Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Common questions of law and facts are involved in these writ petitions; hence they are clubbed and are taken up together for disposal by this common judgment. 2. It is averred in the writ petitions that the petitioners were engaged by the respondents on daily wage basis in the years 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 1996, 1998,1999, 2000, and 2007 respectively as averred in paras 2 and 3 of the writ petitions. Their services were orally terminated by the respondents without complying with the provisions of Section 25-G and F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 somewhere in the years 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001 to 2004, 2007, 2011 and 2012. At the time of termination, the petitioners were assured by the respondents that they would be reemployed as and when work is available, but the Department is stated to have appointed the junior persons than the petitioners, who are still continuing but the petitioners have not been given appointment. 3. The petitioners raised Demand/industrial disputes against their termination somewhere in the years 2005 to 2012, in their respective petitions, before the Labour Commissioner for referring the matter to the State Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, for short ‘the Industrial Tribunal’, but the Labour Commissioner refused to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal for the reason that there was inordinate delay in raising the disputes. 4. The petitioners, by the medium of these writ petitions, have sought a writ of certiorari for quashing the orders made by the Labour Commissioner and a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to refer the disputes for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, on the grounds taken in the writ petitions. 5. As discussed hereinabove, petitioners have chosen to remain in deep slumber for not less than 8-12 years and have come out of deep slumber after more than 8 to 12 years. While going through the writ petitions, it appears that the petitioners remained contented with the orders of their termination and had not made any murmur for making reference. 5. As discussed hereinabove, petitioners have chosen to remain in deep slumber for not less than 8-12 years and have come out of deep slumber after more than 8 to 12 years. While going through the writ petitions, it appears that the petitioners remained contented with the orders of their termination and had not made any murmur for making reference. It is only after noticing the judgment of the apex Court in Ajaib Singh versus Sirhind Cooperative Societies Ltd reported in AIR 1999 SC 1351 , Raghubir Singh versus General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, reported in 2014 AIR SCW 5515, which has been relied upon by this Court in a batch of writ petitions, CWP No. 9467 of 2014 titled as Pratap Chand versus Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board and others, being the lead case, decided on 30.12.2014 and in so many cases, has set aside the orders and directed the Labour Commissioner to make reference to the Industrial Tribunal, reference of which have been made in all the writ petitions. Thus, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that these writ petitions are only because of the judgment made by the apex Court and the judgments made by this Court, is suggestive of the fact that the petitioners were fence-sitter and watching what will happen to other cases. The petitioners have not made any murmur till the judgments were made by the apex Court and by this Court in so many cases. 6. The apex Court in case titled Prabhakar versus Joint Director Sericulture Department and another reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984, has held that if the dispute survives reference is to be made and if dispute does not survive, reference is not to be made. It is apt to reproduce paras 42 and 43 of the said judgment herein. “42. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference Under Section 10(1) of the Act, yet it is for the 'appropriate Government' to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words 'at any time' used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the Act. The words 'at any time' used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry 43. On the application of the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, we are of the view that High Court correctly decided the issue holding that the reference at such a belated stage i.e. after fourteen years of termination without any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had not jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing dispute.” 7. In all these writ petitions, the petitioners have virtually accepted their termination orders and have not raised any finger for 8-10 years. Thus, the dispute in all these writ petitions does not survive. 8. The writ petitioners are also caught by delay and laches conduct, acquiescence and waiver. 9. It is beaten law of land that delay takes away the settings of law. A person who does not seek relief within time, his petition has to be dismissed only on the grounds of delay and laches, otherwise, it would amount to gross misuse of jurisdiction and disturb the settled position. 10. The Apex Court in a case titled as R & M Trust versus Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and others, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 91 , held that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; delay defeats equity and it cannot be brushed aside without any plausible explanation. It is apt to reproduce para 34 of the judgment herein: “34. There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot disturb the third-party interest created on account of delay. Even otherwise also why should the Court come to the rescue of a person who is not vigilant of his rights?” 11. There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot disturb the third-party interest created on account of delay. Even otherwise also why should the Court come to the rescue of a person who is not vigilant of his rights?” 11. The Apex Court in cases titled as S.D.O. Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. and others versus Timudu Oram, reported in 2005 AIR SCW 3715, and Srinivasa Bhat (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. versus A. Sarvothama Kini (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., reported in AIR 2010 SC 2106 , has also discussed the same principle. It is profitable to reproduce para 9 of the judgment in Timudu Oram's case (supra) herein: “9. In the present case, the appellants had disputed the negligence attributed to it and no finding has been recorded by the High Court that the GRIDCO was in any way negligent in the performance of its duty. The present case is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others (supra), 1999 AIR SCW 3383 : AIR 1999 SC 3412 . The High Court has also erred in awarding compensation in Civil Appeal No. …........... of 2005 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 9788 of 1998). The subsequent suit or writ petition would not be maintainable in view of the dismissal of the suit. The writ petition was filed after a lapse of 10 years. No reasons have been given for such an inordinate delay. The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition after a lapse of 10 years. In such a case, awarding of compensation in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be justified.” 12. It would also be apt to reproduce para 39 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Bhakra Beas Management Board versus Kirshan Kumar Vij & Anr., reported in AIR 2010 SC 3342 , herein: “39. Yet, another question that draws our attention is with regard to delay and laches. In fact, respondent No. 1's petition deserved to be dismissed only on that ground but surprisingly the High Court overlooked that aspect of the mater and dealt with it in a rather casual and cursory manner. Yet, another question that draws our attention is with regard to delay and laches. In fact, respondent No. 1's petition deserved to be dismissed only on that ground but surprisingly the High Court overlooked that aspect of the mater and dealt with it in a rather casual and cursory manner. The appellant had categorically raised the ground of delay of over eight years in approaching the High Court for grant of the said relief. But the High Court has simply brushed it aside and condoned such an inordinate, long and unexplained delay in a casual manner. Since, we have decided the matter on merits, thus it is not proper to make avoidable observations, except to say that the approach of the High Court was neither proper nor legal.” 13. The Apex Court in the case titled as State of Jammu & Kashmir versus R.K. Zalpuri and others, reported in JT 2015 (9) SC 214, held that a Writ Court while deciding a writ petition, is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. It is apt to reproduce paras 26 to 28 of the judgment herein: “26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court. 27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim "Deo gratias" - 'thanks to God'. 28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless noninterference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless noninterference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present.” 14. This Court also in LPA No. 48 of 2011 titled Shri Satija Rajesh N. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others decided on 26.8.2014, LPA No. 150 of 2014 titled Mr. Inderjit Kumar Dhir versus State of H.P. and others, decided on 17th September, 2014, batch of LPAs lead case of which is LPA No. 107 of 2014 titled Amit Attri and others versus Anil Verma and others decided on 3rd December, 2014 and LPA 270 of 2010 titled Bhem Sen Sharma versus HP University and another decided on 2nd May, 2016, has laid down the similar principles of law. 15. The Apex Court has considered the same issue and point in a case titled as Delhi Administration and Ors. versus Kaushilya Thakur and Anr., reported in AIR 2012 SC 2515 . It is apt to reproduce para 10 of the judgment herein: “10. We have heard Shri H.P. Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri Rishikesh, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and perused the record. In our view, the impugned order as also the one passed by the learned Single Judge are liable to be set aside because, (i) While granting relief to the husband of respondent No. 1, the learned Single Judge overlooked the fact that the writ petition had been filed after almost 4 years of the rejection of an application for allotment of 1000 sq. yards plot made by Ranjodh Kumar Thakur. The fact that the writ petitioner made further representations could not be made a ground for ignoring the delay of more than 3 years, more so because in the subsequent communication the concerned authorities had merely indicated that the decision contained in the first letter would stand. yards plot made by Ranjodh Kumar Thakur. The fact that the writ petitioner made further representations could not be made a ground for ignoring the delay of more than 3 years, more so because in the subsequent communication the concerned authorities had merely indicated that the decision contained in the first letter would stand. It is trite to say that in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot entertain belated claims unless the petitioner offers tangible explanation State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai (1964) 6 SCR 261 . (ii) The claim of Ranjodh Kumar Thakur for allotment of land was clearly misconceived and was rightly rejected by the Joint Secretary (L&B), Delhi Administration on the ground that he was not the owner of land comprised in khasra No. 70/2. A bare reading of Sale Deed dated 12.7.1959 executed by Shri Hari Chand in favour of Ranjodh Kumar Thakur shows that the former had sold land forming part of khasra Nos. 166, 167 and 168 of village Kotla and not khasra No.70/2. This being the position, Ranjodh Kumar Thakur did not have the locus to seek allotment of land in terms of the policy framed by the Government of India. The payment of compensation to Ranjodh Kumar Thakur in terms of the award passed by the Land Acquisition Collector and the enhanced compensation determined by the Reference Court cannot lead to an inference that he was the owner of land forming part of Khasra No.70/2. In any case, before issuing a mandamus for allotment of 1000 square yards plot to the writ petitioner, the High Court should have called upon him to produce some tangible evidence to prove his ownership of land forming part of Khasra No.70/2. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court did not pay serious attention to the stark reality that Ranjodh Kumar Thakur was not the owner of land mentioned in the application filed by him for allotment of 1000 square yards land.” 16. The Apex Court in a case titled as Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others versus T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , has taken into consideration all the judgments and the development of law and held that delay cannot be brushed aside without any reason. The Apex Court in a case titled as Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others versus T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , has taken into consideration all the judgments and the development of law and held that delay cannot be brushed aside without any reason. It is apt to reproduce paras 13 to 17 of the judgment herein: “13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service,, AIR 1969 SC 329 , the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221, which is as follows: (Balwant Regular Motor Service case, AIR 1969 SC 329 , AIR pp. 335-36, para 11) “11. …..Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.' (Lindsay Petroleum Co. case, PC pp/ 239- 40)” 14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 , while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that: (SCC p. 692, para 19) “19. case, PC pp/ 239- 40)” 14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 , while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that: (SCC p. 692, para 19) “19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person’s entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.” 15. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Court observed that : (SCC p. 594, para 24) “24. …......it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.” It has been further stated therein that: (Nandlal Jaiswal case, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 , SCC p. 594, para 24) “24. …..... If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.” Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice. 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 17. The writ petition can be filed within three years from the date; the cause of action has accrued. If it is not filed within the time the petition is to be dismissed as time barred. 18. The question arose for the first time before the apex Court in case Jai Dev Gupta versus State of Himachal Pradesh and another reported in AIR 1998 SC 2819 , whether the arrears can be restricted only for three years prior to the filing of the writ petition, in terms of the mandate of Limitation Act. The question was answered in affirmative by the apex Court. It is apposite to reproduce paras 2 and 3 of the said judgment herein. “2. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that before approaching the Tribunal the appellant was making number of representations to the appropriate authorities claiming the relief and that was the reason for not approaching the Tribunal earlier than May, 1989. We do not think that such an excuse can be advanced to claim the difference in backwages from the year 1971. In Administrator of Union Territory of Daman and Diu v. R. D. Valand, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 593, this Court while setting aside an order of Central Administrative Tribunal has observed that the Tribunal was not justified in putting the clock back by more than 15 years and the Tribunal fell into patent error in brushing aside the question of limitation by observing that the respondent has been making representations from time to time and as such the limitation would not come in his way. In the light of the above decision, we cannot entertain the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the difference in backwages should be paid right from the year 1971. In the light of the above decision, we cannot entertain the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the difference in backwages should be paid right from the year 1971. At the same time we do not think that the Tribunal was right in invoking Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act for restricting the difference in backwages by one year. 3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the appellant is entitled to get the difference in backwages from May, 1986. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.” [emphasis supplied] 19. The apex Court in another judgment delivered in case Union of India and others versus Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 648 , has laid down the same propositions of law and held that arrears should be restricted to three years prior to filing of writ petition. It is apt to reproduce paras 4 to 8 of the said judgment herein. “4. The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A continuing wrong refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. Recurring/successive wrongs are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This Court in Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan,, explained the concept of continuing wrong (in the context of Section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963) : It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. 5. In M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, the appellant approached the High Court in 1989 with a grievance in regard to his initial pay fixation with effect from 1.8.1978. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. 5. In M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, the appellant approached the High Court in 1989 with a grievance in regard to his initial pay fixation with effect from 1.8.1978. The claim was rejected as it was raised after 11 years. This Court applied the principles of continuing wrong and recurring wrongs and reversed the decision. This Court held : “5……The appellant s grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the appellant s claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant s claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by him, such as, promotion etc., would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred.... 6. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred.... 6. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India, 2007 9 SCC 274 , this Court held: “8…..The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition.... If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. 7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. 8. In this case, the delay of 16 years would affect the consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not justified in directing payment of arrears relating to 16 years, and that too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser. It ought not to have granted interest on arrears in such circumstances.” 20. The apex Court in a latest judgment delivered in case Asger Ibrahim Amin versus Life Insurance Corporation of India reported in JT 2015 (9) SC 329 has also laid down the same principles of law. It is profitable to reproduce paras 4, 4.1 and 16 of the said judgment herein. “4. As regards the issue of delay in matters pertaining to claims of pension, it has already been opined by this Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2008 8 SCC 648 that in cases of continuing or successive wrongs, delay and laches or limitation will not thwart the claim so long as the claim, if allowed, does not have any adverse repercussions on the settled third-party rights. This Court held: 7. This Court held: 7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. [emphasis is ours] 4.1 We respectfully concur with these observations which if extrapolated or applied to the factual matrix of the present case would have the effect of restricting the claim for pension, if otherwise sustainable in law, to three years previous to when it was raised in a judicial forum. Such claims recur month to month and would not stand extinguished on the application of the laws of prescription, merely because the legal remedy pertaining to the time barred part of it has become unavailable. This is too well entrenched in our jurisprudence, foreclosing any fresh consideration. 5 to 15……….. …. …… …. 16. Such claims recur month to month and would not stand extinguished on the application of the laws of prescription, merely because the legal remedy pertaining to the time barred part of it has become unavailable. This is too well entrenched in our jurisprudence, foreclosing any fresh consideration. 5 to 15……….. …. …… …. 16. We thus hold that the termination of services of the Appellant, in essence, was voluntary retirement within the ambit of Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of 1995. The Appellant is entitled for pension, provided he fulfils the condition of refunding of the entire amount of the Corporation's contribution to the Provident Fund along with interest accrued thereon as provided in the Pension Rules of 1995. Considering the huge delay, not explained by proper reasons, on part of the Appellant in approaching the Court, we limit the benefits of arrears of pension payable to the Appellant to three years preceding the date of the petition filed before the High Court. These arrears of pension should be paid to the Appellant in one instalment within four weeks from the date of refund of the entire amount payable by the Appellant in accordance of the Pension Rules of 1995. In the alternative, the Appellant may opt to get the amount of refund adjusted against the arrears of pension. In the latter case, if the amount of arrear is more than the amount of refund required, then the remaining amount shall be paid within two weeks from the date of such request made by the Appellant. However, if the amount of arrears is less than the amount of refund required, then the pension shall be payable on monthly basis after the date on which the amount of refund is entirely adjusted.” [Emphasis supplied] 21. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the Government has made references in the cases of similarly situated persons without any objection regarding the delay and have also relied on the judgment delivered by the apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 9714 of 2016 titled Basant Singh versus State of H.P. and others alongwith connected matters. The argument though attractive is devoid of any force for the following reasons. 22. The argument though attractive is devoid of any force for the following reasons. 22. The petitioners have made applications for making references after a considerable delay, after noticing the judgment made by the apex Court read with the judgments made by this Court, as discussed in para 5 supra. It appears that the petitioners were fencers, as discussed hereinabove and made an attempt for making references. The State has made the references perhaps in terms of the judgments made by this Court. The latest judgment was not in place at that time. Viewed thus, it cannot be said that the petitioners are similarly situated persons. 23. Having said so, the writ petitions are dismissed alongwith pending applications, if any, as indicated hereinabove.