Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. By the medium of this writ petition, the writ petitioner has sought the following reliefs amongst others on the grounds taken in the memo of the writ petition: “That in view of the submissions made hereto before, it is therefore respectfully prayed that an appropriate writ, order or direction may kindly be issued to the respondents to the following effect: (i) For holding that sale deed is not required to be registered in respect of land comprised in khata No. 106, khatauni No. 200, khasra Nos. 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 56, 57, 58, 59, 67; kita 10 measuring 021380 hectare situated in Mahal Ban Atarian Tehsil Indora District Kangra, of which, sale certificate stands issued in favour of the petitioner/auction purchaser by the Official Liquidator pursuant to conformation of sale in favour of the petitioner/auction purchaser by this Hon'ble Court and to direct the respondents to enter the name of the petitioner as owner in the revenue record on the basis of sale certificate. OR in the Alternative to above: (a) for directing the respondents to register the sale deed of the property mentioned in relief clause No.i in a time bound schedule without insisting upon compliance of procedure detailed under Ss. 118 of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, Rules, and Instructions framed there under and (b) For directing the respondents to register the sale deed of the property mentioned in relief clause No.i, without insisting upon the petitioner to seek permission to purchase the property under Ss. 118 of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and Rules and Instructions framed there under and to hold that provisions of Ss. 118 of the Act are not applicable to the Court Auction Purchaser or in the Alternative to direct the respondents to grant such permission straightaway without insisting upon completion of any other formality/procedure required under the Act ibid/Rules and Instructions framed thereunder, in view of the petitioner being Court Auction Purchaser. (ii) For directing the respondents to exempt the petitioner from applicability of Ss. 118 of HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act for the purpose of directly selling the land in question, in favour of third parties/Himachalis, in whose favour the sale deed of the land in question, can then be registered directly.” 2. (ii) For directing the respondents to exempt the petitioner from applicability of Ss. 118 of HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act for the purpose of directly selling the land in question, in favour of third parties/Himachalis, in whose favour the sale deed of the land in question, can then be registered directly.” 2. Respondents No. 1 to 4 have filed the reply and have contended that Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (for short “the Act”) is mandatory in nature and the writ petitioner has to seek permission as required in terms of Section 118 of the Act. 3. It has been averred in the writ petition that the writ petitioner participated in the auction proceedings with respect to the assets of M/s HIM Ispat Ltd. (in liquidation) Village Kandrori, Tehsil Indora, District Kangra, H.P., which were initiated in terms of the orders made by this Court and being the highest bidder, paid 14.52 crore, which was accepted and confirmed by this Court vide order, dated 28th September, 2011 (Annexure P5). Thereafter, a direction was passed by this Court in Company Petition No. 7 of 2001, titled as IFCI Ltd. versus Him Ispat Ltd. and another, vide order, dated 18th March, 2013, in Company Application No. 54 of 2012 to the concerned authority to execute the sale deed in favour of the auction purchaser, i.e. writ petitioner. In compliance to order, dated 18th March, 2013 (supra), sale certificate was issued by the Registrar of Companies-cum-Official Liquidator, Himachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, on 25th June, 2014 (Annexure P8), perusal of which does disclose that the possession was handed over to the writ petitioner on 11th November, 2011. It would be profitable to reproduce the sale certificate herein: “TO WHOM SO EVER IT MAY CONCERN In pursuance to the order dated 28/09/2011 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh, it is certified that M/s. Valley Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. is the successful auction purchaser of the assets of M/s HIM Ispat Ltd. (in liquidation), Village Kandrori, Tehsil Indora, District HP and the same has been confirmed by the Hon'ble bench of Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh vide order dated 28/09/2011. The auction purchaser has been given the possession of the movable and immovable assets of the company by us on 11/11/2011. Sd/ (D.P. OJHA) Registrar of Companies cum Official Liquidator Himachal Pradesh, Chandigarh.” 4. The auction purchaser has been given the possession of the movable and immovable assets of the company by us on 11/11/2011. Sd/ (D.P. OJHA) Registrar of Companies cum Official Liquidator Himachal Pradesh, Chandigarh.” 4. The writ petitioner approached the concerned authorities for recording necessary entries in the revenue record, which they have not made so far and made it to run from pillar to post and post to pillar without there being any fault on its part. 5. The auction notice/terms and conditions of sale find place at pages No. 78 to 82 of the paper book. The writ petitioner, after noticing the auction notice and the terms and conditions, participated in the auction proceedings. The auction notice nowhere contains any such condition whereby it was made known to public that in order to have registration of the sale deed, the successful bidder has to obtain necessary permission in terms of Section 118 of the Act. The writ petitioner bonafidely participated in the auction proceedings and became the highest bidder, rather successful bidder. After depositing the bid amount to the tune of 14.52 crore, the writ petitioner has not been able to reap the fruits. Registration is yet to be made. It appears that the writ petitioner has been made to suffer due to the act of the Court without there being any fault on its part. 6. The question, which arises for consideration in this writ petition, is – whether a bona fide auction purchaser has to obtain necessary permission in terms of Section 118 of the Act in order to have registration of the sale certificate? 7. It is profitable to notice the relevant provisions of the Acts applicable and the judgments occupying the field. 8. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of Section 118 of the Act herein: 118. Transfer of land to non-agriculturists barred. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, contract, agreement, custom or usage for the time being in force otherwise provided in this Chapter, no transfer of land (including sales in execution of a decree of a civil court or for the arrears of land revenue), by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease, mortgage with possession or creation of a tenancy shall be valid in favour on a person who is not an agriculturist. xxx xxx xxx (3) No Registrar or the Sub-Registrar appointed under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 shall register any document pertaining to a transfer of land, which is contravention to subsection (1). Provided that the Registrar or the Sub-Registrar may register any transfer- (i) where the lease is made in relation to a part or whole of a building; or (ii) where the mortgage is made for procuring the loans for construction or improvements over the land either from the Government or from any other financial institution constituted or established under any law for the time being in force or recognised by the State Government. xxx xxx xxx (4). …........... Explanation-I – For the purpose of this section, the expression “land” shall include (i) land recorded as “Gairmumkin”, “Gairmumkin Makan” or any other Gaimumkin land, by whatever name called in the revenue records; and (ii) land which is a site of a building in a town or a village and is occupied or let out not for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient to agriculture but shall not include a builtup area in the municipal area.” 9. Section 118 of the Act contains the word decree and other modes of alienation/transfer. A bona fide auction purchaser does not fall within the said definition. The moment sale is confirmed, his title becomes perfect and there is no need to have registration of the said sale. It is beaten law of the land that mutation does not confer title, is for recording entries in the record. 10. The Allahabad High Court in a case titled as Mt. Ram Sri versus Jai Lal, reported in AIR (34) 1947 Allahabad 171, held that on confirmation of the sale, title passes to the auction purchaser and the said title is perfect. It is apt to reproduce para 2 of the judgment herein: “2. Learned counsel for the appellants has raised the point that it was clear from the judgment of the trial Court that though the sale was confirmed on 31.7.1934, the plaintiff did not apply for a sale certificate and he has urged that without a sale certificate the title in the trees did not pass to the plaintiff. Learned counsel has relied on the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in 48. I. A. 155 in which it was held that a certificate of sale was a document of title. Learned counsel has relied on the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in 48. I. A. 155 in which it was held that a certificate of sale was a document of title. It is no doubt a document of title and the rules make it perfectly clear that this is to be treated as such and then property may be situate with the object of having a note made in the necessary registers, whether the title to the property can or cannot pass till the issue of the sale certificate. Under O. 22, R. 92, Civil P.C., where no application is made under R. 89, R. 90 or 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute. Under S. 65 of the Code where immovable property is become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchased from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. These sections make it perfectly clear that it is the confirmation of the sale that passes the title of the property from the date of the sale. Under O. 21, R. 94, Civil P.C., it is the duty of the Court to grant a certificate specifying the property sold and the name of the person who at the time of the sale is declared to be the purchaser, but such certificate shall bear date the day on which the sale became absolute. The vesting of time is not make dependant on the issue of the sale certificate. To my mind, the law on the point is perfectly clear that the property vested in the plaintiff after the auction sale was confirmed from the date of the said sale and there was therefore no title left in the judgment-debtor which the defendants could purchase in the year 1940. The decision of the lower appellate Court is, therefore, correct and I dismiss this appeal with costs.” 11. It would also be profitable to reproduce para 19 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case titled as S.M. Jakati and another versus S.M. Borkar and others, reported in AIR (46) 1959 Supreme Court 282, herein: “19. The decision of the lower appellate Court is, therefore, correct and I dismiss this appeal with costs.” 11. It would also be profitable to reproduce para 19 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case titled as S.M. Jakati and another versus S.M. Borkar and others, reported in AIR (46) 1959 Supreme Court 282, herein: “19. In cases where the sons do not challenge the liability of their interest in the execution of the decree against the father and the Court after attachment and proper notice of sale sells the whole estate and the auction-purchaser purchases and pays for the whole estate, the mere fact that the sons were eo nomine not brought on the record would not be sufficient to defeat the rights of the auction-purchaser or put an end to the pious obligation of the sons. As was pointed out by Lord Hobhouse in Malkarjan v. Narhari, 27 Ind App 216 at p. 225 (PC ) : "Their Lordships agree with the view of the learned Chief Justice that a purchaser cannot possibly judge of such matters, even if he knows the facts; and that if he is to be held bound to enquire into the accuracy of the Court's conduct of its own business, no purchaser at a Court sale would be safe. Strangers to a suit are justified in believing that the Court has done that which by the directions of the Court it ought to do." In 13 Ind App 1 (PC) Lord Hobhouse said at p. 18 : "But If the fact be that the purchaser has bargained and paid for the entirety, he may clearly defend his title to it upon any ground which would have justified a sale if the sons had been brought in to oppose the executing proceedings." The question which assumes importance in an auction sale of this kind therefore is what did the Court intend to sell and did sell and what did the auction purchaser purport to buy and did buy and what did he pay for. One track of decision of which Simbhu Nath v. Golap Singh, 14 Ind App 77 (PC) is an instance, shows when the father's share alone passes. In that case the father alone was made a party to the proceedings. One track of decision of which Simbhu Nath v. Golap Singh, 14 Ind App 77 (PC) is an instance, shows when the father's share alone passes. In that case the father alone was made a party to the proceedings. The mortgage, the suit of the creditor and the decree and the sale certificate all purported to affect the rights of the father and his interest alone. It was therefore held that whatever the nature of the debt, only the father's right and interest was intended to pass to the auction-purchaser. In Minakshi Nayudu v. Immudi Kanaka Ramya Gounden, 16 Ind App 1 (PC) which represents the other track of decision the Privy Council held that upon the documents the Court intended to sell and did sell the whole of the coparcenary interest and not any partial interest. The query in decided cases has been as to what was put up for sale and was sold and what the purchaser had reason to think he was buying in execution of the decree. 13 Ind App 1 (PC) (Supra), Bhagabut Pershad v. Mt. Girja Koer, 15 Ind App 99 (PC), 16 Ind App 1 (PC) and Mahabir Persad v. Rai Markunda Nath Sahai, 17 Ind App 11 at p. 16 (PC ) and Daulat Ram v. Mehar Chand, 14 Ind App 187 (PC).” 12. The Apex Court in the case titled as M/s. Ouchterloney Valley Estates Ltd. Versus State of Kerala, reported in (1965) 1 SCR 803, held that the title to the goods passed to the buyer as soon as the sale was completed. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of the judgment herein: “We have carefully considered all the rules under which sales in question have been held by public auction, and we are satisfied that title to the goods passed to the buyer under s. 64(2) of the Act as soon as the sale was completed by the auctioneer announcing its completion by the fall of the hammer. The initial auction cannot, in our opinion, be treated as an executory contract which became a conditional contract on the fall of the hammer. The auction was an auction sale in respect of ascertained goods and it was concluded in every case on the fall of the hammer. The initial auction cannot, in our opinion, be treated as an executory contract which became a conditional contract on the fall of the hammer. The auction was an auction sale in respect of ascertained goods and it was concluded in every case on the fall of the hammer. On that view of the matter, we must hold that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the Salestax authorities were justified in imposing sales-tax against the appellants in regard to the transactions which have given rise to the present appeals.” 13. In the case titled as Sagar Mahila Vidyalaya, Sagar versus Pandit Sadashiv Rao Harshe and others, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 588 , the Apex Court has held that once an order confirming the sale has been made, thereafter, the title in the property vests in the auction purchaser. It is apt to reproduce para 14 of the judgment herein: “14. The High Court while dealing with the question of limitation held that the plaintiff in this case was not required to file a suit for getting the sale set aside when he is pleading that the sale itself is void. A void sale could be ignored by a true owner and it did not affect his title. The High Court in our view was totally wrong in holding that it was a case of void sale. It may be noted that Govind Rao Harshe had already taken steps for getting the sale set aside by moving a petition under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC and his sons had filed a suit for declaration but all those proceedings finally terminated against them. Even if for argument's sake the objection now raised in the present suit is considered, it is only in respect of the sale-certificate being wrongly issued in favour of Mahila Vidyalaya. So far as the sale in favour of Gopal Rao Mutatkar is concerned, there is no illegality and the sale was rightly confirmed in his favour under Order XXI Rule 92 CPC by order dated 10th April, 1943. It may be noted that once an order was made under Order XXI Rule 92 confirming the sale, the title of the auction-purchaser related back to the date of sale as provided under Section 65 CPC. The title in the property thereafter vests in the auction-purchaser and not in the judgment-debtor. It may be noted that once an order was made under Order XXI Rule 92 confirming the sale, the title of the auction-purchaser related back to the date of sale as provided under Section 65 CPC. The title in the property thereafter vests in the auction-purchaser and not in the judgment-debtor. The issue of sale certificate under Order XXI Rule 94 CPC in favour of the auction-purchaser though mandatory but the granting of certificate is a ministerial act and not judicial. Thus looking into the matter from this angle also it is clear that no right or title remained with Govind Rao Harshe after confirmation of sale in favour of Gopal Rao Mutatkar which related back to the date of sale i.e. 20th August, 1942. Thus there is no question of holding that it was a case of a void sale which could be ignored by a true owner and it did not affect his title. Govind Rao Harshe and as such the respondents who are his legal representatives were not entitled to take the stand that they were true owner as the sale itself was void and they were not required to file a suit for getting the sale set aside. With the risk of repetition it is held that it was not a case of the sale being void and in any case so far as issue of sale certificate in favour of Mahila Vidyalaya is concerned, the same was determined by a judicial order dated 26th February, 1944 and the executing Court was competent to pass such order, such order cannot be held to be void on the ground of being without jurisdiction as determined by the High Court and it was necessary to challenge the said order within limitation. Even if the residuary Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is applied, it should have been challenged within 6 years and as such the present suit filed on 26th November, 1960 was hopelessly barred by time.” (Emphasis added) 14. The Apex Court in the case titled as Nellikkottu Kolleriyil Madhavi versus Kavakkalathil Kalikutty and others, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 749 , held that a person, who purchases the property in a court auction-sale, gets title to the property by issuance of sale certificate as true owner. It is apt to reproduce para 3 of the judgment herein: “3. The Apex Court in the case titled as Nellikkottu Kolleriyil Madhavi versus Kavakkalathil Kalikutty and others, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 749 , held that a person, who purchases the property in a court auction-sale, gets title to the property by issuance of sale certificate as true owner. It is apt to reproduce para 3 of the judgment herein: “3. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and decree of the Kerala High Court dated 24/5/1993, made in SA No. 368 of 1989. The respondents had purchased the Plaint Schedule property in execution of the decrees in OS No. 262 of 1955 on the file of the court of the District Munsif, Parappanangadi. The sale certificate, Exh. A2 dated 28/1/1958 was given to the respondents. They had also filed an application for delivery of possession of the property which had come to be delivered under Exh. A3 dated 21/7/1961. After taking delivery of the possession on 20/10/1961, they assigned the Plaint Schedule property to the plaintiff. Under those circumstances, the question arises whether they are entitled to a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with his possession. Though the trial court and the appellate court had accepted the case of the appellant, the High court has pointed out that aforesaid documents are material for deciding the controversy and the courts below had not considered those documents in proper perspective. Accordingly, in second appeal, the High court has gone into that question. It is settled law that the person who purchases the property in a court auction-sale, gets title to the property by sale certificate issued by the court as true owner and after confirmation of the sale, he gets possession thereof. In view of the fact that Plaint Schedule property was delivered to Sankaran under Exh. A3 on 21/7/1961, he lawfully came into possession and the same was delivered in turn to the plaintiffs. Non-consideration of the material evidence is a substantial question of law.” (Emphasis added) 15. As discussed hereinabove, the terms and conditions of sale contained in the auction notice were read by the writ petitioner and was not supposed to go beyond the same. It was the duty of the State and the authorities, who conducted the auction, to record all the terms and conditions in the auction notice. As discussed hereinabove, the terms and conditions of sale contained in the auction notice were read by the writ petitioner and was not supposed to go beyond the same. It was the duty of the State and the authorities, who conducted the auction, to record all the terms and conditions in the auction notice. How can it lie in the mouth of the State that the auction purchaser has to do something more after making payment of such a huge amount. 16. It is profitable to reproduce paras 12 and 13 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case titled as The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad versus Haji Abdulgafur Haji Hussenbhai, reported in 1971 (1) SCC 757 , herein: “12. Adverting now to the case before us, as already noticed, the property in question had vested in the receivers in insolvency proceedings since March, 1949 by an interim order, and in October, 1950 the original owner was adjudicated as an insolvent and the property finally vested in the receivers in insolvency. The Plaintiff purchased the property in November, 1954 and in our opinion it could not have reasonably been expected by him that the receivers would not have paid to the municipal corporation, since 1949 the taxes and other dues which were charged on this property by statute. According to Section 61 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 the debts due to a local authority are given priority, being bracketed along with the debts due to the State. Merely because these taxes are charged on the property could not constitute a valid ground for the official receiver not to discharge this liability. In fact we find from the record that on January 15, 1951 the receivers had submitted a report to the insolvency Court about their having received bills for Rs. 62830 in respect of municipal taxes of the insolvent's property and leave of the Court was sought for transferring the said property to the names of the receivers in the municipal and Government records. The Court recorded an order on February 8, 1951 that the municipal taxes had to be paid. On the receivers stating that they did not possess sufficient funds the Court gave notice to the counsel for the opposite party and on February 24, 1951 made the following order : "Mr. Pandya absent. The taxes have to be paid. The Court recorded an order on February 8, 1951 that the municipal taxes had to be paid. On the receivers stating that they did not possess sufficient funds the Court gave notice to the counsel for the opposite party and on February 24, 1951 made the following order : "Mr. Pandya absent. The taxes have to be paid. The Receivers state that they can pay only by sale of some properties of the insolvent from which they want Sanctioned. The property in which the insolvent stays should first be disposed of. The terms are accordingly so authorised." It is not known what happened thereafter. It is, however, difficult to appreciate why after having secured the necessary order from the Court municipal taxes were not paid off by the receivers and why the Municipal Corporation did not pursue the matter and secure payment of the taxes due May be that the Municipal Corporation thought that since these dues were a charge on the property they need not pursue the matter with the receivers and also need not approach the insolvency Court. If so, then this, in our opinion, was not a proper attitude to adopt. In any event the plaintiff could not reasonably have thought that the Municipal Corporation had not cared to secure payment of the taxes due since, 1949. On the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, we cannot hold that the plaintiff as a prudent and reasonable man was bound in enquire from the Municipal Corporation about the existence of any arrears of taxes due from the receivers. It appears from the record, however, that he did in fact make enquiries from the receivers but they did not give any intimation. The p1aintiff made a statement on oath that when he purchased the building in question it was occupied by the tenants and the rant used to be recovered by the receivers. There is no rebuttal to this evidence. Now, if the receivers were receiving rent from the tenants, the reasonable assumption would be that the Municipal taxes which were a charge on the property and which were also given priority under Section 61 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, had been duly paid by the receivers out of the rental income. The plaintiff could have no reasonable ground for assuming that they were in arrears. The plaintiff could have no reasonable ground for assuming that they were in arrears. From the plaintiff's testimony it is clear that he did nevertheless make enquiries from the receivers if there were any dues against the property though the enquiry was not made specifically about Municipal dues. Apparently he was not informed about the arrears of Municipal taxes. This seems to us explainable on the ground that the receivers had, after securing appropriate orders, for some reason not clear on the record, omitted to pay the arrears of Municipal taxes and they were, therefore, reluctant to disclose this lapse on their part. On these facts and circumstances we do not think that the plaintiff could reasonably be fixed with any constructive notice of the arrears of Municipal taxes since 1949. So far as the legal position is concerned we are inclined to agree with the reasoning adopted by the Allahabad High Court in Roop Chand Jain's case. ILR 1940 All 669 : AIR 1940 All 456 (supra) in preference, to the reasoning of the Full Bench of that Court in Nawal Kishore's case, ILR 1943 All 453 (supra) or of the Division Bench of Oudh Chief Court in Ramji Lal's case. ILR 1916 (16) Luck 607 : AIR 1941 Oudh 305 (supra). We do not think there is any principle or firm rule of law as suggested in Nawal Kishore's case, ILR 1943 All 453 (supra) imputing to all intending purchasers of property in Municipal area where Municipal taxes are a charge on the property, constructive knowledge of the existence of such Municipal taxes and of the reasonable possibility of those taxes being in arrears. The question of constructive knowledge or notice has to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. According to the Full Bench decision in Nawal Kishore's case, ILR 1943 All 453 (supra) also the question of constructive notice is a question of fact and we do not find that the material on the present record justifies that the plaintiff should be fixed with any constructive notice of the arrears of Municipal taxes. 13. We may add before concluding that as the question of constructive notice has to be approached from equitable consideration we feel that the Municipal Corporation in the present case was far more negligent and blameworthy than the plaintiff. 13. We may add before concluding that as the question of constructive notice has to be approached from equitable consideration we feel that the Municipal Corporation in the present case was far more negligent and blameworthy than the plaintiff. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the High Court took the correct view of the legal position with the result that this appeal must fail and is dismissed. As there is no representation on behalf of the respondent there will be no order as to costs.” 17. The Apex Court in the case titled as Chinnammal and others versus P. Arumugham and another, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 513 , has made the distinction between bona fide auction purchaser and decree holder and held that if a person is decree holder, he is bound to restore the property when the decree is reversed or modified, but if a person is not a decree holder, is a stranger auction purchaser, he does not lose title to the property and cannot be divested with. It is apt to reproduce para 10 of the judgment herein: “10. There is thus a distinction maintained between the decree holder who purchases the property in execution of his own decree which is afterwards modified or reversed, and an auction purchaser who is not party to the decree. Where the purchaser is the decree holder, he is bound to restore the property to the judgment debtor byway of restitution but not a stranger auction purchaser. The latter remains unaffected and does not lose title to the property by subsequent reversal or modification of the decree. The Courts have held that he could retain the property since he is a bona fide purchaser. This principle is also based on the premise that he is not bound to enquire into correctness of the judgment or decree sought to be executed. He is thus distinguished from an eo nomine party to the litigation.” 18. The Courts have held that he could retain the property since he is a bona fide purchaser. This principle is also based on the premise that he is not bound to enquire into correctness of the judgment or decree sought to be executed. He is thus distinguished from an eo nomine party to the litigation.” 18. A question arose before the Apex Court in the cases titled as Gurjoginder Singh versus Jaswant Kaur (Smt.) and another, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 368 ; Padanathil Ruqmini Amma versus P.K. Abdulla, reported in (1996) 7 SCC 668 ; Ashwin S. Mehta and another versus Custodian and others, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 385 ; and Janatha Textiles and others versus Tax Recovery Officer and another, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 582 , as to what is the status of a bona fide purchaser and a tenant inducted by the landlord. It has been held that the status of a bona fide purchaser in an auction sale stands on a distinct and different footing from that of a tenant. Further held that the stranger auction purchaser does not derive his title from either the decree holder or the judgment debtor and restitution cannot be granted against him and the rights of the auction purchaser cannot be defeated. It is profitable to reproduce paras 18 and 20 of the judgment in Janatha Textiles case (supra) herein: “18. It is an established principle of law that in a third party auction purchaser's interest in the auctioned property continues to be protected notwithstanding that the underlying decree is subsequently set aside or otherwise. This principle has been stated and reaffirmed in a number of judicial pronouncements by the Privy Council and this court. Reliance has been placed on the following decisions: (i) The Privy Council in Nawab Zain-Ul-Abdin Khan v. Muhammad Asghar Ali Khan, (1887-88) 15 IA 12, for the first time crystallized the law on this point, wherein a three Judge Bench held as follows: (IA p. 16) "A great distinction has been made between the case of bona fide purchasers who are not parties to a decree at a sale under execution and the decree-holders themselves. In Bacon's Abridgment,titi. In Bacon's Abridgment,titi. 'Error' it is laid down, citing old authorities, that "if a man recovers damages, and hath execution by fieri facias, and upon the fieri facias the sheriff sells to a stranger a term for years, and after the judgment is reversed, the party shall be restored only to the money for which the term was sold, and not to the term itself, because the sheriff had sold it by the command of the writ of fieri facias." ... So in this case, those bona fide purchasers who were no parties to the decree which was then valid and in force, had nothing to do further than to look to the decree and to the order of sale." (ii) In Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1967 SC 608 : (1967) w2 SCR 77, the Division Bench comprising Wanchoo. J. and Mitter, J. held that in the facts of the said case the appellant auction-purchaser was entitled to a confirmation of the sale notwithstanding the fact that after the holding of the sale, the decree was set aside. It was observed: (AIR p. 613, para 24) "24. … The policy of the Legislature seems to be that unless a stranger auction-purchaser is protected against the vicissitudes of the fortunes of the suit, sales in execution would not attract customers and it would be to the detriment of the interest of the borrower and the creditor alike if sales were allowed to be impugned merely because the decree was ultimately set aside or modified." (iii) In Gurjoginder Singh v. Jaswant Kaur, (1994) 2 SCC 368 , this Court relying on the judgment rendered by the Privy Council held that the status of a bona fide purchaser in an auction sale in execution of a decree to which he was not a party stood on a distinct and different footing from that of a person who was inducted as a tenant by a decree-holder-landlord. It was held as follows: (SCC p. 370, para 3) "3. ….... It was held as follows: (SCC p. 370, para 3) "3. ….... A stranger auction purchaser does not derive his title from either the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor and therefore restitution may not be granted against him but a tenant who obtains possession from the decree-holder landlord cannot avail of the same right as his possession as a tenant is derived from the landlord." (iv) In Padanathil Ruqmini Amma v. P. K. Abdulla, (1996) 7 SCC 668 , this Court in para 11 observed as under: (SCC p. 672) "11. In the present case, as the ex parte decree was set aside, the judgment-debtor was entitled to seek restitution of the property which had been sold in court auction in execution of the ex parte decree. There is no doubt that when the decreeholder himself is the auction-purchaser in a court auction sale held in execution of a decree which is subsequently set aside, restitution of the property can be ordered in favour of the judgment-debtor. The decree-holder auction-purchaser is bound to return the property. It is equally well settled that if at a court auction sale in execution of a decree, the properties are purchased by a bona fide purchaser who is a stranger to the court proceedings, the sale in his favour is protected and he cannot be asked to restitute the property to the judgment-debtor if the decree is set aside. The ratio behind this distinction between a sale to a decree-holder and a sale to a stranger is that the court, as a matter of policy, will protect honest outsider purchasers at sales held in the execution of its decrees, although the sales may be subsequently set aside, when such purchasers are not parties to the suit. But for such protection, the properties which are sold in court auctions would not fetch a proper price and the decree-holder himself would suffer. The same consideration does not apply when the decree-holder is himself the purchaser and the decree in his favour is set aside. He is a party to the litigation and is very much aware of the vicissitudes of litigation and needs no protection." In Para 16, the Court further elaborated the distinction between the decree-holder auction purchaser and a stranger who is a bona fide purchaser in auction. Para 16 reads as under: (P.K. Abdulla case, (1996) 7 SCC 668 , p. 674) "16. Para 16 reads as under: (P.K. Abdulla case, (1996) 7 SCC 668 , p. 674) "16. The distinction between a stranger who purchases at an auction sale and an assignee from a decree-holder purchaser at an auction sale is quite clear. Persons who purchase at a court auction who are strangers to the decree are afforded protection by the court because they are not in any way connected with the decree. Unless they are assured of title; the court auction would not fetch a good price and would be detrimental to the decree-holder. The policy, therefore, is to protect such purchasers. This policy cannot extend to those outsiders who do not purchase at a court auction. When outsiders purchase from a decree-holder who is an auction-purchaser clearly their title is dependent upon the title of decree-holder auction-purchaser. It is a defeasible title liable to be defeated if the decree is set aside. A person who takes an assignment of the property from such a purchaser is expected to be aware of the defeasibility of the title of his assignor. He has not purchased the property through the court at all. There is, therefore, no question of the court extending any protection to him. The doctrine of a bona fide purchaser for value also cannot extend to such an outsider who derives his title through a decree-holder auction-purchaser. He is aware or is expected to be aware of the nature of the title derived by his seller who is a decree-holder auction-purchaser." (v) In Ashwin S. Mehta v. Custodian, (2006) 2 SCC 385 , this Court whilst relying upon the aforementioned two judgments stated the principle in the following words: (SCC p. 407), para 70) "70. …...... In any event, ordinarily, a bona fide purchaser for value in an auction sale is treated differently than a decree holder purchasing such properties. In the former event, even if such a decree is set aside, the interest of the bona fide purchaser in an auction sale is saved." 19. …............ 20. Law makes a clear distinction between a stranger who is a bona fide purchaser of the property at an auction sale and a decree holder purchaser at a court auction. The strangers to the decree are afforded protection by the court because they are not connected with the decree. …............ 20. Law makes a clear distinction between a stranger who is a bona fide purchaser of the property at an auction sale and a decree holder purchaser at a court auction. The strangers to the decree are afforded protection by the court because they are not connected with the decree. Unless the protection is extended to them the court sales would not fetch market value or fair price of the property.” 19. The purpose of conducting auction is to enable the decree holder and the bona fide purchaser, who is a stranger, to reap its fruits on taking steps in pursuance of the terms and conditions contained in the auction notice. It is the duty of the Court to provide and afford protection to such purchaser. In case, the Court will not protect such bona fide purchaser, nobody will come forward to participate in the auction proceedings. Viewed thus, the interest of a third party auction purchaser is to be protected notwithstanding that the decree is subsequently set aside. 20. The Apex Court in a case titled as Sadashiv Prasad Singh versus Harendar Singh and others, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 574 , held that the rights of a third party bona fide auction purchaser in the property purchased by him in a sale in compliance with a court order cannot be extinguished except in cases where the said purchase can be assailed on grounds of fraud or collusion. It would be profitable to reproduce paras 17 to 19 and 23.6 of the judgment herein: “17. The learned counsel for the auction-purchaser Sadashiv Prasad Singh, in the first instance vehemently contended, that in terms of the law declared by this Court, property purchased by a third party auction purchaser, in compliance of a court order, cannot be interfered with on the basis of the success or failure of parties to a proceeding, if auction purchaser had bonafidely purchased the property. In order to substantiate his aforesaid contention, learned counsel representing Sadashiv Prasad Singh placed emphatic reliance, firstly, on a judgment rendered by this Court in Ashwin S. Mehta & Anr. vs. Custodian, (2006) 2 SCC 385 . Our attention was drawn to the following observations recorded therein : (SCC p. 407, para 70) "70. In order to substantiate his aforesaid contention, learned counsel representing Sadashiv Prasad Singh placed emphatic reliance, firstly, on a judgment rendered by this Court in Ashwin S. Mehta & Anr. vs. Custodian, (2006) 2 SCC 385 . Our attention was drawn to the following observations recorded therein : (SCC p. 407, para 70) "70. In that view of the matter, evidently, creation of any third-party interest is no longer in dispute nor the same is subject to any order of this Court. In any event, ordinarily, a bona fide purchaser for value in an auction-sale is treated differently than a decree-holder purchasing such properties. In the former event, even if such a decree is set aside, the interest of the bona fide purchaser in an auction-sale is saved. (See Nawab Zainul Abdin Khan v. Mohd. Asghar Ali Khan, (1887-88) 15 IA 12.) The said decision has been affirmed by this Court in Gurjoginder Singh v. Jaswant Kaur, 1994 2 SCC 368 )." (emphasis supplied) 18. On the same subject, and to the same end, learned counsel placed reliance on another judgment rendered by this Court in Janatha Textiles & Ors. vs. Tax Recovery Officer, (2008) 12 SCC 582 , wherein the conclusions drawn in Ashwin S. Mehta's case, (2006) 2 SCC 385 , came to be reiterated. In the above judgment, this Court relied upon the decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court in Nawab Zain Ul Abdin Khan v. Mohd. Asghar Ali Khan, 1(1887-88) 15 IA 12; Janak Raj vs. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1967 SC 608 ; Gurjoginder Singh vs. Jaswant Kaur, (1994) 2 SCC 368 ; Padanathil Ruqmini Amma vs. P.K. Abdulla, (1996) 7 SCC 668 , as also, on Ashwin S. Mehta in order to conclude, that: (Janatha Textiles case, (2008) 12 SCC 582 , SCC p. 586, para 18) “18. It is an established principle of law, that a third party auction purchaser's interest, in the auctioned property continues to be protected, notwithstanding that the underlying decree is subsequently set aside or otherwise.” It is, therefore, that this Court in its ultimate analysis observed as under: (Janatha Textiles case, (2008) 12 SCC 582 , SCC p. 588-89, para 20) "20. Law makes a clear distinction between a stranger who is a bona fide purchaser of the property at an auction-sale and a decree-holder purchaser at a court auction. Law makes a clear distinction between a stranger who is a bona fide purchaser of the property at an auction-sale and a decree-holder purchaser at a court auction. The strangers to the decree are afforded protection by the court because they are not connected with the decree. Unless the protection is extended to them the court sales would not fetch market value or fair price of the property." (emphasis supplied) On the issue as has been dealt with in the foregoing paragraph, this Court has carved out one exception. The aforesaid exception came to be recorded in Velji Khimji and Co. vs. Official Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product (Gujarat) Ltd., (2008) 9 SCC 299 , wherein it was held as under : (SCC p. 305, paras 30-31) "30. In the first case mentioned above i.e. where the auction is not subject to confirmation by any authority, the auction is complete on the fall of the hammer, and certain rights accrue in favour of the auction-purchaser. However, where the auction is subject to subsequent confirmation by some authority (under a statute or terms of the auction) the auction is not complete and no rights accrue until the sale is confirmed by the said authority. Once, however, the sale is confirmed by that authority, certain rights accrue in favour of the auction-purchaser, and these rights cannot be extinguished except in exceptional cases such as fraud. 31. In the present case, the auction having been confirmed on 30.7.2003 by the Court it cannot be set aside unless some fraud or collusion has been proved. We are satisfied that no fraud or collusion has been established by anyone in this case." (emphasis supplied) 19. It is, therefore, apparent that the rights of an auction-purchaser in the property purchased by him cannot be extinguished except in cases where the said purchase can be assailed on grounds of fraud or collusion. xxx xxx xxx 23.6. Finally, the public auction under reference was held on 28.8.2008. Thereafter the same was confirmed on 22.09.2008. Possession of the property was handed over to the auction-purchaser Sadashiv Prasad Sinha on 11.3.2009. The auction-purchaser initiated mutation proceedings in respect of the property in question. Harender Singh did not raise any objections in the said mutation proceedings. The said mutation proceedings were also finalized in favour of Sadashiv Prasad Sinha. Thereafter the same was confirmed on 22.09.2008. Possession of the property was handed over to the auction-purchaser Sadashiv Prasad Sinha on 11.3.2009. The auction-purchaser initiated mutation proceedings in respect of the property in question. Harender Singh did not raise any objections in the said mutation proceedings. The said mutation proceedings were also finalized in favour of Sadashiv Prasad Sinha. Harender Singh approached the High Court through CWJC No.16485 of 2009 only on 27.11.2009. We are of the view that the challenged raised by Harender Singh ought to have been rejected on the grounds of delay and latches, especially because third party rights had emerged in the meantime. More so, because the auction purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for consideration, having purchased the property in furtherance of a duly publicized public auction, interference by the High Court even on ground of equity was clearly uncalled for.” 21. Applying the tests to the instant case, the writ petitioner has participated in the auction proceedings, has deposited a huge amount and is still wandering for registration of sale documents and to conduct resale of the property. 22. The authorities have defeated the purpose of conducting the auction. Not only the purpose of conducting the auction has been defeated, but the writ petitioner has been made to understand and believe as to how the authorities can defeat the Court proceedings and orders. It is a glaring example of injustice where the Court should step in and pass appropriate directions, as required in the interest of justice. 23. The Apex Court in the case titled as Bai Dosabai versus Mathurdas Govinddas and others, reported in (1980) 3 SCC 545 , held that right of decree holder/auction purchaser cannot be defeated by pressing into service any other law. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 15 of the judgment herein: “15. Shri Vakil finally submitted that the contract had become impossible of performance as a result of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 15 of the judgment herein: “15. Shri Vakil finally submitted that the contract had become impossible of performance as a result of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. It is true that Section 5 (3) of the Act prohibits every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit before the commencement of the Act from transferring such land or part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise until he has furnished a statement as prescribed by the Act and a notification has been published after the prescribed procedure has been gone through. The Act came into force subsequent to the passing of the decree by the High Court. The question for our consideration is what is the effect of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 on the decree passed by the High Court. While it is true that events and changes in the law occurring during the pendency of an appeal are required to be taken into consideration in order to do complete justice between parties and so that a futile decree may not be passed. It is also right and necessary that the decree should be so moulded as to accord with the changed statutory situation. The right obtained by a party under a decree cannot be allowed to be defeated by delay in the disposal of the appeal against the decree, if it is possible to save the decree by moulding it to conform to the statutes subsequently coming into force. ….” 24. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner argued that the authorities concerned have refused to register the sale and make the entries in the revenue records on the ground that the necessary permission was to be obtained as per the mandate of Section 118 of the Act. 25. It is also contended that the sale certificate and the confirmation of sale issued by the authorities, i.e. Annexures P6 and P8, are necessary to be registered before the authority concerned in terms of the mandate of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 (for short “the Registration Act”), which is not legally correct. 26. Section 17 of the Registration Act, though mandatory in nature, provides which of the documents are compulsory to be registered. 26. Section 17 of the Registration Act, though mandatory in nature, provides which of the documents are compulsory to be registered. It does not include sale by auction and sale certificate issued by the concerned authorities including confirmation of sale, which are outcome of the auction proceedings conducted in terms of Court orders. The provision is speaking one and without any ambiguity. Thus, registration was not required. 27. The Apex Court in the case titled as B. Arvind Kumar versus Govt. of India and others, reported in (2007) 5 SCC 745 , held that a sale certificate issued by a Court or an officer authorized by the Court does not require registration. It is apt to reproduce para 12 of the judgment herein: “12. The plaintiff has produced the original registered sale certificate dated 29.8.1941 executed by the Official Receiver, Civil Station, Bangalore. The said deed certifies that Bhowrilal (father of plaintiff) was the highest bidder at an auction sale held on 22.8.1941, in respect of the right, title, interest of the insolvent Anraj Sankla, namely the leasehold right in the property described in the schedule to the certificate (suit property), that his bid of Rs. 8,350.00 was accepted and the sale was confirmed by the District Judge, Civil and Military Station, Bangalore on 25.8.1941. The sale certificate declared Bhowrilal to be the owner of the leasehold right in respect of the suit property. When a property is sold by public auction in pursuance of an order of the court and the bid is accepted and the sale is confirmed by the court in favour of the purchaser, the sale becomes absolute and the title vests in the purchaser. A sale certificate is issued to the purchaser only when the sale becomes absolute. The sale certificate is merely the evidence of such title. It is well settled that when an auction purchaser derives title on confirmation of sale in his favour, and a sale certificate is issued evidencing such sale and title, no further deed of transfer from the court is contemplated or required. In this case, the sale certificate itself was registered, though such a sale certificate issued by a court or an officer authorized by the court, does not require registration. In this case, the sale certificate itself was registered, though such a sale certificate issued by a court or an officer authorized by the court, does not require registration. Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act, 1908 specifically provides that a certificate of sale granted to any purchaser of any property sold by a public auction by a civil or revenue officer does not fall under the category of non testamentary documents which require registration under sub-sec. (b) and (c) of sec. 17(1) of the said Act. We therefore hold that the High Court committed a serious error in holding that the sale certificate did not convey any right, title or interest to plaintiff's father for want of a registered deed of transfer.” (Emphasis added) 28. The same principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case titled as Som Dev and others versus Rati Ram and another, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 788 . It would be profitable to reproduce para 15 of the judgment herein: “15. Almost the whole of the argument on behalf of the appellants here, is based on the ratio of the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, (1995) 5 SCC 709 : 1995 Supp (3) SCR 466, (supra). It was held in that case that exception under clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Act is meant to cover that decree or order of a Court including the decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise which declares the preexisting right and does not by itself create new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/or upwards. Any other view would find the mischief of avoidance of registration which requires payment of stamp duty embedded in the decree or order. It would, therefore, be the duty of the Court to examine in each case whether the parties had preexisting right to the immovable property or whether under the order or decree of the Court one party having right, title or interest therein agreed or suffered to extinguish the same and created a right in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/or upwards in favour of the other party for the first time either by compromise or pretended consent. If latter be the position, the document is compulsorily registrable. If latter be the position, the document is compulsorily registrable. Their Lordships referred to the decisions of this Court in regard to the family arrangements and whether such family arrangements require to be compulsorily registered and also the decision relating to an award. With respect, we may point out that an award does not come within the exception contained in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration act and the exception therein is confined to decrees or orders of a Court. Understood in the context of the decision in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. Ltd., (1918-19) 46 IA 240 : AIR 1919 PC 79 : ILR (1920) 47 Cal 485 (supra) and the subsequent amendment brought about in the provision, the position that emerges is that a decree or order of a court is exempted from registration even if clauses (b)and (c) of Section 17(1) of the Registration Act are attracted, and even a compromise decree comes under the exception, unless, of course, it takes in any immovable property that is not the subject matter of the suit.” (Emphasis added) 29. A question arose before the Madras High Court in a case titled as K. Chidambara Manickam versus Shakeena & Ors., reported in AIR 2008 Madras 108, whether the sale of secured assets in public auction which ended in issuance of a sale certificate is a complete and absolute sale or whether the sale would become final only on the registration of the sale certificate? It has been held that the sale becomes final when it is confirmed in favour of the auction purchaser, he is vested with rights in relation to the property purchased in auction on issuance of the sale certificate and becomes the absolute owner of the property. The sale certificate does not require any registration. It is apt to reproduce paras 10.13, 10.14, 10.17 and 10.18 of the judgment herein: “10.13 Part-III of the Registration Act speaks of the Registration of documents. Section 17(1) of the Registration Act enumerates the documents which require compulsory Registration. However, subsection (2) of Section 10 sets out the documents to which clause (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 17 do not apply. Section 17(1) of the Registration Act enumerates the documents which require compulsory Registration. However, subsection (2) of Section 10 sets out the documents to which clause (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 17 do not apply. Clause (xii) of subsection (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act reads as under: “Section 17(2)(xii) – any certificate of sale granted to the purchaser of any property sold by public auction by a Civil or Revenue Officer.” 10.14 A Division Bench of this Court in Arumugham, S. v. C.K. Venugopal Chetty, 1994 (1) LW 491 , held that the property transferred by Official Assignee, under order of Court, does not require registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act. The Division Bench has held as follows: “Under Ex. D7, the Court permitted the Official Assignee to transfer to the guarantor the assets of the insolvent that are in excess. Being a transfer by order of Court, the document does not require registration under S. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, since S. 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act says that nothing in the Act (except S. 57 and Chapter IV) applies to transfers by orders of Court. The document in question does not require registration and there was a valid conveyance of the 2nd defendant's 1/4th share to G.” xxx xxx xxx 10.17 The ratio laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Arumugham, S. v. C.K. Venugopal Chetty and the Supreme Court in B. Arvind Kumar v. Government of India, referred supra, squarely applies to the case on hand and we, therefore, have no incertitude to hold that the sale which took place on 19-12-2005 has become final when it is confirmed in favour of the auction purchaser and the auction purchaser is vested with rights in relation tot he property purchased in auction on issuance of the sale certificate and he has become the absolute owner of the property. Further, as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Arumugham, S. v. C.K. Venugopal Chetty and the Supreme Court in B. Arvind Kumar v. Government of India, referred supra, the sale certificate issued in favour of the appellant does not require any registration in view of Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act as the same has been granted pursuant to the sale held in public auction by the authorised officer under SARFAESI Act. 10.18 The finding of the learned single Judge that the sale is not complete without registration of sale certificate, therefore, not sustainable in law and the same is liable to be set aside.” 30. Learned Advocate General argued that the validity of Section 118 of the Act was questioned and upheld by this Court in a case tiled as Smt. Sudarshna Devi versus Union of India and another, reported in ILR 1978 H.P. 355, and thereafter in the case titled as Som Kirti alias Som K. Nath and others versus State of H.P. and others, reported in Latest HLJ 2013 (HP) 1223, is mandatory in nature, thus, the writ petitioner has to seek permission as required in terms of Section 118 of the Act. 31. The argument, though attractive, is devoid of any force for the reason that in the cases (supra) the constitutional validity of Section 118 of the Act was questioned. The validity of Section 118 of the Act is not involved in this lis, but, what is the subject matter of the lis is interpretation and applicability of the said provision. 32. While going through Section 118 of the Act, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that the word 'decree' does not include bona fide auction purchaser. It is an act of the Court, not the act of an individual and the act of the Court should not cause prejudice to any person. 33. The action of the Court or Court order/judgment/decree or any action drawn in sequel to the order/judgment/decree cannot cause any prejudice to any person. 34. It is beaten law of land that no person should be prejudiced by the act of the Court based on latin maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'. 35. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, while dealing with the issue of the similar nature in the case titled as Raja Sahib of Poonch versus Kirpa Ram, reported in AIR 1954 J&K 23 , held that the Court has inherent power to amend the decree in terms of Sections 151 and 152 CPC. It is apt to reproduce para 10 of the judgment herein: "10. The appellant did not take the two proceedings for the execution of the decree and for its amendment simultaneously. The application for amendment of the decree was made after the application for execution of the decree was finally rejected by the High Court. It is apt to reproduce para 10 of the judgment herein: "10. The appellant did not take the two proceedings for the execution of the decree and for its amendment simultaneously. The application for amendment of the decree was made after the application for execution of the decree was finally rejected by the High Court. It is also unfortunate that the District Judge in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction after he had interpreted the operative part of his judgment as laying down no time limit for the payment of the increased amount and that the decree was executable, did not exercise his inherent jurisdiction to amend the decree so as to bring it in conformity with the judgment. And his order directing the execution of the decree simpliciter without amending the decree led the High Court to set aside his order on the ground that the executing Court could not go behind the decree. Whether something could not be done by the District Judge or by the High Court in the exercise of their inherent jurisdiction to prevent this unnecessary litigation, it is now unnecessary to consider and in the events that have happened it is not necessary to disturb the decree of the High Court dated Maghar 28, 2002. (Emphasis added)" 36. In the case titled as State of Gujarat & Ors. versus Essar Oil Limited and Anr., reported in 2012 AIR SCW 1008, the Apex Court has laid down the same principle. It is apt to reproduce paras 70 and 71 of the judgment herein: "70. The second principle that an act of court cannot prejudice anyone, based on latin maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" is also encompassed partly within the doctrine of restitution. This actus curiae principle is founded upon justice and good sense and is a guide for the administration of law. 71. The aforesaid principle of "actus curiae" was applied in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & another, 1988 2 SCC 602 , wherein Sabyasachi Mukharji, J (as his lordship then was) giving the majority judgment for the Constitution Bench of this Court, explained its concept and application in para 83, page 672 of the report. 71. The aforesaid principle of "actus curiae" was applied in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & another, 1988 2 SCC 602 , wherein Sabyasachi Mukharji, J (as his lordship then was) giving the majority judgment for the Constitution Bench of this Court, explained its concept and application in para 83, page 672 of the report. His lordship quoted the observation of Lord Cairns in Rodger v. Comptoir D escompte De Paris,1871 3 LR 465 which is set out below: "Now, their Lordships are of opinion, that one of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the Suitors, and when the expression 'the act of the Court' is used, it does not mean merely the act of the Primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case. It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals, if I may use the expression, to take care that no act of the Court in the course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the Court." 37. The next question, which arises for determination in this petition, is – whether rigour of Section 118 of the Act is applicable to the case in hand? 38. The word used in Section 118 of the Act is 'land'. Section 2 (7) of the Act defines 'land' as under: “2. …........ (7) “land” means land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture and includes (a) the sites of buildings and other structures on such land, (b) orchards, (c) ghasnies, (d) banjar land, and (e) private forests.” 39. It provides that the land, which is occupied as site of building in a town or village, does not fall within the ambit of Section 118 of the Act, but the land which is not occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture comes in the rigours of Section 118 of the Act. 40. 40. The plain reading of this Section suggests that a property, which is not agricultural land, but is a site of any building or machinery, does not fall within the definition of land. 41. The same question arose before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case titled as Nemi Chand Jain versus The Financial Commissioner, Punjab and another, reported in 1963 PLJ 137, wherein the word 'land' came to be interpreted. It is apt to reproduce paras 4 to 6 herein: “4. According to Section 2(8) of the Act, the word "land" shall have the same meaning as is assigned to it in the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887. The definition of the word "land" as given in Section 4(1) of the Punjab Tenancy Act is as under: “Land means land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture, and includes the sites of buildings and other structures on such land.” It would appear from the above definition that before land can fall under the definition of the land as given above, two factors are essential to be proved: (1) that it should not be land which is occupied as the site of any building in a town or village, and (2) is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture. The first part of the definition is obviously not applicable as the land in question is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village. The second part of the definition, in my, opinion, also does not cover the land in question because it has not been shown that the land is occupied or has been let for agricultural purpose or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture. On the contrary the fact that the land is banjar jadid or banjar qadim goes to show that it has not been occupied or let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture. According to Land Revenue Assessment Rules of 1929 uncultivated land, which has remained unsown for four successive harvests, is classified as banjar jadid land, while the land, which has remained unsown for eight successive harvests, is described as banjar qadim. According to Land Revenue Assessment Rules of 1929 uncultivated land, which has remained unsown for four successive harvests, is classified as banjar jadid land, while the land, which has remained unsown for eight successive harvests, is described as banjar qadim. As such the banjar jadid or banjar qadim land cannot be held to answer to the description of the word "land" as given in the Act. 5. Land was also defined in Section 2(3) of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, and the definition read as under: “the expression "land" means land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture, and includes :- (a) the sites of buildings and other structures on such land; (b) a share in the profits of an estate or holding: (c) any dues or any fixed percentage of the land-revenue payable by an inferior landowner to a superior landowner; (d) a right to receive rent, (e) any right to water enjoyed by the owner or occupier of land as such; (f) any right of occupancy; (g) all trees standing on such land.” Although the definition of the word "land" as given in the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, had a wider scope because of the addition of the clauses (a) to (g) in the definition, the comparison of the two definitions would go to show that but for the addition of those clauses the definition was identical. While dealing with the above definition of the word "land", as given in the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, it was held in Gopi Mal v. Muhammad Yasin, (A.I.R. 1924 Lahore 657), that where the land had not been used for agricultural purposes for the six years preceding the sale and was subsequently sold as a building site, the land was not covered by that definition. The above case was followed in Mandir Gita Bhawan Sri Kurukshetra v. Sadhu Ram, (A.I.R. 1939 Lahore 554), and it was hold that where the land had not been used for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture for a period of twenty years but had been lying uncultivated except for one year, when there was a garden on a small portion of it, it could not be said to fall within the definition of the word "land". The above authorities clearly lay down the principle that the non-cultivation of land for a number of years goes to show that it does not answer to the definition of the word "land". 6. Learned Additional Advocate General has argued that even though the land in question is banjar jadid or banjar qadim, the possibility of its being brought under cultivation in future cannot be ruled out, and when the land is so brought under cultivation it would fall within the definition of the word "land". This contention is however, devoid of force because the definition of the word "land", as given in the Punjab Tenancy Act, looks to the actual state of the land and the use to which it has been put and not to its future potentialities.” 42. Viewed thus, it is held that the land, which is not used for agricultural purpose or the purpose subservient to agriculture, does not fall within the purview of Section 118 of the Act. 43. The Apex Court in a case titled as Munshi Ram and others versus Financial Commissioner, Haryana and others, reported in (1979) 1 SCC 471 , laid down the same principle. It is apt to reproduce paras 16, 17 and 20 of the judgment herein: “16. According to subsection (8) of Section 2 of the Act 'land' shall have the same meaning as is assigned to it in the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. Sec. 2 (c) of that Act defines 'land' to mean 'land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture, and includes the sites of buildings and other structures on such land'. 17. Sec. 2 (c) of that Act defines 'land' to mean 'land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture, and includes the sites of buildings and other structures on such land'. 17. In Nemi Chand Jain v. Financial Commissioner, Punjab, AIR 1964 Punj 373: (1964) 66 PLR 278, H. R. Khanna, J. speaking for a Division Bench of the High Court, held that Banjar Qadim and Banjar Jadid land cannot be taken into account while computing the surplus area, under the Act, because not being occupied or let for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient to agriculture, it does not fall within the purview of 'land' under the Act. This ruling has been consistently followed by the High Court in its subsequent decisions, some of which are reported as Sadhu Ram v. Punjab State, 1965 Pun LJ 84; Amolak Rai v. Financial Commissioner, Planning, Punjab, (1966) 45 Lah LT 195; Jaggu v. Punjab State, (1967) 46 Lah LT 64 : 1967 Pun LJ 248 and Jiwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 P & H 430 : 1971 Punj LJ 65. 18. In our opinion, this view taken by the High Court proceeds on a correct interpretation of the statutory provisions as it stood at the relevant time. 19. …........... 20. We will, therefore, while upholding the view taken by the High Court in regard to the interpretation and application of Section 2 (3) Proviso (ii) of the Act, allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court and the impugned orders of the Assistant Collector, Collector, and the Commissioner and remit the case to the Collector concerned of Hissar District with the direction that he should ascertain the extent of the Banjar Qadim and Banjar Jadid and Gair Mumkin land of the appellants-allottees at the relevant date and recompute their permissible area after excluding such Banjar and Gair Mumkin land; and then dispose of the applications of the appellants under S. 9 (1) (i) afresh. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.” 44. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.” 44. The word 'land' also came to be interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court in a case titled as The State of Himachal Pradesh versus Maharani Kam Sundri, reported in ILR 1984 HP 397. It would be profitable to reproduce paras 21 and 38 of the judgment herein: “21. These two decisions, in our opinion, which have a direct bearing on the statutory construction, have correctly apprehended the true scope and meaning of the expression “land” as defined. In order to be covered by the main part of the definition contained in Section 2(5), “land” must satisfy two conditions: first, it must not have been occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and, secondly, it must have been occupied or let for agricultural purposes, or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture. By virtue of the inclusive part of the definition, however, sites of buildings and other structures, which are not situate in a town or village but form part of the “land” which is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes, or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture, would constitute “land” within the meaning of the Act. So far as orchards and ghasnis are concerned, they would be “land” within the meaning of the Act, whether or not they satisfy the conditions prescribed in the main part of the definition. The question whether the suit land is “land” within the meaning of the Act will require determination against the aforesaid background. xxx xxx xxx 38. The question may be examined form another angle. Under Section 11(1) of the Act, a tenant is entitled to acquire “the right, title and interest of the landowner in the land of the tenancy held by him under the landowner. The right conferred by Section 11(1) is thus exercisable in respect of the “land of the tenancy” held by a tenant. The two material words “land” and “tenancy have both been defined. The true meaning and content of the definition whether the suit land comprising several Khasra numbers if “land” within the meaning of the definition has been determined on the basis of evidence pertaining to the actual user of each Khasra number on the material date. The two material words “land” and “tenancy have both been defined. The true meaning and content of the definition whether the suit land comprising several Khasra numbers if “land” within the meaning of the definition has been determined on the basis of evidence pertaining to the actual user of each Khasra number on the material date. However, having regard to the fact that in Section 11(1) of the Act, the word “land” occurs in conjunction with the words “of the tenancy” held by a tenant, it would be more appropriate to determine the real nature and character of the occupation with reference to the land as a whole by treating it as a single unit. The word “tenancy” is defined in Section 2(19) of the Act to mean “a parcel of land held by a tenant of a landlord under one lease or one set of conditions”. This definition clearly indicates that the land in respect of which the proprietary rights are claimable should be a piece or parcel of land held by a tenant under one lease or one set of conditions. Even if the land so held is divided into several subdivisions (Khasra numbers) by the revenue authorities with references to its actual user, the tenancy is not consequently split up and, in the eyes of law, the tenant can not be regarded as holding each of such subdivisions (Khasra numbers) under a separate lease or under a separate set of conditions. The contract of tenancy is a single and indivision contract, and in the absence of any statutory provisions to that effect, it is not open to divide it into two or more contracts. (See: Miss S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand, AIR 1968 SC 438 ). For the purpose of determining whether the tenant can claim proprietary rights in respect of the land held by him under the landowner, therefore, what has to be seen is whether the entire piece or parcel of land held by a tenant under the landowner is covered by the definition given in Section 2(5) of the Act. For the purpose of determining whether the tenant can claim proprietary rights in respect of the land held by him under the landowner, therefore, what has to be seen is whether the entire piece or parcel of land held by a tenant under the landowner is covered by the definition given in Section 2(5) of the Act. In a case, therefore, where the purpose of letting is not ascertainable, but the land or a substantial part thereof is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied for agricultural purposes, or for purposes subservient thereto, or for pasture, or for any of the purposes set out in the inclusive part of the definition, the land would be regarded as one to which the provisions of section 11(1) of the Act are applicable. Even if a small portion of such land is found to have been used by the tenant incidently for an ancillary or even for an alien purpose, his entitlement to a claim proprietary rights in respect of whole land is not thereby affected and it would not be proper or permissible to dissect the tenancy and to confine the conferment of proprietary rights to that portion of the land of the tenancy held by him which is actually used for the stated purposes and to reject the claim qua that small portion which is incidently used for ancillary or even alien purposes. Approaching the case in hand from that view point, it is manifest that a predominant or substantial portion of the suit land (29 Bighas 10 Biswas) out of 32 Bighas 7 Biswas is actually occupied for the purposes mentioned in Section 2(5). Since predominant or substantial portion of land consists of Ghasni, Orchard, open land with planted trees and land under actual cultivation incidental or ancillary use of a small portion of such land for the purpose of residence, road, Mali quarters and Cowshed, etc. cannot defeat the claim of the respondent to the conferment of proprietary rights in respect of whole of the suit land. The decision of the learned single Judge, therefore, is eminently correct, even if it is examined from this different angle. cannot defeat the claim of the respondent to the conferment of proprietary rights in respect of whole of the suit land. The decision of the learned single Judge, therefore, is eminently correct, even if it is examined from this different angle. In fact, on the aforesaid reasoning, the respondent ought to have been held entitled to the conferment of proprietary rights even in respect of Khasra No. 19/1 and, to that extent, the learned single Judge’s decision may be regarded as not being in conformity with law. There being no appeal by the respondent, however, against that part of the decision of the learned single Judge, no relief can be granted to her on that score.” 45. It would also be profitable to reproduce para 11 of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case titled as Mrs. Peter Butt and others versus Sister Roseline Kokara, reported in 1992 (2) Sim.L.C.124, herein: “11. In view of what has been stated above, in order to determine as to whether the land is agricultural land as defined in the Act or not, what is required to be seen is the main and primary purpose for which it was or had been let out or taken. In case where the purpose of letting is ascertainable, the question has to be decided on the basis of main and primary purpose for which it was let out. In case the land was or had been let out for a purpose which cannot be said to be agricultural purpose or purpose subservient to agriculture, the same will not fall within the definition of 'land' under the Act and in such a situation, the court will be precluded from considering the use of the land to which it has subsequently been put. A person should not be permitted by any action of his to take undue advantage of the situation by himself changing the main and primary purpose for which the land is let out. In other words, what is to be seen is the character and nature of the land and the purpose for which it had been let out, when such a purpose is ascertainable from the evidence or material on record and not the use of the property to which it has subsequently been put. In other words, what is to be seen is the character and nature of the land and the purpose for which it had been let out, when such a purpose is ascertainable from the evidence or material on record and not the use of the property to which it has subsequently been put. But where the purpose of letting the same is not ascertainable from the evidence and material on record and the land, substantial part whereof, is not used or occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is used or occupied for agricultural purpose, or for purpose subservient thereto then it will fall within the definition of 'land'. What are the purposes subservient to agriculture can be ascertained from the definition part as the same have been set out in the inclusive part of it. The words 'is occupied' and 'has been let' occurring in the definition of 'land' in Subsection (7) of Section 2 of the Act are indicative of two different situations. Firstly, when the purpose is ascertainable, that is the purpose of letting was agricultural or subservient to agriculture, then it is that purpose alone which would be seen but when the purpose is not ascertainable then it is the use to which the property is found to be put which will be taken into consideration.” 46. Another Division Bench of this Court in a case titled as Nirmal Singh versus Randhir Sharma, reported in 1994 (2) Sim.L.C. 255, while considering the constitutional validity of Section 118 of the Act held as to which 'land' falls within the ambit of Section 118 of the Act. It is worthwhile to reproduce paras 10, 11, 13, 17 and 18 of the judgment herein: “10. For the first time, a provision was made in this State for control or transfer of agricultural land to a non-agriculturist, when in Chapter X(sic) of the Act Section 118 was included under the heading "Transfer of Land to Non-Agriculturists Barred". The constitutional validity of Section 118 was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Sudarshna Devi v. Union of India and another, ILR 1978 HP 355. 11. The constitutional validity of Section 118 was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Sudarshna Devi v. Union of India and another, ILR 1978 HP 355. 11. Section 118 prohibits transfer of land by any mode including sale in execution of a decree of a civil court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue, by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease, mortgage with possession or creation of tenancy, in favour of a person, who is not an agriculturist. This prohibition is subject to the provisions of Subsection (2) of Section 118, wherein certain transfers are made permissible. The prohibition in Subsection (1) extends to the transfer of 'land'. Land in the Act has been defined under Clause (7) of Section 2 to mean land which is not occupied as a site of any building in a town or a village and is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture. It includes sites of buildings and Ors. structures on such land, orchards, ghasnies, banjar land, and private forests within the definition of 'land'. 12. …....... 13. On the one hand, Clause (7) of Section 2 excludes from the definition of 'land' all categories of land, which are not occupied as the site of any building in a town or a village, Except the one which are occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture, but in Clause (iii) to Explanation in Section 118, it expressly includes the same within the expression 'land'. A site of a building in a town, which is occupied or has been let or even a site of a building in a village which is occupied or has been let for any purpose, is included in the expression 'land'. Reading Clause (iii) to explanation to Section 118 alongwith Clause (7) of Section 2 of the Act would make the intention of legislature abundantly clear and unambiguous that any site of a building whether in a town or village and occupied or let for any purpose including agricultural purpose or purpose subservient to agriculture is included in the expression 'land' for the purpose of prohibition contained in Section 118 of the Act. 14 to 16. …........... 17. 14 to 16. …........... 17. Reading of the three clauses collectively alongwith Clause (7) of Section 2 of the Act would make it clear that all type of land situate in Himachal Pradesh including sites and Ors. structures on such lands, whether let for agricultural purposes or for the purpose of subservient to agriculture including orchards, Ghasnis, Banjar lands and private forests are included within the expression 'land', for the purposes of Section 118 of the Act. The only category of land, which is excluded from the operation of Section 118 is that land or area which is constructed but which is not subservient to agriculture. Even an area, if recorded in revenue records as "Gairmumkin" or "Gairmumkin Makaan", the same would be included in the expression of land irrespective of the purpose for which the same is occupied or let out, except a constructed area which is not subservient to agriculture. In Ors. words, prohibition contained in Section 118 of the Act will not apply to a constructed area which is not subservient to agriculture. 18. Since the property in suit is the 'constructed area', which admittedly is not subservient to agriculture, there is no ground to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge that the property is not covered by the definition of land within the ambit of Section 118 of the Act.” 47. In a case titled as Krishan Singh (Shri) & Anr. Versus Smt. Krishna & Ors., reported in 2006 (2) CLJ 203, the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Himachal Pradesh, being the Head of the Revenue Department and exercising the powers of revisional authority, held that the land which is not being used for agricultural purpose and is not subservient to agriculture purposes is not 'land' in terms of Section 2 (7) of the Act and does not fall within the scope of Section 118 of the Act. It is apt to reproduce paras 9 and 10 of the judgment herein: “9. The property that was the subject of sale transaction by which Smt Krishna acquired interest in the area is in Muhal Swarg Ashram, Nurpur town and is clearly not subservient to agriculture. It is also notable that as per the description of land in the copy of the sale deed which is available on the record of the collector, Distt. Kangra, built up area has been sold to Smt Krishna. It is also notable that as per the description of land in the copy of the sale deed which is available on the record of the collector, Distt. Kangra, built up area has been sold to Smt Krishna. Besides the classification of land as per jamabandi for the year 1991-92 also available on record further proves that the land in question in which Smt. Krishna has 2/3 share comprises mainly of built up area with some 'sehan'. The complainant is a coowner in the same and perhaps has intention in opposing the sale is to claim the entire area by preventing the respondent No. 1 from enjoying her legal rights upon the same. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and in view of the above discussion, it is clearly established that the area that was the subject of sale transaction in which Smt Krishna was the purchaser is not 'land' as per the definition in section 2(7) of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms act as the same is not being used for agriculture purpose and is not subservient to agriculture. Therefore the sale transaction by which Smt Krishna acquired land in Khasra No. 283, 284, 285, 286 and 287 to the extent of 2/3rd share was not in violation of Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 as the provisions of Section 188 (c) do not apply in this case.” 48. The Apex Court in the case titled as K.N. Farms Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. versus State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 4869, while making a distinction, came to the conclusion as to what is 'land' and held that the Courts, while interpreting the provisions of any Act should, no doubt, adopt an object oriented approach keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be avoided so long as interpretative possibility permits. But, at the same time, the Courts will have to keep in mind that the object oriented approach cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the plain language used in the statue, by rewriting the words of a statute in place of the actual words used. 49. Coming to the case in hand, it is to be seen what was the subject matter of the auction proceedings, whether it was 'land' or building and machinery, which was sold. 50. 49. Coming to the case in hand, it is to be seen what was the subject matter of the auction proceedings, whether it was 'land' or building and machinery, which was sold. 50. The sale notices, dated 15th November, 2010 and 25th April, 2011 (Annexure P2) contain the description of the property. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of sale notice, dated 15th November 2010, herein: Lot No. Description of Property Earnest Money I. LAND & BUILDING: Land : 25 Kanal and 6 Marlas Building : Office/ADM Block RCC frame type structure with RCC Silab roofing, Work Sheds have brick masonry & M. Steel Pillars with ACC sheet roofing on M. Steel trusses, Water Softening Plant is RCC frame structure typed building etc. Rs. 22 lacs II. PLANT & MACHINERIES: Freehold : Steel rolling Mill Complete SECID IMIR (1973), 4 No. Bell Annealing Furnaces and 4 colling hoods, Picking Line 6000 TPA, HR slitting line, CR slitting Mill Skin Pass Mill, 20 Mt Crane, 30 MT capacity Crane 15 M span 1 No. Rs. 34 lacs III. Scrap in the Unit 800 MT (Approx.) & Misc. Assets Rs. 27 lacs IV. Leased Machinery : S. Rolling Mill complete (IFCI Finance) Rs. 9 lacs V. Composite Lot Rs. 92 lacs 51. While going through the same, it is crystal clear that the land in question has not been let for agricultural purpose or purposes subservient to agriculture, but consists of a constructed building and machinery. Thus, on the face of it, the rigours, fetters and restrictions contained in Section 118 of the Act are not applicable. 52. Our this view is also fortified by para 18 of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Nirmal Singh's case (supra), as quoted hereinabove. 53. It is also apt to record herein that the perusal of the record does disclose that there was some litigation qua the auction proceedings viz-a-viz the property, subject matter of this writ petition, i.e. Co. Appeal No. 3 of 2011 (Annexure P4) and the writ petitioner was also a party to that lis. This Court has passed the directions to conduct the auction and accepted the bid of the writ petitioner. The description of the said property is also given in the Company Appeal and the judgment, dated 19th September, 2011. Appeal No. 3 of 2011 (Annexure P4) and the writ petitioner was also a party to that lis. This Court has passed the directions to conduct the auction and accepted the bid of the writ petitioner. The description of the said property is also given in the Company Appeal and the judgment, dated 19th September, 2011. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that it is the 'land' as defined in Section 2 (7) of the Act, which can be said to be agricultural land or subservient to agricultural land. 54. Learned Advocate General argued that the latest Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case titled as Som Kirti alias Som K. Nath and others versus State of H.P. and others, reported in Latest HLJ 2013 (HP) 1223, will prevail wherein it has been held that Section 118 of the Act includes buildings also. 55. The argument is not tenable for the following reasons: 56. It is apt to reproduce paras 53 and 80 of the judgment (supra) herein: “53. After amendments carried out in the Act in the year 1987 onwards, the Act is now no more an agrarian reforms legislation. The 'land; has been defined in section 2 (7) of the Act but in explanation-I to sub section (4) of Section 118, the land which is site of a building in a town or a village and is occupied or let out not for agricultural purpose or purpose subservient to agriculture has also been included. Thus, practically every type of land is covered by the Act, and therefore, the Act cannot be termed an agrarian reform legislation. The amendments carried out in the Act are not included in 9th Schedule of the Constitution. xxx xxx xxx 80. The legislature with a purpose has used the expression 'land' in Explanation-I to Section 118. The Section 2 of the Act opens with; "in this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context". The expression 'land' used in Section 118 is to be understood and interpreted in the manner expression 'land' has been explained in Explanation-I to Section 118 where it has been used for specific purpose as against the definition of land given in the definition clause to be applied for other purposes in the Act if not specifically explained or used otherwise. The specific purpose for which expression 'land' has been used in Explanation-I will override the general purpose for which expression land has been defined in Section 2 (7) of the Act. Therefore, there is no force in the contention of the petitioners that the term 'land' used in Explanation-I to Section 118 is illegal in presence of definition of land in sub section 7 of Section 2 of the Act. There is no absolute bar for purchasing land by non-agriculturist under Section 118. A non-agriculturist still can purchase land with the permission of State Government under Section 118. The Section 118 of the Act as enacted is within the legislative competence of State Legislature referable to entry 18, List-II of Seventh Schedule.” 57. The Division Bench in Som Kirti's case (supra) has not discussed the judgment made by the Division Bench in Nirmal Singh's case (supra), wherein it has been specifically held in para 17, quoted hereinabove, that the land or area which is constructed and is not subservient to agriculture is not 'land' within the meaning of Section 118 of the Act. 58. The Division Bench in Nirmal Singh's case (supra) has upheld the judgment made by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Suit No. 88 of 1990, titled as Randhir Sharma versus Nirmal Singh, whereby the learned Single Judge has made threadbare discussion of Sections 2 (7) and 118 of the Act. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of the judgment in Civil Suit No. 88 of 1990, which has been upheld by the Division Bench in Nirmal Singh's case (supra), herein: “.........The suit property in this case constitutes of constructed area being put to residential as also commercial use, which is admittedly not subservient to agriculture as I apparent from the entries in the jamabnandi for the year 1981-82 annexed with the plaint and reference to which has also been made in the agreement (Ex. P1). Thus, the aforesaid suit property is not included in the definition of land as envisaged in the aforesaid Section. In other words, there is no bar with respect to the transfer of the suit property in this case by the defendant to the plaintiff. In that view of the matter, a lawful decree can be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant............” 59. In other words, there is no bar with respect to the transfer of the suit property in this case by the defendant to the plaintiff. In that view of the matter, a lawful decree can be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant............” 59. We are also of the view that the judgment made by the learned Single Judge in Civil Suit No. 88 of 1990 (supra), which has been upheld by the Division Bench in Nirmal Singh's case (supra) is in accordance with the judgments made by the apex Court and also in view of the aim, object and scope of Section 118 of the Act read with the Act, as discussed hereinabove. 60. The next significant and important question is – what was the aim, object and scope of Section 118 of the Act? 61. This Court in the case titled as Sudarshana Devi versus Union of India, reported in ILR 1978 HP 355, has highlighted the aim of inserting the said provision in the Act. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 39 of the judgment herein: “39. The statement of objects and reasons (quoted above) makes a further reference to restrictions imposed on purchase of land by non-agriculturists with a view to avoid. Concentration of wealth in the hands of non-agriculturists moneyed class. It is obvious that the agricultural land in the State like Himachal Pradesh would be very much limited in view of its mountainous terrain. If this land is allowed to go indiscriminately in the hands of those who can over bid an usual customer, it is very obvious that ultimately the very object for which the Act was enacted would be lost. Non-agriculturists, who have not evinced any interest in the agriculture uptil now, would, by the sheer strength of their money power be able to over bid the agriculturists, and a class of society would emerge which would be interested not so much in the improvement of agriculture but in the investment of unused, and in some cases, undisclosed, finances. Such an incentive would be more to them in view of the fact that income from agriculture is exempt from Income Tax. Such an incentive would be more to them in view of the fact that income from agriculture is exempt from Income Tax. Therefore, if one of the objects of the legislature was to prevent the limited land resources of the State from going in the hands of financial sharks, it cannot be said that that objective was purposeless. ….......... ” 62. It appears that the basic foundation of the insertion of the said provision in the Act is that the land should not go into the hands of the persons who are not bonafide Himachalis. Meaning thereby, it was just to boost the Himachalis and in order to prevent vanishing of the small holdings of the State of Himachal Pradesh. 63. It would also be profitable to reproduce relevant portion of para 68 and para 122 of the judgment rendered by this Court in another case titled as Society for Preservation of Kasauli and its Environs versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, reported in 1994 (Suppl.) Sim. L.C. 450, herein: “68. The object of section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 is that the local population should have opportunity to utilise the land for their benefits and outsiders are not permitted to encroach upon the rights of the sons of the soil.....” xxx xxx xxx 122. The reason for placing restrictions on the transfer of land in favour of non-agriculturists in the Act was to avoid concentration of wealth in the hands of non-agriculturists moneyed-class. Agricultural land in Himachal Pradesh is very limited in view of mountainous terrain and in case it is allowed to pass indiscriminately into the hands of this class by sheer strength of money power, utilising the same through remote control by use of black money in agriculture sector and avoid payment of tax, the small land holdings of the poor people of the State would vanish and the object of the land reforms legislation becoming totally inconsequential and purposeless. In order to check this problem, particularly in rural areas, the transfer of land in favour of non-agriculturists was, therefore, prohibited. Exception has been created in favour of certain cases described in Subsection (2) of Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972.” 64. In order to check this problem, particularly in rural areas, the transfer of land in favour of non-agriculturists was, therefore, prohibited. Exception has been created in favour of certain cases described in Subsection (2) of Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972.” 64. Thus, the classification was made only to prevent the persons, who are moneyedclass and who, on the sheer strength of their money power, are in a position to purchase the land from poor land owners at the throwaway prices and that will have effect of doing away with the economy of the State. It was also noticed at that time that so many rich people had started purchasing land in order to raise orchards in the entire State of Himachal Pradesh. Thus, the only object is to prevent the outsiders to come in, to save the Himachali land owners/holders and it creates a right in their favour. 65. Viewed thus, it can be safely held that a bona fide auction purchaser, who has purchased the land in the auction proceedings pursuant to the Court directions, cannot be deprived of the said property. The rigour is not applicable to the case in hand. 66. It is also apt to record herein that the writ petitioner, in the alternative, has prayed that if, at all, the rigour of Section 118 of the Act is applicable, it may be permitted to sell the said property to a Bonafide Himachali. If only this prayer is granted, that will strictly be as per the mandate of Section 118 of the Act and will also achieve the purpose. But, how can it lie in the mouth of the respondents not to grant permission or not to allow the writ petitioner to sell the property, for the reason that the writ petitioner is a bona fide auction purchaser and had bonafidely made the payment of 14.52 crore, is waiting for the day to come enabling it to reap the fruits, was not allowed to do so, is really a travesty of justice. 67. Having said so, the writ petitioner has made out a case for interference. 68. 67. Having said so, the writ petitioner has made out a case for interference. 68. The question is – what direction is to be made in the given circumstances of the case in order to redress the grievance of the writ petitioner, who is suffering because of the auction conducted in terms of the Court orders and has been made to part with money, that too, a huge amount to the tune of 14.52 crore? 69. Admittedly, it was not prescribed in the auction notice or it was not made known in the auction proceedings that the successful bidder has to follow the rigour and mandate of Section 118 of the Act in order to have the registration and no mutation can be effected without obtaining the permission. 70. It is also not contained in the auction notice that the person/auction purchaser, who is an outsider, non-Himachali or a non-agriculturist, cannot participate in the auction proceedings and cannot conduct resale of the property. 71. Much water has flown down and there is no chance that the bid amount can be paid back to the writ petitioner. Even otherwise, that will not redress the grievance of the writ petitioner for the reason that the inflation rate has gone very high and had the writ petitioner invested the said amount in business or somewhere else for the period of these five years, he would have earned a considerable amount, may be, in crores. 72. Even otherwise, that will not redress the grievance of the writ petitioner for the reason that the inflation rate has gone very high and had the writ petitioner invested the said amount in business or somewhere else for the period of these five years, he would have earned a considerable amount, may be, in crores. 72. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case read with the discussions made hereinabove, we make the following commands/directions in the interest of justice: (i) That in the given circumstances of the case, rigour of Section 118 of the Act is not applicable to the case in hand; (ii) That petitioner is the absolute owner of the property, subject matter of the lis; (iii) That the revenue record is not the proof of title, is just for collection of rent and will not change the status of the petitioner as owner of the said property in any way; (iv) That petitioner, being the absolute owner of the said property, is within its rights, power and competence to sell the property in favour of any Bonafide Himachali; (v) That the Registering Authority to register the said sale deed without asking for any permission or registration of sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner as auction purchaser; (vi) That the Revenue authorities to attest the mutation in favour of Bonafide Himachali in terms of direction (iv) supra; (vii) That this order will not confer any rights upon the petitioner of being Bonafide Himachali. 73. The writ petition is disposed of, as indicated hereinabove, alongwith all pending applications.