JUDGMENT Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 5.12.1998 passed by 4th Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur passed in Civil Appeal no. 503/ 1982. 2. In original Suit No. 622/1978 (Smt. Matorna v. Mahendra & others), the plaint case in brief was that Ramdhari was husband of plaintiff Matorna who was ill and hospitalized from 19.5.1978 to 11.6.1978, and later on after the death of her husband Ramdhari, plaintiff came to know that defendants are trying to place their claim on property of Ramdhari on the basis of alleged registered sale-deed dated 23.05.1978 allegedly executed by Ramdhari in favour of defendants. Since Ramdhari had not executed the said disputed sale-deed, and said sale-deed is an act of forgery and fraud without any consideration, therefore the disputed registered sale-deed dated 23.05.1978 allegedly executed on behalf of Ramdhari in favour of plaintiff is liable to be cancelled, for which plaintiff had filed suit for cancellation of said document. 3. In written-statement, defendants had denied the plaint averments and pleaded that Ramdhari was never hospitalized in between 19.05.1978 to 11.06.1978. He had executed the registered sale-deed in favour of defendants in their appeal since after receiving consideration. Therefore, suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. After framing issues and receiving the adduced evidences, the Court of IVth Additional Munsif, Gorakhpur had dismissed the original suit with finding that plaintiff had failed to prove its case for cancellation of sale-deed in question. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 30.10.1982 of the trial court, the Civil Appeal no. 503 of 1982 (Smt. Matorna v. Mahendra & others) was preferred by plaintiff of original suit. The first appellate court had also heard the appeal and dismissed the original suit by its judgment dated 1.2.1985. 5. Then aggrieved by the judgments of the trial court dated 30.10.1982 and judgment of the first appellate court dated 1.2.1985, the plaintiff of original suit had preferred Second Appeal no. 619/1985 before this Court. In this second appeal this Court had afforded opportunity of hearing to the parties and gave finding that for proper adjudication of the dispute, the matter should be remanded back to the lower appellate court to call for the documents relating to bed-head ticket of allegedly hospitalized Ramdhari and then matter should be decided by the first appellate court. With this finding the second appeal no. With this finding the second appeal no. 619/1985 was allowed by the judgment dated 10.01.1997 of this Court. At the time of deciding the said second appeal, this Court had concluded its judgment with following observation : "The courts are very cautious in remanding a suit and always slow to act upon. Remand is not a legal authority to fill up the lacuna but in a suit where proper adjudication is not possible for want of a document which is available now, I feel that it should be remanded allowing the authority to call for a in document and to prove it. It is also necessary to decide the facts as to who is in possession and whether such possession has any effect on the forms of the suit. On these two points I find that the case should be remanded back to the lower appellate court to examine the same and to give proper verdict. The appeal is therefore allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the IVth Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur, dated 1.2.1985 is hereby set aside The suit is remanded back to the said court with a direction to allow the plaintiff to call for the bed head ticket lying in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur or elsewhere and to allow him to prove it. He will also hear both the parties on the point of possession as indicted above and proceed to decide the case on merits and according to law." 6. After the judgment dated 10.01.1997 in second appeal no. 625/ 1985 by above mentioned order, the matter was again placed before the first appellate court. Then first appellate court had directed for summoning the record of bed-head tickets, examined three witnesses and then passed dated 5.12.1998 in first appeal, by which appeal was allowed, the judgment dated 30.10.1982 of trial court was set aside and the original suit for cancellation of sale-deed dated 19.05.1978 was decreed and said sale-deed was cancelled. Then aggrieved by the judgment dated 05.12.1998 of 4th Additional Judge, Gorakhpur, present Second Appeal was preferred by the defendants of original suit. 7. At the time of admission of this Second Appeal following three substantive questions of law were framed: (1) Whether on the findings that Ram Dhari was admitted in the hospital could lead the findings that Ram Dhani could not have executed the sale deed. 7. At the time of admission of this Second Appeal following three substantive questions of law were framed: (1) Whether on the findings that Ram Dhari was admitted in the hospital could lead the findings that Ram Dhani could not have executed the sale deed. (2) Whether alibi pleaded and moved was sufficient to lead to the findings that the Ram Dhari could not have executed the sale deed. (3) Whether suit was liable to be dismissed under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that first appellate court had to follow the directions given to it in judgment dated 10.01.1997 of second appeal no. 619/1985 to said court, but it had exceeded its jurisdiction. He contended that not only the finding of first appellate court were perverse on facts, as it had considered such evidences which were not legally acceptable, but said Court had also acted beyond the directions of this Court in second appeal no. 619/1985. He pleaded that it was alleged remand under the directions of this Court in second appeal no. 619/1985, which was for accepting the limited evidence and then passing the judgment, but the first appellate court had exceeded the directions referred to in judgment dated 10.01.997 of this Court and accepted the evidence of those persons also which were not required, and also considered those evidences which were not expected from said court in the direction mentioned in the judgment dated 10.01.1997 in second appeal. It was a case of limited remand, but the first appellate court had passed erroneous judgments dated 05.12.1998 on the basis of unacceptable evidences. Therefore, this appeal should be allowed. He further submitted that this court has power to accept additional substantial questions of law at the time of hearing. So the two substantial questions of law should be admitted on the point as to whether remand of case by judgment dated 10.01.1997 in S.A. No. 619/1985 was a limited remand or open remand for all the available points, and as to whether other evidences attached with bed head ticket were secondary non-admissible evidences. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that although the first appellate court had directed for accepting evidence relating to bed-head tickets but legally in absence of primary evidence, the secondary evidence are acceptable. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that although the first appellate court had directed for accepting evidence relating to bed-head tickets but legally in absence of primary evidence, the secondary evidence are acceptable. The first appellate court had complied with directions of judgment dated 10.01.1997 of this Court in its letter and spirit. In case of non availability of primary evidence of bed-head tickets, the Court had accepted the secondary evidence in that regard and then after considering all the evidences, the impugned judgment dated 05.12.1998 was passed without any error or illegality in this second appeal. The point to be determined relates to fact as to whether or not Ramdhari had executed the registered sale-deed dated 23.05.1978. This fact can be, and was decided on the basis of factual evidence, as has been shown in this case. There is, in fact, no question of law or substantial question of law is involved in this case and grounds mentioned in memorandum of appeal were erroneously admitted as substantive questions of law.There is no error in finding of fact of the first appellate court, therefore, this appeal should be dismissed. 10. In this matter, the main ground for challenging the sale-deed dated 23.05.1978 in question was that on the date of its execution, and before and after that, the alleged executant Ramdhari was not in a position to come to the office of Sub-Registrar and execute the said sale-deed due to his serious illness and physical inability to execute the same. The trial court had rejected these contentions as being not proved because of evidences and documents relating to hospitalization of Ramdhari and his proof of illness as well as presence in hospital were not available. Since it was main point for assailing the judgment in question, therefore for the reasons mentioned above, this Court in second appeal had found it necessary in the interest of justice to get the matter verified by calling for evidence and permitting the parties to prove their case and also hear the parties on the point of possession and then decided the first appeal on its merits and in accordance with law. Then after receiving the record after remand, the first appellate court had issued direction for summoning the bed-head tickets as directed, and when said document was made available and found that it was torn and could not be verified as to who was the patient relating to it then first appellate court had proceeded to summon other evidences relating to bed-head tickets, admission and treatment of Ramdhari and regarding statement of witnesses relating to those documents; and then considered their evidences including the evidences available on the point of possession and passed the impugned judgment dated 5.12.1998. 11. So far as the factual aspect relating to evidences adduced before the first appellate court regarding aforesaid bed-head tickets of Ramdhari and other evidences and secondary evidences as well as oral evidences is concerned, a perusal of the judgment and record reveals that at the time of passing its judgment dated 5.12.1998 the first appellate court had meticulously considered all the available oral and documentary evidences and also the circumstances relating to them and thereafter gave descriptive and apparently acceptable finding of fact. The first appellate court had considered this fact that bed-head ticket summoned in compliance of directions of this Court in second appeal no. 619/1985 was in torn condition and witnesses relating to this had verified it, but could not certify as to whether this torn bed-head ticket belonged to Ramdhari or not. Then Court had considered the evidences relating to said bed-head ticket including indoor register, records of registration of patient, document of treatment, indoor registers and other documentary evidences as well as oral evidences of PW-3 Dr. S.K. Srivastava, PW-4 and PW-5 Dr. K.K. Mall, and those witnesses who were examined in first appeal were properly cross-examined; and then court had appreciated documentary and oral evidences and gave specific finding of fact that during 19.5.1978 to 11.06.1978 Ram Dhari was admitted in the district hospital due to ailment of anemia and dehydration and was not in a position to leave the hospital to reach the Sub-Registrar office for execution of sale-deed dated 23.05.1978. Thus there has been specific and believable finding of fact by the first appellate court, on the basis of evidences collected, that the sale-deed dated 23.05.1978 in question was not executed, and could not be executed by plaintiff's husband Ramdhari. Thus there has been specific and believable finding of fact by the first appellate court, on the basis of evidences collected, that the sale-deed dated 23.05.1978 in question was not executed, and could not be executed by plaintiff's husband Ramdhari. Apart from it, first appellate court had also given specific finding of fact that property subject matter of said disputed sale-deed dated 23.05.1978 was in co-ownership of Ramdhari and has family members, as it was never formally partitioned in spite of fact that co-sharers were using it in accordance with their conveniences. On this specific finding of fact given by first appellate court, which is based on adduced evidences and from proper and meticulous appreciation, said court had found that plaint case is proved and the sale-deed in question was not and could not be executed by Ramdharai; therefore, it was a forged document; and on the basis of these findings of fact, first appellate court had passed its judgment dated 5.12.1998. Such finding of fact is apparently correct and acceptable, given after application of judicial mind, and there appears no error in it. Accordingly the first and second substantial questions of law is decided against the appellants and in favour of respondents. 12. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 reads as under: "34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.--Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so." 13. In present matter disputed document, registered sale-deed dated 23.05.1978 executed in favour of defendants, was allegedly executed on behalf of Ramdhari, which had adverse effect on the legal rights of his successors in interest, namely the plaintiffs. The non-existence of said sale-deed could save the legal rights of plaintiffs, of which they were entitled. The cancellation of said document only was sufficient to save the legal rights of plaintiffs, so they had instituted original suit for cancellation of said document. The non-existence of said sale-deed could save the legal rights of plaintiffs, of which they were entitled. The cancellation of said document only was sufficient to save the legal rights of plaintiffs, so they had instituted original suit for cancellation of said document. The plaintiff was not in need to seek any further relief, other than the relief sought in the original suit for protecting his legal rights. Therefore the provision of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 does not the remedy sought by plaintiff-respondent in the plaint of original suit. Accordingly the third substantial question of law is decided in negative, against the appellants and in favour of respondents. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants contended that by judgment dated 10.01.1997, this Court had passed the order of limited remand. He contended that it was not open remand so that first appellate court could re-appreciate the evidences and gave its finding. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/ plaintiff contended that once this court had remanded the matter for collection of evidence then evidences collected in compliance of remand order has to be considered with other available evidences. He argued that remand order of this Court dated 10.01.997 was passed for two reasons. Firstly, for calling the document and proving the same, secondly, for determining the point of possession. He contended that since three witnesses and other documentary evidences were summoned in compliance of directions of this Court in second appeal then they had to be considered, as has done by the first appellate court. Therefore, there appears no illegality, impropriety or error in the impugned judgment dated 5.12.1998 of first appellate court. 15. So far as the arguments relating to open or limited remand is concerned, this can be conveniently verified by perusal of judgment of second appeal no. 619/1985. The portion of said judgment dated 10.01.1997 as quoted above makes it clear that this Court in second appeal had found it just and proper to call for documents and authorities to prove it. The judgment dated 10.01.1997 includes the direction to first appellate court for not only summoning the bed-head tickets lying in Court of C.J.M., Gorakhpur but also allowed the plaintiff to prove the same. The judgment dated 10.01.1997 includes the direction to first appellate court for not only summoning the bed-head tickets lying in Court of C.J.M., Gorakhpur but also allowed the plaintiff to prove the same. The said bed-head ticket, as stated above, was in torn condition; and for proving and verifying the same and its credibility, the first appellate court had summoned the other oral as well as documentary evidences. No direction was ever issued in judgment dated 10.01.1997 in second appeal no. 619/1985 that at the time of affording opportunity to parties for proving the documents and point of possession, other evidences will not be permitted. There was no propriety for issuing such direction of limited remand in this matter because it was not in the knowledge of this Court in second appeal no. 619/1985 that what type of evidence would be available in future. It was also necessary for ascertaining the torn document to take other evidences relating to it, which was done by the first appellate court in this matter. When an opportunity of adducing evidence is afforded to one party then it is always proper to afford opportunity to other party. For these reasons when oral witnesses were examined by the plaintiff's side, then defendants/ appellants were permitted to cross-examine them and also verify their truthfulness. This point of alleged limited remand was also raised before the first appellate court which had discussed it in its impugned judgment dated 5.12.1998 and thereafter gave correct finding of fact that it is open remand. A perusal of judgment dated 10.01.1997 makes it clear that it was a case of open remand for affording opportunity to parties to call for document prove it and to prove the point of possession of disputed property. This was permitted and done by the first appellate court; and in present matter no impropriety, illegality or factual error was committed by said court when it had considered the documents directed by this Court in second appeal as well as the other oral and documentary evidences necessary for complying with directions of this Court's dated 10.01.1997 in its letter and spirit. Thus the contentions of learned counsel for the appellants regarding framing and deciding the two new substantial questions of law are found unacceptable on its merits. 16. Thus the contentions of learned counsel for the appellants regarding framing and deciding the two new substantial questions of law are found unacceptable on its merits. 16. The dispute in this mater between the parties was, in fact was not on any question of law but was on question of fact that as to whether the plaint averement about possession and non-execution of disputed sale-deed is correct or not. Such questions can be determined and decided by the evidence only, as has been done in this case by the courts below. 17. As discussed above, this findings of the first appellate court in this regard is based on meticulous and proper appreciation of all the evidences which are apparently correct and acceptable. Such evidence cannot be interfered by re-appreciate of evidence of this Court. The judgment of first appellate court is neither infirm or perverse. None of the contentions of learned counsel for the appellants can be sustained. 18. In view of the above this appeal is dismissed.