JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. These appeals have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 15.10.2007 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Jamnagar in Sessions Case No. 79 of 2005 whereby original accused Nos. 1 to 3 have been convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 304 (Part II) and 447 of IPC and also under Section 135(1) of B.P. Act. The accused have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and have been imposed fine of Rs. 5000/-, in default, simple imprisonment for six months under Section 304 (Part II) of IPC. The accused have also been sentenced to simple imprisonment for three months each under Sections 447 of IPC and 135(1) of B.P. Act. 1.1 Criminal Appeal No. 1291 of 2007 has been preferred by original accused Nos. 1 & 2 and Criminal Appeal No. 1158 of 2008 has been preferred by original accused No. 3 against the conviction and sentence recorded vide the said judgment and order dated 15.10.2007 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Jamnagar in Sessions Case No. 79 of 2005. On the other hand, the State has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 2008 against the acquittal of original accused Nos. 1 to 3 under Section 302 of IPC. 1.2 Original accused No. 1 - Bharabhai Jesabhai Garsar Rabari expired during the pendency of appeal and therefore the case against him stands abated. Accordingly Criminal Appeal No. 1291 of 2007 as well as Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 2008 shall stand abated qua original accused No. 1. His death certificate is taken on record. We have therefore heard the appeals qua original accused Nos. 2 & 3. 2. As per the prosecution case, the deceased had purchased land from one Harijan Manji Pala. However, the said land was a disputed land and there were several litigations pending the court qua the said land. It is the prosecution case that on 01.03.2005, when the complainant - father of deceased was present at his Vaadi accused persons came there on motorcycle armed with sticks and told the complainant "Tara baap ne Upaadi Aav" (Pick up your father). Sensing trouble, the complainant went to the field where the accused had asked him to go. Hasmukh, son of the deceased had reached there before the complainant reached. Sensing trouble, the complainant went to the field where the accused had asked him to go. Hasmukh, son of the deceased had reached there before the complainant reached. It is the prosecution case that on seeing the deceased, the complainant found injuries on the chest, hands and legs of deceased and blood was oozing out of the body of deceased. He had succumbed to the said injuries and therefore his dead body was taken in a cart to his house and thereafter the Sarpanch was informed about the incident. A complaint was therefore registered by the complainant. 2.1 Thereafter, necessary panchnamas were drawn and post mortem was carried out. After completing the inquest panchnama, the offence was registered against the accused. After their arrest and necessary investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused. Ultimately, as the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the same was committed to the Sessions Court. 2.2 The trial was initiated against the accused and during the course of trial the prosecution examined the following witnesses as oral evidences: P.W. No. Name of Witness Exhibit No. 1 Mulji Makanji 31 2 Karan Petha 32 3 Salim Ibrahim 33 4 Salim Nurruddin 34 5 Dr. Pruthvisinh Vaghela 39 6 Rahim Aadam Noida 45 7 Premji Keshavji 46 8 Dr. Shailendrasinh Vijendrasinh 56 9 Govind Rathod 64 10 Hasmukh Rathod 66 11 Pravinchandra Shah 75 12 Gopalbhai Bhovanbhai 78 13 Lalji Nathu 79 14 Kantilal Keshabhai 80 15 Mohan Ramjibhai 81 16 Hitesh Bhatt 86 17 Yogendrasinh Jadeja 89 18 Jashubha Bhayani 93 19 Nanji Gohil 98 20 Dipak Gondaliya 102 21 Ranman Dhochiya 106 22 Rameshpari Gajrajpari 112 23 Arif Amad 117 24 Rakesh Patel 139 25 Kamlesh Patel 172 26 Madhubha Ker 185 2.3 The prosecution also exhibited as many as 73 documents as documentary evidences which have been perused by us such as inquest panchnama at Ex. 25, yadi for post mortem at Ex. 40, P.M. Note at Ex. 42, Report suggesting cause of death at Ex. 43, blood collection form of accused at Ex. 60-62, map of scene of offence at Ex. 76, complaint at Ex. 140, arrest panchnama at Ex. 143, Serological report at Ex. 168 etc. 25, yadi for post mortem at Ex. 40, P.M. Note at Ex. 42, Report suggesting cause of death at Ex. 43, blood collection form of accused at Ex. 60-62, map of scene of offence at Ex. 76, complaint at Ex. 140, arrest panchnama at Ex. 143, Serological report at Ex. 168 etc. 2.4 At the end of the trial and after recording the statement of the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., and hearing arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellants as mentioned aforesaid. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court the appellants have preferred the present appeals. 3. Mr. B.B. Naik, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Premal Rachh, learned advocate for the accused has contended that there is nothing on record to establish that the accused are involved in this case except the complaint and the evidence of the complainant who is the father of the deceased and the evidence of son of deceased. He submitted that in absence of any eye witness in the present case, the trial court has erred in convicting the accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence when the chain has not been completed by the prosecution. 3.1 Mr. Naik has submitted that the evidence of two main witnesses i.e. Govindbhai - father of deceased who is also the first informant and Hasmukh - son of deceased is full of inconsistencies, contradictions and improvements and that they do not inspire confidence and therefore the said evidences could not be relied upon by the trial court. 3.2 Mr. Naik submitted that motive in an alleged offence is very important. He submitted that the prosecution in the instant case has suggested the motive of land dispute but in fact the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the same by producing cogent, relevant and reliable evidence. He submitted that no documentary evidence has been produced to prove that deceased ever purchased the land and was in possession of land of S. No. 113 & 127. He submitted that no independent witness was examined to prove possession of deceased over disputed land including owners of adjoining land. He submitted that no revenue record is produced in that regard and that even the original owner - Harijan Manji Pala is not examined. 3.3 Mr. He submitted that no independent witness was examined to prove possession of deceased over disputed land including owners of adjoining land. He submitted that no revenue record is produced in that regard and that even the original owner - Harijan Manji Pala is not examined. 3.3 Mr. Naik further submitted that the accused persons have no connection with land of S. No. 127 as there is no evidence on record to show that any accused person or their relative had purchased the said land. He submitted that only sale deed dated 16.08.2004 qua S. No. 113 is produced on record which shows that the said land was purchased by Surtanben Devabhai - mother of accused No. 3. 3.4 Mr. Naik contended that so far as the presence of accused persons in the village is concerned, the prosecution has examined only the interested witnesses. He submitted that no independent witness has been examined with regard to presence of accused persons in the village at the time of incident or earlier when so called threats were given to deceased and son of deceased. 3.5 Mr. Naik further submitted that the so called statement (pick your father from the field) assigned to original accused No. 1 allegedly made to both the witnesses cannot be considered as extra judicial confession and therefore the trial court has wrongly relied upon the same to convict the accused for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 3.6 Mr. Naik contended that the panchas of important panchnamas such as scene of offence, arrest of accused, seizure of clothes of accused and seizure of weapons of accused have not supported the case of the prosecution and therefore the panchnamas cannot be relied upon. 3.7 Mr. Naik submitted that the time of death as per the doctor who conducted post mortem and the settled principles of medical jurisprudence do not match with the time of incident as projected by the prosecution. He submitted that even the investigation has many loopholes. He submitted that the FIR was not registered in its due format and that the panchnama of bullock cart was not drawn and that the bullock cart was not seized. He submitted that the blood stained clothes of son of deceased were not seized and that the timing of drawing panchnamas is highly doubtful. He therefore submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against accused Nos. He submitted that the blood stained clothes of son of deceased were not seized and that the timing of drawing panchnamas is highly doubtful. He therefore submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against accused Nos. 2 & 3 and therefore they deserve to be acquitted or at least granted benefit of doubt. 3.8 Mr. Naik in support of his submissions has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kunju Muhammed alias Khumani and another V. State of Kerala reported in (2004) 9 SCC 193 and another decision of this Court in the case of Vinodgar @ Rameshgar Jivangar Goswami Bavaji & Another vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2015 (1) GLR 58 . The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder: "11. The logical process involved in the admission and consideration of circumstantial evidence is explained by Wigmore in paragraph 32 et seq. The test for the admissibility of evidence to prove a circumstantial fact is that "the evidentiary fact will be considered when, and only when, the desired conclusion based upon it is a more probable or natural, or at least a probable or natural hypothesis, and when the other hypotheses or explanations of the fact, if any, are either less probable or natural, or at least not exceedingly more probable or natural" (paragraph 32, page 421). "Where even the possibility of a single other hypothesis remains open, Proof fails, though it suffices for Admissibility if the desired conclusion is merely the more probable, or a probable one, even though other hypotheses, less probable or equally probable remain open. It is thus apparent that, by the very nature of this test or process, a specific course is suggested for the opponent. He may now properly show that one or another of these hypotheses, thus left open, is not merely possible and speculative, but is more probable and natural as the true explanation of the originally offered evidentiary fact" (Paragraph 34, page 423). 12. Kenny states that "an amount of testimony which is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of innocence entirely (i.e., to shift the burden of proof so completely as to compel the prisoner to call legal evidence of circumstances pointing to his innocence), may yet suffice to throw upon him the necessity of offering, by at least an unsworn statement, some explanation. If he remain silent and leave this hostile testimony unexplained, his silence will corroborate it, and so justify his being convicted" (page 388). 13. The principle that criminal Courts should bear in mind is, in the words of C.B. Pollock: "To make a comparison between convicting the innocent man and acquitting the guilty is perfectly unwarranted. There is no comparison between them. Each of them is a great misfortune to the country and discreditable to the administration of justice. The only rule that can be laid down is that in a criminal trial you should exert your utmost vigilance and take care that if the man be innocent he should be acquitted, and if guilty that he should be convicted." (quoted in Donough's Principles of Circumstantial Evidence, 1918, 158). 14. From the above discussion of the law the following propositions emerge as laying down the correct law: (1) Circumstantial evidence to justify conviction must be inconsistent with any reasonable or rational hypothesis of guilt of the accused. (2) When the inference of guilt from the proved incriminating (i.e. circumstantial) facts is a more natural and probable hypothesis than the other, the onus of offering an explanation for the incriminating facts lies upon the accused. If he does not offer any explanation, or falsely denies the very existence of the incriminating facts it is itself a circumstantial fact against him, even if the court is in a position to imagine an explanation. The guilt is the legitimate inference from the incriminating facts and the added circumstantial fact of failure or refusal to offer an explanation for the incriminating facts because it is not reasonable or rational to say that the accused would fail or refuse to offer an explanation consistent with his innocence if he could. It is immaterial in such a case whether the Court can imagine an explanation or not. (3) If the inference of guilt from the proved incriminating facts is a less natural or probable hypothesis than the other, the Court cannot draw it and the accused must be acquitted whether he offers any explanation or not. (4) If the inference of guilt from the proved incriminating facts is as much a natural or probable hypothesis as any other, the accused may be called upon to explain and if he fails or refuses, the Court may treat it as an additional circumstantial fact and infer his guilt. (4) If the inference of guilt from the proved incriminating facts is as much a natural or probable hypothesis as any other, the accused may be called upon to explain and if he fails or refuses, the Court may treat it as an additional circumstantial fact and infer his guilt. Or it may take judicial notice of the other hypothesis even without any explanation by the accused and acquit him. The instant case falls under proposition (2). 21. Thus, from the above, we have reached to the conclusion that the motive for the alleged murder is as weak as it sounds illogical to us. It is well settled that while motive does not have a major role to play in cases based on the eye-witness account of the incident, it assumes importance in cases that rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. Absence of strong motive in the present case, therefore, is something that cannot be lightly brushed aside [See Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 502 ]. 22. It is equally well settled that proof of motive, by itself, may not be a ground to hold the accused guilty. Enmity, as is well know, is a double-edged weapon. Whereas existence of a motive on the part of the accused may be held to be the reason for committing a crime, the same may also lead to false implication. Suspicion against the accused on the basis of their motive to commit the crime cannot, by itself, lead to a judgment of conviction. [See Ramesh Baburao Devaskar and Others v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2007 SC (suppl.) 1606]. 23. The above takes us to consider the second circumstance sought to be relied upon by the prosecution against the accused-appellants. 24. It is the case of the prosecution that on 26th April 2005 the deceased was called by the accused No. 1 at his farm in the morning hours and was murdered at the said farm. According to the prosecution, the recovery of the dead body of the deceased next to the godown of onions at the farm of the accused No. 1 itself is an incriminating piece of circumstance pointing towards the guilty of the accused. According to the prosecution, the recovery of the dead body of the deceased next to the godown of onions at the farm of the accused No. 1 itself is an incriminating piece of circumstance pointing towards the guilty of the accused. In this connection, the first question that deserves consideration is as to whether there is any evidence on record to indicate that the farm i.e. the place of occurrence is of the ownership and possession of the accused No. 1. On the contrary, the documentary evidence in the form of record of rights, Exh. 63, would suggest that the place of occurrence i.e. the farm is of the ownership of the elder brother of the accused No. 1, namely, Ashokbhai. The P.W.-2, Thobanbhai, in his evidence Exh. 24, has deposed that he had not seen the place of occurrence at any time before the incident. The Circle Inspector, the P.W.-3, in his evidence, Exh. 25, has deposed that he had prepared a map of the place of occurrence but was not able to state as to who is the owner or possessor of the said survey number. The P.W.-14, Rameshbhai, in his evidence, Exh. 71 has deposed that he had not seen the accused No. 1 cultivating the farm in question. The documentary evidence, Exh. 65, would indicate that the farm of the accused No. 1 is adjoining the farm where the incident occurred. It is also not the case of the prosecution that the farm, as noted in Exh. 65, belongs to the elder brother of the accused No. 1 but, in fact, it is the accused No. 1 who is in possession of the same. No statement of any of the witnesses residing in the vicinity of the farm have been recorded to establish the ownership of the place of occurrence. 25. Thus, from the above, we are of the view that even the second circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is in no manner incriminating the accused persons in the crime." 4. Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP, however, submitted that the trial court has given cogent reasons for sustaining the conviction under section 304 (Part II) of Indian Penal Code and this court may not interfere in the conviction appeal filed by the accused. Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP, however, submitted that the trial court has given cogent reasons for sustaining the conviction under section 304 (Part II) of Indian Penal Code and this court may not interfere in the conviction appeal filed by the accused. She stated that the trial court has based the conviction not only on the evidence of witnesses but also considered entire circumstances of the case and the facts which are proved by cogent evidence. She has drawn the attention of this Court to the statements of the father of deceased and son of deceased and submitted that these witnesses have supported the contents of the FIR. She has submitted that in view of the post mortem report and the cause of death, the possibility of accidental death is clearly ruled out. She contended that no benefit of doubt is required to be given to the accused as original accused No. 1 had in fact made a statement before the father of deceased which has been rightly considered by the trial court as extra judicial confession. She further submitted that the trial court has erred in acquitting original accused Nos. 1 to 3 under Section 302 when the prosecution has successfully proved the case against them beyond reasonable doubt. In support of her submissions, Ms. Shah has relied upon two decisions of the Apex court; one in the case of Shyamal Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2012) 7 SCC 646 and the other in the case of State of U.P. vs. Naresh & Others reported in 2011 Cri. L.J. 2162. 5. We have perused the records of the case. The case is based on circumstantial evidence in the absence of any eye witness. There is no direct evidence implicating the appellants. It is trite that all the proved circumstances must provide a complete chain, no link of which must be missing and they must unequivocally point to the guilt of the accused and exclude any hypothesis consistent with his innocence. 5.1 As per the latest decision of the Apex Court, we have appreciated, re-appreciated and re-evaluated the evidence led before the trial court in its entirety but we are unable to persuade ourselves to take a different view than the one taken by the trial court. In the present case, the trial court has mainly relied upon the testimonies of two witnesses viz. In the present case, the trial court has mainly relied upon the testimonies of two witnesses viz. P.W. 9 - Govindbhai Muljibhai (Ex. 64) and P.W. 10 - Hasmukh Chhaganbhai Rathod (Ex. 66) who has though been declared hostile has thrown light on the incident. Let us go through the evidence of these witnesses at the outset. 5.2 P.W. 9 is the complainant and father of the deceased. This witness has stated that on the date of incident at around 09.00 am while he was at his field, all three accused came there on motorcycle armed with sticks and told the deceased 'your father is lying in the field'. Hearing this and sensing some trouble, this witness rushed to the field referred by the accused and saw that his son - deceased was lying there in a pool of blood. This witness has further stated that P.W. 10 was already present there and was shouting. This witness has stated that the body of deceased was taken in a bullock cart and thereafter the Sarpanch as well as police authorities were informed. He has specifically stated that it was original accused No. 1 who had told him about the body of his son lying there and that he did not identify the other two accused. In the cross examination of this witness, it is borne out that this witness has named accused No. 1 and identified him but had not identified accused Nos. 2 & 3. 5.3 P.W. 10 - Hasmukh Rathod is the son of the deceased. This witness has been declared hostile by the prosecution. This witness has stated that all the three accused had come to him while he was returning home from the market and accused No. 1 told him that his father's dead body was lying in the field and that P.W. 10 should pick it up immediately else crows and dogs will feed on it. This witness has further stated that hearing this he immediately rushed to the scene of offence and saw his father lying in a pool of blood. This witness has further stated that there was a land dispute going amongst the accused and his father and accused No. 1 had previously administered threat to his father. This witness has further stated that after some time, P.W. 9 also reached the scene of offence. This witness has further stated that there was a land dispute going amongst the accused and his father and accused No. 1 had previously administered threat to his father. This witness has further stated that after some time, P.W. 9 also reached the scene of offence. 5.4 The medical officer who has conducted the post mortem of the deceased has been examined as P.W. 5 - Dr. Pruthvisinh Vaghela. This witness has stated that the injuries sustained by the deceased were possible by way of muddamal stick and that the said injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased. He submitted that the said injuries could be possible by way of hard and blunt substance which was recovered from the accused at the time of drawing recovery panchnama. The cause of death as stated by this witness and coming forth from the post mortem report is due to shock and haemorrhage on account of poly trauma. 6. It is borne out from the records that there was an ongoing dispute regarding the lands in question for quite some time. Accused No. 1 had also in the past administered threats to the deceased for the lands in question. The accused seem to have tried to overreach the court proceedings. We are of the view that the trial court has rightly considered the statement made by accused No. 1 before them as extra judicial confession. From the injuries sustained by the deceased, it is clear that the accused wanted to intimidate the deceased and assault him. The accused persons were armed with sticks and not other weapons which could have killed the deceased instantly. P.W. 10 though has been declared hostile and there are certain improvements in his evidence, however, the same has not proved fatal to the prosecution case. 6.1 It is a settled position that certain discrepancies and contradictions are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses. Therefore, the contention raised by learned advocate for the accused cannot be accepted. The contradictions and/or discrepancies in the present case are not such that it shall affect the core of the prosecution case. Moreover, as far as independent witnesses are concerned, it cannot be possible for the prosecution to each and every time produce independent witnesses. Therefore, the contention raised by learned advocate for the accused cannot be accepted. The contradictions and/or discrepancies in the present case are not such that it shall affect the core of the prosecution case. Moreover, as far as independent witnesses are concerned, it cannot be possible for the prosecution to each and every time produce independent witnesses. We are unable to accept the submission that the eye witness being related to the deceased is an interested witness and therefore his testimony cannot be relied upon. So far as P.W. 6 & 10 are concerned, it is no doubt true that they are related to the deceased and for that reason they may be interested witnesses. However, the law is well settled that the testimony of a partisan or interested witness cannot be discarded merely on that account. The testimony of such a witness cannot be equated with that of a tainted witness. We are also unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that if the prosecution does not produce independent witnesses and merely produces interested witnesses adverse inference be drawn. There is no law requiring the prosecution to necessarily produce independent witnesses and adverse inference be drawn merely on account of their non-production. Producing independent witnesses depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. In this regard it shall be relevant to peruse the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Naresh (supra), more particularly, paras 23 to 26 which are reproduced hereunder: "23. The High Court has disbelieved Balak Ram (P.W. 5), who had suffered the gun shot injuries. His evidence could not have been brushed aside by the High Court without assigning cogent reasons. Mere contradictions on trivial matters could not render his deposition untrustworthy. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage being a stamped witness, thus, his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. 24. The High Court disbelieved both the witnesses Subedar (P.W. 1) and Balak Ram (P.W. 5) as being closely related to the deceased and for not examining any independent witnesses. In a case like this, it may be difficult for the prosecution to procure an independent witness, wherein the accused had killed one person at the spot and seriously injured the other. The independent witness may not muster the courage to come forward and depose against such accused. A mere relationship cannot be a factor to affect credibility of a witness. Evidence of a witness cannot be discarded solely on the ground of his relationship with the victim of the offence. The plea relating to relatives' evidence remains without any substance in case the evidence has credence and it can be relied upon. In such a case the defence has to lay foundation if plea of false implication is made and the Court has to analyse the evidence of related witnesses carefully to find out whether it is cogent and credible. 25. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence. "Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility." Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited." 6.2 It is required to be noted that from a perusal of serological report it is clear that the blood group of the deceased was 'O' whereas the blood group of accused No. 1 & 2 is 'A' and that of accused No. 3 is 'AB'. Blood stains were found on the clothes of deceased, group of which was 'O'. Even the group of blood found from the mud was 'O'. It is pertinent to note that the blood found from the clothes of accused No. 1 & 3 matched blood group 'O' which is that of deceased. Very few scattered blood stains seem to have been found from the clothes of accused No. 2; blood group of which could not be determined. 6.3 Moreover, it has also come on record that accused No. 1 and 3 used to administer threats to the deceased with regard to the land in question which was allegedly sold to the mother of accused No. 3. The deceased had filed civil suit against the accused persons and therefore there had been disputes amongst the deceased and the accused persons. It is clear that though the appellants had. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that there was any lack of motive in the alleged offence. The deceased had filed civil suit against the accused persons and therefore there had been disputes amongst the deceased and the accused persons. It is clear that though the appellants had. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that there was any lack of motive in the alleged offence. The decision cited by learned advocate for the appellants shall therefore not be applicable on the facts of the present case. The prosecution has completed the chain of evidence so far as role of accused No. 3 is concerned. We are supported in our view by the latest decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar Singh alias Raju alias Batya vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 2013 SC 3150 and in the case of Anuj Kumar Gupta alias Sethi Gupta vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 2013 SC 3013 . 7. However, the role of accused No. 2 has not been clearly etched out from the evidence on record. It has not come on record of the evidence that he had administered any threats to the deceased or his family members or that the blood stains found on his shirt remained undetermined. The deceased has made an application at Ex. 187 against accused Nos. 1 & 3 and the police had also recorded his statement wherein he had stated that he was being harassed by accused Nos. 1 & 3. Moreover, it is borne out that S. No. 113 was purchased by Surtanben Devabhai - mother of accused No. 3 and therefore he was highly interested in the land in question. We find that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against accused No. 2 beyond reasonable doubt. We are therefore of the opinion that accused No. 2 is required to be granted benefit of doubt and acquitted accordingly. However, the sentence imposed upon original accused No. 3 is just and proper. 8. For the foregoing reasons, Criminal Appeal No.1291 of 2007 is partly allowed. Original accused No. 2 is acquitted of the charges levelled against him by granting him benefit of doubt. Bail bond qua original accused No. 2 shall stand cancelled. Criminal Appeals No.150 & 1158 of 2008 are dismissed. The judgment and order dated 15.10.2007 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Jamnagar is modified accordingly. Original accused No. 2 is acquitted of the charges levelled against him by granting him benefit of doubt. Bail bond qua original accused No. 2 shall stand cancelled. Criminal Appeals No.150 & 1158 of 2008 are dismissed. The judgment and order dated 15.10.2007 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Jamnagar is modified accordingly. Original accused No. 3 shall surrender before the competent authorities within a period of twelve weeks to serve the remaining period of sentence. He shall be granted benefit of remission and set off for the sentence already undergone in accordance with law. R & P to be sent back to the trial court forthwith.