JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicant calls in question the legality and validity of the order dated 25th October 2016 passed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Surat, below Exhibit-1 in the Criminal Inquiry Case No.6 of 2016. 2. The facts giving rise to this application may be summarised as under: 2.1. The applicant herein filed a private complaint in the Court of the learned Special Judge, Surat for the offence punishable under Sections 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Ac, 1988 and Sections 120B, 177, 182, 193, 196, 197, 199, 203, 204, 406, 409, 420, 423, 466, 467, 468, 471, 477 read with 34 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint was lodged against in all nineteen persons. Since a neat question of law has been raised, I need not go into the nature of the allegations levelled in the complaint. 3. Upon such complaint being filed in the Court concerned, the same was registered as the Criminal Inquiry Case No.6 of 2016. 4. The learned Special Judge dropped the inquiry as he noticed that along with the complaint, there was no order of sanction passed by a competent authority under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, "the Act, 1988"). The learned Special Judge placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar v. M.R. Aiyappa and another [ (2013) 10 SCC 705 ]. The learned Special Judge observed in para 5 as under: "If we peruse the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar v. M.R. Aiyappa reported in 2013(10) SCC 705 , this Court notices that, in the said decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court was considering the case of private complaint against the public servant under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, where the order was passed by the Magistrate for investigation of complaint by the police under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, without previous sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In such a background, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that requirement to obtain sanction is mandatory requirement once the Court notices that there is no previous sanction. In such a background, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that requirement to obtain sanction is mandatory requirement once the Court notices that there is no previous sanction. The Magistrate cannot order investigation against the public servant by invoking power under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Under these circumstances, this Court cannot order investigation against the opponents and hence, this application deserves to be rejected." 5. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Special Judge referred to above, the applicant has come up with this application invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Submissions on Behalf of The Applicant: 6. Mr. A.B. Pandya, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant vehemently submitted that the learned Judge committed a serious error in law in passing the impugned order. The learned counsel submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) could be termed as 'per incuriam', as many other judgments having a bearing on the issue were not considered by the Apex Court. The learned counsel submitted that neither the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 nor the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 says that a "sanction" from the competent authority is necessary for the purpose of police investigation into any offence under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the question of sanction would arise only after the process of investigation is complete and the Investigating Agency has prepared a charge sheet or a police report under Section 170 of the Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the word "cognizance", as figuring in Section 19 of the Act, 1988, has nothing to do with the power of the Court to order police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. To put it in other words, the submission of the learned counsel is that when the Court orders police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, it does not take cognizance of the offence upon the complaint. According to the learned counsel, the purpose of Section 156(3) is simply to remind the police its duty to register an F.I.R. on the basis of the complaint which discloses commission of a cognizable offence. According to the learned counsel, the purpose of Section 156(3) is simply to remind the police its duty to register an F.I.R. on the basis of the complaint which discloses commission of a cognizable offence. It is submitted that many genuine private complaints for the offence punishable under the Act, 1988 are being dismissed because of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra). If a complaint of corruption or other allegations against a higher ranking public servant for any reason is not looked into or entertained by the police, then the only recourse available with the complainant in law is to file a private complaint and seek an appropriate direction under Section 156(3) of the Code. If such private complaint is also not to be entertained on the ground that a valid sanction under Section 19 of the 1988 is a must along with the private complaint, then that would lead to a very absurd situation. 7. It has been submitted that the Supreme Court overlooked many of its earlier decisions while deciding the case of Anil Kumar (supra) taking the view that a direction by a Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code does not amount to taking of cognizance, and thereby, the question of producing a valid sanction at that stage does not arise. 8. To fortify the submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1951 SC 207 : (1951) SCR 312] (2) Devarapalli Laxminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy [ 1976 (3) SCC 252 ] (3) Mona Panwar v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad High Court [ (2011) 3 SCC 496 ] (4) State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju [ (2006) 6 SCC 728 ] (5) Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi [ (2007) 12 SCC 641 ] (6) Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal [ (1973) 3 SCC 753 ] (7) Vineet Narain v. Union of India [ (1998) 1 SCC 226 ] (8) General Officer Commanding Rashtriya Rifles v. C.B.I. [ (2012) 6 SCC 228 ] 9. The learned counsel vehemently submitted that the word "cognizance" has a reference to the hearing and would determine of the case in connection with the commission of an offence and not merely to the Court's learning that some offence had been committed and is ordering that the matter be investigated. During the investigation of the matter, the learned Magistrate or the learned Special Judge, as the case may be, has nothing to do judicially. He has to determine nothing. It will be after the investigation that he will have to determine whether there is a case to goon against any particular person or not. It is at that stage that he will be taking cognizance of the offence because he would be determining whether the matter should be judicially inquired into or not. If he decides to inquire into the matter judicially, he takes cognizance of the offence. If he decides that there is no case to goon and he accepts the final report submitted by the police after the investigation, he does not take cognizance of the offence. Similarly, a Magistrate does not take cognizance of a complaint if he dismisses it under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C. 10. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prays that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) being per incuriam, the same does not lay down the correct proposition of law, and therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge be quashed, and the reliefs prayed for be granted. Submissions On Behalf of the State: 11. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. The learned A.P.P. submitted that there is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) is per incuriam. The learned A.P.P. pointed out that the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Subramaniam Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [ (2012) 3 SCC 64 ]. The learned A.P.P. submitted that the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar (supra) has given an altogether a new dimension to the word "cognizance", as contained in Section 19 of the Act, 1988. The learned A.P.P. submitted that the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar (supra) has given an altogether a new dimension to the word "cognizance", as contained in Section 19 of the Act, 1988. It is submitted that the insistence for a valid sanction order at the initial stage itself is keeping in mind the object of Section 19 of the Act, 1988. 12. The object of Section 19 of the Act, 1988 is to protect the honest public servant from frivolous and vexatious prosecution. Keeping in mind such avowed object in mind, the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) held that if the Court concerned applies its mind for the purpose of issuing directions under Section 156(3) of the Code, then he takes cognizance. The learned A.P.P. submitted that Anil Kumar (supra), which according to the learned counsel appearing for the applicant is per incuriam, has been followed in two later decisions (i) Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat [ (2015) 6 SCC 439 ], and (ii) L. Narayana Swamy v. State of Karnataka and others [ (2016) 9 SCC 598 ]. The learned A.P.P. invited my attention to the fact that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramdev Food Products (supra) is of three Honourable Judges'. 13. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned A.P.P. prays that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected. Analysis: 14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the learned Special Judge committed any error in passing the impugned order. 15. The question of law that falls for my consideration is, whether a private complaint for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 without the sanction order being accompanied can be entertained by the Court while invoking the power under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. 16. Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: "156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case (1) ...... (2) ...... (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned." 17. Section 19 of the Act, 1988 reads as under: "19. Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: "156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case (1) ...... (2) ...... (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned." 17. Section 19 of the Act, 1988 reads as under: "19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under subsection (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority; such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under subsection (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under subsection (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature." 18. Before I look into and discuss the decision of the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar (supra), I must look into few earlier decisions of the Supreme Court explaining the concept of 'cognizance'. To start with R.R. Chari (supra), the Apex Court approved a widely known observation of the Calcutta High Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abni Kumar Banerjee ( AIR 1950 Cal 437 ): "7. ...What is 'taking cognizance' has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure and I have no desire to attempt to define it. ... When the magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g. ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence." (emphasis supplied) 19. Thus, the Supreme Court, in R.R. Chari (supra) clearly, held that when a Magistrate directs police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, he does not take cognizance of any offence. Meaning, no question of sanction should arise at that stage. 20. The next decision, I would like to refer to is of Devarappali Laxminarayana Reddy (supra). The Supreme Court held in the said case as under: "9. Section 156 of the Code of 1973 reads thus: (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned." "10. This provision is substantially the same as Section 156 of the Code of 1898, excepting that in Subsection (1), for the words "Chapter XV relating to the place of inquiry or trial," the words "Chapter XIII" have been substituted." "13. This provision is substantially the same as Section 156 of the Code of 1898, excepting that in Subsection (1), for the words "Chapter XV relating to the place of inquiry or trial," the words "Chapter XIII" have been substituted." "13. ...If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself." "14. This raises the incidental question: What is meant by 'taking cognizance of an offence' by a Magistrate...If...he has in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence." "17.... The power to order police investigation under Section 156(3) is ... exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage...It may be noted further that an order made under Subsection (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1) Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or charge sheet under Section 173..." [emphasis supplied] 21. I shall now come to the Supreme Court's decision in Mona Panwar (supra): "18. ... An order made under subsection (3) of Section 156 of the Code is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation under Section 156(1)..." "19. ...However, when the Magistrate had applied his mind only for ordering an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code or issued a warrant for the purposes of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of an offence." [emphasis supplied] 22. In the case of Pastor P. Raju (supra), the High Court had quashed a proceeding on the ground that no sanction had been obtained by the police for the purpose of investigation. In the case of Pastor P. Raju (supra), the High Court had quashed a proceeding on the ground that no sanction had been obtained by the police for the purpose of investigation. The High Court took the view in the said case that the police could not have investigated certain offence as sanction was necessary for that purpose. The High Court thought that the investigation commenced without any sanction was illegal, and therefore, went on to quash the proceeding. The Supreme Court, while reversing the decision of the High Court, observed: "10. Several provisions in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure use the word 'cognizance'....However, the word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure....The meaning of the word has been explained by judicial pronouncements and it has acquired a definite connotation. The earliest decision of this Court on the point is R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. AIR 1951 SC 207 , wherein it was held..." "14...the High Court clearly erred in quashing the proceedings on the ground that previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government or of the District Magistrate had not been obtained. It is important to note that on the view taken by the High Court, no person accused of an offence, which is of the nature which requires previous sanction of a specified authority before taking of cognizance by the Court, can ever be arrested nor such an offence can be investigated by the police. The specified authority empowered to grant sanction does so after applying his mind to the material collected during the course of investigation. There is no occasion for grant of sanction soon after the FIR is lodged nor such a power can be exercised before completion of investigation and collection of evidence. Therefore, the whole premise on the basis of which the proceedings have been quashed by the High Court is wholly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside." (emphasis supplied) 23. In Dilwar Singh (supra), the Court observed as under: "14. Therefore, the whole premise on the basis of which the proceedings have been quashed by the High Court is wholly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside." (emphasis supplied) 23. In Dilwar Singh (supra), the Court observed as under: "14. The various steps to be adopted for investigation under Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence." "17. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all, registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of Cr.P.C. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. only thereafter." "18. The above position was highlighted in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P. and Another [ 2001(2) SCC 628 ]." "19. In Gopal Das Sindhi and Ors. v. State of Assam and Anr. ( AIR 1961 SC 986 ) it was observed as follows: "When the complaint was received by Mr. Thomas on August 3, 1957, his order, which we have already quoted, clearly indicates that he did not take cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint but had sent the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. to the Officer. In charge of Police Station, Gauhati for investigation....A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint, under Section 156(3) to the police for investigation...." 24. In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: "...Firstly, the police authorities have under Sections 154 and 156 of the Code a statutory right to investigate into a cognizable offence without requiring any sanction from a judicial authority, of King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad ( AIR 1945 PC 18 )] ... It is true that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had under Section 156(3) ordered in the present case an investigation by the police. But once that was done, the inquiry by the police was of the same nature and character as the one which the police had the power to conduct under subsections (1) and (2) of that section. It is true that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had under Section 156(3) ordered in the present case an investigation by the police. But once that was done, the inquiry by the police was of the same nature and character as the one which the police had the power to conduct under subsections (1) and (2) of that section. Indeed subsection (3) expressly states that an investigation ordered by a Magistrate would be an investigation "as above mentioned", i.e., an investigation made by a police officer in his statutory right under subsections (1) and (2). ...But where he has applied his mind only for ordering an investigation under Section 156(3) or issuing a warrant for purposes of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. [See R.R. Chari v. U.P. ( AIR 1951 SC 207 ); also Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Sah ( AIR 1964 SC 1541 )]...." 25. In Vineet Narain (supra), after examining the scheme of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, i.e. the repealed statute to the current Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the Supreme Court held that there is no such thing as a 'sanction' to investigate under those statutes. It said so emphatically: "43. ...The requirement of sanction for prosecution being provided in the very statute which enacts the offence, the sanction for prosecution is a prerequisite for the court to take cognizance of the offence. In the absence of any statutory requirement of prior permission or sanction for investigation, it cannot be imposed as a condition precedent for initiation of the investigation....The necessity of previous sanction for prosecution is provided in Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Section 19 of the 1988 Act) without which no court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 5 of that Act. There is no such previous sanction for investigation provided for either in the Prevention of Corruption Act or the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act or in any other statutory provision...." 26. In General Officer Commanding Rashtriya Rifles (supra), the Supreme Court once again analysed the various statutes that prescribe prior sanction for the prosecution and reiterated the same position as above that the investigation does not warrant any sanction. "81. In General Officer Commanding Rashtriya Rifles (supra), the Supreme Court once again analysed the various statutes that prescribe prior sanction for the prosecution and reiterated the same position as above that the investigation does not warrant any sanction. "81. To understand the complicacy of the issue involved herein, it will be useful to compare the relevant provisions of different statutes requiring previous sanction. "The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 The Prevention Of Corruption Act, 1988 The Armed Forces (Special Powers) ACT, 1990 197. Prosecution of Judges and Public servants.(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction. 19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable Under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction. (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government. 7. Protection to persons acting under Act. No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act." "43. The question to examine as to whether the sanction is required or not under a statute has to be considered at the time of taking cognizance of the offence and not during enquiry or investigation." (emphasis supplied) 27. In Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. West Bengal [ AIR 1959 SC 1118 ], the Court held that as to when cognizance is taken of an offence would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. In Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. West Bengal [ AIR 1959 SC 1118 ], the Court held that as to when cognizance is taken of an offence would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuing of a search warrant for the purpose of an investigation or of a warrant of arrest for that purpose cannot by themselves be regarded as acts by which cognizance is taken of an offence. It is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or under Section 204 of Chapter XVII of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and therefore had taken cognizance. 28. Similarly, in the case of S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. and others [ (2008) 2 SCC 492 ], it is observed that the expression "cognizance" has not been defined in the Code, but the word is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means "become aware of" and when used with reference to a Court or a Judge, it connotes "to take notice of judicially". Taking Cognizance" does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance if taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. It is also settled that cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Therefore, it is clear that, directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code is a pre-cognizance stage. 29. The Supreme Court in Tula Ram v. Kishore AIR1977 SC 2401, held that, it seems that there is no special charm or any magical formula in the expression. 'Taking cognizance' which merely means judicial application of the mind of the Magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to take further action. 29. The Supreme Court in Tula Ram v. Kishore AIR1977 SC 2401, held that, it seems that there is no special charm or any magical formula in the expression. 'Taking cognizance' which merely means judicial application of the mind of the Magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to take further action. Thus, what Section 190 contemplates is that the Magistrate is said to have taken "cognizance" once he makes himself fully conscious and aware of the allegations made in the complaint and decides to examine or test the validity of the said allegations. 30. In Mohd. Yousuf v. Smt. Afaq Jahan and another [ AIR 2006 SC 705 ], the Supreme Court held as under: "6. Section 156 falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of police officers to investigate cognizable offences. Investigation envisaged in Section 202 contained in Chapter XV is different from the investigation contemplated under Section 156 of the Code. 7. Chapter XII of the Code contains provisions relating to "information to the police and their powers to investigate", whereas Chapter XV, which contains Section 202, deals with provisions relating to the steps which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e. complaint filed by a person. Section 156, falling within Chapter XII deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences. True, Section 202, which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to "direct an investigation by a police officer". But the investigation envisaged in Section 202 is different from the investigation contemplated in Section 156 of the Code. 8. The various steps to be adopted for investigation under Section 156 of the Code have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence. 9. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of Section 202(1) of the Code makes the position clear that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202(1) i.e. "or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding." 10. This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him. 11. The clear position therefore is that any judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter." 31. Thus, the position of law till the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) was that an order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. will not amount to taking cognizance. Such order if passed could be said to have been passed at a pre-cognizance stage. It is only after the verification of the complainant on oath is recorded and the Court concerned either orders a magisterial or police inquiry, as the case may be, under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. or issues process under Section 204 of the Cr.P.C., then the cognizance could be said to have been taken and that stage is to be the post cognizance stage. 32. The Supreme Court in Anil Kumar (supra) took the view that when a complaint is filed to a learned Special Judge under Section 156(3) of the Code asking for a police investigation against a public servant for the offence punishable under the provisions of the Act, 1988 and such offence requires sanction for the prosecution, the Court cannot direct investigation by the police unless the complainant also produces sanction from the Government to allow such police investigation. I may quote the relevant observations of the Supreme Court as under: "10. I may quote the relevant observations of the Supreme Court as under: "10. We may first examine whether the Magistrate, while exercising his powers under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., could act in a mechanical or casual manner and go on with the complaint after getting the report. 11. The scope of the above mentioned provision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. This Court in Maksud Saiyed case (supra) examined the requirement of the application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and held that where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200, Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is required to apply his mind, in such a case, the Special Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3) against a public servant without a valid sanction order. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be sufficient. After going through the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, what weighed with the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., should be reflected in the order, though a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted. We have already extracted the order passed by the learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated no reasons for ordering investigation. 12. We will now examine whether the order directing investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. would amount to taking cognizance of the offence, since a contention was raised that the expression "cognizance" appearing in Section 19(1) of the PC Act will have to be construed as post cognizance stage, not pre-cognizance stage and, therefore, the requirement of sanction does not arise prior to taking cognizance of the offences punishable under the provisions of the PC Act. 13. The expression "cognizance" which appears in Section 197, Cr.P.C. came up for consideration before a three Judge Bench of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh (2009) 6 SCC 372 : (AIR 2009 SC (supp) 1615 : 2009 AIR SCW 3712), and this Court expressed the following view: "6. 13. The expression "cognizance" which appears in Section 197, Cr.P.C. came up for consideration before a three Judge Bench of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh (2009) 6 SCC 372 : (AIR 2009 SC (supp) 1615 : 2009 AIR SCW 3712), and this Court expressed the following view: "6. .............And the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is provided by Section 190 of the Code, either on receipt of a complaint, or upon a police report or upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed. So far as public servants are concerned, the cognizance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The section not only specifies the persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also specifies the conditions and circumstances in which it shall be available and the effect in law if the conditions are satisfied. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression, 'no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction'. Use of the words 'no' and 'shall' makes it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The very cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Black's Law Dictionary the word 'cognizance' means 'jurisdiction' or 'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power to try and determine causes'. In common parlance, it means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official duty..." 14. In State of West Bengal and another v. Mohd. Khalid and others (1995) 1 SCC 684 : ( AIR 1995 SC 785 : 1995 AIR SCW 559), this Court has observed as follows: "13. It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. In State of West Bengal and another v. Mohd. Khalid and others (1995) 1 SCC 684 : ( AIR 1995 SC 785 : 1995 AIR SCW 559), this Court has observed as follows: "13. It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out." The meaning of the said expression was also considered by this Court in Subramanium Swamy case v. Manmohan Singh [ (2012) 3 SCC 64 ]. 15. The judgments referred to herein above clearly indicate that the word "cognizance" has a wider connotation and not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. When a Special Judge refers a complaint for investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., obviously, he has not taken cognizance of the offence and, therefore, it is a pre-cognizance stage and cannot be equated with post cognizance stage. When a Special Judge takes cognizance of the offence on a complaint presented under Section 200, Cr.P.C. and the next step to be taken is to follow up under Section 202, Cr.P.C. Consequently, a Special Judge referring the case for investigation under Section 156(3) is at pre cognizance stage. 16. A Special Judge is deemed to be a Magistrate under Section 5(4) of the PC Act and, therefore, clothed with all the magisterial powers provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. When a private complaint is filed before the Magistrate, he has two options. He may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190, Cr.P.C. or proceed further in enquiry or trial. A Magistrate, who is otherwise competent to take cognizance, without taking cognizance under Section 190, may direct an investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. The Magistrate, who is empowered under Section 190 to take cognizance, alone has the power to refer a private complaint for police investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. 17. A Magistrate, who is otherwise competent to take cognizance, without taking cognizance under Section 190, may direct an investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. The Magistrate, who is empowered under Section 190 to take cognizance, alone has the power to refer a private complaint for police investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. 17. We may now examine whether, in the above mentioned legal situation, the requirement of sanction is a precondition for ordering investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., even at a pre-cognizance stage. 18. Section 2(c) of the PC Act deals with the definition of the expression "public servant" and provides under Clauses (viii) and (xii) as under: "2.(c) (viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorized or required to perform any public duty. (xii) any person who is an office-bearer or an employee of an educational, scientific, social, cultural or other institution, in whatever manner established, receiving or having received any financial assistance from the Central Government or any State Government, or local or other public authority." 19. The relevant provision for sanction is given in Section 19(1) of the PC Act, which reads as under:" 19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution. (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office." 20. Section 19(3) of the PC Act also has some relevance; the operative portion of the same is extracted hereunder: "Section 19(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under subsection (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) .... (c) ...." 21. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants raised the contention that the requirement of sanction is only procedural in nature and hence, directory or else Section 19(3) would be rendered otiose. We find it difficult to accept that contention. Subsection (3) of Section 19 has an object to achieve, which applies in circumstances where a Special Judge has already rendered a finding, sentence or order. In such an event, it shall not be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of absence of sanction. That does not mean that the requirement to obtain sanction is not a mandatory requirement. Once it is noticed that there was no previous sanction, as already indicated in various judgments referred to herein above, the Magistrate cannot order investigation against a public servant while invoking powers under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. The above legal position, as already indicated, has been clearly spelt out in Paras Nath Singh and Subramanium Swamy cases (supra). 22. Further, this Court in Army Headquarters v. C.B.I. (reported in AIR 2012 SC 1890 : (2012) 6 SCC 228 ) opined as follows: (Para 82-83) "82. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue of sanction can be summarized to the effect that the question of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duty. In order that the public servant may not be unnecessarily harassed on a complaint of an unscrupulous person, it is obligatory on the part of the executive authority to protect him..... 83. In order that the public servant may not be unnecessarily harassed on a complaint of an unscrupulous person, it is obligatory on the part of the executive authority to protect him..... 83. If the law requires sanction, and the court proceeds against a public servant without sanction, the public servant has a right to raise the issue of jurisdiction as the entire action may be rendered void ab initio ...." 33. Thus, the ratio that is discernible from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) is that as soon as a complaint is lodged if the Court concerned goes through the contents of such complaint in order to proceed and refer the matter to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code or to take any other steps as contemplated under Section 200 of the Code, it is deemed that the Court has taken cognizance of the contents of the complaint and came to the conclusion that it is a case either to be referred to the police for investigation or to inquire into by the Court itself. The Supreme Court held that even for the purpose of lodging a private complaint, the order of sanction is an absolute legal requirement to prosecute under Section 19(1) of the Act, 1988. 34. The decision in the case of Anil Kumar (supra), later on, came to be followed by a three Judge Bench in the case of Ramdev Food Products (supra). The Supreme Court, after referring to the decision in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) in para 20, observed in para 22 as under: "22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that the direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone issue of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightway direct investigation, such a direction is issued. Cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient ground to proceed". In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightway direct investigation, such a direction is issued. Cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient ground to proceed". Category of cases falling under Para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari, ( AIR 2014 SC 187 ) (supra) may fall under Section 202. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case." 35. It appears that in Ramdev Food Products (supra), the Supreme Court referred to and relied upon Anil Kumar (supra) for the proposition that the direction by the Magistrate for investigation under Section 156(3) should not be issued mechanically. In Ramdev Food Products (supra), the Court was not concerned with the issue of sanction at the stage of ordering police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. 36. In a very recent pronouncement in the case of L. Narayana Swamy (supra), the Supreme Court referred to and relied upon Anil Kumar (supra). A Bench of two Judges framed two questions of law. One of the questions of law was as under: "(i) Whether an order directing further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. can be passed in relation to public servant in the absence of valid sanction and contrary to the judgments of this Court in Anil Kumar & Ors. v. M.K. Aiyappa & Anr. [ (2013) 10 SCC 705 and Manharibhyai Muljibhai Kakadia v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel [ (2012) 10 SCC 517 ] The Court, thereafter, proceeded to answer the question as under: "11 Since requirement of obtaining sanction is contained in Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act, it would be proper to reproduce the same. For our purposes, reproduction of subsection (1) of Section 19 of the P.C. Act shall suffice which we reproduce herein below: "19. For our purposes, reproduction of subsection (1) of Section 19 of the P.C. Act shall suffice which we reproduce herein below: "19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.-(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction [save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013]- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office." 12. As is clear from the plain language of the said Section, the Court is precluded from taking "cognizance" of an offence under certain sections mentioned in this provision if the prosecution is against the public servant, unless previous sanction of the Government (Central or State, as the case may be) has been obtained. What is relevant for our purposes is that this Section bars taking of cognizance of an offence. The question is whether it will cover within its sweep order directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C? High Court has taken the view, in the impugned judgment, that bar is from taking cognizance which would not apply at the stage of investigation by investigating officer. It is observed that sanction is required only after investigation and that too when, after investigation, it is found that there is substantial truth in the investigation report as to what amounts to cognizance of offence. 13. The High Court has referred to Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. which stipulates that cognizance of an offence is to be taken under three contingencies viz. (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, or (b) on the basis of police report stating such facts which constitute an offence or upon information received from any person other than police officer, or (c) suo moto when Magistrate acquires that such an offence has been committed. (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, or (b) on the basis of police report stating such facts which constitute an offence or upon information received from any person other than police officer, or (c) suo moto when Magistrate acquires that such an offence has been committed. This position is clearly discernible from the reading of Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. and we extract the same herein below: "190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under Sub-Section (2), may take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under subsection (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try." 14. When a complaint is received, the Court records preliminary evidence of the complainant on the basis of which it satisfies itself as to whether sufficient evidence is placed on record which may prima facie constitute such offence. Likewise, Police report is filed under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. on the completion of investigation and on perusal thereof, the Magistrate satisfies himself about the facts which constitute such offence. Similar is the position in the third contingency. On this basis, the High Court has opined that since prior sanction is required only at the time of taking cognizance which stage comes much after the investigation is ordered under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. at the stage of giving direction to investigate into the complaint, such a sanction is not required. 15. The above view taken by the High Court is contrary to the judgments of this Court in Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia and Anil Kumar. In Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia, the facts were that the respondent filed before the CJM a criminal complaint alleging that the appellant had, by doing the acts stated, committed the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC. In Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia, the facts were that the respondent filed before the CJM a criminal complaint alleging that the appellant had, by doing the acts stated, committed the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC. The CJM, in exercise of his power under Section 202 CrPC by his order dated 18.06.2004 directed an enquiry to be made by a police inspector. The investigating officer investigated into the matter and submitted a compliant summary report opining that no offence was made out. The CJM on 16.04.2005 accepted that report and dismissed the complaint. The respondent complainant filed a criminal revision petition there against under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC before the High Court. The appellants then made an application seeking their impleadment as respondents in the revision proceedings so that they could be heard in the matter. On 05.08.2005, the High Court dismissed that application. Against that order, appeal was heard by special leave. This Court set aside the order of the High Court permitting the appellants to be impleaded in the revision proceedings. The Court took note of the provisions of Cr.P.C. i.e. Section 202, which does not permit an accused person to intervene in the course of inquiry by the Magistrate. However, it was held that even while directing inquiry, the Magistrate applies his judicial mind on the complaint and, therefore, it would amount to taking cognizance of the matter. In this context, the Court explained the word "cognizance" in the following manner: "34. The word "cognizance" occurring in various sections in the Code is a word of wide import. It embraces within itself all powers and authority in exercise of jurisdiction and taking of authoritative notice of the allegations made in the complaint or a police report or any information received that an offence has been committed. In the context of Sections 200, 202 and 203, the expression "taking cognizance" has been used in the sense of taking notice of the complaint or the first information report or the information that an offence has been committed on application of judicial mind. It does not necessarily mean issuance of process." 16. Second judgment in the case of Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa referred to above is directly on the point. In that case, identical question had fallen for consideration viz. It does not necessarily mean issuance of process." 16. Second judgment in the case of Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa referred to above is directly on the point. In that case, identical question had fallen for consideration viz. whether sanction under Section 19 of the P.C. Act is a precondition for ordering investigation against a public servant under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. even at pre-cognizance stage? Answering the question in the affirmative, the Court discussed the legal position in the following manner: "13. The expression "cognizance" which appears in Section 197 CrPC came up for consideration before a three Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh [ (2009) 6 SCC 372 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 200], and this Court expressed the following view: (SCC pp. 375, para 6) "6. ... 10. ... And the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is provided by Section 190 of the Code, either on receipt of a complaint, or upon a police report or upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed. So far as public servants are concerned, the cognizance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The section not only specifies the persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also specifies the conditions and circumstances in which it shall be available and the effect in law if the conditions are satisfied. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression, 'no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction'. Use of the words 'no' and 'shall' makes it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The very cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Black's Law Dictionary the word 'cognizance' means 'jurisdiction' or 'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power to try and determine causes'. In common parlance, it means taking notice of. The very cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Black's Law Dictionary the word 'cognizance' means 'jurisdiction' or 'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power to try and determine causes'. In common parlance, it means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official duty.' [Ed.: As observed in State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta, (2004) 2 SCC 349 , 358, para 10 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 539.] " 14. In State of W.B. v. Mohd. Khalid [ (1995) 1 SCC 684 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 266], this Court has observed as follows: "13. It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out." [Ed.: As considered in State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju, (2006) 6 SCC 728 , 734, para 13 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 179.] The meaning of the said expression was also considered by this Court in Subramanian Swamy case [ (2012) 3 SCC 64 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666] . 15. The judgments referred to herein above clearly indicate that the word "cognizance" has a wider connotation and is not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. When a Special Judge refers a complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, obviously, he has not taken cognizance of the offence and, therefore, it is a pre-cognizance stage and cannot be equated with post cognizance stage. When a Special Judge takes cognizance of the offence on a complaint presented under Section 200 CrPC and the next step to be taken is to follow up under Section 202 CrPC. When a Special Judge takes cognizance of the offence on a complaint presented under Section 200 CrPC and the next step to be taken is to follow up under Section 202 CrPC. Consequently, a Special Judge referring the case for investigation under Section 156(3) is at pre-cognizance stage. xxx xxx xxx 21 The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants raised the contention that the requirement of sanction is only procedural in nature and hence, directory or else Section 19(3) would be rendered otiose. We find it difficult to accept that contention. Subsection (3) of Section 19 has an object to achieve, which applies in circumstances where a Special Judge has already rendered a finding, sentence or order. In such an event, it shall not be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of absence of sanction. That does not mean that the requirement to obtain sanction is not a mandatory requirement. Once it is noticed that there was no previous sanction, as already indicated in various judgments referred to herein above, the Magistrate cannot order investigation against a public servant while invoking powers under Section 156(3) CrPC. The above legal position, as already indicated, has been clearly spelt out in Paras Nath Singh [ (2009) 6 SCC 372 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 200] and Subramanian Swamy [ (2012) 3 SCC 64 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666] cases." Having regard to the ratio of the aforesaid judgment, we have no hesitation in answering the question of law, as formulated in para 7 above, in the negative. In other words, we hold that an order directing further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be passed in the absence of valid sanction. " 37. At this stage, it would be appropriate for me to look into the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Subramaniam Swamy (supra). Although Subramaniam Swamy (supra) has been referred to and relied upon in Anil Kumar (supra), I may quote the relevant observations made in paras 34, 64 and 64.1 64.2 as under: "34. " 37. At this stage, it would be appropriate for me to look into the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Subramaniam Swamy (supra). Although Subramaniam Swamy (supra) has been referred to and relied upon in Anil Kumar (supra), I may quote the relevant observations made in paras 34, 64 and 64.1 64.2 as under: "34. The argument of the learned Attorney General that the question of granting sanction for prosecution of a public servant charged with an offence under the 1988 Act arises only at the stage of taking cognizance and not before that is neither supported by the plain language of the section nor the judicial precedents relied upon by him. Though, the term 'cognizance' has not been defined either in the 1988 Act or the CrPC, the same has acquired a definite meaning and connotation from various judicial precedents. In legal parlance cognizance is "taking judicial notice by the court of law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented before it so as to decide whether there is any basis for initiating proceedings and determination of the cause or matter judicially"." "64 I also entirely agree with the conclusion of learned brother Singhvi, J., that the argument of the learned Attorney General that question for granting sanction for prosecution of a public servant charged with offences under the 1988 Act arises only at the stage of cognizance is also not acceptable. In formulating this submission, the learned Attorney General substantially advanced two contentions. The first contention is that an order granting sanction is not required to be filed along with a complaint in connection with a prosecution under Section 19 of the P.C. Act. The aforesaid submission is contrary to the settled law laid down by this Court in various judgments. 64.1 Recently a unanimous three Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh, [ (2009) 6 SCC 372 ] : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1615 : 2009 AIR SCW 3712), speaking through Justice Pasayat and construing the requirement of sanction, held that without sanction : "6.... 10....The very cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Black's Law Dictionary the word 'cognizance' means 'jurisdiction' or 'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power to try and determine causes'. In common parlance, it means taking notice of. 10....The very cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Black's Law Dictionary the word 'cognizance' means 'jurisdiction' or 'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power to try and determine causes'. In common parlance, it means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official duty." 64.2 The other contention of the learned Attorney General is that in taking cognizance under the P.C. Act the Court is guided by the provisions under Section 190 of the Code and in support of that contention the learned Attorney General relied on several judgments." 38. The Apex Court in the case of Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Sah [ AIR 1964 SC 1541 ] has held that when a complaint is filed in the Court of a learned Magistrate, the Magistrate applies his mind in proceeding under the various provisions of Chapter - XVI of the Code and he must be held to have taken cognizance for the offence mentioned in the complaint. When, however, he applies his mind, not for the purpose, but for the purpose of ordering investigation under Section 156(3) or issue a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. Thus, it is clear that an application of mind is required even while exercising powers under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. 39. Jamuna Singh (supra) has been referred to and relied upon by the Supreme Court in the case of Kishun Singh and others v. State of Bihar [ (1993) 2 SCC 16 ], wherein the Supreme Court observed that mere application of mind does not amount to taking cognizance unless the Magistrate does so for proceeding under Section 200/204 of the Code. I may quote the observations as contained in para 7 of the said decision: "...Section 190 of the Code sets out the different ways in which a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence, that is to say, take notice of an allegation disclosing commission of a crime with a view to setting the law in motion to bring the offender to book. Under this provision cognizance can be taken in three ways enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the offence alleged to have been committed. The object is to ensure the safety of a citizen against the vagaries of the police by giving him the right to approach the Magistrate directly if the police do not take action or he has reason to believe that no such action will be taken by the police. Even though the expression 'take cognizance' is not defined, it is well settled by a catena of decisions of this court that when the Magistrate takes notice of the accusations and applies his mind to the allegations made in the complaint or police report or information and on being satisfied that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence decides to initiate judicial proceedings against the alleged offender he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence. It is essential to bear in mind the fact that cognizance is in regard to the offence and not the offender. Mere application of mind does not amount to taking cognizance unless the magistrate does so for proceeding under Section 200/204 of the Code (See Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Sah, (1964) 5 SCR 37 at 4041 : ( AIR 1964 SC 1541 at p. 1544)). It is, therefore, obvious that if on receipt of a complaint under Section 154 of the Code in regard to a cognizable offence, an offence is registered and the concerned Police Officer embarks on an investigation and ultimately submits a police report under Section 173 of the Code, the Magistrate may take cognizance and if the offence is exclusively triable by a Court of Session, he must follow the procedure set out in Section 209.." 40. The very same principle was laid down by the Apex Court in another decision in the case of Gopaldas v. State of Assam [ AIR 1961 SC 986 ]. 41. A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of P.R. Venugopal v. S.M. Krishna, the Chief Minister of Karnataka [(2003) 6 K.L.J. 507] has taken the view that, to make a reference to police for investigation, the Magistrate has to apply his mind as to whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to make such order for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. 42. One another decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Guruduth Prabhu v. M.S. Krishna Bhat [2009 Criminal Law Journal 3909] is to the effect that, the order of Magistrate directing the investigation under Section 156(3), without applying his mind to the allegations made in the complaint, will be without jurisdiction and the High Court, either under Section 482 of the Code or Article 226 of the Constitution, is empowered to quash the investigation. 43. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid principles laid down by the Apex Court and also by the two judgments of the Karnataka High Court that, the application of mind is necessary even when the Special Judge refers the case for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. The same principles were also reiterated by the Apex Court in yet another decision in the case of Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat [ (2008) 5 SCC 668 ]. It was also held in the said case that the Magistrate ordering police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. has to apply his mind and in the said case before it, the Apex Court found that there had been non-application of mind by the Magistrate while ordering the police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. 44. Almost two decades' back, a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Gupta v. State of Gujarat reported in 1998 (1) G.L.R. 327 expressed grave concern as regards the Magistrates passing orders of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code mechanically. While expressing such concern, this Court in no uncertain terms observed that it is not the job of the Postman that the Magistrate has to perform on the receipt of a complaint that without application of mind straightway to order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. The ratio of this judgment is that due application of mind is necessary before the Magistrate orders police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. It is true that this judgment does not deal with the issue whether the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence while passing an order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. I may quote the relevant observations as contained in paras 9, 10, 11 and 12: "9. Question is which of the mode should be adopted by the Magistrate. I may quote the relevant observations as contained in paras 9, 10, 11 and 12: "9. Question is which of the mode should be adopted by the Magistrate. Simply because he has discretion, should he take cognizance and proceed in the matter in accordance with law or should he direct inquiry or investigation by Police? Whether any guideline is provided in any of the provisions of the Code? In my opinion, the provisions of the Code do provide such guideline. To read such guideline from the provisions of the Code, it is necessary to understand what is an investigation? To make full and complete investigation, what are the powers and limitations of, or the extent of investigation agency? What Courts cannot do in inquiry or trial and what will be the help needed by the Court from Police agency? 10. The above issue is required to be considered and determined in view of the present trend of the litigants, professionals (legal) to go for criminal complaints and of the learned Magistrates to order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code indiscriminately without inquiring and applying mind whether facts stated constitute offence or dispute between the parties is not of the civil nature. It is not the job of the Postman that the Magistrate has to do on receipt of a complaint that without application of mind straightaway to order investigation under Section 156(3), unless there is a clear case which needs investigation to assist the learned Magistrate to do justice. Before he orders or directs investigation under Section 156(3), he has to notionally decide that investigation through Police agency is needed in this case and the enquiry by himself may not be sufficient. Investigation consists generally of (1) proceeding to the spot; (2) ascertainment of facts and circumstances; (3) discovery and arrest of suspected offender; (4) collection of evidence which may consists of (a) examination of persons, including accused, and recording statement, if thought fit; (b). search of place and seizure of incriminating things; (c) consideration whether the materials are enough for submitting charge sheet. search of place and seizure of incriminating things; (c) consideration whether the materials are enough for submitting charge sheet. Such and other things if needed to investigate into the matter, then the question is what is that evidence to prove case cannot be procured by the Court itself and complainant cannot produce it before the Court without the help of investigating agency and help of the concerned Police Officer to proceed in the matter is needed. There are cases, more particularly non-cognizable offences, and some of the cognizable ones where the complainant may produce the whole of the evidence to prove the case. The learned Magistrate himself through complainant can collect necessary evidence to prove guilt. For example, in number of cases, it may not be necessary to proceed to the spot, ascertainment of facts and circumstances can be gathered by the Magistrate himself by calling the witnesses, discovery and arrest of suspected offender may not be necessary and necessary evidence to prove the case may be produced by the complainant himself with or without the assistance of the Court. There may be no necessity of any search of place or seizure of the things. In such a situation, when the necessary material to prove guilt can be produced before the Court with or without the help of the Court by the complainant, why direction for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code So, when a complaint is received be it for an offence cognizable or non-cognizable, the learned Magistrate has to look at the complaint or the information received, apply his mind and has to come to a tentative decision whether necessary material to prove the guilt of the accused can be gathered by him without any difficulty through the complaint or it is necessary to take assistance of investigating agency. If for the proof of guilt it is felt necessary to go to spot, to discover and seize some incriminating article, to search a place, etc., then direction to investigate stands justified. In all cases where the complainant approaches the Court by private complaint, anything needed to prove case can be and has to be done by complainant. For example, in facts of the case on hand, though cognizable offence is alleged to have been committed, why was it necessary to direct the Police to investigate? 11. In all cases where the complainant approaches the Court by private complaint, anything needed to prove case can be and has to be done by complainant. For example, in facts of the case on hand, though cognizable offence is alleged to have been committed, why was it necessary to direct the Police to investigate? 11. Learned Magistrate has also to consider as to why the party has not approached the Police immediately on occurrence of incidence constituting offence, be it a non-cognizable offence. It is not that the parties do not approach the Police for non-cognizable offence. Normally, the parties concerned do not know whether the facts which he states constitutes a cognizable offence or non-cognizable one. It is the person in authority and in charge of the Police Station who decides that the facts stated by the complainant against someone or a particular person, constitute an offence and whether it is cognizable or non-cognizable one. It is also necessary for the learned Magistrate to bear in mind and consider that though the offence is a cognizable one, why the party has approached him directly. It may be because of some reason that the party approaches the Magistrate. If there is a reason for the party to approach the learned Magistrate instead of Police, then directing Police to investigate into the matter may frustrate the purpose to complain, and grievance may not be redressed. Thus, it is not an ordinary discretion of the learned Magistrate to order, on receipt of the information amounting to any offence, to straightaway direct investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. Section 202(2) of the Code empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of process and direct the Police to enquire into the matter. The power to order Police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by Section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post cognizance stages when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked provided he feels necessary to do so by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(l) (a). That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked provided he feels necessary to do so by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(l) (a). But once he takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under Subsection (3) of Section 156 is in the nature of peremptory reminder of intimation to the Police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or charge sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section, an investigation "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceedings". Thus, the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on Police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him. Thus, it is clear that a discretion is there with the learned Magistrate whether to enquire by himself either before taking cognizance or after taking cognizance. It is also open to him to direct investigation under Section 156(3) before taking cognizance of the matter, but when, how and in what circumstances such a discretion should be exercised is required to be borne in mind by the learned Magistrate from the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. There is a common complaint that the complainants approach the Magistrate with complaints and powers to direct investigation under Section 156(3) are being exercised indiscriminately and Magistrates fall prey to the wicked mind of the complainants and the alleged accused persons are in the clutches of the Police who investigate the same. 12. There is a common complaint that the complainants approach the Magistrate with complaints and powers to direct investigation under Section 156(3) are being exercised indiscriminately and Magistrates fall prey to the wicked mind of the complainants and the alleged accused persons are in the clutches of the Police who investigate the same. This appears to be an indirect way of empowering Police authority through agency of Court in the matter where Police had no authority to enquire of its own. It may be that complainant had no desire to go to Police. If complainant wanted to go to Police, where he should have ordinarily gone, why should he have approached the Court? This aspect is required to be born in mind before passing any order, more particularly of investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. It is the duty of the learned Magistrate to decide whether any investigation is necessary in the matter or not. I am, therefore, of the opinion that whenever a direction to inquire under Section 156(3) of the Code is given, the said order of direction should be a speaking one to reflect the reason why for what material to be collected he needs the police to investigate." 45. The Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. [ AIR 2015 SC 1758 ] observed in paras 26 and 27 that: "26. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same. 27. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an the application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR." 46. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant herein that no application of mind is necessary while ordering the investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., has to be rejected. 47. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR." 46. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant herein that no application of mind is necessary while ordering the investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., has to be rejected. 47. Dealing with the expression "cognizance" in Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. the Apex Court through a three Judge Bench in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh [ (2009) 6 SCC 372 )] has considered the meaning of the term 'cognizance' and has held at para 6 thus: "The jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is provided by Section 190 of the Code, either on receipt of a complaint, or upon a police report or upon information received from any person other than police officer, or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed. So far as public servants are concerned the cognizance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The Section not only specifies the persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also specifies the conditions and circumstances in which it shall be available and the effect in law if the conditions are satisfied. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression, 'no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction'. Use of the words, 'no' and 'shall' make it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The very cognizance is barred. That is the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Black's law Dictionary the word 'cognizance' means 'Jurisdiction' or 'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power to try and determine causes'. In common parlance it means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have committed during discharge of his official duty." (emphasis supplied) 48. In common parlance it means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have committed during discharge of his official duty." (emphasis supplied) 48. The Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Mohd. Khalid & others ( (1995)1 SCC 684 ) which judgment is referred to in the case of Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [ (2012) 3 SCC 64 ] has observed thus at para 38: "It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out." 49. Though the word "cognizance" (rooting from Old French "conoisance", based on Latin "cognoscere") or the words "taking cognizance" have not been deciphered and defined in the procedural law, the same derive definite connotation from plethora of precedents and gain perceptive explanation and incisive exegesis from the judicial pronouncements. While plain and dictionary meaning thereof is "taking note of", "taking account of", "to know about", "to gain knowledge about", "awareness about certain things" etc. in law, the common understanding of the term 'cognizance' is "taking judicial notice by a court of law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented before it so as to decide whether there is any basis for initiating proceedings and determination of the cause or matter 'judicially'". Thus, the legal sense of taking judicial notice by a court of law or a Magistrate is altogether different from the view and idea a layman has for it; however, a broad and general comprehension is 'judicial notice by a court of law on a crime which, according to such court, has been committed against the complainant, to take further action if facts and circumstances so warrant'. 50. The Law Lexicon of Sri. 50. The Law Lexicon of Sri. P. Ramanatha Iyer (2nd Edition Reprint 2008) has the following meaning assigned to the term 'cognizance' at page.352. "Cognizance Judicial notice or knowledge; the judicial recognition or hearing of a cause; jurisdiction, or right to try and determine causes. It is a word of the largest import: embracing all power, authority and jurisdiction. The word "Cognizance" is used in the sense of "the right to take notice of and determine a cause". Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such, applies his mind of the suspected commission of an offence. (37 Cal 412: 14 CWN 512: 6 IC 8: 11 Cr L.J.217) To take cognizance implies a conscious volition on the part of the Magistrate. The 37 fact that a Magistrate passes an order remanding the accused to custody pending investigation does not lead to the inference that he has taken cognizance, when he never considers at all whether he is or is not taking cognizance. (1936 AMLJ 85). Cognizance takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. This is the position whether the magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint, or on a police report, or upon information of a person other than a police officer. Darshan Singh v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 2372 , 2374 (Section 196A)." 51. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid meaning assigned to the word "cognizance" by the Apex Court, as well as the meaning in the Law Lexicon referred to above, that the word "cognizance" has a wider connotation than the limited or the narrow view expressed by the learned counsel for the applicant. As the Apex Court has held in Paras Nath Singh's case (supra), the word "cognizance", therefore, means in common term "taking notice of", it is, therefore, not confined only to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. 52. I have already referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Subramaniam Swamy (supra). In the said case, the Apex Court negatived the contention that the order of granting sanction is not required to be filed along with the complaint in connection with the prosecution under Section 19 of the Act, 1988. 53. 52. I have already referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Subramaniam Swamy (supra). In the said case, the Apex Court negatived the contention that the order of granting sanction is not required to be filed along with the complaint in connection with the prosecution under Section 19 of the Act, 1988. 53. The object behind the requirement of sanction order was also considered by the Apex Court in the very same decision under consideration, at para.72 and para.73. The observations made are as under: "72. The right of private citizen to file a complaint against a corrupt his right to access the Court in order to set the criminal law in motion against a corrupt public servant must be equated with public official. This right of access, a Constitutional right should not be burdened with unreasonable fetters. When a private citizen approaches a court of law against a corrupt public servant who is highly placed, what is at stake is not only a vindication of personal grievance of 44 that citizen but also the question of bringing orderliness in society and maintaining equal balance in the rule of law. 73. It was pointed out by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sheonanadan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others (1987) 1 SCC 288 at page 315: "14.......It is now settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the society that certain acts are constituted offences and the right is given to any citizen to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason that in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak this Court pointed out that (SCC p. 509, para 6). "6.....Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes 45 enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait jacket formula of locus standi......" 54. "6.....Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes 45 enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait jacket formula of locus standi......" 54. At para 74 of the decision, the Apex Court has held that the protection given under Section 19 to a public servant are not available to other citizens and public servants are treated as a special class of persons enjoying the said protection so that they can perform their duties without fear and favour and without threats of malicious prosecution. However, the court also added that the protection given cannot become a shield to protect the corrupt officials. Thus, after holding as regards the requirement of sanction in respect of a private complaint, at para 81 of the judgment certain guidelines were also laid down for the Parliament to consider. One such guideline is at 81(c) which reads as under: "81(c) At the end of the extended period of time limit, if no decision is taken, sanction will be deemed to have been granted to the proposal for prosecution, and the prosecuting 46 agency or the private complainant will proceed to file the charge sheet/complaint in the court to commence prosecution within 15 days of the expiry of the aforementioned time limit." 55. I may also refer to a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Veeraswami v. Union of India and others [(1991) 3 SCC 655]. I may quote the observations made by the Apex Court as contained in para 28: "The Act was intended to suppress bribery and corruption in public administration and it contains stringent provisions. Section 4 raises presumption unless the contrary is proved by the accused in respect of offence punishable under Section 161 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or of an offence referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of Section 5(1) of the Act. Section 5 of the Act creates offence of criminal misconduct on the part of a public servant. The public servant defined under Section 2 means a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the IPC. Section 21 of the IPC is not really defining "public servant" but enumerating the categories of public servants. Section 5 of the Act creates offence of criminal misconduct on the part of a public servant. The public servant defined under Section 2 means a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the IPC. Section 21 of the IPC is not really defining "public servant" but enumerating the categories of public servants. It has enumerated as many as twelve categories of public servants. Section 5(2) provides punishment for such an offence of criminal misconduct up to a term of 7 years or with fine, or with both. Section 6 prohibits Courts from taking cognizance of an offence unless certain condition is complied with. We will have an occasion to consider the provisions of Section 6 in detail and for the present we may deal only with the condition prescribed by the Section for a Court to take cognizance of an offence The condition prescribed therein is the previous sanction of a competent authority. The public servant cannot be prosecuted for offences specified in the Section unless there is prior sanction for prosecution from the competent authority. It may be of importance to remember that the power to take cognizance of an offence is vested in the Court of competent jurisdiction. Section 6 is primarily concerned to see that prosecution for the specified offences shall not commence without the sanction of a competent authority. That does not mean that the Act was intended to condone the offence of bribery. and corruption by public servant. Nor it was meant to afford protection to public servant from criminal prosecution for such offences. It is only to protect the honest public servants from frivolous and vexatious prosecution. The competent authority has to examine independently and impartially the material on record to form his own opinion whether the offence alleged is frivolous or vexatious. The competent authority may refuse sanction for prosecution if the offence alleged has no material to support or it is frivolous or intended to harass the honest officer. But he cannot refuse to grant sanction if the material collected has made out the commission of the offence alleged against the public servant. Indeed he is duty bound to grant sanction if the material collected lend credence to the offence complained of. There seems to be another reason for taking away the discretion of the investigating agency to prosecute or not to prosecute a public servant. Indeed he is duty bound to grant sanction if the material collected lend credence to the offence complained of. There seems to be another reason for taking away the discretion of the investigating agency to prosecute or not to prosecute a public servant. When a public servant is prosecuted for an offence which challenges his honesty and integrity, the issue in such a case is not only between the prosecutor and the offender, but the State is also vitally concerned with it as it affects the morale of public servants and also the administrative interest of the State. The discretion to prosecute public servant is taken away from the prosecuting agency and is vested in the authority which is competent to remove the public servant. The authority competent to remove the public servant would be in a better position than the prosecuting agency to assess the material collected in a dispassionate and reasonable manner and determine whether sanction for prosecution of a public servant deserves to be granted or not." 56. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court that the requirement of sanction order cannot be dispensed with even in respect of a private complaint filed by a citizen against a public servant alleging offences under the P.C. Act said to have been committed while discharging public duty as a public servant. 57. A bare reading of Section 19 would indicate that it aims at preventing harassment and vexatious prosecution of a public servant. It assures that an honest public servant would not be in a position to oblige everyone and may, therefore, incur displeasure of many of them. This displeasure may even result in his vexatious and malicious prosecution for the offence relating to discharge of his official duties. The Legislature, therefore, thought of providing a reasonable protection to the public servant in the discharge of their official functions so that they continue performing the duties and obligations undeterred by vexatious and unnecessary prosecution. The said provision was noticed by the Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1958 SC 124 ] to hold that the object of the provision for sanction is that the authority according the sanction should be able to consider for itself the evidence before it comes to a conclusion that the prosecution in the circumstances be sanctioned or forbidden. In this connection, the following passage from the decision being important may be quoted for ready reference: "4. The sanction under the Act is not intended to be nor is an automatic formality and it is essential that the provisions in regard to sanction should be observed with complete strictness; Basdeo Agarwala v. Emperor, 1945 FC 93 at p. 98, AIR 1945 FC 16 : (46 Cri LJ 510) at p. 18. The object of the provision for sanction is that the authority giving the sanction should be able to consider for itself the evidence before it comes to a conclusion that the prosecution in the circumstances be sanctioned or forbidden. In Gokulchand Dwarakadas Morarka v. The King, 75 Ind. App. 30 at p. 37, AIR 1948 PC 82 : (49 Cri LJ 261) at p. 84 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also took a similar view when it observed : "In their Lordships' view, to comply with the provisions of Clause 23 it must be proved that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged. It is plainly desirable that the facts should be referred to on the face of the sanction, but this is not essential, since Clause 23 does not require the sanction to be in any particular form, nor even to be in writing. But if the facts constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts, were placed before the sanctioning authority. The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction." 58. Thus, prima facie, it appears that what weighed with the Supreme Court in Subramaniam Swamy (supra), Anil Kumar (supra), Priyanka Srivastava (supra) and other decisions is the object of Section 19. It would be preposterous to suggest that whether the prosecution is vexatious and malicious can be considered or looked into only at the post cognizance stage and not at the stage when the Court concerned directs investigation through police under Section 156(3) of the Code. If the complaint is otherwise malicious and vexatious, the harassment to the public servant concerned would start no sooner the Court orders police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If the complaint is otherwise malicious and vexatious, the harassment to the public servant concerned would start no sooner the Court orders police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If the avowed object of Section 19 is to be kept in mind, then the word "cognizance" as appearing in Section 19 of the Act, 1988, has to be construed as even an order under Section 156(3) of the Code. To put in plain words, for the purpose of directing police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, an appropriate and thorough application of mind is necessary, and once there is an application of mind for such purpose, it amounts to taking cognizance upon the complaint. The term "cognizance" should not be misunderstood or confused with the two stages under the Code i.e. pre-cognizance and post cognizance stage. The term "cognizance" has not been defined anywhere in the Criminal Procedure Code. It has to be understood and interpreted in the context with which it is to be applied. 59. I find it extremely difficult to take the view that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aiyappa (supra) is per incuriam. In Aiyappa (supra), the decision in the case of Subramaniam Swamy (supra) has been considered. Most importantly R.R. Chari (supra), Mohd. Khalid (supra), Pastor P. Raju (supra), K. Kalimuthu v. State [ AIR 2005 SC 2257 ] and State through C.B.I. v. Rajkumar Jain [ AIR 1998 SC 2985 ] have already been considered. After due consideration of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, it was ruled in Aiyappa (supra) that cognizance of the offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is deemed to have been taken at the initial stage itself, when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in the complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is a subsequent stage, when after considering the materials placed before the Court, it decides to proceed against an offender against whom a prima facie case is made out, either referring the case for investigation or proceeding further under Section 200 / Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. 60. The issuance of process is a subsequent stage, when after considering the materials placed before the Court, it decides to proceed against an offender against whom a prima facie case is made out, either referring the case for investigation or proceeding further under Section 200 / Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. 60. In the aforesaid context, I must look into the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra and another [ (2014) 16 SCC 623 ] observed as under: "16. It is necessary to give a salutary clarion caution to all Courts, including High Courts, to be extremely careful and circumspect in concluding a judgment of the Supreme Court to be per incuriam . In the present case, in the impugned Order the learned single Judge appears to have blindly followed the incorrect and certainly misleading editorial note in the Supreme Court Reports without taking the trouble of conscientiously apprising himself of the context in which Rashmi Rekha appears to hold Niranjan Singh per incuriam, and equally importantly, to which previous judgment. An earlier judgment cannot possibly be seen as per incuriam a later judgment as the latter if numerically stronger only then it would overrule the former.." 61. I have also come across one decision of the Kerala High Court delivered by a learned Single Judge in the case of Maneesh E. v. State of Kerala and others [Criminal M.C. No.7331 of 2015 decided on 14th December 2015]. A learned Single, in the said judgment, took the view that Anil Kumar (supra) is per incuriam, as in the said judgment, the Court has not considered a Constitution Bench decision in the case of Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari reported in AIR 1956 SC 44 . I may quote the observations made therein: "2 Annexure-A4 order passed by the learned Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kozhikode, is under challenge. When a complaint was filed by seeking a relief to forward the matter under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for investigation, the court below has chosen to reject the complaint through Annexure-A4 order. Offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act are alleged in the private complaint. In such case, apart from forwarding the matter for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the court below cannot take cognizance of the offences by proceeding through Section 200 or 202 Cr.P.C. 2. Offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act are alleged in the private complaint. In such case, apart from forwarding the matter for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the court below cannot take cognizance of the offences by proceeding through Section 200 or 202 Cr.P.C. 2. In the said matter, an investigation is required and sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is also required on the final report for taking cognizance of the offences. Even when the court below proceeds through Section 200 Cr.P.C., sanction is required within the meaning of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act for taking cognizance of the offences, even though sanction is not required to conduct an inquiry. Therefore, even if the court below decides to have an inquiry within the meaning of Section 200 or 202 Cr.P.C., no fruitful purpose would be served. 3. In such a case, even when the only relief sought for in the complaint is to get the complaint forwarded under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it cannot be said that the complaint is not maintainable, if it reflects sufficient grounds to bring out the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In cases wherein the contents of the private complaint reveal sufficient grounds to invite an offence, the mere fact that the complainant has sought for the relief of forwarding it to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., does not make the complaint not maintainable. When the contents reveal offences, courts are competent to take cognizance of the offences involved or to forward the matter under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. When the contents do not reveal any offence, and the relief sought for is solely for getting it forwarded to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it can be said that such a complaint is not maintainable. 4. In this particular case, it seems that a preliminary enquiry was conducted and it was revealed that there are grounds to believe that the accused had committed the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. 4. In this particular case, it seems that a preliminary enquiry was conducted and it was revealed that there are grounds to believe that the accused had committed the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In such case, the court below ought not to have rejected the complaint merely by highlighting the reason that the relief sought for is one for forwarding the same to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 5 Over and above it, it seems that the court below has relied on the decision in Anil Kumar v. Aiyappa [2013(4) KLT 125 (SC)] by taking a view that even for forwarding the complaint for investigation, sanction is required. The court below has not cared to consider the decision of the Constitution Bench in Nand Ram Agarwala v. H.C. Bhari and others [ AIR 1956 SC 44 (1)], where in an identical situation, it was held that 'sanction was required at the stage of taking cognizance only and not prior to it'. In the decision in Anil Kumar (supra), the aforesaid decision of the Constitution Bench was not considered. When there is a decision squarely applicable on the point by the Constitution Bench, the court below ought to have followed the decision of the Constitution Bench. Matters being so, the impugned order passed by the court below is liable to be set aside. The court below shall follow the observations made above as well as the decision of the Constitution Bench in Nand Ram (supra) and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The petitioner shall appear before the court below on 05.01.2016." 62. In Matajog Dobey (supra), the Supreme Court considered Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. There is a fine difference between Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 19 of the Act, 1988. Both the provisions talk about sanction, but both, in my view, differ in their application. The Supreme Court made the following observations: "20. Is the need for sanction to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained? At first sight, it seems as though there is some support for this view in ' Hori Ram's case (B)', and also in Sarjoo Prasad v. Emperor', AIR 1946 FC 25 (G). Is the need for sanction to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained? At first sight, it seems as though there is some support for this view in ' Hori Ram's case (B)', and also in Sarjoo Prasad v. Emperor', AIR 1946 FC 25 (G). Sulaiman, J., says that as the prohibitions is against the institution itself, its applicability must be judged in the first instance at the earliest stage of institution. Varadachariar, J. also states that the question must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against the public servant in the criminal proceedings. But a careful perusal of the later parts of their judgments shows that they did not intend to lay down any such proposition. Sulaiman, J. refers (at page 52) to the prosecution case as disclosed by the complaint or the 'police report' and he winds up the discussion in these words : "Of course, if the case as put forward fails or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in execution of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped and the complaint dismissed on that ground." The other learned Judge also states at p. 55, "At this stage we have only to see whether the case alleged against the appellant or 'sought to be proved' against him relates to acts done or purporting to be done by him in the execution of his duty." It must be so. The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case." 63. Having regard to the object of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and the language employed, it is clear that the issue as regards sanction under Section 197 can be looked into at any stage of the proceedings. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case." 63. Having regard to the object of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and the language employed, it is clear that the issue as regards sanction under Section 197 can be looked into at any stage of the proceedings. Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. would come into play if any offence is alleged to have been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. Whether such offence, as alleged, is committed by the public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, would be a question of fact and can be determined by the Court even if in the midst of the trial on the basis of the evidence led before the Court. So far as Section 19 of the Act, 1988 is concerned, it makes very clear that the Court will not be able to take cognizance in the absence of any valid sanction. Section 19 of the Act, 1988 does not talk about an act or an offence said to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. This is the fine distinction between Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 64. In Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, reported in (1998) 6 SCC 411 : ( AIR 1998 SC 2595 ), the Supreme Court held as under: "It must be remembered that in spite of bringing such a significant change to Section 197 of the Code in 1973, Parliament was circumspect enough not to change the wording in Section 19 of the Act which deals with sanction. The reason is obvious. The sanction contemplated in Section 197 of the Code concerns a public servant who 'is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty', whereas the offences contemplated in the P.C. Act are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties. Parliament must have desired to maintain the distinction and hence the wording in the corresponding provision in the former P.C. Act was materially imported in the new P.C. Act, 1988, without any change in spite of the change made in Section 197 of the Code." Thereafter, the Supreme Court, in para 10, held as under: "It may he noted that Section 197 of the Code and Section 19 of the Act operate in conceptually different fields. In cases covered under the Act, in respect of public servants the sanction is of automatic nature and thus factual aspects are of little or no consequence. Conversely, in a case relatable to Section 197 of the Code, the substratum and basic features of the case have to be considered to find out whether the alleged act has any nexus with the discharge of duties. Position is not so in the case of Section 19 of the Act." 65. It is crystal clear that as soon as the complaint is filed, the learned Magistrate has to decide either to refer the case to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. or to inquire into the matter himself. In either of the cases, the learned Magistrate has to go through the contents of the complaint and Annexures thereon to the complaint, in order to convince itself that the complainant has made out a case for further action. Therefore, in this context, in Aiyappa's case (supra), the Court held that the order of sanction is an absolute requirement even prior to referring the case to the police for investigation. 66. Whatever may be the legal implications of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aiyappa (supra), the position of law as its stand today is that a valid sanction under Section 19 of the Act, 1988 is mandatory before the Court concerned proceeds to order police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. 67. I am conscious of the fact that this principle laid down by the Supreme Court, by giving plain and literal meaning to the term "cognizance", has led to some confusion. The confusion is that if an order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code amounts to taking of cognizance, then the concept of pre-cognizance stage and post cognizance stage would pale into insignificance. The confusion is that if an order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code amounts to taking of cognizance, then the concept of pre-cognizance stage and post cognizance stage would pale into insignificance. To put it in other words, the law, as on date, is that once the Magistrate decides to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section 200 / Section 204 of the Code, he is deemed to have been taken cognizance, and in the course of the inquiry, he cannot switch over to a pre-cognizance and order police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. 68. What would be the position, if an order under Section 156(3) of the Code, amounts to taking of the cognizance upon a complaint? I am not going into this issue as it is not relevant or necessary for the purpose of deciding this matter. In an appropriate case and at an appropriate stage, the Apex Court may clarify this issue. 69. Before I conclude, I would like to make a reference once again to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava (supra). In Priyankya Srivastava (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. applications should be supported by an affidavit duly sworn of the applicant who seeks to invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. According to the Supreme Court, the object is to verify the truth and also to verify the veracity of the allegations. Such affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. This is somewhat in tune with the object of recording of the verification of the complainant on oath, as provided under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. 70. My final conclusions are as under: [A] The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aiyappa (supra) cannot be termed as per incuriam. [B] The power to take cognizance of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has been conferred on the Special Judge by virtue of Section 5 of that Act. Hence, the application, under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. disclosing the commission of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, can be entertained by the Special Judge only if the complaint is accompanied by a valid sanction accorded by a competent authority under Section 19 of the Act, 1988. Hence, the application, under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. disclosing the commission of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, can be entertained by the Special Judge only if the complaint is accompanied by a valid sanction accorded by a competent authority under Section 19 of the Act, 1988. [C] Although there is no specific provision in the Prevention of Corruption Act conferring power on the Special Judge to act under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., but since the Special Judge, by virtue of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, is empowered to take cognizance of the offences under that Act, yet the order of the registration of the F.I.R. and its investigation on the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. can only be made by the Special Judge. When the Court concerned applies his mind for the purpose of ordering an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, he can be said to have taken cognizance of the complaint. At the stage of referring the complaint to the police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. for investigation, the Court concerned is under an obligation to apply his mind to the allegations made in the complaint. [D] In the absence of a valid sanction issued by a competent authority under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the complaint or an application under section 156(3) of the Code, cannot be looked into and will be liable to be dismissed.