JUDGMENT : The present appeal is filed by the appellant-ESI Corporation, original opponent, under sec. 82 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the ESI Act') being aggrieved with the impugned judgment and order passed by the ESI Court in ESI First Appeal No. 48/2003 in MAT Appeal No. 6/2003 dated 23.11.2004, dismissing the appeal of the appellant-Corporation. 2. Heard learned advocate Shri Sachin Vasavada for the appellant and learned advocate Shri Sashvata Shukla for the defendant. 3. Learned advocate Shri Vasavada referred to the impugned judgment and order and tried to submit that the issue of disability or permanent partial disablement is required to be considered. For that purpose, he referred to sec. 2(15A) of the ESI Act which defines "permanent partial disablement" as follows: "Permanent partial disablement" means such disablement of a permanent nature, as reduces the earning capacity of an employee in every employment which he was capable of undertaking at the time of the accident resulting in the disablement" Provided that every injury specified in Part II of the Second Schedule shall be deemed to result in permanent partial disablement." 4. Learned advocate Shri Vasavada, therefore, submitted that if the injury is falling in Part II of the Second Schedule, it would be a permanent partial disablement. He submitted that the Second Schedule refers to the list of injuries 'deemed to result in permanent partial disablement.' He pointedly referred to the injury at Sl. No. 32 which refers to "loss of vision of one eye without complications or disfigurement of eye-ball, the other being normal." Learned advocate Shri Vasavada submitted that Sl. No.32A also refers to "partial loss of vision of one eye". He therefore submitted that 30% disablement is granted by the ESI Court which is required to be appreciated and considered whether the ESI Court has the power to decide or fix the percentage of disability. 5. Learned advocate Shri Vasavada, therefore, strenuously submitted that once it is accepted that the law provides for the percentage of disability as stated in the Schedule, the Court has no power to go beyond the Schedule. He referred to the impugned judgment and pointedly referred to the discussion in para 6 and submitted that the workman was referred to the Medical Board and on the basis of examination the Board has assessed the disability at 20%. He referred to the impugned judgment and pointedly referred to the discussion in para 6 and submitted that the workman was referred to the Medical Board and on the basis of examination the Board has assessed the disability at 20%. However, referring to the observation so made in para 9 and 11 of the judgment of the ESI Court it has been submitted that the presumption for the disability has been made de hors the disability provided in Schedule 2. He therefore submitted that it is an error which requires interference by this court in the present appeal. Learned advocate Shri Vasavada also referred to the judgment and order of the High Court in First Appeal No. 1957 of 2005 with First Appeal No. 1958 of 2005 (Coram: G.R. Udhwani, J.) dated 25.11.2013 and submitted that it has been observed that ESI Court in absence of evidence could not have enhanced permanent partial functional disablement and therefore it could be said to be a question of law involved and the appeal may be allowed. 6. Learned advocate Shri Shashvata Shukla for the respondent-workman referred to the background of facts and submitted that it is not in dispute that the respondent workman suffered injury during the course of employment. He submitted that the vision is only 6/16 which would mean that he cannot see. Therefore, learned advocate Shri Shukla submitted that Schedule 2 refer to the assessment and percentage of disability. However, he submitted that it refers to the nature of injury and the disability and the inference can be drawn on the basis of evidence. He therefore submitted that the Schedule is only a broad indication or guideline but the court has to consider on the basis of disability or the nature of injury provided in Schedule 2, the impact of such disability and has to decide the functional disability. Learned advocate Shri Shukla therefore submitted that this court has considered the same issue while deciding First Appeal No. 2131 of 2011 vide judgment and order dated 11.4.2012. He pointedly referred to the observations in para 7 to emphasise that the effect of such injury on the vision has to be considered. 7. Learned advocate Shri Shukla has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of this High Court reported in 2011 (5) GLR 4465 in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation v. Kishan Shobhram. He pointedly referred to the observations in para 7 to emphasise that the effect of such injury on the vision has to be considered. 7. Learned advocate Shri Shukla has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of this High Court reported in 2011 (5) GLR 4465 in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation v. Kishan Shobhram. He has further referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1981 AIR(SC) 174 in the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Ameer Hasan and emphasised the observations about the conduct and attitude of the corporation. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1957 Cal. 660 . 8. Learned advocate Shri Shukla referred to sec. 82(2) of the ESI Act and submitted that it provides "an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law." He therefore strenuously submitted that it does not involve any question of law merely because the ESI Court has come to the conclusion with regard to assessment of disability or percentage of disability. He therefore submitted that the court has to consider and appreciate that it is a social piece of legislation which has to be considered keeping in mind the underlying object and purpose of the legislation. He therefore submitted that the present appeal filed by the ESI Corporation may not be allowed. 9. Learned advocate Shri Shukla also referred to the 'Snellen's test types' and submitted that as observed in this if the visual acuity is 6/6 when he is at the distance he can only see a line which a person with standardised vision could see at 24 metres. It has been quoted,- "Thus, if his vision is 'normal' and he sees the line which ought to be read at 6 metres when he is 6 metres distant, his visual acuity is 6/6; if when he is at this distance, he can only see the line which a person with standard vision should see at 24 metres, his visual acuity is 6/24..." He therefore submitted that for the purpose of considering disability regard must be had to the earning capacity and not merely the percentage of disability. He submitted that in view of the statutory provisions of sec. He submitted that in view of the statutory provisions of sec. 82(2) of the ESI Act unless there is a question of law which can be said to have been involved, the present first appeal may not be entertained. 10. In view of these rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present first appeal deserves consideration. 11. As could be seen from the background of facts, it is not in dispute that the respondent workman has suffered injury affecting his vision. The Medical Board had examined and his disability was assessed against which an appeal was preferred being MAT Appeal No. 6/2003 where it was assessed as 20% disability. It is against that the present appellant had challenged the said opinion of the Medical Appellate Tribunal contending that the opinion of the Medical Board may be maintained. The ESI Court dismissed the first appeal of the ESI Corporation being First Appeal No. 48/2003 and accepted the appeal of the respondent for assessment of the disability at 30%. It is this judgment and order against which the present appeal has been preferred. 12. The first contention raised by learned advocate Shri Vasavada with reference to the definition of sec. 2(15A) providing for "permanent partial disablement" and Schedule 2 requires a closer scrutiny. Section 2(15A) defines 'permanent partial disablement and Schedule 2 enumerates the type of disability which would be deemed to result in permanent partial disablement. Therefore, the submission made by learned advocate Shri Vasavada on the basis of the Second Schedule that the loss of vision of one eye without complication or disfigurement of eye-ball, other being normal, loss of earning capacity assessed at 30% is erroneous require a closer scrutiny. The injury which has been emphasised at Sl. No. 32 provide, "loss of vision of one eye without complications or disfigurement of eye-ball, the other being normal." Thus, it refers to loss of vision which may be partial and it clearly states that loss of vision without any other complication and other things being normal meaning thereby it would not be a total loss of vision. Therefore, at this stage the court is required to consider such permanent disablement vis-a-vis the effect on the earning capacity. 13. In the facts of the present case, as discussed in detail with regard to the injury received by the respondent workman, it is not in dispute. Therefore, at this stage the court is required to consider such permanent disablement vis-a-vis the effect on the earning capacity. 13. In the facts of the present case, as discussed in detail with regard to the injury received by the respondent workman, it is not in dispute. However, the aspect of percentage of disability is required to be considered. The MAT having considered the effect on vision and also the opinion of experts for such ailment has come to the conclusion that there is disablement and with 6/36 vision the disability could be 30%. It is in this background the submission made by learned advocate Shri Vasavada are misconceived inasmuch as if the disability affecting the vision would have a bearing on the earning capacity and therefore when there is impairment on the vision the percentage of disability may also differ. Therefore, Schedule 2 referring to the type of injuries and the percentage of disability would not be a straitjacket formula as submitted by learned advocate Shri Vasavada that the court has no jurisdiction to make any assessment or consider the percentage of disability for the purpose of damages on appreciation of the material and evidence. Therefore, such a submission based on Sch. 2 and the nature of injury are misconceived. 14. It is required to be appreciated that a social piece of legislation with the object of providing general welfare has to be considered bearing in mind the underlying object and purpose of the legislation. The approach in such cases has to be balanced with humanity and the assessment of disability based on medical evidence cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material and evidence on record as canvassed. Much emphasis on the Second Schedule with reference to Sl. No.32 that the disability could be at a particular percentage only for such injury is misconceived as the injury or the nature of injury is broadly referred but the disability may be more which can be considered by the experts. Again, the disability or permanent partial disability is one thing but it has an effect on the earning capacity for the purpose of assessment of damage is another thing. The courts are required to consider the loss of earning capacity for the purpose of damages with reference to the percentage of disability and the type of work or vocation in which the person is employed. The courts are required to consider the loss of earning capacity for the purpose of damages with reference to the percentage of disability and the type of work or vocation in which the person is employed. The well-accepted judgment in the case of Carpenter an injury to the thumb of a carpenter could be assessed at 100% functional disability has been believed. In the facts of the case, the respondent workman who would be doing manual work will have the effect or bearing on his earning capacity in the labour market when he is trying to get the job. He would face difficulty in getting the job as well as in doing or performing the job of manual nature with a kind of affected vision affecting his performance. 15. A useful reference can be made to the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in AIR 2012 SCW 902 in the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Hooghly Mills Co. Ltd. & ors. wherein it has been observed, "Under the Directive Principles the State has the obligation for securing just and humane conditions of work which includes a living wage and decent standard of life. The said Act obviously seeks to promote those goals. Therefore, interpretation of the said Act must not only be liberal but it must be informed by the values of Directive Principles. Therefore, an awareness of the social perspective of the Act must guide the interpretative process of the legislative device." Moreover, the approach in such cases has to be balanced with a humanitarian approach. 16. Lord Denning has observed about the purposive approach to the interpretation of such words used in the statute and has clearly observed, "A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in this texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do so as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material or which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." 17. Therefore, having regard to the underlying object of the legislation, which is a beneficial piece of legislation intended for social welfare, the judgment and order of the ESI Court cannot be said to be perverse which would call for any interference. Moreover, the provisions of sec. Therefore, having regard to the underlying object of the legislation, which is a beneficial piece of legislation intended for social welfare, the judgment and order of the ESI Court cannot be said to be perverse which would call for any interference. Moreover, the provisions of sec. 82 of the ESI Act clearly provide, "An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law." 18. Therefore, the moot question is whether the contentions and the submissions which have been raised questioning about the assessment of disability can be said to be a substantial question of law. Though the submissions have been made by learned advocate Shri Vasavada with much emphasis that when the legislature has provided in the schedule referring to different injuries and the assessment of the percentage of disability qua each injury the court could not have assessed the disability is misconceived inasmuch as the Schedule refers to the nature of injuries or the type of injury qua part of the body with reference to the percentage of disability which the law presumes. Schedule 2 Part II refer to the list of injuries deemed to result in permanent partial disablement, meaning thereby, the law presumes about permanent partial disablement if such injuries have occurred. However, the extent of injuries and the loss of earning capacity have to be considered on a case to case basis depending upon the facts and circumstances as such a Schedule is only laying down broad guidelines. The list of injuries which result in permanent partial disablement as provided in the Schedule refers to presumption by the Legislature that such an injury would result in a kind of disability or permanent partial disablement. However, it is referring to the percentage of earning capacity which is normally to be believed, but again, as stated above, has to be considered with other factors like the nature of occupation or vocation in which the person is employed. For example, an injury on the finger on right or left hand and the percentage of disability has been provided but the vocation of the carpenter will have a different context for the purpose of his earning capacity. 19. For example, an injury on the finger on right or left hand and the percentage of disability has been provided but the vocation of the carpenter will have a different context for the purpose of his earning capacity. 19. Therefore, the percentage of disability which the law presumes is one thing and the effect of such disability or percentage of disability on the earning capacity is a different thing. It may have a bearing on his earning capacity depending on his vocation, profession or the nature of work and the same injury may have a different effect on the earning capacity of 2 different persons engaged in different vocations. Therefore, the Schedule cannot be said to be a rule of thumb but rather a broad guideline. Again, as stated above, the assumption of disability could be considered on overall appreciation of the material and evidence by the court and there is no jurisdictional error which can be said to be giving rise to a substantial question of law. It is not a substantial question of law which can be said to have been involved as provided under sec. 82(2) of the ESI Act. A useful reference can be made to the percentage of disability and the loss of earning capacity for the purpose of damages considered by the courts and the tribunals day in and day out in case of vehicular accidents or medical negligence. It is well-accepted that on the basis of the percentage of disability assessed ultimately the earning capacity is considered by the courts for the purpose of assessment. 20. Therefore, the submissions made by learned advocate Shri Vasavada are thoroughly misconceived and the resent first appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed.