JUDGMENT & ORDER : By means of this petition filed under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. The petitioner has challenged legality of the judgment dated 23.11.2015 delivered in Criminal Appeal No. 03 of 2015. The petitioner had been convicted for committing offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [in short N.I. Act] by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala by his judgment and order dated 29.12.2014 delivered in N.I.21 of 2012. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.3,85,000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 2(two) years. The said judgment dated 29.12.2014 was challenged by the petitioner by filing an appeal under Section 374(3) of the Cr.P.C. being Criminal Appeal No.03 of 2015 in the court of the Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. By the said judgment dated 23.11.2015, the appeal was dismissed observing that though the complainant [the respondent No.1] in his examination-in-chief [filed by the affidavit] has stated that the accused issued the cheques 'to secure' the debt of Rs.3,50,000/-, it is more than apparent that when the cheques were issued, already there was an outstanding loan taken by the accused with the promise to repay it after a month. So, despite using the words ''to secure the debt'' in his affidavit in chief and this not being the case of the complainant, it cannot be accepted that the cheques were issued as security to the loan. 2. It was the specific case of the complainant that the loan was taken on 12.08.2011 on promise of repayment after a month. On expiry of the said period for repayment, the respondent No.1 demanded the amount on 12.09.2011 when the petitioner handed over two cheques to the respondent No.1, one being dated 16.09.2011 and another being dated 17.09.2011 drawn on State Bank of India, Agartala branch. The respondent No.1 deposited the cheques with the Syndicate Bank, Agartala branch on 20.09.2011 and 21.09.2011. But these were returned unpaid due to insufficiency of fund. Following this, the respondent No.1 met the petitioner when the petitioner requested him to wait for 2(two) months accordingly the respondent No.1 again met the petitioner on 21.06.2011. Being assured that there was sufficient fund in his bank account, the respondent No.1 deposited the cheques again on 28.12.2011. But the cheques were returned for the second time on the ground of insufficient fund. Being assured that there was sufficient fund in his bank account, the respondent No.1 deposited the cheques again on 28.12.2011. But the cheques were returned for the second time on the ground of insufficient fund. On the face of such development, the respondent No.1 served the notice on 04.01.2012 demanding for the payment of the amount in the cheques within 15(fifteen) days from the date of receipt of the notice. Despite having received the notice on 09.01.2012, the petitioner did not pay the money or part thereof. As a result, the cause for filing the complaint arose on 22.01.2012 and within the stipulated term the complaint was filed. The only ground that was taken in the appeal is that two cheques were handed over by the accused-complainant as security to secure the loan for which Section 138 of the N.I. Act cannot be attracted. The said ground of objection has not been accepted by the impugned judgment assigning the reasons as noticed above. The similar ground has been asserted again to question the judgment dated 23.11.2015 by the petitioner. According to him, the cheques were for securing the loan not for discharging the liability. Unless the cheques [Negotiable Instruments] are issued for discharging the liability, no penal action under Section 138 can be taken. 3. There is no dispute that the complainant, the respondent No.1 herein as PW-1 in his cross-examination has stated as under: “The accused person approached to me due to urgent necessity for his business amounting Rs.3,50,000/- (Rupees three lac and fifty thousand) only and accordingly on 12-08-2011 I paid him the said amount for one month, but after one month I demand said amount of money then the accused person handed over two cheques bearing No.456766, dated 16-09-2011 for amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two lac) and another cheque bearing No.456767 dated 17.09.2011 for amount of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lack and fifty thousand) only drawn on S.B.I, Agartala Branch, H.G. Basak Road, Agartala, West Tripura to secure the said debt of Rs.3,50,000/- (Rupees three lac and fifty thousand) only.” 4. Mr. S. Lodh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner to bolster his submission has relied on a decision of the apex court in M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani vs. State of Kerala & Anr. Mr. S. Lodh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner to bolster his submission has relied on a decision of the apex court in M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani vs. State of Kerala & Anr. reported in AIR 2006 SC 3366 where the apex court has observed as under: “We in the facts and circumstances of this case need not go into the question as to whether even if the prosecution fails to prove that a large portion of the amount claimed to be a part of debt was not owing and due to the complainant by the accused and only because he has issued a cheque for a higher amount, he would be convicted if it is held that existence of debt in respect of large part of the said amount has not been proved. The Appellant clearly said that nothing is due and the cheque was issued by way of security. The said defence has been accepted as probable. If the defence is acceptable as probable the cheque therefore cannot be held to have been issued in discharge of the debt as, for example, if a cheque is issued for security or for any other purpose the same would not come within the purview of Section 138 of the Act.” [Emphasis added] 5. Mr. Lodh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has also relied on another decision of the apex court in Sudhir Kumar Bhalla vs. Jagdish Chand & etc. etc. reported in AIR 2008 SC 2407 , where it has been held as under: “On examination of the above-stated findings of the learned Single Judge in the judgment impugned before us, we find that the learned Single Judge has not addressed himself on the legal question raised before him by the appellant that the criminal liability of the appellant under the provisions of Section 138 of the Act are attracted only on account of the dishonour of the cheques issued in discharge of liability or debt, but not on account of issuance of security cheques. The learned Single Judge has also not given cogent, satisfactory and convincing reasons for disbelieving and discarding the pre-charge evidence of the appellant corroborated by the evidence of the expert opinion in regard to the interpolation in and fabrication of the cheques by adding one more figure 0' to make Rs.30,000/- to Rs.3,00.000/- and similarly adding one more figure 0' to make Rs.40,000/- to Rs.4,00.000/-.” [Emphasis added] 6. In the contexts related in those judgments, the apex court has held that those were not cases to be brought under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Mr. Lodh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that what PW-1, the complainant has stated in the trial by itself constitutes the cogent evidence to demonstrate that the cheques issued by the petitioner were for purpose of securing the loan and hence the conviction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is unsustainable. As consequenti, according to Mr. Lodh, learned counsel, the impugned judgment is liable to be interfered with. 7. The basic principle of applying a precedent in the criminal jurisprudence is that the ratio that has been laid down by a particular judgment has to be first construed in the backdrop of its peculiar circumstances. If the facts and circumstances are identical and not subject to distinction then only the principle as laid can be applied. But there can be another way of looking at the precedent is that when the precedent interprets a provision having due regard to the scheme of the Act that can be imported for purpose of applying in the future cases. In this case, the petitioner did not adduce any evidence and the complainant, the respondent No.1 herein, has proved that he provided the loan much before the cheques were issued. On the face of such evidence it cannot be held that the cheques [Exbt.1 and 2] were issued for securing the loan. Moreover, when the cheques are admitted by the petitioner issued the court is bound to presume under Section 139 read with Section 118 of the N.I. Act that the cheques were issued for discharging in whole or in part of any debt or other liability. The law has developed and now it is no more res integra that under Section 139 of the N.I. Act a statutory presumption which has a evidentiary value can be drawn. The law has developed and now it is no more res integra that under Section 139 of the N.I. Act a statutory presumption which has a evidentiary value can be drawn. The question that has to be examined whether the presumption stood rebutted or not. That must therefore be determined keeping in view the other evidence on record. In Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde reported in (2008) 4 SCC 54 the apex court has observed as under: “A statutory presumption has an evidentiary value. The question as to whether the presumption whether stood rebutted or not, must, therefore, be determined keeping in view the other evidence on record. For the said purpose, stepping into the witness box by the appellant is not imperative. In a case of this nature, where the chances of false implication cannot be ruled out, the background fact and the conduct of the parties together with their legal requirements are required to be taken into consideration.” 8. In M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani vs. State of Kerala & Anr. (supra), it has been held that once the accused is found to discharge his initial burden, it shifts to the complainant. In Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. vs. Amin Chand Payrelal reported in (1999) 3 SCC 35 , the apex court had occasion to observe on interpreting the Section 118(a) of the Act as follows: “Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen' with a doubt....” [Emphasis added] 9. The petitioner being the accused did not discharge his initial burden in any way and as such there is no infirmity in the finding of conviction. Hence, this court cannot called upon to interfere the impugned judgment and accordingly this revision petition stands dismissed.