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2016 DIGILAW 2243 (ALL)

Amber Developers v. Fit Tight Nuts & Bolts Ltd.

2016-06-27

V.K.MATHUR

body2016
JUDGMENT : V.K. Mathur, Chairperson. The learned Counsels for the parties were heard on 16th June, 2016 on the application for condonation of delay. The present Appeal has been preferred by the Appellants under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 against the order dated 27th May, 2003 passed by the learned DRT-I, Mumbai on the application in O.A. No. 1561/1999. The present Appeal has been stated to be barred by time of three years and one month. 2. The Appellant has stated in the application that the Appellant has no knowledge about the impugned order dated 27th May, 2003 until August, 2005. It was further stated that the Appellant came to know when the Respondent No. 6 was attempting to get the properties mutated in the revenue record at Porbandar where the properties in question situated. 3. It was further stated that the Respondent No. 6 had preferred a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat challenging the inaction on part of the Collector Porbandar for not mutating the entry in, the revenue records. It was further averred that the Appellant moved an application for being impleaded as Respondent in the said writ petition which was rejected by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat against which the Appellant preferred Letters Patent Appeal before the Hon'ble Division Bench. It was further stated that in the course of hearing of the Appeal before the Hon Tile Division Bench, it transpired that the Appellant would be required to file review application before the DRT-I, Mumbai. Accordingly, the review application was filed by the Appellant seeking review/recall of the order dated 27th May, 2003 which was rejected by the DRT vide its order dated 10th July, 2006 on the ground that the review application is not maintainable. The Appellant has further averred that in the course of hearing of review application before DRT, Mumbai, it was felt that the remedy of the Appellant would be to prefer Appeal before this Appellate Tribunal against the J impugned order and thereafter the present Appeal has been filed. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant prayed that the delay occurred in I filing the present appeal be condoned in such circumstances. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant prayed that the delay occurred in I filing the present appeal be condoned in such circumstances. In support of his contention the learned Counsel placed reliance in the case of Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu v. Goberdhan Sao, (2002) 3 S.C.C. 195 , wherein it was held that expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides cannot be imputed to the party concerned. In Board of Control for Cricket India v. Netaji Cricket Club, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 592, held that the words "sufficient reason" in Order 47, Rule 1, of C.P.C. is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a Court or even an Advocate. 5. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 submitted that the Appellant was not party to the original proceeding in which the impugned order was passed, therefore, the Appellant is not entitled to file the present Appeal challenging the said order. It was further stated that the Appellant is not an interested party nor an affected party in the impugned order dated 27th May, 2003. It was further stated by the learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 that in fact the Appellant has no locus standi in the present case. It was further averred by the learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 that the Appellant was not in existence at the time of passing of impugned order. Therefore, the Appellant is not entitled to adopt any proceedings. 6. The learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 submitted that since the sale has been confirmed and the conveyance deeds have been executed in favour of the Respondent Nos. 6 and 7, these Respondents have become absolute owner of the property in question. It was further averred that the possession of the property in question has been handed over to the said Respondents by the Court receiver of High Court Bombay. 7. The learned Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the present Appeal is barred by time of more than three years and one month. 8. It was further submitted that the Appellant has the knowledge of the proceedings before the Tribunal below prior to the impugned order dated 27th May, 2003. 7. The learned Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the present Appeal is barred by time of more than three years and one month. 8. It was further submitted that the Appellant has the knowledge of the proceedings before the Tribunal below prior to the impugned order dated 27th May, 2003. It was further submitted that there is no explanation given by the Appellant as to how they gathered the knowledge of the applications made by the Respondents before the Revenue Authority for mutation entry. 9. It was further stated by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Appellants has the knowledge of the sale in favour of the Respondent Nos. 6 and 7. It was prayed that the application for condonation of delay be dismissed since in the present case, the Appellant has not explained the undue delay in filing the present Appeal. The learned Counsel for the Respondent-Bank supported the arguments of the Counsel for the appearing Respondents. 10. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties in the delay condonation application and perused the record of the case. 11. It has been stated by the Appellant that the impugned order was passed on 27th May, 2003 by the Tribunal below but the present Appeal could not be filed within the period of limitation. The Appellant has stated that the application filed by the Respondent No. 6-Divine Developers was allowed by the order dated 27th May, 2003 confirming the sale of the property in question against which the Appellant has preferred the present Appeal on 1st August, 2006. 12. As per the provision of Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, the Appeal is to be filed within a period of 45 days from the date of the order passed by the Tribunal below. The Appeal under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act has been filed by the Appellant before this Tribunal on 1st August, 2006 which is after a delay of three years and one month. 13. The question for consideration is whether the averments disclosed any sufficient cause to condone the delay of three years and one month in filing the present Appeal. 14. In Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 495 , this Court observed : (S.C.C. p. 497, para 6) "6.........it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an Appeal. 14. In Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 495 , this Court observed : (S.C.C. p. 497, para 6) "6.........it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an Appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the Appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstances arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the Appeal within time. No. event or circumstances arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute sufficient cause." 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Basawaraj v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, A.I.R. 2014 S.C. 746, has held that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the Applicant has to explain to the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. No Court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the Legislature. 16. The Apex Court in case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 S.C.C. 649 , has laid down the principles regarding condonation of delay which are as under : "xxx (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact; (vi) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play; xxxx (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go up by in the name of liberal approach; xxxx (xvii) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters." 17. The Appellant did not initiate any steps whatsoever before the expiry of the limitation and no circumstances have been placed before this Tribunal that steps were taken to file the present Appeal but it was not possible to file the Appeal within time. 18. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it was stated that the Appellant has no knowledge of the impugned order dated 27th May, 2003 which came to the knowledge of the Appellant when the Respondent No. 6 was attempting to get the mutation entry done in the revenue records at Porbandar where the property in question is situated. The present Appeal has been filed by the Appellant under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act before this Tribunal on 1st August, 2006. As such the present Appeal is barred by three years and one month for which no sufficient cause has been given and the delay has not been satisfactory explained. 19. In the present case the Appellant has not given any specific date when the Appellant learnt about the attempt being made on the part of Respondent No. 6 to mutate entry in the revenue records at Porbandar. The filing of impleadment application by the Appellant as party Respondent in the writ petition filed by Respondent No. 6 before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat and the Appellant thereafter preferring Letters Patent Appeal before the Hon'ble Division Bench cannot be treated as sufficient cause to condone the delay in this matter. The filing of impleadment application by the Appellant as party Respondent in the writ petition filed by Respondent No. 6 before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat and the Appellant thereafter preferring Letters Patent Appeal before the Hon'ble Division Bench cannot be treated as sufficient cause to condone the delay in this matter. The contention of the Appellant that during the course of hearing of the Appeal before the Hon'ble Division Bench, it transpired to the Appellant that he would be required to file Review Application before the DRT, Mumbai-I seeking to review/recall the impugned order dated 27th May, 2003 which was rejected on 10th July, 2006 and further in the course of hearing of the review application before the DRT, it was felt that the remedy of the Appellant would be to prefer an Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the impugned order dated 27th May, 2003, in my considered opinion, cannot be treated as justifiable reasons and sufficient cause after the expiry of the period of limitation to condone the inordinate delay in filing the Appeal in the present matter. In my considered opinion, the explanation offered by the Appellant for the said delay is completely unsatisfactory. 20. Therefore, in view of the law laid down in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (supra); Basawaraj v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (supra); Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujarat (supra) and from the conduct of the Appellant, it cannot be said that the Appellant was prevented by any sufficient cause to present the Appeal before this Tribunal within time or that there was any sufficient cause to file the Appeal after an inordinate delay three years and one month. The authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the Appellant in the facts and circumstances of the present case are distinguishable. 21. Thus, in the present case there are serious laches and negligence on the part of the Appellant in presenting the Appeal before this Tribunal. The delay in the present case cannot be mechanically condoned since the inordinate delay has not been properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained. 22. Thus, on overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of three years and one month in filing the present Appeal before this Tribunal. Therefore the application for condonation of delay is rejected. 23. 22. Thus, on overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of three years and one month in filing the present Appeal before this Tribunal. Therefore the application for condonation of delay is rejected. 23. Consequently, the present Appeal is also dismissed as barred by time with no order as to costs.