JUDGMENT : B.K. Nayak, J. - This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 has been filed by the appellants challenging the judgment dated 05.08.2011 passed by the learned District Judge, Dhenkanal in Arbitration Petition No. 29 of 2010 confirming the award passed by the sole Arbitrator. 2. In response to Tender Call Notice issued by the Government of Orissa in the Department of Water Resources for execution of the work, "Construction of Structured System in the compact area of Manikmara Distributory on left bank canal of Rengali Irrigation Sub-Project", the respondent-claimant, who is a contractor with wide experience in irrigation work, submitted tender for the contract and on being found by the appropriate authority to be the most responsive and competitive, the contract was awarded in its favour for a total value of Rs. 1,95,33,236/-. On demand by the appellant, the claimant furnished the performance security to the tune of Rs. 9,76,662/- in the form of Bank Guarantee where after the agreement was executed between the parties vide Contract No. 3NCB-1998-99. Appellant No. 3 by his letter dated 15.03.1999 (Ext.C/2) instructed the claimant to proceed with the execution of the contract work. Subsequent to the execution of the agreement, the scope of the work was modified to the effect that Distributary-I became Distributary-I & I(A), and Distributary-2 became Distributary-2(A) & 2(B). Thus, the scope of the work got varied. The claimant raised the claim before the arbitrator stating that under the contract (vide clause-21.1) the appellants are obliged to deliver possession of the entire work site to the claimant within seven days from the date of the issue of work order, but they failed to handover the entire work site and instead handed over possession in piecemeal manner. It was the further case of the claimant that the appellants' undue delay in furnishing the contract work drawing resulted in delay in execution of the contract. Further, the work could not be executed within the stipulated period on account of hindrances pertaining to land acquisition as well as non-completion of the design of the structure, as a result of which the claimant was compelled to file an application for extension of time, which was granted on 30.08.2001, extending the period till 14.03.2002. Further, the work could not be executed within the stipulated period on account of hindrances pertaining to land acquisition as well as non-completion of the design of the structure, as a result of which the claimant was compelled to file an application for extension of time, which was granted on 30.08.2001, extending the period till 14.03.2002. It is the further case of the claimant that the application for extension of time was accompanied with 'no claim' certificate on the specified format, for want of which, the appellants would not have considered the application for extension, and that furnishing of such 'no claim' certificate under the circumstances tantamounts to exercise of coercion and pressure upon the claimant. Notwithstanding the furnishing of 'no claim' certificate, the claimant received 18th and 19th R/A Bills "under protest". Due to the failure on the part of the appellants in performing their part of the contract of giving vacant possession of the work site as well as the necessary approved structured drawings to the claimant, the claimant was compelled to apply for further extension in two phases till 14.09.2004, but the said extension of time was not granted and the work was closed after payment of 18th R/A Bill. According to the claimant, the delay in execution of the work is attributable to the appellants and therefore the claimant is entitled to the compensation claimed. The further case of the claimant is that on account of change in the scope of the work due to improper investigation before inviting the Bid as well as due to change of alignment of the work, the quantities of executed work got varied, which has not been anticipated by the claimant and even though for the said quantity it was incumbent upon the appellants to execute a supplementary agreement, but they did not execute the same. The claimant had been making representations to the appellants seeking adjustment in rate, as provided under the contract, but the appellants after taking measurement against each BOQ item made payments till 17th R/A Bill dated 02.09.2004 and finally considering completion of the project the appellants by letter No. 8234 dated 12.10.2004 closed the contract work. The claimant had been making representations to the appellants seeking adjustment in rate, as provided under the contract, but the appellants after taking measurement against each BOQ item made payments till 17th R/A Bill dated 02.09.2004 and finally considering completion of the project the appellants by letter No. 8234 dated 12.10.2004 closed the contract work. Thereafter, the appellants took level section measurement of the entire work on 28.11.2004 with the participation of the claimant and basing on such measurement evaluated and incorporated quantities of each BOQ items as per actual level section measurement except item No. 17. The quantity of BOQ item No. 17, which was prepared in the 18th R/A Bill on 30.12.2004 came to 69,659,34 CUM. But the appellants prepared 18th R/A Bill arbitrarily reducing the aforesaid executed quantity of work, for which the claimant received the amount under 18th R/A Bill recording its protest on the body of measurement book as well as the bill. Thereafter, the appellants prepared another 19th R/A and final bill on 15.03.2005 arbitrarily, which the claimant also received under protest. It is stated that the representations were made by the claimant to the appellants from time to time indicating the reasons for the delay in execution of the contract and yet the legitimate payments due to the claimant was denied. 3. The appellants in their objection filed before the arbitral Tribunal took the stand admitting that there has been delay in giving possession of the entire land on account of problems relating to land acquisition and change in the structured drawings, but stated further that there was ample land made available to the claimant for starting execution of the work, which the claimant did not do and, therefore, the claimant is not entitled to any compensation. The appellants took the further stand that the original project pertaining to Distributary Nos. 1 and 2 was later sub-divided, which was for creating better irrigational potentiality, but such alteration could not have been the ground for the claimant not to start execution of the project with right earnest from the beginning. The appellants took the further stand that the original project pertaining to Distributary Nos. 1 and 2 was later sub-divided, which was for creating better irrigational potentiality, but such alteration could not have been the ground for the claimant not to start execution of the project with right earnest from the beginning. It was stated that the contract does not indicate that the contractor will not proceed with execution unless and until possession of the entire work site is given to him and unless and until all the drawings necessary for execution of the project are handed over to him and, therefore, the contractor committed a breach of contract and hence not entitled to make any claim for compensation. It is further stated that it is true that non-providing the entire work site to the claimant may attract "compensation event", but the contract has to be read as a whole and such a reading will not entitle the claimant to make any claim of compensation especially when the claimant did not proceed with the execution even though sufficient vacant land was under its possession and sufficient drawings had been given for starting the execution. The claimant was negligent in not deploying the required number of machinery and men at the work site and it is on this score there was delay in execution of the project. It is further stated that in view of furnishing of 'No Claim' Certificate by the claimant with the application for extension, it was not entitled to claim compensation. The plea of the claimant giving 'no claim' certificate under pressure and coercion was denied. It is also pleaded that when the second extension of time was granted by the employer-appellants, it was specifically stated that the future price escalation will not be available. Apart from denying the claims made by the claimant, the appellants had also made a counter claim on the ground that non-completion of timely execution of the project caused undue hardship to the consumers, agriculturists and the State ultimately suffered huge loss. 4. The arbitral Tribunal framed seven issues and on consideration of the evidence and materials on record allowed Claim Item Nos. 1 (a), 1(b), 2 (a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 3, 4 partly and 8 and awarded a total sum of Rs. 70,77,981.91 along with interest @ 9% per annum and also a cost of Rs. 5.00 lakhs. Claim Nos. 4. The arbitral Tribunal framed seven issues and on consideration of the evidence and materials on record allowed Claim Item Nos. 1 (a), 1(b), 2 (a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 3, 4 partly and 8 and awarded a total sum of Rs. 70,77,981.91 along with interest @ 9% per annum and also a cost of Rs. 5.00 lakhs. Claim Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of the claimant and the counter claim of the appellants were rejected. 5. The appellants filed ARBA No. 29 of 2010 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (in short, 'the Act) before the learned District Judge, Dhenkanal, who by the impugned judgment dismissed the said proceeding holding that the arbitral Tribunal did not commit illegality or jurisdictional error in passing the award. 6. The learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the appellants contends that the court below has passed the impugned order in mechanical manner though the arbitral award suffers from patent illegality which goes to the root of the matter and is resultantly opposed to public policy. It is highlighted that the arbitrator has acted contrary to the terms of the contract and misinterpreted the terms. It is also urged that in respect of claim No. 1(a), the arbitrator has relied on clause Nos. 3.5.4.1 of the contract dealing with canal embankment though the claim was in respect of back filling around structures. Similarly, the arbitrator has wrongly interpreted clause-3.5.4.1 of the contract while considering claim item No. 1 (b). It is also stated that the other claims which have been allowed are the outcome of misinterpretation of the terms of the contract. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the claimant-respondent, on the other hand, submits that the arbitral award is liable to be interfered with by the court only on limited grounds as contained in Section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act, when the award is in conflict with public policy of India as per Section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act. The merits of an arbitral award are to be looked into under certain specified circumstances. He also submits that heads of "Public Policy of India" are Fundamental Policy of Indian law, Interest of India, Justice or Morality, and Patent Illegality. 8. It is necessary to analyze the scope of judicial interference in an arbitral award. The merits of an arbitral award are to be looked into under certain specified circumstances. He also submits that heads of "Public Policy of India" are Fundamental Policy of Indian law, Interest of India, Justice or Morality, and Patent Illegality. 8. It is necessary to analyze the scope of judicial interference in an arbitral award. Referring to its different earlier decisions, the Hon'ble apex Court in the recent decision reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 : Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, held that the grounds contained in Section 34 of the Act do not deal with the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitral award. In this respect, the Hon'ble apex Court held in paragraphs-17 to 19 as follows : "17. It will be seen that none of the grounds contained in sub-section (2)(a) of Section 34 deal with the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitral award. It is only when we come to the award being in conflict with the public policy of India that the merits of an arbitral award are to be looked into under certain specified circumstances. 18. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., the Supreme Court construed Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961: "7. Conditions for enforcement of foreign awards.-(1) A foreign award may not be enforced under this Act- * * * (b) if the Court dealing with the case is satisfied that- (ii) the enforcement of the award will be contrary to the public policy." In construing the expression "public policy" in the context of a foreign award, the Court held that an award contrary to (i) The fundamental policy of Indian law, (ii) The interest of India, (iii) Justice or morality, would be set aside on the ground that it would be contrary to the public policy of India. It went on further to hold that a contravention of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act would be contrary to the public policy of India in that the statute is enacted for the national economic interest to ensure that the nation does not lose foreign exchange which is essential for the economic survival of the nation (see SCC p. 685, para 75). Equally, disregarding orders passed by the superior courts in India could also be a contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, but the recovery of compound interest on interest, being contrary to statute only, would not contravene any fundamental policy of Indian law (see SCC pp. 689 & 693, paras 85 & 95). 19. When it came to construing the expression "the public policy of India" contained in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, this Court in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. held: (SCC pp. 727-28 & 744-45, paras 31 & 74) "31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase 'public policy of India' used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term 'public policy' in Renusagar case it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would be-award could be set aside if it is contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void." 9. Elucidating the meaning of the expression "Fundamental Policy of Indian Law", the Hon'ble apex Court in the aforesaid decision held as follows : "Fundamental Policy of Indian Law 27. Coming to each of the heads contained in Saw Pipes judgment, we will first deal with the head "fundamental policy of Indian law". Elucidating the meaning of the expression "Fundamental Policy of Indian Law", the Hon'ble apex Court in the aforesaid decision held as follows : "Fundamental Policy of Indian Law 27. Coming to each of the heads contained in Saw Pipes judgment, we will first deal with the head "fundamental policy of Indian law". It has already been seen from Renusagar judgment that violation of the Foreign Exchange Act and disregarding orders of superior courts in India would be regarded as being contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law. To this it could be added that the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court being disregarded would be equally violative of the fundamental policy of Indian law. 28. In a recent judgment, ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., this Court added three other distinct and fundamental juristic principles which must be understood as a part and parcel of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The Court held: (SCC pp. 278-80, paras 35 & 38-40) "35. What then would constitute the 'fundamental policy of Indian law' is the question. The decision in ONGC does not elaborate that aspect. Even so, the expression must, in our opinion, include all such fundamental principles as providing a basis for administration of justice and enforcement of law in this country. Without meaning to exhaustively enumerate the purport of the expression 'fundamental policy of Indian law', we may refer to three distinct and fundamental juristic principles that must necessarily be understood as a part and parcel of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The first and foremost is the principle that in every determination whether by a court or other authority that affects the rights of a citizen or leads to any civil consequences, the court or authority concerned is bound to adopt what is in legal parlance called a 'judicial approach' in the matter. The duty to adopt a judicial approach arises from the very nature of the power exercised by the court or the authority does not have to be separately or additionally enjoined upon the fora concerned. The duty to adopt a judicial approach arises from the very nature of the power exercised by the court or the authority does not have to be separately or additionally enjoined upon the fora concerned. What must be remembered is that the importance of a judicial approach in judicial and quasi-judicial determination lies in the fact that so long as the court, tribunal or the authority exercising powers that affect the rights or obligations of the parties before them shows fidelity to judicial approach, they cannot act in an arbitrary, capricious or whimsical manner. Judicial approach ensures that the authority acts bona fide and deals with the subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and that its decision is not actuated by any extraneous consideration. Judicial approach in that sense acts as a check against flaws and faults that can render the decision of a court, tribunal or authority vulnerable to challenge. * * * 38. Equally important and indeed fundamental to the policy of Indian law is the principle that a court and so also a quasi-judicial authority must, while determining the rights and obligations of parties before it, do so in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Besides the celebrated audi alteram partem rule one of the facets of the principles of natural justice is that the court/authority deciding the matter must apply its mind to the attendant facts and circumstances while taking a view one way or the other. Non-application of mind is a defect that is fatal to any adjudication. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of the mind and disclosure of mind is best done by recording reasons in support of the decision which the court or authority is taking. The requirement that an adjudicatory authority must apply its mind is, in that view, so deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that it can be described as a fundamental policy of Indian law. 39. No less important is the principle now recognised as a salutary juristic fundamental in administrative law that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same will not be sustained in a court of law. Perversity or irrationality of decisions is tested on the touchstone of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness. 39. No less important is the principle now recognised as a salutary juristic fundamental in administrative law that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same will not be sustained in a court of law. Perversity or irrationality of decisions is tested on the touchstone of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness. Decisions that fall short of the standards of reasonableness are open to challenge in a court of law often in writ jurisdiction of the superior courts but no less in statutory processes wherever the same are available. 40. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to attempt an exhaustive enumeration of what would constitute the fundamental policy of Indian law nor is it possible to place the expression in the straitjacket of a definition. What is important in the context of the case at hand is that if on facts proved before them the arbitrators fail to draw an inference which ought to have been drawn or if they have drawn an inference which is on the face of it, untenable resulting in miscarriage of justice, the adjudication even when made by an Arbitral Tribunal that enjoys considerable latitude and play at the joints in making awards will be open to challenge and may be cast away or modified depending upon whether the offending part is or is not severable from the rest." (emphasis in original) 29. It is clear that the juristic principle of a "judicial approach" demands that a decision be fair, reasonable and objective. On the obverse side, anything arbitrary and whimsical would obviously not be a determination which would either be fair, reasonable or objective. 30. The audi alteram partem principle which undoubtedly is a fundamental juristic principle in Indian law is also contained in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. These sections read as follows: "18. Equal treatment of parties.-The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his case. * * * 34. These sections read as follows: "18. Equal treatment of parties.-The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his case. * * * 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) * * * (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court only if- a) the party making the application furnishes proof that- * * * (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case;" 31. The third juristic principle is that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same is important and requires some degree of explanation. It is settled law that where: (i) a finding is based on no evidence, or (ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or (iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision would necessarily be perverse. 32. A good working test of perversity is contained in two judgments. In Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, it was held: (SCC p. 317, para 7) "7. .... It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, it was held: (SCC p. 14, para 10) "10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 33. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 33. It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the "public policy" test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score. Once it is found that the arbitrators approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the last word on facts. In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd., this Court held: (SCC pp. 601-02, para 21) "21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or re-appreciating the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal has examined the facts and held that both the second respondent and the appellant are liable. The case as put forward by the first respondent has been accepted. Even the minority view was that the second respondent was liable as claimed by the first respondent, but the appellant was not liable only on the ground that the arbitrators appointed by the Stock Exchange under Bye-law 248, in a claim against a non-member, had no jurisdiction to decide a claim against another member. The finding of the majority is that the appellant did the transaction in the name of the second respondent and is therefore, liable along with the second respondent. Therefore, in the absence of any ground under Section 34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at." 10. In the same decision, the Hon'ble apex Court elucidated the principle of "patent illegality" in paragraphs-40, 42, 42.1, 42.2 and 42.3 which are quoted hereunder : "Patent Illegality 40. In the same decision, the Hon'ble apex Court elucidated the principle of "patent illegality" in paragraphs-40, 42, 42.1, 42.2 and 42.3 which are quoted hereunder : "Patent Illegality 40. We now come to the fourth head of public policy, namely, patent illegality. It must be remembered that under the Explanation to Section 34(2)(b), an award is said to be in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. This ground is perhaps the earliest ground on which courts in England set aside awards under English law. Added to this ground (in 1802) is the ground that an arbitral award would be set aside if there were an error of law by the arbitrator. This is explained by Denning, L.J. in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex p Shaw: (All ER p. 130 D-E : KB p. 351) "Leaving now the statutory tribunals, I turn to the awards of the arbitrators. The Court of King's Bench never interfered by certiorari with the award of an arbitrator, because it was a private tribunal and not subject to the prerogative writs. If the award was not made a rule of court, the only course available to an aggrieved party was to resist an action on the award or to file a bill in equity. If the award was made a rule of court, a motion could be made to the court to set it aside for misconduct of the arbitrator on the ground that it was procured by corruption or other undue means (see Statutes 9 and 10 Will. III, C. 15). At one time an award could not be upset on the ground of error of law by the arbitrator because that could not be said to be misconduct or undue means, but ultimately it was held in Kent v. Elstob, that an award could be set aside for error of law on the face of it. This was regretted by Williams, J., in Hodgkinson v. Fernie, but is now well established." 42. In the 1996 Act, this principle is substituted by the "patent illegality" principle which, in turn, contains three subheads: 42.1. (a) A contravention of the substantive law of India would result in the death knell of an arbitral award. This was regretted by Williams, J., in Hodgkinson v. Fernie, but is now well established." 42. In the 1996 Act, this principle is substituted by the "patent illegality" principle which, in turn, contains three subheads: 42.1. (a) A contravention of the substantive law of India would result in the death knell of an arbitral award. This must be understood in the sense that such illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature. This again is really a contravention of Section 28(1)(a) of the Act, which reads as under: "28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.-(1) Where the place of arbitration is situated in India- (a) in an arbitration other than an international commercial arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force in India;" 42.2. (b) A contravention of the Arbitration Act itself would be regarded as a patent illegality - for example if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award in contravention of Section 31(3) of the Act, such award will be liable to be set aside. 42.3. (c) Equally, the third subhead of patent illegality is really a contravention of Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under: "28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.-(1)-(2) * * * (3) In all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction." This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. An Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no fair-minded or reasonable person could do." 11. Law is well settled, as has been held in MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2011) 10 SCC 573 that an error in the construction of the contract by the arbitrator cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. Law is well settled, as has been held in MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2011) 10 SCC 573 that an error in the construction of the contract by the arbitrator cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. This has also been taken note of in the case of Associate Builders (supra) in paragraphs-44 and 45 to the following effect : "44. In MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, the Court held: (SCC pp. 581-82, para 17) "17. If the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. But if he wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits a jurisdictional error. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in such cases because the dispute is not something which arises under or in relation to the contract or dependent on the construction of the contract or to be determined within the award. The ambiguity of the award can, in such cases, be resolved by admitting extrinsic evidence. The rationale of this rule is that the nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined outside and independent of what appears in the award. Such a jurisdictional error needs to be proved by evidence extrinsic to the award. (See Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram, Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India, Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros., Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth v. Chintamanrao Balaji and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.)" 45. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, the Court held: (SCC pp. 320-21, paras 43-45) "43. In any case, assuming that Clause 9.3 was capable of two interpretations, the view taken by the arbitrator was clearly a possible if not a plausible one. It is not possible to say that the arbitrator had travelled outside his jurisdiction, or that the view taken by him was against the terms of contract. That being the position, the High Court had no reason to interfere with the award and substitute its view in place of the interpretation accepted by the arbitrator. 44. The legal position in this behalf has been summarised in para 18 of the judgment of this Court in SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. and which has been referred to above. 44. The legal position in this behalf has been summarised in para 18 of the judgment of this Court in SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. and which has been referred to above. Similar view has been taken later in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd. to which one of us (Gokhale, J.) was a party. The observations in para 43 thereof are instructive in this behalf. 45. This para 43 reads as follows: (Sumitomo case, SCC p. 313) '43. ........... The umpire has considered the fact situation and placed a construction on the clauses of the agreement which according to him was the correct one. One may at the highest say that one would have preferred another construction of Clause 17.3 but that cannot make the award in any way perverse. Nor can one substitute one's own view in such a situation, in place of the one taken by the umpire, which would amount to sitting in appeal. As held by this Court in Kwality Mfg. Corpn. v. Central Warehousing Corpn. the Court while considering challenge to arbitral award does not sit in appeal over the findings and decision of the arbitrator, which is what the High Court has practically done in this matter. The umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be the correct one after considering the material before him and after interpreting the provisions of the agreement. If he does so, the decision of the umpire has to be accepted as final and binding." 12. The arguments on behalf of the appellants with regard to the claim item No. 1(a) & 1(b) are that the arbitrator has misinterpreted some clauses of the contract and passed the award in respect of those claims. Those two items of claim related to back filling around structures and earth filling of canal embankment. With regard to claim item No. 1 (a) it has been held by the arbitrator that there was no iota of material produced by the present appellants in support of the fact that suitable earth was available for filling the backfill of the structure. With regard to claim item No. 1 (a) it has been held by the arbitrator that there was no iota of material produced by the present appellants in support of the fact that suitable earth was available for filling the backfill of the structure. Similarly with regard to claim No. 1 (b) the arbitrator has held that the present appellants had not been able to establish either through affidavit evidence of the Executive Engineer or any other authority that usable and suitable earth was available to the tune of 22,001.275 CUM. There was also no order of any appropriate authority of the present appellants indicating any approval of the excavated earth to be used. Similarly, the other claims, which have been allowed by the arbitrator and taken note of by the learned District Judge in the impugned judgment individually, are based on assessment of the evidence and interpretation of different clauses of the contract. The main plank of argument of the appellants is that there is a misinterpretation of some clauses of the contract by the arbitrator in allowing the claims. 13. As has been seen above in the case of MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. (supra), which has also been taken note of by the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Associate Builders (supra), it is trite that if the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. Such error in construction cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. Only where the arbitrator wanders outside the contract, he commits jurisdictional error. In the instant case, no such jurisdictional error has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants and the award therefore, cannot be said to be in conflict with public policy of India as per Section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act. 14. In the circumstances, this appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed