JUDGMENT : 1. RULE. Respondents waive service. All the petitions raise common question of facts and law and therefore they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Rejection of the applications under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short “the Act”) has given rise to these petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. A further relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is sought for a direction to the respondents to immediately fix the pension and other retiral benefits of the petitioners by taking into consideration their entire length of service from the date of their entry in service till the date of retirement. The arrears of pension and other retiral dues as also gratuity and other benefits with interest at the rate of 18% are also sought. 3. It is the case of the petitioners that they were appointed as daily wagers workmen and were conferred upon with the benefits under Government Resolution dated 17.10.1988 and have retired from the service as per the details given in the following table. Sr. No Name Date of Appointment 17.10.88 benefits conferred on Date of retirement Special Civil Application 1 Mangalbhai Madhabhai Solanki 21.10.83 01/05/06 31.5.09 12351/16 2 Dahyabhai Chakubhai Harijan 21.1.69 01/04/06 31.5.10 15447/16 3 Solanki Abhabhai Narabhai 21.10.77 01/04/06 31.8.08 17345/16 4 Amarbhai Ramjubhai Parmar 01/03/81 01/04/07 30.9.10 15451/16 5 Chatrabhai Bhulabhai Chauhan 21.8.67 01/04/05 31.7.09 15448/16 6 Shabhai Damabhai Rathod 21.10.72 01/04/06 31.12.10 15449/16 7 Maniben Abhesinh Solanki 21.10.78 01/04/06 31.8.10 15450/16 8 Bhoi Jenabhai Sukabhai 11/09/76 01/12/07 31.1.11 15452/16 9 Chauhan Dhulabhai Sanabhai 21.9.68 01/04/07 31.7.09 15453/16 10 Balvantbhai Sardarbhai Pagi 03/04/77 01/12/04 31.8.11 12350/16 11 Andarsinh Amarsinh Patel 11/04/77 01/12/04 30.6.09 15438/16 12 Parmar Punabhai Hathibhai 11/04/77 01/12/04 30.6.09 15439/16 13 Moti Sardarbhai Pagi 11/04/77 01/12/04 31.7.12 15440/16 14 Baria Dhirabhai Sardarbhai 26.7.1980 01/12/04 30.6.08 15441/16 15 Baria Vaghabhai Arjanbhai 08/10/87 01/12/04 29.2.12 15442/16 16 Baria Somabhai Rupabhai 21.3.1977 01/12/04 30.6.09 15443/16 17 Pagi Abhesinh Narsinghbhai 11/04/77 01/12/04 30.4.13 15444/16 18 Baria Kanubhai Narsinghbhai 09/06/77 01/12/04 30.6.11 15445/16 19 Patel Maganbhai Chaganbhai 14.4.1977 01/12/04 31.5.10 15446/16 3.1 The petitioners had approached Labour Court, Godhra with separate but similar applications under Section 33C(2) of the Act for recovery of the amount on account of their entitlement to various benefits contemplated in G.R. dated 17.10.1988. The Labour Court rejected the applications for want of jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) of the Act while relying upon certain judicial pronouncements; in absence of the recognition of the entitlement and in absence of adjudication of their claim under G.R. Dated 17.10.1988. 3.2 The principal contention raised by the petitioners is that having found eligible and conferred upon with several benefits under G.R. dated 17.10.1988 and having completed more than 10 years of continuous service before their superannuation as required by the said G.R., they are entitled to pension and other retiral benefits including gratuity as contemplated in the G.R. dated 17.10.1988. 4. The respondents more particularly the respondent-State has opposed these petitions by contending that, for the benefits under G.R. dated 17.10.1988, the length of permanent service only is required to be considered and that service rendered preceding permanent status of the daily wagers falls beyond the scope of consideration under the policy in G.R. dated 17.10.1988 It is stated that gratuity was paid to the petitioners under G.R. dated 13.2.1998 while relying upon the resolution dated 24.3.2006 but other benefits claimed by the petitioners being a matter of dispute which requires adjudication; the proceedings for recovery under Section 33C(2) of the Act, in absence of such adjudication were not maintainable and have rightly been dismissed by the Labour Court. Thus principal dispute raised by the State is regarding reckoning of the entire service rendered by the workmen within the meaning of Section 25B of the Act including the one rendered prior to regularisation for the purpose of specified benefit under G.R.dated 17.10.988 as also against maintainability of the proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) of the I.D. Act. It is also contended that in absence of adjudication of the petitioner's claim under Labour Laws, the petitioner's claim before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. It is also contended that in absence of adjudication of the petitioner's claim under Labour Laws, the petitioner's claim before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. In the light of the contention that the clubbing and entitlement by the workmen to the services rendered within the meaning of Section 25B of the Act, post and pre conferment of the permanent status for the purpose of various benefits under G.R.dated 17.10.988 has been agitated and reagitated before this Court in series of cases and still the Courts are being called upon to invest valuable public time once again for adjudicating the same issue of law, this Court by an order dated 9.11.2016 called upon the respondent State to explain its litigation policy, more particularly, the policy of dealing with the similar cases arising at different points of time raising the legal issues which may have been already settled and might have attained finality either in absence of challenge to it or being unsuccessful in such challenge in the higher forum. In compliance with the said order, the litigation policy has been produced with the further affidavit filed by the respondent No.4. Clause 5 of the litigation policy has been emphasised in the affidavit-in-reply, thus: “5 covered matters: Many cases are covered or governed by a similar point of law. In such cases, each department shall consider and settle the claim, if the claim is found to be covered by any decision of the Tribunal or Court. Many service matters of this nature can be disposed of at the level of the department itself without compelling the litigant to go to the Tribunal or Court.” However, right of the State to challenge the judgments of the High Court settling the legal position under the circumstances pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar [ AIR 1995 SC 1991 ] has been emphasised and reiterated by the learned AGP in his submissions. 6. From the pleadings and the documents on record, it appears that the dispute resides in a narrow compass. Even the applicability of the G.R. dated 17.10.1988 to the petitioners is not disputed and it has been applied to the petitioners. 6. From the pleadings and the documents on record, it appears that the dispute resides in a narrow compass. Even the applicability of the G.R. dated 17.10.1988 to the petitioners is not disputed and it has been applied to the petitioners. Learned AGP had, however, advanced a contention that none of the petitioners have completed 240 days as required by G.R.dated 17.10.1988 and, therefore, they are not entitled to the benefits contemplated therein. Such contention must be mentioned only for rejection for the reasons above stated. The plain reading of G.R. dated 17.10.1988 makes it clear that certain benefits can be conferred upon the eligible employees under four situations. The class of daily wagers who have completed less than five years of service on 1.10.1988 have been ensured minimum wages, and amongst such class those who have completed 240 days are entitled to the paid sunday holiday, medical facility and national festival holiday. Other benefits under remaining three situations are dependant on the rendition of the services defined in Section 25B of the Act. On completion of such service for specified period, the daily wagers are resolved to be entitled to different facilities and benefits subject to satisfying other criteria laid in G.R. dated 17.10.1988. Thus, conferment of benefits under one of the said three situations would imply admission of rendition of said specified service. Therefore it cannot be contended that though the benefit under G.R. dated 17.10.1988 was extended, yet the beneficiaries had not completed 240 days. That would be an argument in contradiction to its own case by the State. The contention of the learned AGP that before the Labour Court no such factual foundation was laid by the workman is also required to be rejected for the foregoing reasons. 7. That would be an argument in contradiction to its own case by the State. The contention of the learned AGP that before the Labour Court no such factual foundation was laid by the workman is also required to be rejected for the foregoing reasons. 7. Learned AGP's argument that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed, and in absence of establishment of the entitlement to the benefits under G.R. Dated 17.10.1988 by adjudication, this Court cannot go into the disputed fact, is also required to be rejected for the foregoing reasons as well as for the reason that the petitions have been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as well, and when several benefits were undisputedly already conferred upon the petitioners under G.R. dated 17.10.1988, the dispute about their entitlement to other benefits under G.R. dated 17.10.1988 cannot be permitted to be raised and this Court can issue suitable writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on finding unjustifiable denial of the benefits under G.R.dated 17.10.1988 to the eligible workmen. 8. True that the settled legal position as regards Section 33C(2) of the Act is, as canvassed by learned AGP. Section 33C(2) of the Act cannot be applied for adjudicating the facts in dispute but the facts in dispute must be genuinely disputed and not for the sake of disputing them. The crucial expression used in Section 33C(2) of the Act is thus: “Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer …. “ The expression “entitlement” will have to be given its due and appropriate meaning. “Entitlement” may flow from statutorily recognised rights or recognised policy as may have been interpreted by the High Court or the Supreme Court or from some other legal source. If the legal position concerning the statute or the policy is made clear by interpretation by High Court or the Supreme Court, and if by virtue of such interpretation, the beneficiary is found to be entitled to certain benefits contemplated in the statute or the policy, such entitlement, in the opinion of this Court, would be the entitlement within the meaning of subsec. 2 of Section 33(C) of the Act. 2 of Section 33(C) of the Act. If there are genuine reasons for disputing the entitlement, as contemplated in Section 33(C)(2) of the Act, of course, the court or the judicial authority exercising the power under Section 33(C)(2) of the Act would not have a jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputed entitlement. If the issue of law has been raised in past and is settled by the court and is accepted and implemented, raising of such an issue once again to challenge the entitlement of the workman under Section 33(C)(2) of the Act would not, in the opinion of this Court, constitute a genuine dispute. When the Government or the public body is a litigant before the judicial authorities like Labour Court, it owes an extra duty and a fair approach for resolution of the claims genuinely raised by the lower strata of the society wherein the workman comprises. In stead of raising ingenuine dispute, constitutional obligation of the State would require it to place before the judicial authority the facts if any against and in favour of the workman. The fairness would require the State or its instrumentality the other public body to point out to the judicial authority, the legal position relating to the subject matter of the dispute irrespective of its adverse effect on its case for the object of the state or its instrumentality. If the scheme of some of the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 3, 4, 5, 9C, 10(i) (a) and 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act is borne in mind, the legislative intent to ensure the resolution of the industrial dispute through mechanism like Works Committee, Conciliation Officers and Board of Conciliation before its reference to the adjudicating forum is eloquent and clear. Appropriate Government is required to play a crucial role in above referred provisions even as it is duty bound to ensure the constitution of the appropriate dispute resolution mechanism for resolution of the industrial disputes before its reference to the adjudicating forum. The very object of the constitution of the mechanism aforestated being resolution of the industrial disputes at the threshold, the obligation of the appropriate Government to ensure resolution of the industrial dispute by avoiding avoidable pleas in cases where it is one of the parties to the industrial dispute multiples manifold. The very object of the constitution of the mechanism aforestated being resolution of the industrial disputes at the threshold, the obligation of the appropriate Government to ensure resolution of the industrial dispute by avoiding avoidable pleas in cases where it is one of the parties to the industrial dispute multiples manifold. In other words, when the appropriate Government is a party to industrial dispute, it owes extra responsibility to ensure the use of the said mechanism for settlement of the disputes by avoiding avoidable contest. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would prohibit it to conduct a case like a private litigant who can raise all sorts of hurdles to unnecessarily resist the claim of the workman. When such is the statutory and constitutional obligation of the appropriate Government, its disputant department or its instrumentality who may be summoned to aforestated mechanism for resolution of the industrial dispute would be constitutionally obliged to scrupulously follow the binding judicial pronouncements in a bid to resolve the dispute at the threshold rather than ensuring the mechanical or artificial reference of the disputes to adjudicatory forum; else they will be failing in observing the constitutional obligation. 9. The interpretation of the G.R.dated 17.10.1988 so far made by this Court briefly stated is that, once the eligible daily wager is found to have rendered specified service within the meaning of Section 25B of the Act, entire such service from the date of his entry until retirement has to be reckoned for pensionary and other related benefits. If the reference is required on this count, this Court may refer to the case of Tribhovanbhai Jerambhai v. Deputy Executive Engineer [1998(2) GLH 1]. The Court had extensively discussed the issue similar to the one raised in these petitions thus: “1. The petition relates to travails of a person who has been in the employment of the State Government for almost 28 years and still awaiting for his retiral benefits in terms of the Government's order, revealing a pathetic insensitivity towards the fellow employees who has superannuated and look for a peaceful and quiet life at the twilight of his life banking upon the retiral benefits assured under the relevant rules and orders of the State authorities themselves. 2. 2. The facts which are not in dispute are that the petitioner had been in service of the State Government mostly as a daily rated workman since 1966 until he was treated permanent in terms of Government Resolution dated 17.10.1988 and retired on completing sixty years on 31.1.1994. After laying the claim before the Assistant Labour Commissioner and Provident Fund Commissioner his retiral benefits in the form of gratuity and provident fund contributions were determined and paid by treating the period of service rendered by the petitioner from 1966 to 1994. However, the pension, the regular source of income to maintain a retired employee had not so far not been granted. In fact, an attempt has been made to show that the petitioner is not entitled to pensionary benefit because he has not completed qualifying service as per the award read in the light of Bombay Civil Services Rules governing the grant of pension. 3. Though initially the learned counsel for the respondent tentatively sought to urge that as on the date of retirement on 31.1.1994 the petitioner has not completed 10 years of service as daily rated employee and he cannot be treated as permanent in terms of resolution dated 17.10.1966. But when it was pointed out that in reply the respondents have admitted that the petitioner was a daily wager for the period of 1966 to 1987. It is further revealed from the reply that though department initially treated the petitioner in employment as daily rated workman on work charge establishment with effect from 16.4.1987 only, and paid gratuity for that period only, ultimately on a dispute having been raised in that regard the petitioner was held to be in service with effect from 1966 and gratuity was paid for the entire period from 1966 to 1994, the learned counsel candidly stated that the fact that petitioner was in service of respondents since 1966 cannot be disputed. This further makes it clear that as on date resolutions dated 17.10.1988 was made by the Government the petitioner had been in employment of State for more than ten years as daily rated employee, entitled to be treated as permanent. 4. The short question which concerns the issue before me is whether the petitioner is entitled to pension or not. This further makes it clear that as on date resolutions dated 17.10.1988 was made by the Government the petitioner had been in employment of State for more than ten years as daily rated employee, entitled to be treated as permanent. 4. The short question which concerns the issue before me is whether the petitioner is entitled to pension or not. Primarily, the question of pension in pensionable service has been determined under Section III of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959 commencing from Rule 230 onwards. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner being on daily wages, was not holding a pensionable service under Section 230 nor he falls in the exception to the Rule provided thereunder, therefore, the services rendered on daily wages basis prior to his becoming permanent cannot be considered as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. 5. It was urged also that the service has been declared as pensionable by the resolution dated 17.10.1988 by the Government, which deems a daily rated workman on completion of ten years service as on 1.10.1988 or thereafter as deemed to be in permanent service and has been made entitled to pension. However, for the purpose of entitlement of pension under resolution the service on regular basis only has to be counted for determining qualifying service and entitled to pension. As the petitioner has not been on permanent basis after he can be deemed to have become permanent as on 1.10.1988, for the qualifying period of ten years he is not entitled to pension. 6. This plea, in my opinion, cannot be sustained being contrary to record and Government's own decision. 7. Rule 230 of Bombay Civil Services Rules says that unless in any case it is otherwise provided by or under the Rules a Government Servant is considered in pensionable service if he holds substantively a permanent post in Government service. The argument is that though the petitioner may be treated as permanent under Resolution dated 17.10.1988, he cannot be deemed to holding a permanent post. Without going into this contention it may be noticed that rule itself envisages that a person may be otherwise eligible to pension if so provided by or under the Rules. In this connection, attention has been drawn to Rule 248 of the Rules. 8. Without going into this contention it may be noticed that rule itself envisages that a person may be otherwise eligible to pension if so provided by or under the Rules. In this connection, attention has been drawn to Rule 248 of the Rules. 8. Rule 248 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules provide that Government may by general or special order permit service other than pensionable service for performing which a government servant is paid from State revenues or from a local fund to be treated as a duty counting for pension. In issuing such order the Government is to specify the method at which the amount of duty shall be calculated and may impose any condition which it thinks fit. Thus Government has necessary power to provide for pension even in cases where service other than pensionable service may become eligible for grant of pension. 9. In the resolution dated 17.10.1988, it has been envisaged that those workman who as on 1.10.1988 or thereafter completes ten years of continuous service to be counted in accordance with provisions of Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act shall be deemed to be permanent and amongst other benefits conferred on being treated as permanent their age of superannuation was fixed at 60 years and they were made entitled for pensionary benefit. By yet another resolution dated 30.5.1989 (Annexure E), in which a specific query was raised at item No (6) with reference to resolution dated 17.10.1988, about the calculation of period of qualifying service for the purpose of entitlement to pension in connection with the pensionary benefits made available to those daily wagers who are deemed to be permanent on completion of ten years of service and it was specifically made clear that within the meaning of resolution dated 17.10.1988, the service which is to be counted is that which can be said as continuous within the meaning of Section 25B with effect from the date of entry in the service is duty counted for the purpose of pension and pension has to be accordingly determined. This does not say that qualifying service is to be counted with effect from date of becoming permanent. This does not say that qualifying service is to be counted with effect from date of becoming permanent. This leaves no room of doubt that the resolution dated 17.10.1988 along with clarification issued on the various aspects of it vide resolution dated 30.5.1989 is in consonance with the provisions of Rule 248 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959 which provide that Government has not only power by general or special order to permit service other than pensionable service, for performing which a Government servant is paid from State revenues or from a local fund, to be treated as duty counting for pension and in issuing such an order Government is to specify the method by which the amount of duty shall be calculated for the purpose of pension. Once the Government has made it clear that those who have completed ten years of service as daily rated workman are to be deemed permanent with effect from and after 17.10.1988 and are entitled to various benefits on that basis including pension and thereafter has provided by the resolution dated 30.5.1989 that the continuous service for the purposes of pension, made available to employees under resolution dated 17.10.1988, is to be counted with effect from the date of entry in the service provided it can be continuous within the meaning of Section 25B of the Industrial Act, thus making it clear that once a daily rated workman is treated to be permanent under the resolution dated 17.10.1988 his entire continuous service from the date of entry until he retires including his services rendered prior to the date of his regularisation is taken into consideration for the purpose of computing pension or making pension available to such retired employee. 10. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Assuming that Bombay Civil Services Rules do not provide for grant of pension to those, who are not holding a permanent post in the service, then it must be held that daily rated workman working on daily wages, are ex cadre employees and not governed by particular service rules, but are governed by terms of employment under which they have been engaged. This further leads to conclusion that area of employment on daily wages is not covered by statutory rules either promulgated under Act 309 or by other legislature enactment. This further leads to conclusion that area of employment on daily wages is not covered by statutory rules either promulgated under Act 309 or by other legislature enactment. That is the area left uncovered by specific law, and such employment is in exercise of general executive powers of the State and terms and conditions of such employment is governed by terms of order under which such employment is made and shall be further governed by orders made by State in exercise of its executive power from time to time. The resolution dated 17.10.88 and 30.5.89 shall thus govern the terms of employment of such employees. If considered from this view, the conclusion will be the same. 11. In view of the aforesaid, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that resolution dated 17.10.1988 read with resolution dated 30.5.1989 read with Rule 248, of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, the petitioner is entitled to pensionary benefits by counting the entire period of service from 1966 to 1994 until the date of his retirement which is to be counted continuous under Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act as qualifying service and determining the pension payable to the petitioner who has retired on 31.1.1994, on that basis. 12. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to compute the pension payable to the petitioner on the aforesaid basis within the period of months from today and release the arrears of pension payable to the petitioner on such determination within a further period of one month and start making regular payment of pension with effect from the date of such determination. The petitioner be paid the costs of this petition which is quantified at Rs.3000/. Rule made absolute accordingly.” The ratio laid down in the said case which has subsequently been followed by this Court in several cases, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners ought to have concluded the issue as regards entitlement to the pension and other related benefits or clubbing of two periods of service indicated above; and in all fairness, the respondent No.2 ought to have conceded to the fact that the benefits under G.R. dated 17.10.1988 were already conferred upon the eligible daily wagers, and that, in view of the ratio laid down by this Court in the above case, the petitioners are entitled to more benefits including pension and related terminal benefits. The entitlement of the workman under the circumstances could not have been genuinely disputed inasmuch as, at the cost of repetition, it must be observed that the grant of benefit under G.R. dated 17.10.1988 implies an admission on the part of the respondents that they were so entitled and the relevant criteria including completion of the service as provided in Section 25B of the Act was satisfied inasmuch as, in absence of such satisfaction, the benefits under G.R.dated 17.10.1988 could not have been conferred upon the workmen. The matter is, therefore, squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Tribhovanbhai (supra) and could not have been reagitated. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (supra) had recognised the right of the State or the public body to agitate and reagitate certain issues. It would thus appear that while there cannot be an absolute ban on the State or the other public authority raising the issue of certain categories over and over again for the reason similar to those indicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the judgment cannot be cited as laying down the proposition of law that the ratio laid down by the High Court or the Supreme Court after considering the arguments advanced before it can be agitated and reagitated without any justification. When the constitutional court interprets the policy or the statute and lays down the ratio, undisputedly it has a binding effect. Once the pronouncement is accepted without further challenge, the State or the public bodies cannot be permitted to reiterate the argument which was rejected in decided cases, without any justification. The decision in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (supra) cannot be interpreted as dispensing with the principle of stare decisis. To say that even in the matters which are covered by the decision of the constitutional court can be challenged by the State or the other public body over and over again without any conceivable justification would be against the litigation policy of the State itself which promises to curb the avoidable cases going to the courts. 11. To say that even in the matters which are covered by the decision of the constitutional court can be challenged by the State or the other public body over and over again without any conceivable justification would be against the litigation policy of the State itself which promises to curb the avoidable cases going to the courts. 11. Only question which ought to have been asked by the Labour Court was: whether the G.R. dated 17.10.1988 has been interpreted by this High Court, and if yes, whether the High Court has held that the past continuous service of the workman are required to be taken into consideration for extending the benefits under G.R. dated 17.10.1988. If the answer to the said question was in affirmative, there remained nothing to be adjudicated and thus recovery applications were maintainable. 12. Even otherwise, in the opinion of this Court, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for enforcing the G.R. dated 17.10.1988 would lie in absence of the serious dispute of the facts of the case. Concededly, G.R. dated 17.10.1988 has been applied to the petitioners and, therefore, its applicability is not in dispute. The only dispute raised by the State in its affidavit is with regard to the interpretation of the said G.R. which has already been interpreted in Tribhovanbhai (supra), and thus, applying the ratio laid down therein, in the opinion of this Court, the respondents are not right when they say that for the purpose of pensionary benefits, the services post regularisation only must be reckoned. 13. Reliance placed on G.R. dated 24.3.2006 in support of the above contention is also misconceived since the said issue has been set at rest in Nirubha Vajubhai Sarvaiya v. State of Gujarat and three others [2016 Lawsuit (Guj) 155]. The said case has been followed by this Court in Ranabhai Ajmalbhai Harijan, since deceased through legal heirs – petitioners v. Secretary, Road and Building, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar and two others [Special Civil Application No. 18036 of 2013 decided on 19.10.2016. It is, however, stated by the learned AGP that the decision in Nirubha (supra) is pending consideration in Letters Patent Appeal. In the opinion of this Court, mere pendency of the appeal would not be sufficient to deter this Court from following the said case. 14. It is, however, stated by the learned AGP that the decision in Nirubha (supra) is pending consideration in Letters Patent Appeal. In the opinion of this Court, mere pendency of the appeal would not be sufficient to deter this Court from following the said case. 14. One of the prayer made by the petitioner is with regard to the interest on overdue amount. However, in absence of the justification for interest, it cannot be awarded. It is noticed that the parties were so far rightly or wrongly, litigating for the rights under G.R. dated 17.10.1988 and, therefore, there does not appear to be a deliberate delay in paying the pensionary and other related benefits to the petitioners. The prayer for interest is therefore declined. 15. In above view of the matter, the petitions partly succeed. Accordingly the impugned orders passed in each of the recovery applications made by the petitioners under Section 33C(2) of the Act are quashed and set aside. The respondents will recompute the pension and other retiral benefits of the petitioners from the date of their rendition of specified service within the meaning of Section 25B of the Act till the date of retirement and pay the same to the petitioners within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court, failing which, the same would carry simple interest at the rate of 8% p.a. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.