JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This revisional application filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of CrPC is directed against judgment and order dated 02.08.2012, passed by learned Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar in Criminal Appeal No.17(2) of 2012, whereunder the learned Sessions Judge held the accused-appellants Subash Deb and Sanjoy Deb guilty of committing offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC and sentenced them to suffer RI for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each, in default of payment of fine to suffer SI for two months. 2. Heard learned counsel, Mr. B. Nandi Majumder for the accused-petitioners and learned Addl. P.P., Mr. R.C. Debnath for the State respondent. 3. The accused-petitioners along with two others were tried by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, North Tripura, Kailashahar in police report case No.G.R.279 of 2009 on the charges framed against them for commission of offence punishable under Sections 341, 324 and 326 read with Section 34 of IPC. 4. The prosecution case was that on 28.07.2009 at about 5.00 pm Sribash Deb(PW13) went to a place near his house to bring back his cattle and at that time the accused-petitioners and two other attacked him and the accused Subash Deb dealt dao blow on the head of Sribash and accused Sanjoy dealt blow with a crowbar and the accused Subash when dealt another blow, the victim tried to resist by raising his hands and it hit his right hand. The victim received bleeding injury on head and other injuries on other parts of the body and on his alarm local people came to the spot and he was taken to Kanchanbari PHC and therefrom he was taken to RGM Hospital, Kailashahar and he was treated for about 27/28 days in the hospital. 5. Prosecution examined thirteen witnesses to prove the charges against the accused persons. After closure of the prosecution evidence accused persons were examined under Section 313 of CrPC and in their turn they did not adduce any defence evidence. Defence case was that of the denial of prosecution case. 6. 5. Prosecution examined thirteen witnesses to prove the charges against the accused persons. After closure of the prosecution evidence accused persons were examined under Section 313 of CrPC and in their turn they did not adduce any defence evidence. Defence case was that of the denial of prosecution case. 6. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate found the accused-petitioner Subash Deb guilty of committing offence punishable under Section 326 of IPC and sentenced him to suffer RI for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and again he held the accused-petitioner Sanjoy Deb guilty of committing offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC and sentenced him to suffer RI for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine to suffer SI for one month. 7. Aggrieved, the accused-petitioners preferred Criminal Appeal No.17(2) of 2012 in the Court of learned Sessions Judge and the learned Sessions Judge found both the accused guilty of committing offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC and sentenced them as already stated hereinbefore. 8. Learned counsel, Mr. Nandi Majumder at the very outset has submitted that the accused-petitioners already deposited the fine money as per direction of the appellate Court. According to Mr. Nandi Majumder there is no independent witness supporting the case of the prosecution and that PWs 1 and 2 are the daughter and son of the alleged victim(PW13) and there is no other independent witness supporting the case of the prosecution. He has also submitted that the accused-petitioners were not habitual offenders and there is no record that they were earlier convicted and that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court did not consider all those aspects and mechanically deprived the accused-petitioners from the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or that of Section 360 of CrPC. He has submitted that accused Subash is the father of accused Sanjoy and the victim Sribash Deb is the brother of accused Subash Deb. So, it would appear that the incident, if any was between the two brothers and there is evidence that there was quarrel between the brothers and it may happen that in the midst of quarrel someone received injury for which the punishment of rigorous imprisonment will be excessive and harsh. Learned counsel, therefore, prayed for extending the benefit of Section 360 of CrPC or that of the Probation of Offenders Act. Learned counsel, therefore, prayed for extending the benefit of Section 360 of CrPC or that of the Probation of Offenders Act. 9. Learned Addl. P.P., Mr. R.C. Debnath on the other hand has submitted that the accused-petitioners being the brother and nephew of the victim, in a planned manner attacked and assaulted the victim with dangerous weapons, causing grievous injury on head and other parts of the body and it is the sheer luck of the victim that he survived. It was not a fact that in the midst of the quarrel one assaulted the other in a heat of the moment. The accused-petitioners in a planned manner assaulted the victim causing severe injuries and therefore the trial Court as well as the appellate Court did not consider it proper to extend the benefit of Section 360 of CrPC or that of the Probation of Offenders Act. He has also submitted that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court considered the evidence on record meticulously and arrived at a consistent finding which does not deserve interference by the revisional Court. 10. While exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of CrPC this Court is not ordinarily required to re-appreciate the evidence on record which is already appreciated by the trial Court and the appellate Court, unless there is perversity in the finding, while appreciating the evidence on record by those Courts. This Court is ordinarily required to see the correctness, legality and propriety of the finding of the Courts below and to see the regularity of the proceeding. 11. I have meticulously gone through the impugned judgments passed by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court and the evidence and materials on record. It is an admitted position that PW13, the victim Sribash Deb is the brother of accused-petitioner Subash Deb and uncle of the accused-petitioner Sanjoy Deb. PW13, the victim has made clear and unambiguous statement about the assault on him by both the accused-petitioners and that has not been shaken in cross-examination. PW2 is the eyewitness of the occurrence. She corroborated her father i.e. the victim, PW13. PW8 also corroborated the statement of PW13. PW9, the medical officer proved the injury report and supported the contention of PW13. Except denial the accused persons did not come out with any specific defence plea at the time of cross-examination of PW13 and other witnesses. PW2 is the eyewitness of the occurrence. She corroborated her father i.e. the victim, PW13. PW8 also corroborated the statement of PW13. PW9, the medical officer proved the injury report and supported the contention of PW13. Except denial the accused persons did not come out with any specific defence plea at the time of cross-examination of PW13 and other witnesses. In his examination under Section 313 of CrPC the accused-petitioner Subash Deb has stated that he was going towards the market and on way Sribash(PW13) assaulted him with a dao and he pushed Sribash Deb and ran away from that place. This statement of the accused seems to be a afterthought statement since neither there is any evidence nor even a suggestion put to the victim, Sribash(PW13) that he assaulted the accused Subash while on way to market. In my considered opinion, the trial Court and the appellate Court correctly arrived at a conclusion that the prosecution case has been proved against the accused-petitioners. The punishment inflicted on accused Subash Deb under Section 326 of IPC has been reduced to punishment under Section 324 of IPC and no appeal preferred by the State against that finding of the Sessions Judge. So I find nothing to discuss more on that point. 12. Next argument advanced by learned counsel, Mr. Nandi Majumder is that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court would extend the benefit under Section 360 of CrPC or that of the Probation of Offenders Act and that the benefit has not been given mechanically. The trial Court while not extending the benefit of 360 of CrPC or that of the Probation of Offenders Act in the judgment observed: “27. I have considered to extend the benefit of Probation to both the convicts but considering the nature and gravity of the offences as well as the injuries inflicted by them to the victim, I hold the view that the act of the convicts cannot be viewed with leniency. Accordingly, I am not inclined to extend the benefit of Probation to the convicts.” The appellate Court in para 15 of the judgment observed: “15. While passing sentence the learned Court below did not consider the benefit of probation of the Offenders’ Act considering the gravity of the offence. Accordingly, I am not inclined to extend the benefit of Probation to the convicts.” The appellate Court in para 15 of the judgment observed: “15. While passing sentence the learned Court below did not consider the benefit of probation of the Offenders’ Act considering the gravity of the offence. From the evidence it is revealed that the offence was committed in cold blood with motive and a brother is the assailant in this case. So, the learned Court below rightly did not extend the benefit of Probation of Offenders’ Act to the convicts. However, the learned Court below considered the age of the convict Subhash Deb and reduced his sentence. Another convict Sanjoy Deb is also a young man. He has no past antecedent and the dispute is in between the family members. So, leniency may be shown to both the convicts while passing sentence…………………………………………………………….” It is apparent that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court considered the aspect of extending the benefit of Section 360 of CrPC and/or the Probation of Offenders Act but decided not to extend the benefit of those provisions. It is not a case that the trial Court and the appellate Court did not at all consider the case of the accused-petitioners in respect of giving these benefits. 13. Now, refusal of the same, whether justified or not in the given facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Nandi Majumder, learned counsel has referred the case of Mithun Debnath v. State of Tripura reported in (2014) 2 TLR 922 as well as the case of Ratan Deb v. State of Tripura(Crl. Rev. P. No.74 of 2011). He has also referred the observation of the Apex Court made in para 6 in the case of Sushil Murmu v. State of Jharkhand reported in (2004) 2 SCC 338 . 14. Section 361 of CrPC prescribes that the Court shall record special reasons in its judgment while not giving the benefit of Section 360 of CrPC or that of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 in a given case. No doubt, for the punishment under Section 324 of IPC the benefit of Section 360 of CrPC or that of the Probation of Offenders Act could have been extended but assigning some reasons the trial Court and the appellate Court refused to extend the benefits. No doubt, for the punishment under Section 324 of IPC the benefit of Section 360 of CrPC or that of the Probation of Offenders Act could have been extended but assigning some reasons the trial Court and the appellate Court refused to extend the benefits. The Supreme Court in the case of Sushil Murmu(supra) has held- “……………………………….In the context of Section 360, the "special reasons" contemplated by Section 361 must be such as to compel the court to hold that it is impossible to reform and rehabilitate the offender after examining the matter with due regard to the age, character and antecedents of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. This is some indication by the legislature that reformation and rehabilitation of offenders and not mere deterrence, are now among the foremost objects of the administration of criminal justice in our country. Section 361 and Section 354(3) have both entered the statute-book at the same time and they are part of the emerging picture of acceptance by the legislature of the new trends in criminology. It would not, therefore, be wrong to assume that the personality of the offender as revealed by his age, character, antecedents and other circumstances and the tractability of the offender to reform must necessarily play the most prominent role in determining the sentence to be awarded. Special reasons must have some relation to these factors. Criminal justice deals with complex human problems and diverse human beings. A Judge has to balance the personality of the offender with the circumstances, situations and the reactions and choose the appropriate sentence to be imposed.” In the case of Mithun Debnath(supra), a Single Bench of this Court in para 22 of the judgment has observed- “22. The modern trend of penology is towards reformation of criminals, especially those who are at the younger age. First time offenders must normally be given a chance to improve themselves. Sending first time offenders to jail in offences where they can get benefit of the Probation of Offenders act or section 360 of the Cr.P.C. is against the spirit of these provisions. As held by this court above, it is not that in every case this benefit must be extended. The court convicting the accused is best suited to decide this matter. As held by this court above, it is not that in every case this benefit must be extended. The court convicting the accused is best suited to decide this matter. It is the Judge who has seen the accused, seen his behaviour in court and also knows how the occurrence took place. If the occurrence shows that the accused is a cruel person and is not likely to improve, the court would be fully justified in not granting this benefit but if on the other hand, there is material to show that reformation can be carried out if the convict is a first time offender, he must be given benefit of these provisions. In the case of Mithun Debnath(supra) no weapon of offence was used and the injuries were caused by fist and blows only. The accused was young in age and therefore the Court considered it fit to extend the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. The case of Ratan Deb(supra) was that of a theft. In the case of Sushil Murmu(supra) the Supreme Court has explained the legislative intention behind the enactment of the provisions of Section 360 of CrPC as well as the provisions under the Probation of Offenders Act and has given a broader outline of application of the same. 15. In the given facts of this case, it appears that the brother and nephew of the victim armed with dao and crowbar attacked the victim and assaulted him inflicting injuries out of which one was grievous injury. The injury report i.e. exbt.5 shows that the victim was admitted in the hospital on the date of occurrence i.e. on 28.07.2009 and he was discharged on 22.08.2009. So, it is apparent that he was hospitalized for more than twenty days. The injury what the victim has sustained has been supported by the evidence of the medical officer. So, it was a deliberate and desperate attack by the accused persons on the victim, inflicting injuries and there is nothing on record to consider any mitigating circumstance in favour of the accused-petitioners. The statement of the accused Subash that he was attacked and assaulted by the victim seems to be a statement not supported by any evidence or material on record. There is also nothing on record that the character and antecedent of the accused-petitioners were unblemished. The statement of the accused Subash that he was attacked and assaulted by the victim seems to be a statement not supported by any evidence or material on record. There is also nothing on record that the character and antecedent of the accused-petitioners were unblemished. It is the duty of the accused to bring on record that they were having with an unblemished character and antecedent and that there was nothing adverse against them. They brought on record nothing to show that the incident occurred in a circumstance for which a lenient consideration should be given. The accused Sanjoy Deb as stated by him was aged 25 years and the accused Subash Deb as stated by him was 57 years at the relevant point of time when they were examined under Section 313 of CrPC. So, they cannot be said to be very young offenders or that out of sudden excitement or provocation or because of some other mitigating circumstance they had committed the offence. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court has recorded the reasons while not giving the benefit of those welfare provisions and since there is nothing material on record to take a lenient view I think it appropriate not to disturb the finding of the Courts below. 16. In my considered opinion, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, the refusal of benefits of the provisions under Section 360 of CrPC or that of the provisions of the Probation of the Offenders Act was justified. 17. The revisional application is therefore found to be devoid of any merit and hence it stands dismissed. 18. Send back the L.C. records along with a copy of this judgment.