ORDER : Jayant Patel, J. The present petition is directed against the order dated 26.11.2012 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal' for short), whereby the Tribunal has allowed the Original Application. 2. We may further record that after the aforesaid order was passed by the Tribunal, review application was preferred by the petitioners being Review Application No. 15/2013 before the Tribunal and the Tribunal vide order dated 24.07.2015 has dismissed the review application, which is also assailed in this writ petition. 3. We have heard Mr. N.S. Prasad, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. 4. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners was that it is not that in every case the recovery of excess payment made by the employer to the employee is not permissible. He submitted that the issue concerns public money and if excess payment has been made due to bona fide mistake or without authority on the part of the person who has paid money, there is no reason why recovery should not be permitted. He also submitted that fraud or misrepresentation made by the employee concerned should not be the only criteria for permitting recovery of the excess amount paid. He heavily relied upon the decision of Apex Court in case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal and others v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2012) 8 SCC 417 (Chandi Prasad Uniyal) and more particularly, the observations made at paragraph-14 of the said decision. He submitted that if the matter is examined in light of the aforesaid observations made by the Apex Court in the above referred decision, it can be said that the Tribunal has committed an error in not properly considering the matter and hence this Court may interfere. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners fairly submitted that after the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal, the matter again had come up before a larger Bench (three Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court) in the case of State of Punjab and others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), (2014) 8 SCC 883 (Rafiq Masih) and the larger Bench interpreted the decision of the Apex Court in case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal as declaration made under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and the earlier decisions were held as made under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It was also submitted that subsequently the very case i.e., the case of Rafiq Masih, came up again before the Division Bench, as per the decision of the larger Bench of the Apex Court and the matter was again considered and the decision is reported at State of Punjab and others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), (2015) 4 SCC 334 . The submission of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners was that once the decision of the Apex Court in case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal was found as the decision by the larger Bench (three Hon'ble Judges) under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, in the subsequent decision of two Hon'ble Judges in case of Rafiq Masih (second case i e., [ (2015) 4 SCC 334 ]), the effect could not be diluted. He therefore submitted that this Court may consider the matter as covered by the; decision of the Apex Court in case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal. It is his submission, if the observations made at paragraph-14 in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal are followed, then the order passed by the Tribunal quashing the recovery cannot stand in the eye of law and hence, this Court may interfere. 6. Before we consider the legal aspects, we need to emphasise on two aspects. One is that the decision to pay higher pay scale was taken by the Management of the petitioners where the employee concerned had no role to play in the decision making process. It is true that the Central Government may not have sanctioned or may not have approved the decision of the Management of the petitioners, but thereby, it cannot be said that it was a case of any fraud or misrepresentation played by the employees concerned who were beneficiaries of the decision. Secondly, majority of the employees concerned on whose behalf the application was filed before the Tribunal were of Class-III cadre except one Smt. Gayathri and one other, who were above in the cadre but in any case, they have retired by now. Not only the said employee Smt. Gayathri, who was above in the cadre but majority of the employees have retired by now or are on the verge of retirement. 7. It is in light of the aforesaid fact situation, that the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners needs to be examined. Not only the said employee Smt. Gayathri, who was above in the cadre but majority of the employees have retired by now or are on the verge of retirement. 7. It is in light of the aforesaid fact situation, that the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners needs to be examined. It is true that the observations were made by the Apex Court in case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal that when it is public money involved the amount paid/received without any authority of law should be permitted to be recovered. But even in the said decision at paragraph-14, the Apex Court did carve out an exception of extreme hardship. It is also correct that thereafter when the question again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in case of Rafiq Masih before the Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court, it was held that the observations were made in case of Chandi Rrasad Uniyal decision under Article 136 and not Article 142 of the Constitution of India. But, further the relevant aspect is that the very matter thereafter was referred to two Hon'ble Judges, in the very decision. Further, without answering the reference the matter was sent back to the Division Bench for appropriate disposal. Thus matter was again placed before a Division Bench of the Apex Court and the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Rafiq Masih (second decision) held and observed at paragraph-18, which reads as under: "18. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to herein above, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law: (i) Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV service (or Group C and Group D service). (ii) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. (ii) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. (iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. (v) In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover." 8. An attempt made by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners that the observations made by the Apex Court in its later decision in the case of Rafiq Masih cannot dilute the observations made by the Apex Court in its earlier decision in the case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal, cannot be countenanced for two reasons. One is that even in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal an exception has been made as in the case of extreme hardship. In the later decision, in the case of Rafiq Masih, the Apex Court addressed on the question of situations of hardship and elaborately considered various situations/circumstances of hardship. Of course they are few and only illustrative and not exhaustive. In these circumstances, it is not possible for us to accept the contention that the present matter should be decided only on the basis of the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal and more particularly at paragraph-14, as it was found as the case decided under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and not on the later decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rafiq Masih, whereby the Apex Court addressed itself on the question of various situations of hardship precluding an action for recovery of the amount already paid. The contention that the later judgment in Rafiq Masih is not under Article 136 of the Constitution of India runs counter to record because in the very decision at the first paragraph, leave has been granted under Article 136 of the Constitution. 9. The contention that the later judgment in Rafiq Masih is not under Article 136 of the Constitution of India runs counter to record because in the very decision at the first paragraph, leave has been granted under Article 136 of the Constitution. 9. If the fact situation of the present case is considered on the above legal position and more particularly, the observations made by the Apex Court at paragraph-18 reproduced herein above in its later decision in the case of Rafiq Masih, we find that the situation in the present case stands covered by Clause (i) and Clause (ii) apart from Clause (v). As recorded by us earlier, all the employees were belonging to Class-111 in service and therefore those employees would be covered by Clause-(iii) and (iv) except two persons who were of the higher rank but the Learned Counsel fairly conceded that they have also retired by now and therefore would stand covered by Clause-(ii) of the above required decision vide paragraph-18. 10. It is hardly required to state that the power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arising from the order passed by the Tribunal has a limited scope of judicial scrutiny. If the error is found to be apparent on the face of the record or grave injustice is caused or any statutory provision is breached, the case may call for interference in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Tribunal once having found that the recovery was not permitted and such decision, in our view, when considered in the above legal position, cannot be faulted with, it would not be a case for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. In view of the above, we do not find any case for interference with the decision of the Tribunal. Hence, the petition is meritless. Therefore, the petition is dismissed. Writ Petition is Dismissed.