JUDGMENT S.B. Shukre, J. Heard. Admit. Heard finally by consent. 2. This is an appeal preferred against the judgment and order dated 15.11.2014, delivered in M.A.C.P No. 198/2011 by the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Buldana. 3. A Claim Petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (in short, "MV Act") was filed by the respondent Nos.1 to 5 against the appellant and deceased respondent No.6, who were respectively insurer and owner of the motorcycle bearing Registration No MH21AC7039, which was found by the Tribunal to be the vehicle solely responsible for causing of the accident in which husband of respondent No.1, father of respondent Nos.2 and 3 and son of respondent Nos.4 and 5 died. These respondents claimed compensation of Rs.9,00,000/from the appellant and respondent No.6. 4. It was alleged that on 6.5.2011, deceased Raju was proceeding on his motorcycle bearing registration No.MH28B8007 on Singaon Road when another motorcycle came from opposite direction and suddenly gave a severe dash to the motorcycle of the deceased. Resultantly, the deceased fell down on the road and sustained head injuries. It appears that he was lying at the spot of accident for quite some time. Some time after, a passerby, one Vaibhav, noticed the deceased as lying in injured condition on the road and, therefore, the passerby tried to take him to the hospital, but on way to the hospital deceased Raju succumbed to the injuries. 5. The F.I.R. of the incident dated 6.5.2011 was, however, filed about six days thereafter i.e. on 12th May, 2011 by the father of the deceased. It is a mystery as to why the Police did not register any AD inquiry or any offence in the matter immediately when the information about the deceased Raju dying in unnatural circumstances had been received by the Police Station Deulgaonraja in the night of 6.5.2011 itself, which is evident from the spot panchanama drawn out in between 21.30 hours and 22.00 hours of 6.5.2011. Be that as it may, fact remains that the Police were required to be made aware of their duty in this case by a father, who, however, could bring this fact to their notice only after he recovered from the shock and grief that visited him after sudden demise of his young son. 6. Be that as it may, fact remains that the Police were required to be made aware of their duty in this case by a father, who, however, could bring this fact to their notice only after he recovered from the shock and grief that visited him after sudden demise of his young son. 6. On the basis of F.I.R. dated 12th May, 2011, Police Station Deulgaon Raja registered offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code against the owner of the motorcycle bearing registration No.MH21AC7039. Later on, a claim petition, as stated earlier, under Section 166 of the MV Act was also filed by the dependents of the deceased. 7. The claim petition was proceeded against the respondent No.6 ex parte as he did not file any appearance in the matter though duly served. The petition was strongly contested by the appellant. On merits of the case, the learned Member of the Claims Tribunal found that the claimants could prove the accident being the result of rash and negligent driving of the motorcycle bearing registration No.MH21AC7039 (hereinafter referred to as, "the offending vehicle") and further found that the claimants i.e. respondent Nos.1 to 5 being the dependents of the deceased were entitled to receive the compensation of Rs.11,93,000/together with interest at the rate 8% p.a. from the date of petition till realization of the entire amount as per the judgment and order dated 15.11.2014. Not being satisfied with the same, the insurance company i.e. the appellant is before this Court in the present appeal. 8. I have heard Smt. Gauri Venkatraman, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri R.N. Ghuge, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 5. None for the legal heirs of respondent No.6 though duly served. I have carefully gone through the paper-book of the case including the impugned judgment and order. 9. The following points arise for my determination : (i) Whether the claimants have proved that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending motorcycle? (ii) Whether the finding regarding entitlement of respondent Nos.1 to 5 to receive amount of Rs.11,93,000/as compensation is legal and correct, warranting no interference with the same ? 10. In this case, the evidence adduced on the question of fault for the accident leaves much to be desired. (ii) Whether the finding regarding entitlement of respondent Nos.1 to 5 to receive amount of Rs.11,93,000/as compensation is legal and correct, warranting no interference with the same ? 10. In this case, the evidence adduced on the question of fault for the accident leaves much to be desired. The circumstances of this case are such that they cast responsibility to establish the material issue of rashness and negligence not only on the claimants but also on the owner/rider of the motorcycle as well as the insurance company, the appellant, whose application under Section 170 of the MV Act to contest the petition on all counts was granted by the Tribunal. But, that responsibility has not been discharged satisfactorily, especially by the rider/owner and the appellant. So, this Court would be left with no other option, but to assess the evidence available on record as it is. 11. The F.I.R. has been lodged by the father of the deceased about six days after the accident i.e. on 12th May, 2011. He has alleged in the F.I.R. that his son Raju died in a vehicular accident caused by giving of a dash to his motorcycle by another motorcycle bearing registration No.MH21AC7039 on Singaon Road, near Vetalwadi. He also alleged that this offending motorcycle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner and at great speed. These allegations were taken by the Police as disclosing commission of offences and, therefore, Deolgaon Raja Police registered offences punishable under Sections 379 and 304A against the rider of offending motorcycle. The F.I.R. does not disclose any source of information of the informant. But, it would have to be presumed that as Police registered the offences, Police must have made investigation to ascertain the prima facie truth of the allegations. Eventually, it was turned out that the rider of the offending motorcycle was also its owner, who is respondent No.6, in this appeal, since deceased, and original respondent No.1. The F.I.R. has been lodged belatedly. But, in the F.I.R. itself there is some explanation given by the informant about belated lodging of the F.I.R. and for the purposes of this petition, same would have to be accepted as reasonable, especially when nothing has been brought on record by the insurance company to reject such an explanation. 12. This F.I.R. also discloses that the informant was not an eye witness to the accident. 12. This F.I.R. also discloses that the informant was not an eye witness to the accident. The claimant's witness, CW 1 Sharda, widow of the deceased was not an eye witness either. It is natural also as the deceased was admittedly riding the motorcycle all alone. The information of the informant or the claimants witness in such cases would be dependent upon what they are told about the accident by the person who had seen the accident or the Police who registered offences on the basis of the information received about commission of offences and proceeded further in the matter. Such witnesses of the claimants are not expected to have personal information of the accident. Therefore, the burden to prove the occurrence of the accident and the probable cause behind it lying upon the shoulders of the claimants would be of limited nature and it would come to an end the moment the claimants succeed in establishing the facts on the basis of the Police record and other attending circumstances, that a particular vehicle is the offending one and its rider or driver was rash and negligent in using that vehicle. After these facts are established in this way, the burden would shift upon the party which denies the claim. 13. In the instant case, upon consideration of the evidence available on record, I find, the claimants have succeeded in showing to the Court in a reasonable manner, on the basis of the Police record and other circumstances, that not only the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code against the original respondent No.1 or respondent No.6 in the present appeal who was the rider-cum-owner of the offending vehicle were registered but the respondent No.6 was also rash and negligent in using the offending vehicle and thereby causing hurt or death. 14. After the claimants having so established their case, the burden in this case shifted to the party which denied that there was any rashness or negligence in driving the offending vehicle. It is not necessary for such a party to establish his or it's assertion about absence of negligence by producing on record clinching evidence or such evidence as could be accepted by applying the principle of beyond reasonable doubt. It is not necessary for such a party to establish his or it's assertion about absence of negligence by producing on record clinching evidence or such evidence as could be accepted by applying the principle of beyond reasonable doubt. It would be enough for such a party to establish his or its case by bringing on record other probabilities reasonably pointing towards no rashness or negligence. These other probabilities, in the present case, were for the original respondent No.1 or respondent No.6 here and in his absence the appellant to bring on record. The claim petition proceeded ex parte against the original respondent No.1 as he never made his appearance before the Tribunal after receipt of notice by him. It then fell upon the appellant, the original respondent No.2, to contest the petition on all counts and in fact permission was also granted to it in that regard by the Tribunal. 15. In order to bring on record such other probabilities, the appellant could have helped itself by at least getting summoned the Investigating Officer as a witness before the Tribunal. It could have questioned the Police under the Right to information Act as to whether or not it had made an inquiry into the death of Raju under unnatural circumstances in accordance with the provision of Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It could have similarly questioned the Police as to whether the spot panchanama of the place where the deceased Raju was found to be lying on the road along with his motorcycle was prepared by it or not and if not what was the reason therefor. I must mention here that a panchanama drawn by Deolgaon Raja Police on 6th May, 2011 between 21.30 and 22.00 hours has been titled as spot panchanama, but it pertains to a place where dead body of Raju was kept on an iron cot in the Government Hospital. Apparently, this place could not have been the spot of incident or accident. The panchanama having been drawn on 6th May, 2011, the day on which the accident occurred, also shows that the Police were aware of unnatural death of Raju. So, all this information under the Right to Information Act or otherwise could have been collected by the appellant. But, nothing of this sort has been done by the appellant. The panchanama having been drawn on 6th May, 2011, the day on which the accident occurred, also shows that the Police were aware of unnatural death of Raju. So, all this information under the Right to Information Act or otherwise could have been collected by the appellant. But, nothing of this sort has been done by the appellant. To top it all, the rider-cum-owner of the offending motorcycle did not appear before the Court and apparently no effort was made by the insurance company to at least get him as a witness before the Tribunal, for, he was the eye witness to the accident and hence the best witness to throw light upon the material facts of the case. In my view, such failure would call for drawing of an adverse inference against the appellant as well as the rider-cum-owner of the offending motorcycle which I do and hold that no such efforts were made because there was something against the rider-cum-owner which disuaded these parties from bringing before the Court best evidence. 16. Cumulative effect of the above discussion is that the claimants, who are the respondent Nos.1 to 5 in the present appeal, have established as a reasonable probability the fact that the accident occurred in this case due to rash and negligent driving of the offending motorcycle by respondent No.6 or the original respondent No.1 which resulted in causing of death of deceased Raju. I, therefore, see no illegality or incorrectness in the finding recorded in this regard by the Tribunal. So, the Point No.1 is answered affirmatively. 17. Smt. Gauri Venkatraman, learned counsel for the appellant in a forceful argument submitted that there are fundamental flaws in the approach adopted by the learned Member of the Tribunal in calculating the loss of dependency, quantum of compensation and number of dependents. She submits that no evidence to prove the income of the deceased was brought on record and therefore his notional income at the rate of Rs.4,000/per month could not have been determined by the Tribunal. She submits that no evidence to prove the income of the deceased was brought on record and therefore his notional income at the rate of Rs.4,000/per month could not have been determined by the Tribunal. She also submits that the deceased was a labourer and so his income was in the nature of fixed wages or a self-employed person and, therefore, the Tribunal, as held in the cases of Sarla Verma (Smt) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 and Reshma Kumari and others v. Madan Mohan and another, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 65 , could have made no addition to the income on account of future prospects. She also submits that the parents of the deceased were not dependents as the father was admittedly a labourer earning some income. 18. This is, however, disputed by Shri R.N. Ghuge, learned counsel for the claimants or respondent Nos.1 to 5 who submits that in the latest case of Munna Lal Jain and another v. Vipin Kumar Sharma and others, reported in (2015) 6 SCC 347 and even in another case of Pushkar Mehra v. Brij Mohan Kushwaha and others, reported in (2015) 12 SCC 688 which considered the ratio of cases of Sarla Verma and Reshma Kumari, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held, following the law laid down in Rajesh and others v. Rajbir Singh and others, reported in 2014(1) Mh.L.J. 79, that in case of self employed person also, if the deceased victim is below 40 years, there must be addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased by considering future prospects of the deceased. 19. No doubt, no independent evidence has been adduced in this case to prove the income of the deceased victim. However, it must be appreciated that the deceased was admittedly a labourer and, therefore, it would be very difficult in such a case to adduce evidence in the nature of some certificate or the receipts or any other documents. The claimants witness, CW 1 Sharda, has deposed before the Tribunal that at the time of his death, deceased Raju was a skilled labourer and his daily earning was of Rs.300/. The claimants witness, CW 1 Sharda, has deposed before the Tribunal that at the time of his death, deceased Raju was a skilled labourer and his daily earning was of Rs.300/. This assertion of CW 1 that her deceased husband was a skilled labourer has not been denied by the appellant, if one carefully goes through the cross examination of CW 1 taken on behalf of the appellant. This would mean that the deceased was a skilled labourer and then, even if no documentary evidence to prove the income has been brought on record by the claimant, the Tribunal would be justified in determining the monthly income through some guesswork which is what has been done in the present case by it. It has determined the monthly income of the deceased Raju to be of Rs.4,000/, by rejecting the claim of CW 1 that it was of about Rs.9,000/per month and rightly so. I see no error in this regard on the part of the Tribunal. 20. As regards, the submission regarding error committed in making addition to the monthly income by considering future prospects, I am of the view that there is no substance in this argument. Learned Member of the Tribunal has followed the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh v. Rajber Singh (supra) as the Hon'ble Supreme Court settled the law in Rajesh v. Rajber Singh (supra) by considering the judgment in the case of Sarla Verma (supra) and further clarification given by it in the case of Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited, reported in (2012) 6 SCC 421 . Of course, the Tribunal has not considered the ratio of Reshma Kumari (supra). But, it appears that it must not have been brought to the notice of the Tribunal. In Reshma Kumari (supra), the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sarla Verma (supra) that where the deceased was self employed or was on a fixed wages, the Court would usually take the actual income at the time of death and any departure there from should be only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances have been reiterated. In Reshma Kumari (supra), the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sarla Verma (supra) that where the deceased was self employed or was on a fixed wages, the Court would usually take the actual income at the time of death and any departure there from should be only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances have been reiterated. The Judgment in Reshma Kumari (supra) was delivered by the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but in another three Judges decision in Munnalal Jain and another v. Vipin Kumar Sharma and others (supra), rendered on 15th May, 2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus in paragraph 10 : "As far as future prospects are concerned, in Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, a three Judge Bench of this Court held that in case of self-employed persons also, if the deceased victim is below 40 years, there must be addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. To quote: (SCC p. 61, para 8) "8. Since, the Court in Santosh Devi case actually intended to follow the principle in the case of salaried persons as laid down in Sarla Verma case and to make it applicable also to the self-employed and persons on fixed wages, it is clarified that the increase in the case of those groups is not 30% always; it will also have a reference to the age. In other words, in the case of self-employed or persons with fixed wages, in case, the deceased victim was below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. Needless to say that the actual income should be income after paying the tax, if any. Addition should be 30% in case the deceased was in the age group of 40 to 50 years." The deceased being of the age of 30 years, 50% is the required addition." 21. These observations clarify the present legal position. It is also seen that in Munna Jain (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the judgment rendered in Reshma Kumari (supra). Therefore, I do not see any error of law in the view taken by the Tribunal in this regard. 22. These observations clarify the present legal position. It is also seen that in Munna Jain (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the judgment rendered in Reshma Kumari (supra). Therefore, I do not see any error of law in the view taken by the Tribunal in this regard. 22. As regards the argument that parents of the deceased were not dependent upon him, I find that there is no evidence showing that they were not dependents. CW 1 Sharda has deposed before the Court that they were dependents upon deceased Raju. This has not been controverted by the appellant. It is true that in the F.I.R. dated 12th May, 2011, father of the deceased has claimed that his occupation is labour. But, saying so would not by itself mean that his income from labour work has made him self sufficient or self dependent. When it is asserted by CW 1 Sharda that the father was dependent upon the income of the deceased Raju, it was necessary for the party interested in denying it to bring some evidence on record to disprove such a claim. The appellant has not brought on record any evidence in this regard and has not even contested the claim that the father was dependent upon the deceased Raju. So, no error of fact could be found in the finding recorded in this regard by the Tribunal. 23. After having held that the factors of income of the deceased and dependency of claimants upon the income of the deceased have been rightly determined by the learned Member of the Tribunal, I see no reason to disagree with the other findings regarding love and affection, funeral expenses etc. recorded in favour of the claimants. Therefore, I am of the view that the quantum of compensation determined to be at Rs.11,93,000/payable with interest at the rate of 8% per annum to the claimants jointly and severally by the appellant and respondent No.6 or the original respondent No.1 cannot be faulted with in any manner. The appeal deserves to be dismissed. 24. The second point is answered accordingly. 25. The appeal stands dismissed. 26. The parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.