ORDER : A.S. Bopanna, J. 1. The petitioner-Management is before this Court assailing the award dated 01.02.2008 passed by the II Addl. Labour Court in I.D. No. 38/1995 impugned at Annexure-L to the petition. By the said award, the Labour Court has directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent-Workman into service to his original post with continuity of service and consequential benefits from 06.03.1995, but with backwages of 50%. The petitioner-Management therefore claims to be aggrieved by the award. 2. The brief facts are that the respondent-Workman joined the petitioner-Management on 01.10.1986 as Office boy. While he was thus working, the respondent-Workman is stated to have developed back pain due to which he could not attend to the work regularly and he also underwent treatment. Though the respondent-Workman thereafter sent the letter seeking medical leave, the same was not considered. The respondent-Workman contends that when he recovered and sought to report for work on 06.03.1995, he was not permitted to resume work. The respondent-Workman in that view submitted a complaint to the Labour Commissioner. The petitioner-Management in their reply to the Labour Commissioner however contended that the question of refusal of work does not arise since the respondent-Workman had tendered the resignation on 17.03.1995. 3. Though rival contentions were put forth, the conciliation was not taken up and it did not proceed to its logical conclusion. The respondent-Workman in that view filed a dispute before the Labour Court by taking benefit of Section 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('I.D. Act' for short) with regard to the refusal of employment. The petitioner-Management filed the counter statement raising the same contention about the respondent- Workman having tendered his resignation. In the process of consideration before the Labour Court, the respondent-Workman examined himself as WW-1 and relied upon the documents at Exhs. W-1 to W-18. The petitioner-Management on the other hand examined a witness as MW-1 and relied on the documents at Exhs. M1 to M16. On analysing the same, the Labour Court has passed the impugned award. 4. Heard Sri. C.K. Subramanya, learned counsel for the petitioner-Management, Sri. K.B. Narayanaswamy, learned counsel for the respondent-Workman and perused the petition papers including the records received from the Labour Court. 5. M1 to M16. On analysing the same, the Labour Court has passed the impugned award. 4. Heard Sri. C.K. Subramanya, learned counsel for the petitioner-Management, Sri. K.B. Narayanaswamy, learned counsel for the respondent-Workman and perused the petition papers including the records received from the Labour Court. 5. Though elaborate arguments have been addressed by the learned counsel for the parties and the perusal of the impugned award also indicates detail consideration with regard to the ill-health of the petitioner etc., the core issue is with regard to the fact as to whether the petitioner-Management has established that the respondent-Workman had in fact tendered his resignation on 17.03.1995. If the said contention is not established, since there is no other manner in which the service is terminated though allegation is made about his unauthorised absence, the contention of the respondent-Workman that there was refusal of employment will stand established. On the other hand, if the resignation as alleged is proved, all other aspects will become immaterial. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Management with reference to the reasons assigned by the Labour Court in answering Issues No. 1 and 2 would contend that the Court has proceeded on a wrong assumption with regard to the resignation. It is contended that the resignation is not disputed by the Workman, but it was contended that it was fabricated. In that view, when the Management has examined a witness and proved the resignation the same ought to have been accepted. In that light, the documents relied on are referred to by the learned counsel. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent-Workman on the other hand by referring the consideration as made by the Labour Court would point out that the evidence available on record has been referred and in that light, has arrived at the conclusion that the resignation letter as claimed by the Management is fabricated. Further the entire sequence with regard to the events from the time the Workman was suffering from illness is taken into consideration to alternatively arrive at the conclusion that even if the resignation had been obtained, the same cannot be considered as voluntary. Hence, it is contended that when a finding of fact is recorded by the Labour Court, such award will not call for interference in a writ petition. 8. Hence, it is contended that when a finding of fact is recorded by the Labour Court, such award will not call for interference in a writ petition. 8. In the light of the rival contentions, a perusal of the award no doubt will indicate that the Labour Court had taken note of the document at Ex. M-6 i.e., the resignation letter relied on by the petitioner-Management at the outset and has observed that the Workman has ignored the same as fabricated. But it is seen that the Labour Court has not rested with that. The issue that was framed no doubt is only as to whether the Workman proves that his services were terminated illegally on 06.03.1995. In that background, the case of the respondent-Workman in his claim statement is simple and clear that after recovering from his illness he had reported for duty on 06.03.1995, but he was not permitted to do so which amounts to refusal of employment from that date. He has also averred that when he approached the Sales Manager he was forced to sign a resignation which he refused. On the contrary, the petitioner-Management, in their counter statement have contended that the respondent-Workman in his leave letter had stated that he would resume his duty, if possible on 16.03.1995, but instead of doing so, had submitted his resignation on 17.03.1995 stating ill-health as the reason. 9. In the backdrop of the pleadings, the respondent-Workman by examining himself as WW-1, on referring to other aspects relating to his illness and the leave letter being sent, has categorically stated that he has not submitted his resignation on 17.03.1995. In the cross-examination though the other aspects have been touched upon, the alleged resignation letter dated 17.03.1995 was confronted and marked as Ex. M-6. The respondent-Workman has however asserted that the signature shown on the letter is not his. Further, the suggestion that he had submitted the resignation letter due to his ill-health was denied. 10. In the cross-examination though the other aspects have been touched upon, the alleged resignation letter dated 17.03.1995 was confronted and marked as Ex. M-6. The respondent-Workman has however asserted that the signature shown on the letter is not his. Further, the suggestion that he had submitted the resignation letter due to his ill-health was denied. 10. In that view, though no issue had been framed as to whether the II Party proves the resignation dated 17.03.1995 is the voluntary act of the I Party as contended on behalf of the petitioner-Management, on the respondent-Workman flatly denying the very allegation about the resignation being submitted by him and had also denied the signature on the letter as his, the burden had in law shifted on the petitioner-Management at the outset to prove that the letter at Ex. M-6 was in fact the resignation signed and submitted by the respondent-Workman. If that fact was established, only then the next question as to whether it was voluntary or not would have arisen. 11. The evidence tendered on behalf of the petitioner-Management through M.W. 1 is that of one Sri G.N. Krishnaprasad who was working as a Sales Manager in the year 1995 when the issue in question arose. His evidence was recorded on 05.08.2003. Though he has stated with regard to the sequence about the ill-health of the respondent-Workman, insofar as the resignation he has referred to the letter dated 17.03.1995 at Ex. M6 and has identified the signature therein as that of the respondent-Workman and got it marked as Ex. M6(a). In an attempt to prove that it is the signature of respondent-Workman, the admitted signatures of the respondent-Workman were marked in the other documents as Exhs. M2(a), M3(a to g), M4(a) and Exhs. C1 and C2. In the cross-examination of MW-1, it has been suggested to him that the document at Ex. M6 is fabricated and the signature therein is not the signature of the respondent-Workman and it has been forged by somebody in the Office. The said suggestions no doubt have been denied by M.W. 1. Even if that be the position, what cannot be lost sight is that when the respondent-Workman had in no uncertain terms denied the very resignation letter and the signature thereon, the burden was heavy on the petitioner-Management to discharge with regard to the proof of the said document at Ex. M6. 12. Even if that be the position, what cannot be lost sight is that when the respondent-Workman had in no uncertain terms denied the very resignation letter and the signature thereon, the burden was heavy on the petitioner-Management to discharge with regard to the proof of the said document at Ex. M6. 12. Though the admitted signature of the respondent-Workman was marked, in an attempt to prove the same the petitioner-Management has not taken steps to seek and secure the opinion of the Expert. No doubt, in the absence of the same or with such report, it would be open for the Court to compare the admitted and the disputed signatures in view of the provision contained in Section 73 of the Evidence Act. If in that light the admitted and disputed signatures are compared and examined, a marked difference would be visible to the naked eye as the signature on Ex. M6 alone appears different from the signature on the other documents. Keeping this in perspective, a perusal of the award passed by the Labour Court would indicate that the Labour Court has also referred to all other documents which are available on record to come to a conclusion as to whether in that background the contention that the respondent-Workman had actually submitted the resignation can be accepted or not. 13. Based on the same, the Labour Court has concluded that the tenor of the document at Ex. M6, the language, the grammar and the paper used would all indicate that it has been prepared by the petitioner-Management. The circumstance which was also noticed is that the petitioner-Management though contended that the said resignation had been accepted, the alleged acceptance letter which is in the registered cover marked at Ex. M7 had not been served on the respondent-Workman. It is also noticed by the Labour Court that in the said letter, the alleged resignation of the respondent-Workman is referred as dated 11.03.1995. M7 had not been served on the respondent-Workman. It is also noticed by the Labour Court that in the said letter, the alleged resignation of the respondent-Workman is referred as dated 11.03.1995. Therefore in such circumstance, when the Labour Court has referred to the entire evidence on record to come to a conclusion that the resignation letter as alleged had not in fact been signed by the respondent-Workman and the consideration in that regard by this Court on taking note of the evidence is of similar nature, the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court cannot be termed as perverse so as to call for interference in a writ proceedings. 14. When the claim of the resignation is not established by the petitioner-Management, the evidence with regard to the respondent-Workman having remained unauthorisedly absent or not having attended the work due to ill-health during the earlier period are all immaterial in the present facts since in any event it is not the contention of the petitioner-Management that the services has been terminated for misconduct in accordance with law nor is it their case that there is abandonment of service on the part of the respondent-Workman. Further, it was also not a situation where the petitioner-Management was seeking to prove the charge before the Labour Court for the first time by contending that it was a dismissal for misconduct but without enquiry. Instead the positive case of the petitioner-Management was that he had tendered his resignation and when that fact is not established the contention of the respondent-Workman that he was refused employment when he reported for work on 06.03.1995 will have to be accepted as being the only other logical conclusion. One other aspect is also that as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent-Workman, the theory of respondent-Workman having submitted the resignation on 17.03.1995 cannot even remotely be accepted since as per the admitted document at Ex. M1, the respondent-Workman had made a complaint dated 16.03.1995 to the Labour Commissioner about the harassment being meted out to him and the said complaint was submitted on 17.03.1995 as per the seal of the Office affixed thereon which will rule out the possibility of submitting the resignation. The petitioner-Management therefore having contended that the respondent-Workman had tendered his resignation has failed to establish the same. 15. The petitioner-Management therefore having contended that the respondent-Workman had tendered his resignation has failed to establish the same. 15. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-Management is also that the very dispute ought not to have been entertained by the Labour Court since the conciliation relating to the dispute raised by the respondent-Workman had ended in failure and the same had not been referred to the Labour Court. The reference being refused and not being challenged, the respondent-Workman could not have filed the dispute directly to the Labour Court, is the contention. The said contention in my opinion is to be noticed only to be rejected. I am of the said opinion for the reason that firstly, there is no material on record to indicate that the conciliation proceedings were held which ended in failure and thereafter the Government after applying its mind had rejected the request to refer the dispute to the Labour Court. Even otherwise, the consideration for reference in the said manner is as contemplated under Section 10(1)(c) and (d) of the I.D. Act and such refusal cannot be considered as an adjudication of the dispute. If that be the position, when an independent right to raise a dispute in respect of the nature of grievances as provided in Section 10(4-A)of the Act is available, such right in any event can be availed and the Labour Court was justified in entertaining the dispute and adjudicating the same. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner-Management alternatively contended that considering the respondent-Workman had ceased to work from the year 1995, it would not be appropriate to grant reinstatement at this stage and as such grant of monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement be considered. At the outset, it is to be noticed that in respect of the refusal of employment on 06.03.1995, the respondent-Workman had filed the complaint before the Labour Commissioner on 17.03.1995 and the claim petition under Section 10(4-A) of the I.D. Act was also filed immediately thereafter on 22.04.1995. The respondent-Workman therefore has not caused any delay in agitating his rights. The systemic delay should not affect the right of an individual who has been diligent in exercising his legal right. The respondent-Workman therefore has not caused any delay in agitating his rights. The systemic delay should not affect the right of an individual who has been diligent in exercising his legal right. Therefore, if at all the actual reinstatement would cause any difficulty to the petitioner-Management, the only option would be to notionally implement the reinstatement and pay all the benefits in monetary terms till the deemed date of retirement as if he had continued in service till the date of his superannuation, if he had continued in service without interruption from 06.03.1995. If such benefits are paid, the award would be deemed as implemented. Hence, for all the aforestated reasons, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned award. The petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.