Secretary Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Una v. Bhajan Singh Maan
2016-10-20
SURESHWAR THAKUR
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. 1. The plaintiff-respondent herein instituted a suit qua the suit premises against the defendant/petitioner herein for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction. The suit was instituted before the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Una, yet prior thereto the plaintiff omitted to serve upon the defendant petitioner herein a mandatory notice as envisaged under Section 80 of the CPC. However, during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff respondent herein instituted an application under Section 80 (2) of the CPC before the learned trial Court whereupon he sought relief for dispensing with the mandatory requirement envisaged in Sub section 1 of Section 80 of the CPC wherein a mandate is constituted, qua a suit against the Government or against a public officer in respect of any act purported to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, being not institutable theiragainst until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing standing delivered upon the authorized officer of the Government or upon the public servant concerned. The learned trial Court allowed the application. The defendant/petitioner herein stands aggrieved by the rendition of the learned trial Court leading it to assail it herebefore by instituting a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The defendant/petitioner herein owes its birth to a statute nomenclatured as H.P. Agriculture and Horticulture Produce Marketing (Development & Regulation) Act, 2005, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), wherewithin in Section 70 thereof, which stands extracted hereinafter:- ?70. Bar to sue in the absence of notice.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no suit shall be instituted against the Board or any Committee, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing stating the cause of action, name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and the relief which he claims has been delivered or left at its office. Every such suit shall be dismissed unless it is instituted within six months from the date of the accrual of the alleged cause of action.? a preemptory mandate stands encapsulated qua no suit being institutable against the Board or any Committee until expiry of two months next after notice in writing stating the cause of action, name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims, has been delivered and left at its office.
a preemptory mandate stands encapsulated qua no suit being institutable against the Board or any Committee until expiry of two months next after notice in writing stating the cause of action, name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims, has been delivered and left at its office. A circumspect reading of the mandate constituted in Section 70 of the Act aforesaid wherefrom the defendant/petitioner herein has taken birth unveils of, unlike the provisions engrafted in sub section 2 of Section 80 of the CPC wherewithin an exception is constituted vis.a.vis the operation of sub section 1 of Section 80 CPC holding therein mandatory obligation cast upon the plaintiff to prior to institute a suit within its ambit serve a notice upon the entity or public officer concerned enumerated therein, exception whereof on emergence of exigencies or contingencies spelt therein hence standing galvanized, no exception to the mandate held there within is carved therein. In sequel, with the Act being a special statute also with hence it ousting the provisions of Section 80 of the CPC, its mandate holds sway and clout whereas the mandate of Section 80 of the CPC holds no play or command vis.a.vis the material factum of institution of a suit against a committee owing its genesis to the Act, in respect whereof the special mechanism contemplated in the special statute holds the field whereupon the inevitable effect is of the application preferred by the plaintiff/respondent herein before the learned trial Court under Section 80 (2) of the CPC being neither maintainable nor an order in affirmation to the relief canvassed therein holding any virtue of legal solemnity.
The learned counsel appearing for the respondent herein on the anvil of a judgement of the Kerala High Court reported in V.Padmanabhan Nair vs. State Electricity Board AIR 1989 Kerala 86 wherewithin the Kerala High Court has pronounced a view qua given the distinctivity in parlance or in coinage borne by the parlance Government or public officer embodied in Section 80 of the CPC vis.a.vis an Electricity Board or its Officers surgingforth on the anvil of the political concept of =Government' holding no congruity or analogoty vis.a.vis the jurisprudential concept of =State' within ambit whereof an instrumentality or an agency of a State may fall, mantle whereof may stand donned by the Electricity Board besides when hence it may be rendered to carry the characteristic traits of a =State' contemplated in Article 12 of the Constitution of India whereupon it is rendered amenable to writ jurisdiction, yet it not for the purpose of applicability of Section 80 of the CPC nor within its ambit bearing any tinge, trait or element of a =Government' whereupon it is not construable to be Government nor its Officers are construable to be Public Officers, has contended of likewise the petitioner herein being unamenable qua operation qua it of the mandate of Section 80 of the CPC. True it is qua the petitioner herein in congruity with the mandate of the verdict aforesaid of the Kerala High Court may be holding the trait of an agency or an instrumentality of =State' whereupon it may be amenable to writ jurisdiction yet the mandate of Section 80 of the CPC may stand unattracted vis.a.vis. it. However, yet conspicuously when the mandate of Section 70 of the Act is trite besides categorical in rendering a suit against a Committee owing its birth to its provisions being unmaintainable unless the mechanism contemplated therein stands resorted to also when unlike Section 80 of the CPC wherein sub section 2 stands carved to operate as an exception to the mandate of sub section (1) thereof, no exception to the rigour of the mandate of Section 70 of the Act stands engrafted therein. Consequently, it was mandatorily incumbent upon the plaintiff for rendering his suit to be maintainable to prior thereto in consonance with its provisions serve a notice upon the defendant whereas the plaintiff not serving a notice upon the defendant rendered his suit to be not statutorily maintainable.
Consequently, it was mandatorily incumbent upon the plaintiff for rendering his suit to be maintainable to prior thereto in consonance with its provisions serve a notice upon the defendant whereas the plaintiff not serving a notice upon the defendant rendered his suit to be not statutorily maintainable. Consequently, for reasons aforestated the provisions of sub section 2 of Section 80 of the CPC are neither invokable hereat nor the order rendered thereon by the learned trial Court holds any legal tenacity. This Court while building the aforesaid legal postulation finds succor from a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Nagar Palika Parishad, Mihona and another Vs. Ramnath and another, (2014) 6 SCC 394 . In view of the above the impugned order is set-aside. No costs.