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2016 DIGILAW 2302 (HP)

Tikka Maheshwar Chand v. Ripudaman Singh

2016-10-28

SURESHWAR THAKUR

body2016
JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J: This appeal stands directed against the impugned rendition of the learned District Judge, Hamirpur, whereby he reversed the decree of dismissal of suit of the plaintiff wherein the plaintiff had claimed a decree for declaring valid the order pronounced by the Assistant Collecto 2nd Grade, Nadaun, whereby under the latters' orders mutation stood attested qua the suit property, orders whereof recorded by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Nadaun stood anvilled on a compromise decree comprised in Ext.P-1, orders whereof recorded by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Nadaun, stood rescinded by the Sub Divisional Collector, Nadaun, orders whereof of the Sub Divisional Collector, Nadaun, attained affirmation from the Divisional Commissioner under the latters' orders recorded on 6.8.1992, latter orders whereof stand canvassed to be declared to be null and void. The effect of the judgement of the learned District Judge, Hamirpur pronounced in reversal to the verdict of the learned trial Court is qua mutation qua the suit property attested on 10.02.1983 by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Nadaun, on anvil of Ext.P-1 acquiring validation. 2. The facts necessary for rendering a decision on the instant appeal are that the plaintiff filed Civil Suit No. 45 of 1978 against the defendant which was compounded by the parties leading to compromise decree dated 3.11.1981 by the learned Sub Judge (I), Hamirpur. On the basis of compromise decree Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Nadaun, sanctioned mutation qua the suit property in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was exclusively possessing the suit land as owner but the defendant later on filed an appeal against the mutation order before the Sub Divisional Collector, Hamirpur, who set-aside the mutation wrongly on the ground that mutation could not have been sanctioned qua =Gair Mumkin Land because the suit property never formed part of the compromise decree in Civil Suit No. 45 of 1978. Against it, the plaintiff went in appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, who also rejected the appeal wider order dated 6.8.1992. Both the orders of the Sub Divisional Collector and Divisional Commissioner are claimed to be wrong, illegal and against the law by the plaintiff in this appeal. 3. The defendant admitted passing of compromise decree in a suit brought by the plaintiff. Both the orders of the Sub Divisional Collector and Divisional Commissioner are claimed to be wrong, illegal and against the law by the plaintiff in this appeal. 3. The defendant admitted passing of compromise decree in a suit brought by the plaintiff. He claimed that the mutation on the basis of compromise decree was wrongly sanctioned by the A.C. IInd Grade, Nadaun and has rightly been reversed in appeal by the Sub Divisional Collector and also affirmed rightly by the Divisional Commissioner and claimed that the defendant is exclusive owner in possession of Gair Mumkin land of Patwar Circle, Dhaneta, Nauhngi, Choru and Sproh i.e. the suit property nor it was subject matter of previous suit. As the suit property never formed part of the suit, so it could not have been transferred without registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Therefore, orders of the Collector and Divisional Commissioner are legal and binding and suit deserves to be dismissed. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court struck following issues inter-se the parties at contest:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration, as prayed? OPP. 2. Relief. 5. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff whereas the learned First Appellate Court allowed the appeal preferred therefrom before it by the plaintiff. 6. Now the defendant/appellant herein has instituted before this Court the instant Regular Second Appeal wherein he assails the findings recorded in its impugned judgment and decree by the learned first Appellate Court. When the appeal came up for admission on 22.03.2005, this Court admitted the appeal on the hereinafter extracted substantial questions of law:- ?1. Whether the facts as established and proved on record of the case particularly the compromise decree Ext.PC and the statements of the parties Ext.PA and Ext.PB do establish the creation of new rights in favour of the plaintiff. 2. Whether during the pendency of the lis before the Revenue Courts, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction qua the same subject matter. 3. Whether the suit of the plaintiff/respondent is within limitation?? Substantial questions of law. Uncontrovertedly, Ext.P-1 holds therein a compromise decree recorded inter partes thereat who likewise are contestants hereat besides is qua suit property which is also the subject matter of contest in the instant suit. 3. Whether the suit of the plaintiff/respondent is within limitation?? Substantial questions of law. Uncontrovertedly, Ext.P-1 holds therein a compromise decree recorded inter partes thereat who likewise are contestants hereat besides is qua suit property which is also the subject matter of contest in the instant suit. Also uncontrovertedly Ext.P-1 stands recorded not only qua suit property which fell for contest inter se the litigating parties thereat rather holds therewithin depictions besides reflections qua property which was not the subject matter of contest in the previous civil suit inter se the parties at lis hereat. Even though before the learned First Appellate Court an argument stood espoused qua the mandate of Section 17 of the Registration Act ordaining compulsory registration of instruments other than testamentary instruments besides instruments of gifts especially when the relevant instruments other than testamentary dispositions or instruments of gifts, operate to create, declare, assign limit or extinguish, whether vested or contingent of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards, to or in immovable property mandate whereof held therewithin stood enjoined to be read in conjunction with the provisions embodied in clause (Vi) of sub section (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) wherein though a mandate stands encapsulated qua the diktat of the provisions engrafted in sub section (1) of Section 17 of the Act standing excluded qua any decree or order of the Court as is Ext.P-1 nonetheless with it also therewithin carving an exception to the exclusion of the mandate of sub section (1) of Section 17 of the Act qua any decree or order of a Civil Court, wherewithin a compromise stands enunciated interse the combatants therein qua a suit property vis-a-vis whereof no relief apposite to it stood canvassed therebefore whereupon a concomitant espousal was made qua with Ext.P-1 standing pronounced qua property whereupon the contestants thereat were not at lis, it hence warranting compulsory registration, whereas it remaining unregistered rendered the order of attestation of mutation of the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Nadaun, when read in consonance therewith warranting its standing pronounced to be set-aside, contrarily the orders recorded by the Collector, concerned whereupon he rescinded the relevant orders of mutation attested by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Nadaun, orders whereof attained affirmation from the Commissioner concerned rather warranting validation. The provisions of the Registration Act are extracted hereinafter: 17. The provisions of the Registration Act are extracted hereinafter: 17. Documents of which registration is compulsory 1. (b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees, and upwards, to or in immovable property; xxx. xxx.. xxx… 2. (vi) any decree or order of a court [except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding;] or 8. On analogy of various judicial pronouncements the learned First Appellate Court discounted the submission addressed herebefore by the learned counsel for the defendants. However, the reasoning as stands assigned by the learned First Appellate Court to on anvil thereof dispel the vigour of the aforesaid contention addressed herebefore by the learned counsel for the defendant, lacks in legal sinew nor also any dependence by it upon judicial pronouncements is apt, given the attraction hereat with aplomb, the relevant mandate of the provisions of the Registration Act, provisions whereof evidently extantly stand infringed. Irrefutably the mandate of Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC, which stands extracted hereinafter: (3). Compromise of suit: Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise (in writing and signed by the parties), or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit.? empowers the Civil Court concerned to pronounce a compromise decree not only qua a subject matter which stands espoused in the apposite plaint besides qua a subject matter which remains unespoused in the apposite plaint constituted therebefore by the plaintiff. empowers the Civil Court concerned to pronounce a compromise decree not only qua a subject matter which stands espoused in the apposite plaint besides qua a subject matter which remains unespoused in the apposite plaint constituted therebefore by the plaintiff. Though the mandate of the Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC does hold leverage to a Civil Court to in the manner aforesaid record a verdict compromising the lis inter se the relevant contestants also the mandate of the apposite decree recorded by the Civil Court concerned when put therebefore for execution is enjoined to be meted deference by the authority concerned, nonetheless the mandate of the aforesaid provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are enjoined to be read in conjunction with the mandate of clause (VI) of sub section (2) of Section 17 of the Act wherewithin a preemptory dictate is held qua a compromise decree being enjoined to be compulsorily registered predominantly when it holds therewithin recitals qua immoveable property whereagainst no contest occurred inter se the relevant contestants thereat. The learned First Appellate Court has excluded from consideration the mandate of clause (VI) of sub section (2) of Section 17 of the Act whereas it enjoined compulsory registration of Ext.P-1 significantly when it held therewithin pronouncements qua its recording a compromise vis-a-vis. the parties hereat qua immoveable property which was not in litigation inter se the contestants thereat. The reliance placed on judicial pronouncements by the learned First Appellate Court stands belittled by the aforesaid trite factum besides when the authority concerned on standing seized with an execution petition constituted therebefore stood enjoined to mete deference to Ext.P-1 yet meteing of deference thereto by it would stand sparked only when preceding thereto the parties to the lis mete deference also to the mandate of the relevant provisions of the Registration Act besides thereupon alone the relevant authority concerned held empowerment to record an order attesting mutation qua the suit property whereas evidently with Ext.P-1 standing unregistered prior to the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Nadaun, recording an order attesting mutation qua the suit property, naturally rendered the relevant pronouncement recorded by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Nadaun, to stand afflicted with a malady of invalidation fostered by non adherence of the apposite statutory mandate by the relevant contestants. Contrarily, the pronouncement in reversal thereto recorded thereon by the Sub Divisional Collector concerned, pronouncement whereof attained affirmation on 6.8.1992 from the Divisional Commissioner concerned warranted vindication, whereas the learned First Appellate Court holding contrarily has committed an illegality in undermining the impact of the relevant provisions of the Registration Act vis-a-vis. Ext.P-1 besides by slighting the impact of the relevant provisions of the Registration Act vis-a-vis the provisions of the Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC significantly when both the statutory provisions aforesaid are complementary also when hence both warrant meteing of deference thereto, whereas evidently with deference remaining unmeted to the relevant provisions of the Registration Act, the impugned order of the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Nadaun, warranted interference. Contrarily it standing pronounced to be valid enjoins this Court to interfere with the verdict of the learned First Appellate Court. Dehors the aforesaid discussion, the learned trial Court concluded qua the suit of the plaintiff being barred by the mandate of Section 171 of the H.P.Land Revenue Act, mandate whereof excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court qua a lis qua which the aforesaid Act prescribes a remedy under Section 14 thereof, remedy prescribed therein is qua the plaintiff instituting before the Financial Commissioner an appeal against the order recorded by the Divisional Commissioner, remedy whereof remaining un-availed, whereupon it concluded of the suit of the plaintiff being statutorily barred. The aforesaid reasoning is well merited. The learned First Appellate Court in discarding the aforesaid reasoning has committed an illegality comprised in its misappreciating the aforesaid statutory provisions of the H.P.Land Revenue Act. The effect of the above discussion is of substantial questions of law No.1, 2 and 3 warranting theirs standing answered in favour of the appellant herein. Consequently, the appeal preferred by the defendant/appellant herein is allowed. The judgement and decree rendered by the learned first Appellate Court is set-aside and the judgement and decree rendered by the learned trial Court is maintained and affirmed. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. The parties are left to bear their own costs. All pending applications also stand disposed of accordingly. Records be sent back forthwith.