Under Section 44 of the Code, that power is vested in the Court of the Magistrate when an offence is committed in his presence. If the Legislature has taken care of providing such specific power under Section 44 of the Code, then there could be no reason for such a power not to be specified under the provisions of Chapter XII of the Code. In terms of Section 41, a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant or order from the Magistrate for any or all of the conditions specified in that provision. Language of this provision clearly suggested that the Police Officer can arrest a person without an order from the Magistrate. Thus, there appears to be no reason why on the strength of Section 156(3) of the Code, any restriction should be read into the powers specifically granted by the legislature to the Police Officer. Of course, freedom of investigation is the essence of these provisions but in order to suppress the mischief it is sufficiently indicated under different provisions of the Code that the arresting officer should exercise his power or discretion judiciously and should be free of motive. Some kind of inbuilt safeguard is available to the accused in the cases where the Magistrate directs investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 438 of the Code by approaching the Court of Session or the High Court for such relief. Thus, during the course of investigation of a criminal case, an accused is not remediless and that would further buttress the above view taken by us." The Full Bench also stated thus in paragraph nos.12 and 13 as follows:- "12. Another aspect is the case would be dependent on the construction of language under Section 156(3) of the Code. Though this provision does empower the Magistrate to order an investigation, the Legislature in its wisdom had extended no further power to the Magistrate to control or intercheck or stop or give direction to the mode of investigation. Another aspect is the case would be dependent on the construction of language under Section 156(3) of the Code. Though this provision does empower the Magistrate to order an investigation, the Legislature in its wisdom had extended no further power to the Magistrate to control or intercheck or stop or give direction to the mode of investigation. The scheme of the investigation thus postulate investigation uncontrolled by the Magistrate. This was also the view taken by the Supreme Court in S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and ors., 1970 (1) SCC 653 and State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha and Ors., 1980 (1) SCC 534. 13. Consistent is the view taken by the Court for decades now on this aspect of investigation of offence. These principles had pervaded effect on the mode and control of investigation by the investigating agency. These precepts have been relegated with variance." 10. The learned counsel for the parties have cited before us decision of the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Father Thomas v. State of U.P. & another reported at 2011 CrLJ 2278 . We have perused the said decision and we think that the said decision is clearly distinguishable since the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court did not advert to the fact of termination of the proceedings u/s 156(3) of the Code after passing of the order by the Magistrate thereunder and thus the said proceeding ending into final order. 11. It is thus clear from the above that the investigation pursuant to the order u/s 156(3) of the Code is not controlled by the Magistrate and that was what was held by the Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha and Ors., as stated in the Full Bench judgment. To repeat, after making of order u/s 156(3) of the Code, the Magistrate has further nothing to do and the proceeding u/s 156(3) of the Code gets terminated. Nothing remains pending before the Magistrate after such order is made. Thus, despite termination of the proceeding u/s 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and in the light of the principle 'ubi jus ibi remedium', the petitioners/applicants cannot be denied the statutory remedy of revision. 12. Nothing remains pending before the Magistrate after such order is made. Thus, despite termination of the proceeding u/s 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and in the light of the principle 'ubi jus ibi remedium', the petitioners/applicants cannot be denied the statutory remedy of revision. 12. Learned counsel have further cited decision of the Supreme Court in Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai & others v. State of Gujarat & others reported at (2009) 6 SCC 576 . We quote paragraph nos.6 to 8 from this decision as under:- "6. It is well settled that any person may set the criminal law in motion subject of course to the statutory interdicts. When an offence is committed, a first information report can be lodged under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, 'the Code'). A complaint petition may also be filed in terms of Section 200 thereof. However, in the event for some reasons or the other, the first information report is not recorded in terms of subsection (1) of Section 156 of the Code, the magistrate is empowered under subsection (3) of Section 156 thereof to order an investigation into the allegations contained in the complaint petition. Thus, power to direct investigation may arise in two different situations (1) when a first information report is refused to be lodged; or (2) when the statutory power of investigation for some reason or the other is not conducted. 7. When an order is passed under subsection (3) of Section 156 of the Code, an investigation must be carried out. Only when the investigating officer arrives at a finding that the alleged offence has not been committed by the accused, he may submit a final form; On the other hand, upon investigation if it is found that a prima facie case has been made out, a chargesheet must be filed. 8. Interference in the exercise of the statutory power of investigation by the Police by the Magistrate far less direction for withdrawal of any investigation which is sought to be carried out is not envisaged under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate's power in this regard is limited. Even otherwise, he does not have any inherent power. Ordinarily, he has no power to recall his order. The Magistrate's power in this regard is limited. Even otherwise, he does not have any inherent power. Ordinarily, he has no power to recall his order. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari & Ors., (1970) 1 SCC 653 , wherein the law has been stated as under :- "6. Without the use of the expression "if he thinks fit", the second alternative could have been held to be independent of the first; but the use of this expression, in our opinion, makes it plain that the power conferred by the second clause of this section is only an alternative to the power given by the first clause and can, therefore, be exercised only in those cases in which the first clause is applicable. 7. It may also be further noticed that, even in subsection (3) of Section 156, the only power given to the Magistrate, who can take cognizance of an offence under Section 190, is to order an investigation; there is no mention of any power to stop an investigation by the police. The scheme of these sections, thus, clearly is that the power of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation, or, in the alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case. The power of the police to investigate has been made independent of any control by the Magistrate." 13. We thus find from the perusal of the scheme contained in the aforesaid two Chapters viz. XII and XV and in the light of above decisions that the order u/s 156(3) of the Code must be held to be not an interlocutory order, but an order in the nature of a final order. In the case of B.S. Khatri v. State of Maharashtra & another, 2004 (1) MhLJ 747 , a Division Bench of this Court held thus in paragraph nos.13, 17 and 19 and extracted portion from paragraph no.20 as under:- "13. In the case of B.S. Khatri v. State of Maharashtra & another, 2004 (1) MhLJ 747 , a Division Bench of this Court held thus in paragraph nos.13, 17 and 19 and extracted portion from paragraph no.20 as under:- "13. All that has been done in the present case is an order under Section 156(3) of the Code requiring investigation by a particular wing of the police of the State of Maharashtra is passed and it is at this stage the petitioners have moved this court for exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. Factually an order under Section 156(3) of the Code can be revised by a Sessions Judge or by this court under Section 397 read with 401 of the Code. Even for that purpose therefore alternate remedy is available to the petitioners. Apart from that mere order directing investigation does not cause any injury of irreparable nature, which requires quashing of even the investigation. All that has been ordered is investigation into the complaint. 17. The stage of cognizance would arise after the investigation report is filed and bar provided by Section 195 of the Code regarding taking of cognizance would be applicable thereafter. We need not therefore consider any of these decisions as they are on the merits of the case. 19. The Supreme Court has observed in the case of Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Bhada, (1997) 2 SCC 397 that the writ jurisdiction should be sparingly used. We would like to note verbatim what the Supreme Court has to say: "It is wellsettled legal position that the High Court should sparingly and cautiously exercise the power under Sectin 482 of the Code to prevent miscarriage of justice. In State of H.P. v. Prithi Chand two of us (K. Ramaswamy and S.B. Majmudar, JJ.) composing the Bench and in State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, a three Judge Bench of this Court, reviewed the entire case law on the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code to quash the complaint or the chargesheet or the first information report and held that the High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court would consider whether the exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would tantamount to abuse of the process of the court. Social stability and order require to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon the exercise of the inherent power vested in the Court." It will be seen therefore that the writ jurisdiction has to be exercised very circumspectively. 20. ....... ..... ..... ..... It will be seen that what is impugned before us is the order passed under Section 156(3) of the Code which directs investigation into the complaint by a particular wing of the police. What is going to be the outcome of that investigation is not known. Everything that can happen thereafter can be scrutinized and rescrutinized by judicial authorities mentioned in the Code and there is therefore no question of miscarriage of justice being caused by not quashing of the complaint and order." Finally we quote paragraph no.31 as under : "31. We have also noted above that several efficacious alternate statutory remedies under the Criminal Procedure Code are available to the petitioners to challenge the order under Section 156(3). Without availing them the petitioners have rushed before this court, claiming exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. In our opinion therefore, there is no need to exercise this jurisdiction to quash merely the complaint and order under Section 156, Criminal Procedure Code requiring investigation into complaint by the police. The petitions are therefore liable to be dismissed." 14. Insofar as the question framed by us is concerned, we find that there is a passing reference in paragraph no.31 made by the Division Bench about availability of several efficacious alternative statutory remedies under the Criminal Procedure Code to challenge the order u/s 156(3). We think though it is obiter dicta, nevertheless the same is binding on us as we respectively agree with the said view, for the above reasons that the order u/s 156(3) of the Code not being an interlocutory order, but being a final order in a proceeding u/s 156(3) of the Code would certainly be revisable under the revisional powers of the Sessions Court or the High Court. The Division Bench in the case of B.S. Khatri v. State of Maharashtra & another (supra), however, clearly held that the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be made for considering the challenge to order u/s 156(3) of the Code with which again we respectfully agree. We, however, state that the bar to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is the one of self-imposed rule. We, however, hold that the order u/s 156(3) of the Code not being an interlocutory order, would obviously be revisable. We thus hold that the order u/s 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is not an interlocutory order, but is a final order terminating the proceeding u/s 156(3) of the Code and that the revision u/s 397 or Section 401of the Code would lie.” 37. Thus, what weighed with the Bombay High Court in taking the view that an order under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order, but is a final order, is the fact of termination of the proceeding under Section 156(3) of the Code after passing of the order by the Magistrate thereunder and the proceeding ending into a final order. To put it in other words, after making of order under Section 156(3) of the Code, the Magistrate has further nothing to do and the proceeding under Section 156(3) of the Code gets terminated. 38. It is difficult for me to accept the view taken by the Bombay High Court. In my view, a stamp of finality, proceeding or termination of the proceeding may be quite a relevant and important consideration, however, is not a sole criterion of the test in that behalf. What is important to consider is whether the order decides or adjudicates any important rights or liabilities or substantially affects the rights of the person named in the complaint as an accused. The argument of Mr. Bhatt is that no sooner the Magistrate passes an order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the police would register the First Information Report as an M. case and would start with the investigation. In the course of the investigation, the accused might be even arrested by the police and that would substantially affect the rights of the accused so far as his personal liberty is concerned. If this argument of Mr. In the course of the investigation, the accused might be even arrested by the police and that would substantially affect the rights of the accused so far as his personal liberty is concerned. If this argument of Mr. Bhatt is accepted, then even an order of police remand passed by the Magistrate could be termed as a “final order” and not an “interlocutory order”. The reason I am saying so is that even in the case of police remand, the personal liberty of the accused to a certain extent is definitely affected, but the same could be said to be in accordance with law. The Supreme Court in the case of State vs. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate, AIR 2004 SC 2282 has taken the view that an order of police remand is not a “final order” or an “intermediate order”, but the same is an “interlocutory order” and no revision would lie against such an order. At the same time, if the Magistrate refuses to grant police remand, then such order could be termed as “final order” and a revision is maintainable. 39. An order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is not an order of matter of moment, which affects or adjudicates the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial. 40. In Union of India and another vs. W.N. Chadha, AIR 1993 SC 1082 the Supreme Court held:- “92. More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under Section 204 of the Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding that the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding that the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under Section 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances.” (Emphasis supplied) 41. The Supreme Court in Sri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of A.P. And others, (1999) 5 SCC 740 held thus :- “11. In such a situation the power of the court to direct the police to conduct further investigation cannot have any inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. Casting of any such obligation on the court would only result in encumbering the court with the burden of searching for all the potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being heard. As the law does not require it, we would not burden the Magistrate with such an obligation.” (Emphasis supplied) 42. In Central Bureau of Investigation and another v. Rajesh Gandhi and another, AIR 1997 SC 93 , the Supreme Court held thus :- “8. There is no merit in the pleas raised by the first respondent either. The decision to investigate or the decision on the agency which should investigate, does not attract principles of natural justice. The accused cannot have a say in who should investigate the offences he is charged with. We also fail to see any provision of law for recording reasons for such a decision.......” (Emphasis supplied) 43. The decision to investigate or the decision on the agency which should investigate, does not attract principles of natural justice. The accused cannot have a say in who should investigate the offences he is charged with. We also fail to see any provision of law for recording reasons for such a decision.......” (Emphasis supplied) 43. In view of the above pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the law appears to be wellsettled that at the stage of investigation by the police either under Section 156(1) of the Code when the jurisdictional Station House Officer proceeds to investigate the matter of his own or under Section 156(3) of the Code when he does so under the order of jurisdictional Magistrate, the prospective accused has no right of hearing. 44. In Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2014) 2 SCC 1 the Supreme Court, while dealing with the power of incharge of a police station with respect to registration of FIR when he receives an information disclosing a cognizable offence, has held that the registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary enquiry is permissible in such a situation. Such preliminary enquiry may be conducted only when the information does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an enquiry and when after such enquiry commission of such cognizable offence is disclosed the FIR must be registered. Nothing has been laid down by the Supreme Court that at the stage of registration of FIR or an enquiry to assert commission of cognizable offence, the prospective accused would have a right of hearing or would have locus standi to challenge the registration of FIR. 45. The question, therefore, would arise as to when law does not recognize any such right in favour of a prospective accused at the time of registration of F.I.R. or investigation, the Sessions Court would have power to entertain a revision application against an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the Code. Under this provision the Magistrate only directs the jurisdictional Station House Officer to do what he is obliged in law under Sections 154 or 156 (1) of the Code. 46. Under this provision the Magistrate only directs the jurisdictional Station House Officer to do what he is obliged in law under Sections 154 or 156 (1) of the Code. 46. The moot question is if a revision application against mere registration of F.I.R. by the police is not maintainable whether such revision would be held maintainable when the Magistrate only directs registration of FIR. In the opinion of this Court, the answer is an emphatic No. Exercise of revisory power conferred by the Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code would occasion when there is an order passed by the competent court, which is not interlocutory in nature, however, the said power cannot be exercised to quash the FIR or investigation because such power can be exercised only by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. If the revision application is considered to be maintainable before the Sessions Court against an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) and if such revision is allowed it would have effect of quashing the FIR, therefore, if the Sessions Court has no such powers otherwise, it cannot do so by entertaining a revision against an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code. [See: Amar Nath vs. State of Haryana (supra)] 47. Referring to its earlier decisions in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Others vs. V. Narayana Reddy and Others, (1976) 3 SSC 252 and Tula Ram and Others vs. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459 , the Supreme Court in Srinivas Gundluri and Others vs. Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 206 has held that when a Magistrate orders investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code without examining the merits of the claim, the Magistrate does not bring into motion the machinery of Chapter XV of the Code, therefore, the Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the matter, and, as such, when such direction for investigation is made, the Magistrate does not commit any illegality. Even after receipt of such report, the Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code may or may not take cognizance of the offence. Even after receipt of such report, the Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code may or may not take cognizance of the offence. Thus, at the stage of directing investigation the Magistrate having not applied its mind as it has not taken cognizance of the matter, there is no order of the Magistrate which can be revised under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code. What is revisable under Section 397 of the Code is the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior court against whose order the revision application has been preferred. When there is no finding, sentence or order against the accused, the same is not revisable under Section 397 of the Code. 48. In Naresh Kavarchand Khatri v. State of Gujarat and Another, (2008) 8 SCC 300 , the Supreme Court in para 6 held thus :- “6. The power of the court to interfere with an investigation is limited. The police authorities, in terms of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, exercise a statutory power. The Code of Criminal Procedure has conferred power on the statutory authorities to direct transfer of an investigation from one police station to another in the event it is found that they do not have any jurisdiction in the matter. The court should not interfere in the matter at an initial stage in regard thereto. If it is found that the investigation has been conducted by an investigating officer who did not have any territorial jurisdiction in the matter, the same should be transferred by him to the police station having the requisite jurisdiction.” 49. The Supreme Court in Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai and Others v. State of Gujarat and Others, (2009) 6 SCC 576 , in paras 8, 9 & 10, has held thus :- “8. Interference in the exercise of the statutory power of investigation by the police by the Magistrate far less direction for withdrawal of any investigation which is sought to be carried out is not envisaged under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate’s power in this regard is limited. Even otherwise, he does not have any inherent power. Ordinarily, he has no power to recall his order. The Magistrate’s power in this regard is limited. Even otherwise, he does not have any inherent power. Ordinarily, he has no power to recall his order. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari wherein the law has been stated as under: (SCC pp. 656-57, paras 67) “6. Without the use of the expression ‘if he thinks fit’, the second alternative could have been held to be independent of the first; but the use of this expression, in our opinion, makes it plain that the power conferred by the second clause of this section is only an alternative to the power given by the first clause and can, therefore, be exercised only in those cases in which the first clause is applicable. 7. It may also be further noticed that, even in subsection (3) of Section 156, the only power given to the Magistrate, who can take cognizance of an offence under Section 190, is to order an investigation; there is no mention of any power to stop an investigation by the police. The scheme of these sections, thus, clearly is that the power of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation, or, in the alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case. The power of the police to investigate has been made independent of any control by the Magistrate.” 9. Interpreting the aforementioned provisions vis-à-vis the lack of inherent power in the Magistrate in terms of Section 561A of the old Criminal Procedure Code (equivalent to Section 482 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure), it was held: (S.N. Sharma case3, SCC p. 657, para 10) “10. This interpretation, to some extent, supports the view that the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code is that the power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is not to be interfered with by the judiciary. This interpretation, to some extent, supports the view that the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code is that the power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is not to be interfered with by the judiciary. Their Lordships of the Privy Council were, of course, concerned only with the powers of the High Court under Section 561A CrPC, while we have to interpret Section 159 of the Code which defines the powers of a Magistrate which he can exercise on receiving a report from the police of the cognizable offence under Section 157 of the Code. In our opinion, Section 159 was really intended to give a limited power to the Magistrate to ensure that the police investigate all cognizable offences and do not refuse to do so by abusing the right granted for certain limited cases of not proceeding with the investigation of the offence.” 10. Yet again in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy this Court, upon comparison of the provision of the old Code and the new Code, held as under: (SCC p. 258, para 17) “17. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption: ‘Information to the police and their powers to investigate’; while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading: ‘Of complaints to Magistrates’. The power to order police investigation under Section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by Section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the precognizance stage, the second at the postcognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the precognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under subsection (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). It may be noted further that an order made under subsection (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or chargesheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section an investigation ‘for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding’. Thus the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him.” (Emphasis supplied)” 50. A learned Single Judge of the Chhatisgarh High Court in the case of Amarnath Agrawal vs. Jai Singh Agrawal and others [Writ Petition (Cr) No.116 of 2013 decided on 10th February 2015] had the occasion to consider the very same issue. After an elaborate discussion of various decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, the final conclusion drawn is as under:- “Investigation into a cognizable offence by Incharge of jurisdictional police station is a statutory power. Once an information is sent to the jurisdictional police regarding commission of a cognizable offence, it is the statutory duty of the said police to investigate offence. [Lalita Kumari (supra)] The accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation of an offence. W.N. Chadha (supra), Sri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj (supra) and Rajesh Gandhi (supra). The power of the Court to interfere with the investigation is limited. Naresh Kavarchand Khatri (supra). Under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. Magistrate is conferred limited power to ensure that the police investigate all cognizable offences and do not refuse to do so by abusing the right granted for certain limited cases of not proceeding with the investigation of the offence Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai (supra). Naresh Kavarchand Khatri (supra). Under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. Magistrate is conferred limited power to ensure that the police investigate all cognizable offences and do not refuse to do so by abusing the right granted for certain limited cases of not proceeding with the investigation of the offence Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai (supra). Exercise of power by a Magistrate under Section 156 (3) is at the precognizance stage. Such exercise is done by the Magistrate when the concerned police officer fails to investigate the matter as is obligatory upon him. To exercise revisory power under Section 397, the Court whose order is sought to be revised must have recorded some finding, order or sentence or have drawn a proceeding which is ex facie illegal or without jurisdiction. While directing the police officer to investigate the matter the Magistrate neither records any finding nor passes any order or sentence against the accused because at that stage the registration of FIR is only against the prospective accused. If it is held that an order under Section 156(3) of the Code is revisable, the same would amount to clothing the Sessions Court with the power of quashing the FIR or investigation. Such power is conferred only on the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226, 227 of the Constitution of India.” 51. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I hold that the order under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is an “interlocutory order” and the revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. would not lie. At the same time, an order of the Magistrate rejecting an application under Section 156(3) of the Code for the registration of a case by the police and for investigation is not an “interlocutory order”. Such an order is amenable to the remedy of a criminal revision under Sections 397 read with 401 of the Cr.P.C. 52. This application, therefore, fails and is hereby rejected. Application dismissed.