JUDGMENT : Indira Banerjee, J. This appeal is against a judgment and Order dated 9th December, 2014 passed by the learned District Judge, Uttar Dinajpur, dismissing the application being Misc. Case No. 12 of 2014 filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for setting aside an award dated 12th November, 2013 passed by the learned Arbitrator, Shri Kalyanmoy Ganguly, a retired Judge of this Court. 2. The learned Arbitrator handed over the original award to the respondent No. 1. On the same day a photocopy of the award was handed over to Sri. Pradip Saha, an Assistant Engineer, who acknowledged receipt thereof. 3. The photocopy of the award that was handed over to Sri. Pradip Saha had the photocopied signature of the learned Arbitrator. However, the learned Arbitrator had not signed the photocopy of the award. 4. The said application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act has been rejected on the ground that it had filed beyond a period of three months and thirty days from the date of receipt of the award. 5. Section 34(3) provides as follows:- “An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.” 6. In view of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, delay beyond three months and thirty days, in filing an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, for setting aside an award, cannot be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 7. In view of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, delay beyond three months and thirty days, in filing an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, for setting aside an award, cannot be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 7. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides as follows:- “Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” 8. The 1996 Act is a special law and Section 34 thereof provides for a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 as observed by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470 . 9. In Popular Construction Company (supra), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the mere stipulation of a period of limitation, howsoever peremptory the language, might not, in itself be sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court, however, held that the crucial words “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, would amount to express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under Section 29(2) of the said Act and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. To quote the Supreme Court “to hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside an award, beyond the extended period of limitation under the proviso, should render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such result.” 10. The proposition that the proviso to Section 34(3) bars the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, beyond the extended period of limitation also finds support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subhash Projects and Marketing Limited reported in (2012) 2 SCC 624 . The proposition that the proviso to Section 34(3) bars the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, beyond the extended period of limitation also finds support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subhash Projects and Marketing Limited reported in (2012) 2 SCC 624 . 11. However, as rightly argued by Mr. Samrat Sen, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the appellant, limitation under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, would only start running from the date of receipt by the appellant of a signed copy of the award, in the manner prescribed by law. 12. In Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Engineers reported in (2010) 12 SCC 210 cited by Mr. Sen, the Supreme Court held that when the award was delivered or deposited or left in the office of a party on a non-working day, the date of such physical delivery would not be the date of receipt of the award by that party. Necessarily the date of receipt would have to be the next working day. The judgment has no application to the facts of this case. 13. Mr. Sen argued that no copy of the award had been served on the appellants. Limitation had, therefore, not started running since the learned Arbitrator handed over a copy of the award to an Assistant Engineer Pradip Saha, who was not authorized to represent the appellants. 14. In any case, the copy of the award that had been received by the said Pradip Saha, Assistant Engineer, from the learned Arbitrator not being a signed copy of the award, limitation could not have started running. The application ought not to have been rejected on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. 15. Referring to Section 31(1) of the 1996 Act, Mr. Sen argued, and rightly, that an arbitral award was required to be made in writing and signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. In arbitral proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal with more than one Arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal would be sufficient, as long as the reason for any omitted signature was stated, as provided in Section 31(2) of the 1996 Act. Sub-section 5 of Section 31 provides that after an arbitral award is made, a signed copy thereof shall be delivered to each party. 16. Sub-section 5 of Section 31 provides that after an arbitral award is made, a signed copy thereof shall be delivered to each party. 16. As held by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors reported in (2005) 4 SCC 239 , cited by Mr. Sen, “the delivery of an arbitral award under sub-section (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter of substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to be ‘received’ by the party. 17. This delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal and receipt by the party of the award sets in motion several periods of limitation such as an application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application for making an additional award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which would be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy of award by the Tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings.” 18. There can be no doubt that the arbitral award would necessarily have to be signed by the Arbitrator. Where the Arbitral Tribunal consists of more than one Arbitrator the Arbitral Award would have to be signed by all the Arbitrators or atleast by the majority of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. However, in our view, it was not the intention of legislature that all the copies of the award, dispatched to the respective parties would have to be separately signed by the Learned Arbitrator. An authentic photocopy of the original award along with the signatures of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal would suffice. 19. However, in our view, it was not the intention of legislature that all the copies of the award, dispatched to the respective parties would have to be separately signed by the Learned Arbitrator. An authentic photocopy of the original award along with the signatures of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal would suffice. 19. Had it been the legislative intent that all copies of the award required to be furnished to the respective parties to a multi party arbitration, should actually be signed by Learned Arbitrator himself and/or in other words, each of the copies should contain the original signature of the learned Arbitrator, Parliament would, perhaps, not have used the expression ‘signed copy of the award’ but used the expression ‘a copy of the award, which is signed by the Arbitrators’, in Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act. 20. In Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1967 SC 526 , the Supreme Court considered what was a signed copy of the award, in the context of Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which required the Arbitrators to cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with depositions and documents which might have been taken or proved before them, to be filed in Court, so that judgment could be pronounced thereon. 21. In Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), it was not in dispute before the Supreme Court that the original award had not been filed in Court. The dispute was, whether the document filed was a signed copy of the award, as the respondent contended that what had been filed, was a certified copy of the award and not a signed copy thereof, and therefore could not be acted upon. In the context of the disputes before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held: “……..Obviously, therefore a copy means a document prepared from the original which is an accurate or true copy of the original. In Webster's New Dictionary, the word “copy” means “a thing made just like another; full reproduction or transcription”. What the word “copy” in Section 14(2) therefore requires is that it must be a full reproduction of the original and that it should be accurate or true. When a document is an accurate or true and full reproduction of the original it would be a copy. What the word “copy” in Section 14(2) therefore requires is that it must be a full reproduction of the original and that it should be accurate or true. When a document is an accurate or true and full reproduction of the original it would be a copy. In the present case it is not in dispute that what was produced by Sri. Dildar Hussain was a true or accurate and full reproduction of the original. It was therefore a copy of the original, and the only question that remains is whether it was signed, for if it was signed, it would be a signed copy. 7. This brings us to the meaning of the word “sign” as used in the expression “signed copy”. In Webster's New World Dictionary, the word ‘sign” means “to write one's name on, as in acknowledging authorship, authorising action etc.” To write one's name is signature. Section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 10 of 1897, has not defined the word “sign” but has extended its meaning with reference to a person who is unable to write his name to include “mark” with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions. This provision indicates that signing means writing one's name on some document or paper. In Mohesh Lal v. Busunt Kumaree, a question arose as to what “signature” meant in connection with Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 9 of 1871. It was observed that ‘where a party to a contract signs his name in any part of it in such a way as to acknowledge that he is the party contracting, that is a sufficient signature”. It was further observed that the document must be signed in such a way as to make it appear that the person signing it is the author of it, and if that appears it does not matter what the form of the instrument is, or in what part of it the signature occurs. 8. We accept these observations and are of the opinion that so long as there is the signature of the arbitrator or umpire on the copy of the award filed in court and it shows that the person signing authenticated the accuracy or correctness of the copy of the document would be a singed copy of the award. 8. We accept these observations and are of the opinion that so long as there is the signature of the arbitrator or umpire on the copy of the award filed in court and it shows that the person signing authenticated the accuracy or correctness of the copy of the document would be a singed copy of the award. It would in such circumstances be immaterial whether the arbitrator or umpire put down the words “certified to be true copy” before signing the copy of the award. If anything, the addition of these words (namely, certified to be true copy) would be the clearest indication of the authentication of the copy as a true copy of the award, which is what Section 14(2) requires, so long as the authentication is under the signature of the arbitrator or the umpire himself.” 22. A judgment is an authority for the proposition of law that is raised and decided. The judgment in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. (supra), rendered in the context of Section 14(2) of Arbitration Act, 1940, is not an authority for the proposition that a certified photo copy of the original award signed by the sole Arbitrator and/or Arbitrators, photocopied along with the signature of the Arbitrator would not be a ‘signed copy’ as contemplated in Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act. 23. In any case, this Court cannot be oblivious of the technical developments that have taken place over the last three or four decades. When Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was enacted, or even when the judgment in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) was pronounced, photocopies, faxed copies, computer print outs with digital signatures, computerized scanned copies, e-mails etc. were not in contemplation. Copies of documents were generally handwritten copies, cyclostyled copies, typed copies or may be carbon copies, which needed to be authenticated by affixation of signature. 24. In recent years, there has been a rise in the popularity of institutionalized arbitration. There are many established, recognized institutions which conduct arbitrations. We see no reason why photocopies of the award with photocopied signatures, or digitally signed awards, duly certified by an authorized office bearer of the institution conducting the arbitration, should not satisfy the requirement of Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act. 25. There are many established, recognized institutions which conduct arbitrations. We see no reason why photocopies of the award with photocopied signatures, or digitally signed awards, duly certified by an authorized office bearer of the institution conducting the arbitration, should not satisfy the requirement of Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act. 25. Moreover there is a vast difference between Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act and Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, under which the original award signed by the Arbitrators or a copy of the award along with signatures of the Arbitrators would have to be filed in Court as observed above so that judgment could be pronounced thereon. There was no requirement in law for the Arbitrators to serve copies of the award to the respective parties. On the other hand, under Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act, copies of the award might have to be served to numerous parties in a multi party arbitration, and it may not be feasible for the Arbitrators to physically sign all the copies of the awards. 26. In our view, limitation under Section 34(3) would start running from the date on which the party applying for setting aside of the arbitral award received a signed copy of the award from the Arbitral Tribunal. Such copy need not necessarily be signed in original by the Arbitrator/majority of the Arbitrators. An authentic photo copy along with signatures would suffice. This issue is covered by a judgment dated 28th August, 2015 of this Bench in APOT 337 of 2015 (National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. v. R. Piyarelall Import & Export Ltd.). 27. The award made over by the learned Arbitrator to Sri. Pradip Saha, Assistant Engineer was a signed copy. However, the question is whether the period of limitation for making an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, would start running from the date on which the signed copy was received by Mr. Pradip Saha, Assistant Engineer. 28. In State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders reported in (2011) 4 SCC 616 , cited by Mr. However, the question is whether the period of limitation for making an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, would start running from the date on which the signed copy was received by Mr. Pradip Saha, Assistant Engineer. 28. In State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders reported in (2011) 4 SCC 616 , cited by Mr. Sen, the issue was, whether the period of limitation for making an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, for setting aside an arbitral award, was to be reckoned from the date on which a copy of the award was received by the applicant by any means or source, or whether it was to start running from the date a signed copy of the award was delivered to the applicant by the Arbitrator. 29. The Supreme Court held that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, could only commence from the date on which the award was received by the applicant in the manner prescribed by law and/or in other words, in the manner for service of the award prescribed in Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act. 30. In ARK Builders (supra) the Arbitrators had not supplied a copy of the award to the appellants. The award holder had, however, forwarded a photocopy of the award to the appellant and claimed payment in terms of the award. The Supreme Court held that limitation would run from the time the award duly signed, was received by the appellant, from the Arbitrator. 31. In ARK Builders (supra) the Supreme Court did not consider the question of whether the copies served by the Arbitrators to the parties concerned, would all have to actually and separately be signed by the Arbitrators themselves. However, the Supreme Court clearly held that limitation would start running from the date on which a copy of the award was received by the applicant from the Arbitral Tribunal. 32. In Benarsi Krishna Committee v. Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited reported in (2012) 9 SCC 496 the Supreme Court held that the expression ‘party’ as defined in Section 2(i)(h) of the 1996 Act clearly indicates a person who is a party to an arbitration agreement. The said definition is not clarified in any way so as to include the agent of the party to such agreement. The said definition is not clarified in any way so as to include the agent of the party to such agreement. Any reference, therefore, made in Section 31(5) and Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act could only mean the party himself and not his or her agent or advocate empowered to act on the basis of a vakalatnama. In the aforesaid case, the award had been served on the advocate. 33. In this case, Sri. Pradip Saha, Assistant Engineer was not a party to the arbitration. The State of West Bengal, represented through the Secretary, Irrigation and Waterways Department and the Executive Engineer were parties. Copies of the award should have been served on the Secretary, Irrigation and Waterways Department, and the Executive Engineer. 34. The award not having been served on the Secretary, Irrigation and Waterways Department, or the Executive Engineer, it cannot be said that limitation had started running. The application under Section 34(2) for setting aside of the arbitral award cannot be held to have been barred by limitation. 35. The appeal is therefore, allowed. 36. The order under appeal is set aside. The learned Court is directed to hear and dispose of the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act on merits, at the earliest preferably within 6 months from the date of communication of this order. 37. Urgent Photostat certified copy, if applied for, be delivered to the learned counsel for the parties, upon compliance of all usual formalities. Sahidullah Munshi, J. : I agree.